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A couple of quick thoughts on the DOJ’s filing to block AT&T/T-Mobile

Popular Media As Josh noted, the DOJ filed a complaint today to block the merger.  I’m sure we’ll have much, much more to say on the topic, . . .

As Josh noted, the DOJ filed a complaint today to block the merger.  I’m sure we’ll have much, much more to say on the topic, but here are a few things that jump out at me from perusing the complaint:

  • The DOJ distinguishes between the business (“Enterprise”) market and the consumer market.  This is actually a good play on their part, on the one hand, because it is more sensible to claim a national market for business customers who may be purchasing plans for widely-geographically-dispersed employees.  I would question how common this actually is, however, given that, I’m sure, most businesses that buy group cell plans are not IBM but are instead pretty small and pretty local, but still, it’s a good ploy.
  • But it has one significant problem:  The DOJ also seems to be stressing a coordinated effects story, making T-Mobile out to be a disruptive maverick disciplining the bigger carriers.  But–and this is, of course an empirical matter I will have to look in to–I highly doubt that T-Mobile plays anything like this role in the Enterprise market, at least for those enterprises that fit the DOJ’s overly-broad description.  In fact, the DOJ admits as much in para. 43 of its Complaint.  Of course, the DOJ claims this was all about to change, but that’s not a very convincing story coupled with the fact that DT, T-Mobile’s parent, was reducing its investment in the company anyway.  The reality is that Enterprise was not a key part of T-Mobile’s business model–if it occupied any cognizable part of it at all– and it can hardly be considered a maverick in a market in which it doesn’t actually operate.
  • On coordinated effects, I think the claim that T-Mobile is a maverick is pretty easily refuted, and not only in the Enterprise realm.  As Josh has pointed out in his Congressional testimony, a maverick is a term of art in antitrust, and it’s just not enough that a firm may be offering products at a lower price–there is nothing “maverick-y” about a firm that offers a different, less valuable product at a lower price.  I have seen no evidence to suggest that T-Mobile offered the kind of pricing constraint on AT&T that would be required to make it out to be a maverick.
  • Meanwhile, I know this is just a complaint and even post-Twombly pleading standards are lower than standards of proof, but the DOJ does seem t make a lot out of its HHI numbers.  In part this is a function of its adoption of a national relevant geographic market.  But (as noted above even for most Enterprise customers) this is just absurd.  As the FCC itself has noted, consumers buy cell service where they “live, work and travel.”  For most everyone, this is local.
  • Meanwhile, even on a national level, the blithe dismissal of a whole range of competitors is untenable.  MetroPCS, Cell South and many other companies have broad regional coverage (MetroPCS even has next-gen LTE service in something like 17 cities) and roaming agreements with each other and with the larger carriers that give them national coverage.  Why they should be excluded from consideration is baffling.  Moreover, Dish has just announced plans to build a national 4G network (take that, DOJ claim that entry is just impossible here!).  And perhaps most important the real competition here is not for mobile telephone service.  The merger is about broadband.  Mobile is one way of getting broadband.  So is cable and DSL and WiMax, etc.  That market includes such insignificant competitors as Time Warner, Comcast and Cox.  Calling this a 4 to 3 merger strains credulity, particularly under the new merger guidelines.
  • Moreover, the DOJ already said as much!  In its letter to the FCC on the FCC’s National Broadband Plan the DOJ says:

Ultimately what matters for any given consumer is the set of broadband offerings available to that consumer, including their technical characteristics and the commercial terms and conditions on which they are offered.  Competitive conditions vary considerably for consumers in different geographic locales.

  • The DOJ also said this, in the same letter:

[W]ith differentiated products subject to large economies of scale (relative to the size of the market), the Department does not expect to see a large number of suppliers. . . . [Rather, the DOJ cautions the FCC agains] striving for broadband markets that look like textbook markets of perfect competition, with many price-taking firms.  That market structure is unsuitable for the provision of broadband services.

Quite the different tune, now that it’s the DOJ’s turn to spring into action rather than simply admonish the antitrust activities of a sister agency!

I’m sure there is lots more, but I must say I’m really surprised and disappointed by this filing.  Effective, efficient provision of mobile broadband service is a complicated business.  It is severely hampered by constraints of the government’s own doing — both in terms of the government’s failure to make available spectrum to enable companies to build out large-scale broadband networks, and in local governments’ continued intransigence in permitting new cell towers and even co-location of cell sites on existing towers that would relieve some of the infuriating congestion we now experience.

This decision by the DOJ is an ill-conceived assault on innovation and progress in what may be the one shining segment of our bedraggled economy.

Filed under: antitrust, business, doj, error costs, merger guidelines, mergers & acquisitions, technology, telecommunications Tagged: at&t, Federal Communications Commission, t-mobile, United States Department of Justice

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

FairSearch’s Non-Sequitur Response

TOTM Our search neutrality paper has received some recent attention.  While the initial response from Gordon Crovitz in the Wall Street Journal was favorable, critics are . . .

Our search neutrality paper has received some recent attention.  While the initial response from Gordon Crovitz in the Wall Street Journal was favorable, critics are now voicing their responses.  Although we appreciate FairSearch’s attempt to engage with our paper’s central claims, its response is really little more than an extended non-sequitur and fails to contribute to the debate meaningfully.

Read the full piece here.

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

FCC Competition Report is one green light for AT&T-T-Mobile deal

Popular Media The FCC published in June its annual report on the state of competition in the mobile services marketplace. Under ordinary circumstances, this 300-plus page tome would sit quietly on the shelf ...

Excerpt

The FCC published in June its annual report on the state of competition in the mobile services marketplace. Under ordinary circumstances, this 300-plus page tome would sit quietly on the shelf, since, like last year’s report, it ‘‘makes no formal finding as to whether there is, or is not, effective competition in the industry.’’

But these are not ordinary circumstances. Thanks to innovations including new smartphones and tablet computers, application (app) stores and the mania for games such as ‘‘Angry Birds,’’ the mobile industry is perhaps the only sector of the economy where consumer demand is growing explosively.

Meanwhile, the pending merger between AT&T and T-Mobile USA, valued at more than $39 billion, has the potential to accelerate development of the mobile ecosystem. All eyes, including many in Congress, are on the FCC and the Department of Justice. Their review of the deal could take the rest of the year. So the FCC’s refusal to make a definitive finding on the competitive state of the industry has left analysts poring through the report, reading the tea leaves for clues as to how the FCC will evaluate the proposed merger.

Make no mistake: this is some seriously expensive tea. If the deal is rejected, AT&T is reported to have agreed to pay T-Mobile $3 billion in cash for its troubles. Some competitors, notably Sprint, have declared full-scale war, marshaling an army of interest groups and friendly journalists.

But the deal makes good economic sense for consumers. Most important, T-Mobile’s spectrum assets will allow AT&T to roll out a second national 4G LTE (longterm evolution) network to compete with Verizon’s, and expand service to rural customers. (Currently, only 38 percent of rural customers have three or more choices for mobile broadband.)

More to the point, the government has no legal basis for turning down the deal based on its antitrust review. Under the law, the FCC must approve AT&T’s bid to buy T-Mobile USA unless the agency can prove the transaction is not ‘‘in the public interest.’’ While the FCC’s public interest standard is famously undefined, the agency typically balances the benefits of the deal against potential harm to consumers. If the benefits outweigh the harms, the Commission must approve.

The benefits are there, and the harms are few. Though the FCC refuses to acknowledge it explicitly, the report’s impressive detail amply supports what everyone already knows: falling prices, improved quality, dynamic competition and unflagging innovation have led to a golden age of mobile services. Indeed, the three main themes of the report all support AT&T’s contention that competition will thrive and the public’s interests will be well served by combining with T-Mobile.

 

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

First Microsoft, Now Google: Berin Szoka, Josh Wright and Geoff Manne in CNET

Popular Media Josh, Berin Szoka and I have a new op-ed up at CNET on why the lessons of Microsoft suggest the FTC’s action against Google might be misguided. . . .

Josh, Berin Szoka and I have a new op-ed up at CNET on why the lessons of Microsoft suggest the FTC’s action against Google might be misguided.  A taste:

Ten years ago this week, an appeals court upheld Microsoft’s conviction for monopolizing the PC operating system market. The decision became a key legal precedent for U.S. antitrust enforcement. It also cemented the government’s confidence in its ability to pick winners and losers in fast-moving technology markets–a confidence not borne out by subsequent events.

Now this sad history seems to be repeating itself: By uncanny coincidence, news broke just last Friday that the FTC had begun an antitrust investigation into Google’s business practices. Unfortunately, there’s no reason to expect the outcome to be any better for consumers this time around.

There is, in fact, no evidence that the case against Microsoft or its settlement contributed to the spectacular innovation in the IT sector over the last decade. Indeed, they may even have solidified Microsoft’s role as the perennial also-ran in this latest wave of technological progress, as the company struggled to keep innovating under the threat of constant antitrust scrutiny in the U.S. and abroad.

The true lesson of the Microsoft case is this: antitrust intervention in information technology has a poor track record of serving consumers. Even Harvard law professor Lawrence Lessig, who was a court-appointed Special Master in that case and has since championed government tinkering with the Internet, finally admitted in 2007 that he “blew it on Microsoft” by underestimating the potential for innovation and market forces to dethrone Microsoft, particularly through the rise of open-source software (which now in part powers Apple’s popular iOS).

