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Moneyball, GMU and the Future of Law and Economics

TOTM My colleague Ilya Somin insightfully defends against allegations of the death of Moneyball in baseball and legal academia — largely making the point that larger . . .

My colleague Ilya Somin insightfully defends against allegations of the death of Moneyball in baseball and legal academia — largely making the point that larger institutions with larger payrolls imitating the successful elements of the strategy.  There is more there, so go read the whole thing as well as an interesting comment thread.  Ilya points out the following non-exhaustive list of GMU strategies on the hiring market aimed at acquiring undervalued assets: (1) L&E scholars, (2) conservative and libertarian academics; (3) academics with strong publication records but otherwise inferior traditional academic credentials.  Ilya correctly notes that L&E scholars are no longer generally undervalued in legal academia (he also asserts that ideological discrimination and credential fetishization are less than ten years ago — a view that contradicts my own prior somewhat — but I want to focus on the L&E point).

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EU Likely to Require A Browser Ballot Screen for Windows 7 in Europe

TOTM It looks like the old/new EU Microsoft browser tie-in case might be resolved through a requirement that Microsoft offers consumers a “ballot screen”  that would allow users to select and install competing browsers.

It looks like the old/new EU Microsoft browser tie-in case might be resolved through a requirement that Microsoft offers consumers a “ballot screen”  that would allow users to select and install competing browsers.  (HT: WSJ) That is, Microsoft will be offering up a menu of rival browsers to consumers.  Apparently, the EU is willing to allow Internet Explorer on the menu.  Word from the Commission on the proposal is favorable…

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Whitman on Libertarian Paternalism and the Public-Private Distinction

TOTM Here’s a great post from Glen Whitman on libertarian paternalism as applied to mortgages and the housing market.  Glen takes Richard Thaler to task for . . .

Here’s a great post from Glen Whitman on libertarian paternalism as applied to mortgages and the housing market.  Glen takes Richard Thaler to task for his NY Times piece discussing behavioral economics in the mortgage market and advocating defaults for “plain vanilla” mortgages. Glen’s primary beef is that Thaler ignores the distinction between private and public action…

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Too Big To Fail as an Antitrust Concept

TOTM There has been a lot of talk recently about the possibility that lax antitrust gave rise to the financial crisis or that antitrust could be . . .

There has been a lot of talk recently about the possibility that lax antitrust gave rise to the financial crisis or that antitrust could be used as a proactive weapon to prevent mergers and acquisitions that would create entities “too big to fail.” George Priest recently took AAG Varney to task for suggesting that there was a consensus amongst economists that lax antitrust contributed to the current financial situation.  Simon Johnson has been pushing the idea that antitrust is an appropriate tool for dealing with the type of financial risk imposed by businesses that become so large that their failure would cause substantial damage throughout the economy.  The idea might be catching on.  Frank Pasquale recently cited to Johnson’s work favorably.  The idea has also been favorably cited by Commissioner Rosch.

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Commissioner Rosch, Rhetoric, and the Relationship Between Economics and Antitrust

TOTM Economic theory is essential to antitrust law.  It is economic analysis that constrains antitrust law and harnesses it so that it is used to protect . . .

Economic theory is essential to antitrust law.  It is economic analysis that constrains antitrust law and harnesses it so that it is used to protect consumers rather than competitors.  And the relationship between economics and antitrust is responsible for the successful evolution of antitrust from its economically incoherent origins to its present state.  In my view, which I’ve expressed in greater detail elsewhere, the fundamental challenge for antitrust is one that is created by having “too many theories” without methodological commitments from regulators and courts on how to select between them.  The proliferation of economic models that came along with the rise of Post-Chicago economics and integration of game theory into industrial organization has led to a state of affairs where a regulator or court has a broad spectrum of models to choose from when analyzing an antitrust issue.

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

The Return of “Big is Bad”

Popular Media But wholesale rejection of the document — the most complete statement to date on the law and economics of Section 2 — because of disagreement with some of its positions is irresponsible and premature.

But wholesale rejection of the document — the most complete statement to date on the law and economics of Section 2 — because of disagreement with some of its positions is irresponsible and premature. And the rejection of specific conclusions from among the range of possibilities discussed in the report without any discussion of which other policy positions the DOJ would support, and why, severely undermines the intellectual efforts that the DOJ and FTC staffs put into the original report by summarily dismissing them. Instead, Varney asserts that the report “loses sight of an ultimate goal of antitrust laws — the protection of consumer welfare” — but cites no evidence. (And the report, for its part, mentions “consumer welfare” 31 times.) Meanwhile, the mere reference in Varney’s speech to the idea of returning to “tried and true” principles of Section 2 enforcement is meaningless, since no one knows what those are, and the whole point of the report was to define them. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the announcement dismisses the report and its intellectual bases simply because it was inconvenient to the agenda upon which the DOJ’s antitrust division is about to embark.

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

If A Tree Falls in a Forest and Nobody Hears It, Did the Bush Antitrust Division Cut It Down?

TOTM The NYT ran an unsigned editorial on “Intel and Competition” that, quite frankly, doesn’t make much sense to us.  It offers two basic arguments: (1) . . .

The NYT ran an unsigned editorial on “Intel and Competition” that, quite frankly, doesn’t make much sense to us.  It offers two basic arguments: (1) that the Bush administration DOJ is responsible for the state of Section 2 law requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate actual consumer harm, and (2) that foreign antitrust jurisdictions’ pursuit of enforcement actions against Intel’s loyalty rebates suggests that the failure of the Federal Trade Commission to do so is a failure of the Bush administration to enforce the antitrust laws to protect consumers.

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

More ‘New Economy’ Hyperbole

Popular Media Wired’s Chris Anderson drinks the New Economy Kool-Aid. It’s the same old argument — information technology reduces transaction costs, leading to a radical disaggregation of industry and society — . . .

Wired’s Chris Anderson drinks the New Economy Kool-Aid. It’s the same old argument — information technology reduces transaction costs, leading to a radical disaggregation of industry and society — still supported by little more than a few colorful anecdotes, not any kind of systematic analysis. The new twist is the financial crisis, described by Anderson as “not just the trough of a cycle but the end of an era.”

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Innovation & the New Economy

RPM Workshop Testimony

TOTM I’ll be testifying tomorrow at the Federal Trade Commission hearings on Resale Price Maintenance.   My panel will focus on rule of reason analysis of RPM . . .

I’ll be testifying tomorrow at the Federal Trade Commission hearings on Resale Price Maintenance.   My panel will focus on rule of reason analysis of RPM Post-Leegin.  There is a bit of awkwardness testifying about different modes of rule of reason analysis with legislation that would restore the Dr. Miles per se rule pending, but it strikes me as a valuable exercise nonetheless.  The early afternoon panel looks very interesting and focuses on the legal and business history of RPM.   I do not have a written statement for my prepared remarks, but you can see my slides here.

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection