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TOTM Readers of TOTM know that the future of law and economics is a frequent topic of discussion here, and a topic in which I am . . .
Readers of TOTM know that the future of law and economics is a frequent topic of discussion here, and a topic in which I am both personally invested and spend a good deal of time thinking about (see, e.g. my blog series on the future of law and economics here). Legal Pad (at CNN/Fortune Magazine) announces the Kauffman Foundations plan to reinvigorate a “new” version of law and economics aimed at a new focus on static efficiency to innovation and economic growth…
Read the full piece here.
TOTM Being a “glass is half-full” type of guy, I figured there was no way the D.C. Circuit’s decision on Whole Foods’ petition for rehearing en . . .
Being a “glass is half-full” type of guy, I figured there was no way the D.C. Circuit’s decision on Whole Foods’ petition for rehearing en banc could turn out poorly: Either the court would grant the motion and correct the panel’s mistakes, or the court would deny the motion, setting up an attractive opportunity for the Supreme Court, which hasn’t decided a significant merger case since 1974 and badly needs to update its doctrine (see, e.g., Brown Shoe, upon which the D.C. Circuit heavily relied in Whole Foods).
TOTM As noted, the FTC has exercised its right under 15 USC 56(a)(3) to petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the . . .
As noted, the FTC has exercised its right under 15 USC 56(a)(3) to petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the D.C. Circuit in its FTC v. Rambus. The FTC press release is here. The petition is here. The questions presented, as framed by the Commission are…
TOTM Yesterday I started a new TOTM feature on why price discrimination is good in light of the bad rap that the practice gets in public . . .
Yesterday I started a new TOTM feature on why price discrimination is good in light of the bad rap that the practice gets in public policy circles and with the public generally. Lest one believe that the examples of regulatory scrutiny of price discrimination in antitrust and regulated industries are special cases, a reader points me to this perfectly timed column from NY Times “Ethicist” Randy Cohen arguing that price discrimination is unethical.
TOTM Price discrimination involves a firm taking advantage of different elasticities of demand for the same goods by charging different prices relative to marginal cost. Price . . .
Price discrimination involves a firm taking advantage of different elasticities of demand for the same goods by charging different prices relative to marginal cost. Price discrimination is ubiquitous in our economy but remains a four letter word in policy and regulation circles. We observe price discrimination in all sorts of product markets, from small and large firms, and in marketing strategies from brick and mortar to Web 2.0. Its economic definition is relatively straightforward and it is a concept, unlike the complex models and explanations for some business practices in the modern economics literature, that is intuitive for everyday consumers. Airlines charge reduced fares for children or require Saturday stayovers in order to exclude business purchasers. We see this type of price discrimination every day in grocery stores, gas stations, movie theaters, online retail websites, and bookstores. It also exists in markets with which every day consumers might be less familiar, e.g. the tying of ink and printers.
TOTM My colleague Tom Hazlett strikes again in Barron’s on Google’s transformation from its initial reluctance to advertise and its desire to stick to the non-profit . . .
My colleague Tom Hazlett strikes again in Barron’s on Google’s transformation from its initial reluctance to advertise and its desire to stick to the non-profit sector to an unrelenting market driven approach to its discovery that search-term clicks were … well … profitable.
TOTM The NY Times (HT: Danny Sokol) decided to run an editorial blasts the DOJ’s Section 2 Report, asserting that the “antitrust division is supposed to . . .
The NY Times (HT: Danny Sokol) decided to run an editorial blasts the DOJ’s Section 2 Report, asserting that the “antitrust division is supposed to be the agency looking out for the interests of American consumers, not big companies — a role it has clearly forgotten over the last eight years” citing the familiar bullet points (e.g. “Throughout the entire Bush administration, it has not brought a single case against a dominant firm for anticompetitive behavior and “it has argued enthusiastically on behalf of monopolists before the Supreme Court”). Its a superficial treatment of the issues at best (see here or here for my views and some links to others).
TOTM It looks like the FTC is interested in doing more than just investigating RPM (see Thom’s excellent post), as the agency just announced a series . . .
It looks like the FTC is interested in doing more than just investigating RPM (see Thom’s excellent post), as the agency just announced a series of public workshops on the question of how best to distinguish pro-competitive uses of RPM from those that raise competitive concerns.
TOTM Once again displaying its tenacious devotion to old Dr. Miles, the FTC is investigating whether makers of musical instruments and audio equipment have engaged in . . .
Once again displaying its tenacious devotion to old Dr. Miles, the FTC is investigating whether makers of musical instruments and audio equipment have engaged in illegal resale price maintenance (RPM). Yesterday’s WSJ reported that the Commission has issued subpoenas to a number of prominent musical instrument manufacturers, including Fender, Yamaha, and Gibson, as well as to the retailer, Guitar Center, Inc. The Commission is apparently seeking to determine whether the manufacturers’ minimum advertised price (MAP) programs, which forbid retailers from advertising prices below some minimum level, amount to unreasonable vertical restraints of trade. In the post-Leegin world, even those MAP programs that amount to agreements to set retail prices are not automatically illegal. Instead, a challenger must establish their anticompetitive effect.