Filed under: antitrust, business, error costs, exclusionary conduct, federal trade commission, law and economics, monopolization, technology, tying

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

First Microsoft, Now Google: Does the Government Have it in for Consumers?

Popular Media Ten years ago this week, an appeals court upheld Microsoft's conviction for monopolizing the PC operating system market. The decision became a key legal precedent for U.S. antitrust enforcement.

Excerpt

Ten years ago this week, an appeals court upheld Microsoft’s conviction for monopolizing the PC operating system market. The decision became a key legal precedent for U.S. antitrust enforcement. It also cemented the government’s confidence in its ability to pick winners and losers in fast-moving technology markets–a confidence not borne out by subsequent events.

Now this sad history seems to be repeating itself: By uncanny coincidence, news broke just last Friday that the FTC had begun an antitrust investigation into Google’s business practices. Unfortunately, there’s no reason to expect the outcome to be any better for consumers this time around.

There is, in fact, no evidence that the case against Microsoft or its settlement contributed to the spectacular innovation in the IT sector over the last decade. Indeed, they may even have solidified Microsoft’s role as the perennial also-ran in this latest wave of technological progress, as the company struggled to keep innovating under the threat of constant antitrust scrutiny in the U.S. and abroad.

The true lesson of the Microsoft case is this: antitrust intervention in information technology has a poor track record of serving consumers. Even Harvard law professor Lawrence Lessig, who was a court-appointed Special Master in that case and has since championed government tinkering with the Internet, finally admitted in 2007 that he “blew it on Microsoft” by underestimating the potential for innovation and market forces to dethrone Microsoft, particularly through the rise of open-source software (which now in part powers Apple’s popular iOS).

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

The FTC Makes its Google Investigation Official, Now What?

TOTM No surprise here.  The WSJ announced it was coming yesterday, and today Google publicly acknowledged that it has received subpoenas related to the Commission’s investigation.  . . .

No surprise here.  The WSJ announced it was coming yesterday, and today Google publicly acknowledged that it has received subpoenas related to the Commission’s investigation.  Amit Singhal of Google acknowledged the FTC subpoenas at the Google Public Policy Blog…

Read the full piece here.

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Search Engine Regulation, a Solution in Search of a Problem?

Popular Media Allegations of “search bias” have led to increased scrutiny of Google, including active investigations in the European Union and Texas, a possible FTC investigation, and . . .

Allegations of “search bias” have led to increased scrutiny of Google, including active investigations in the European Union and Texas, a possible FTC investigation, and sharply-worded inquiries from members of Congress. But what does “search bias” really mean? Does it demand preemptive “search neutrality” regulation, requiring government oversight of how search results are ranked? Is antitrust intervention required to protect competition? Or can market forces deal with these concerns?

Panelists:
* Declan McCullagh (Moderator), Chief Political Correspondent for CNET, part of CBS Corporation
* Prof. Frank Pasquale, Seton Hall University School of Law, author of “Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness and Accountability in the Law of Search”
* Prof. Geoffrey Manne, Lewis & Clark Law School, TechFreedom Adjunct Fellow, and Director of the International Center for Law & Economics, author of “If Search Neutrality Is the Answer, What’s the Question?”
* Prof. James Grimmelman, New York Law School, author of “The Structure of Search Engine Law”
* Prof. Eric Goldman, Santa Clara University School of Law, author of “Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism”

More information on this event can be found at http://techfreedom.org/event/search-engine-regulation-solution-search-problem

View the conference

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

What’s really motivating the pursuit of Google?

Popular Media I have an op-ed up at Main Justice on FTC Chairman Leibowitz’ recent comment in response the a question about the FTC’s investigation of Google . . .

I have an op-ed up at Main Justice on FTC Chairman Leibowitz’ recent comment in response the a question about the FTC’s investigation of Google that the FTC is looking for a “pure Section Five case.”  With Main Justice’s permission, the op-ed is re-printed here:

 

There’s been a lot of chatter around Washington about federal antitrust regulators’ interest in investigating Google, including stories about an apparent tug of war between agencies. But this interest may be motivated by expanding the agencies’ authority, rather than by any legitimate concern about Google’s behavior.

Last month in an interview with Global Competition Review, FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz was asked whether the agency was “investigating the online search market” and he made this startling revelation:

“What I can say is that one of the commission’s priorities is to find a pure Section Five case under unfair methods of competition. Everyone acknowledges that Congress gave us much more jurisdiction than just antitrust. And I go back to this because at some point if and when, say, a large technology company acknowledges an investigation by the FTC, we can use both our unfair or deceptive acts or practice authority and our unfair methods of competition authority to investigate the same or similar unfair competitive behavior . . . . ”

“Section Five” refers to Section Five of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Exercising its antitrust authority, the FTC can directly enforce the Clayton Act but can enforce the Sherman Act only via the FTC Act, challenging as “unfair methods of competition” conduct that would otherwise violate the Sherman Act. Following Sherman Act jurisprudence, traditionally the FTC has interpreted Section Five to require demonstrable consumer harm to apply.

