What are you looking for?

Showing 8 of 467 Results in Economics

The Law and Economics of Contracts

TOTM This new chapter in the forthcoming Handbook of Law and Economics (Polinsky & Shavell, eds.) from Avery Katz, Benjamin Hermalin, and Richard Craswell looks like . . .

This new chapter in the forthcoming Handbook of Law and Economics (Polinsky & Shavell, eds.) from Avery Katz, Benjamin Hermalin, and Richard Craswell looks like essential reading for anyone interested in economic analysis of contracts and contract law.

Read the full piece here.

Continue reading

Hovenkamp on Slotting, Discounts, and Competition for Distribution

TOTM Like Thom, I also have spent the last few weeks reading Herbert Hovenkamp’s excellent new antitrust book, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principles and Execution. I am . . .

Like Thom, I also have spent the last few weeks reading Herbert Hovenkamp’s excellent new antitrust book, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principles and Execution. I am looking forward to Thom’s review in the Texas Law Review, and wholeheartedly agree with him that Hovenkamp’s book is an important and significant contribution to the antitrust literature (see also Randy Picker’s book review here describing “The Antitrust Enterprise as The Antitrust Paradox for a post-Chicago antitrust landscape”). I’m still digesting most of the book, and perhaps will share some more thoughts in this space later on, but thought I would chime in with some thoughts on two issues relevant to my own research on slotting contracts, discounts, and competition for product distribution.

Read the full piece here.

Continue reading
Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Update on the Costs of Regulating Inequality

TOTM Larry Solum was kind enough to link to my post on economics and arguments about social justice, and raises the following concerns about my argument :

Larry Solum was kind enough to link to my post on economics and arguments about social justice, and raises the following concerns about my argument…

Read the full piece here.

 

Continue reading
Intellectual Property & Licensing

Do Slotting Contracts Harm Consumers?

TOTM Warning: shameless plug of my own research to follow! Slotting allowances, or payments for shelf space, have been a central part of my research agenda . . .

Warning: shameless plug of my own research to follow!

Slotting allowances, or payments for shelf space, have been a central part of my research agenda for the last several years. My work with Ben Klein, The Economics of Slotting Contracts, presents a procompetitive theoretical explanation (and some aggregate data in support of our theory) for slotting contracts which I have blogged about from time to time. One of the reasons that I enjoy this topic is because payments for distribution are pervasive.

Read the full piece here.

Continue reading
Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Coase and Smoking: Who’s the Victim Here?

TOTM Today’s New York Times reports on a new cigarette bar in Chicago, where the city council has just imposed a sweeping smoking ban. (I recently . . .

Today’s New York Times reports on a new cigarette bar in Chicago, where the city council has just imposed a sweeping smoking ban. (I recently criticized the ban at Ideoblog.) The proprietors of the Marshall McGearty Tobacco Lounge insist that the lounge is permitted because of a loophole allowing smoking in retail tobacco shops. Not surprisingly, Chicago’s anti-smoking zealots are seeking to shut down the business, which they say violates the intent of the anti-smoking ordinance.

Read the full piece here.

Continue reading
Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards

Scholarship Abstract Behavioral law and economics scholars who advance paternalistic policy proposals typically employ static models of decision-making behavior, despite the dynamic effects of paternalistic policies. . . .

Abstract

Behavioral law and economics scholars who advance paternalistic policy proposals typically employ static models of decision-making behavior, despite the dynamic effects of paternalistic policies. In this article, we consider how paternalistic policies fare under a dynamic account of decision-making that incorporates learning and motivation effects. This approach brings out two important limitations on the efficiency effects of paternalistic regulations. First, if preferences and biases are endogenous to institutional forces, paternalistic government regulations may perpetuate and even magnify a given bias and cause other adverse psychological effects. Second, for some biases, it will be more efficient to invest resources in debiasing than to change legal rights and remedies or, in some cases, to do nothing in light of the natural variation in irrational propensities. We propose dynamic models for determining ex ante and ex post when accommodation of bias will be second-best efficient. These models direct decision-makers to consider (1) the efficiency cost of the bias; (2) the extent to which accommodation worsens the bias or, alternatively, the extent to which non-accommodation improves the bias or has other benefits; and (3) the potential for education or other mechanisms to debias an individual. We argue that the concept of “cognitive hazard” – the potential for the costs of a bias to increase as individuals are insulated from the adverse effects of the bias – should be added to the concept of moral hazard as important qualifications to paternalistic proposals.

Continue reading
Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance

Tax Evasion and New Types of Assessment: An Introduction to Economic Analysis

Scholarship Abstract Tax evasion is still widespread around the world, among the most advanced countries too. Its level in Italy is comparatively very high, as it . . .

Abstract

Tax evasion is still widespread around the world, among the most advanced countries too. Its level in Italy is comparatively very high, as it is commonly recognized. This essay offers a broad non-technical outline of the main topics concerning tax evasion, from the economist’s point of view. The first section introduces the paper, summarizes its main contents, and depicts the basic conclusions and suggestions. The second section is devoted to a critical survey of existing empirical estimates on evasion magnitude, both in Italy and in other Western countries. Some figures on tax evasion consequences in Italy are then briefly discussed. The third section focuses on individuals’ decision to evade, inside the framework built on the classical grounds of Allingham-Sandmo’s (A/S) model. It scrutinizes A/S model’s hypotheses and implications and finally introduces some other factors which may prove relevant for the decision to evade taxes. According to this framework, the fourth section analytically derives the main properties of new audit procedures, recently adopted or proposed in Italy

NOTE: The paper is in Italian. 

Continue reading
Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance

Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property

Scholarship Abstract The literature on the economic analysis of intellectual property rights evidences a broad scholarly consensus on a number of central and important issues. First, . . .

Abstract

The literature on the economic analysis of intellectual property rights evidences a broad scholarly consensus on a number of central and important issues. First, intellectual property rights enable economic actors to capture some of the benefits of the investment they make in establishing a good reputation, creating expressive works, and inventing new and improved technology. Absent intellectual property rights, copiers are free to take for themselves a significant part of the economic benefit generated by these types of investment and to undermine the incentive to make these in- vestments in the first place. Second, the investment activities induced by intellectual property rights-developing a positive reputation with consumers, creating expressive works that consumers want to read, view, or hear, and developing improved technology- are efficient investments up to the point that consumers are willing to pay for their fruits. Third, a decentralized system of incentives such as that created by a system of intellectual property rights will over time produce results better preferred by consumers than will any kind of centrally directed subsidy system. Fourth, intellectual property rights systems have costs, costs involved in identifying, defining and enforcing the subject matter of the rights. Fifth, the intellectual property regimes of the United States, in particular, and of the developed economies are, as a general matter, economically sensible, no matter what particular details may concern a particular author. Even Justice Stephen Breyer, that once youthful Harvard skeptic, has said that the issue is not whether to have intellectual property rights, but what form they should take.

Scholars made considerable progress over the last century understanding the economics of intellectual property rights. Yet, much remains to be done. There is ample room for additional progress in the literature. Indeed, it seems likely that this progress will result in part from the work of the scholars who assembled for this conference.

Continue reading
Intellectual Property & Licensing