But more recently the commission—and especially Commissioners Rosch and Leibowitz—has been pursuing an interpretation of Section Five that would give the agency unprecedented and largely-unchecked authority. In particular, the definition of “unfair” competition wouldn’t be confined to the traditional measures–reduction in output or increase in price–but could expand to, well, just about whatever the agency deems improper.

Commissioner Rosch has claimed that Section Five could address conduct that has the effect of “reducing consumer choice”—an effect that a very few commentators support without requiring any evidence that the conduct actually reduces consumer welfare. Troublingly, “reducing consumer choice” seems to be a euphemism for “harm to competitors, not competition,” where the reduction in choice is the reduction of choice of competitors who may be put out of business by competitive behavior.

The U.S. has a long tradition of resisting enforcement based on harm to competitors without requiring a commensurate, strong showing of harm to consumers–an economically-sensible tradition aimed squarely at minimizing the likelihood of erroneous enforcement. The FTC’s invigorated interest in Section Five contemplates just such wrong-headed enforcement, however, to the inevitable detriment of the very consumers the agency is tasked with protecting.

In fact, the theoretical case against Google depends entirely on the ways it may have harmed certain competitors rather than on any evidence of actual harm to consumers (and in the face of ample evidence of significant consumer benefits).

Google has faced these claims at a number of levels. Many of the complaints against Google originate from Microsoft (Bing), Google’s largest competitor. Other sites have argued that that Google impairs the placement in its search results of certain competing websites, thereby reducing these sites’ ability easily to access Google’s users to advertise their competing products. Other sites that offer content like maps and videos complain that Google’s integration of these products into its search results has impaired their attractiveness to users.

In each of these cases, the problem is that the claimed harm to competitors does not demonstrably translate into harm to consumers.

For example, Google’s integration of maps into its search results unquestionably offers users an extremely helpful presentation of these results, particularly for users of mobile phones. That this integration might be harmful to MapQuest’s bottom line is not surprising—but nor is it a cause for concern if the harm flows from a strong consumer preference for Google’s improved, innovative product. The same is true of the other claims; harm to competitors is at least as consistent with pro-competitive as with anti-competitive conduct, and simply counting the number of firms offering competing choices to consumers is no way to infer actual consumer harm.

In the absence of evidence of Google’s harm to consumers, then, Leibowitz appears more interested in using Google as a tool in his and Rosch’s efforts to expand the FTC’s footprint. Advancing the commission’s “priority” to “find a pure Section Five case” seems to be more important than the question of whether Google is actually doing anything harmful.

When economic sense takes a back seat to political aggrandizement, we should worry about the effect on markets, innovation and the overall health of the economy.

Filed under: antitrust, error costs, federal trade commission, google, monopolization Tagged: Federal Trade Commission, google, Jon Leibowitz, Search Engines

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

TechFreedom Search Engine Regulation Event today

Popular Media Today at 12:30 at the Capitol Visitor Center, TechFreedom is hosting a discussion on the regulation of search engines:  “Search Engine Regulation: A Solution in . . .

Today at 12:30 at the Capitol Visitor Center, TechFreedom is hosting a discussion on the regulation of search engines:  “Search Engine Regulation: A Solution in Search of a Problem?”

The basics:

Allegations of “search bias” have led to increased scrutiny of Google, including active investigations in the European Union and Texas, a possible FTC investigation, and sharply-worded inquiries from members of Congress. But what does “search bias” really mean? Does it demand preemptive “search neutrality” regulation, requiring government oversight of how search results are ranked? Is antitrust intervention required to protect competition? Or can market forces deal with these concerns?

A panel of leading thinkers on Internet law will explore these questions at a luncheon hosted by TechFreedom, a new digital policy think tank. The event will take place at the Capitol Visitor Center room SVC-210/212 onTuesday, June 14 from 12:30 to 2:30pm, and include a complimentary lunch. CNET’s Declan McCullagh, a veteran tech policy journalist, will moderate a panel of four legal experts:

More details are here, and the event will be streaming live from that link as well.  If all goes well, it will also be accessible right here:

http://www.ustream.tv/flash/viewer.swf

Live Broadcasting by Ustream

Filed under: administrative, announcements, essential facilities, google, law and economics, monopolization, regulation, technology Tagged: Declan McCullagh, Eric Goldman, frank pasquale, geoffrey manne, google, james grimmelmann, techfreedom, Web search engine

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection