Showing 9 of 64 Publications

Big Tech and the Dystopian Fears Undermining Sound Policy

Popular Media Sens. Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.) and Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) have just unveiled their long-awaited draft American Innovation and Choice Online Act. If passed into law, the . . .

Sens. Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.) and Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) have just unveiled their long-awaited draft American Innovation and Choice Online Act. If passed into law, the bill would effectively outlaw a wide array of common tech industry practices in which platforms favor their own products. This despite scant evidence that such practices are detrimental to consumers, that they prevent rivals from entering online markets, or that they harm innovation.

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Why There Needs to Be More, not Less, Consolidation in Video Streaming

TOTM Recent commentary on the proposed merger between WarnerMedia and Discovery, as well as Amazon’s acquisition of MGM, often has included the suggestion that the online content-creation and . . .

Recent commentary on the proposed merger between WarnerMedia and Discovery, as well as Amazon’s acquisition of MGM, often has included the suggestion that the online content-creation and video-streaming markets are excessively consolidated, or that they will become so absent regulatory intervention. For example, in a recent letter to the U.S. Justice Department (DOJ), the American Antitrust Institute and Public Knowledge opine that…

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Dystopia vs. Evidence-Based Policymaking

TL;DR All around the world, policymakers are proposing legislative changes that would drastically alter the ways that online platforms can operate.

Background…

All around the world, policymakers are proposing legislative changes that would drastically alter the ways that online platforms can operate. Motivating these initiatives have been fears that, absent explicit regulation, digital markets would suffer from failures that could not later be remediated.

But…

These putative reforms are not rooted in a rigorous assessment of the costs and benefits of regulatory intervention. In lieu of empirical evidence, lawmakers are relying on highly abstracted theories of potential harm whose bearing on real-world markets is uncertain. Policymakers should instead rely on the tried-and-tested Consumer Welfare Standard that has successfully guided U.S. antitrust enforcement for the better part of a century.

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

The Virtues and Pitfalls of Economic Models

TOTM Interrogations concerning the role that economic theory should play in policy decisions are nothing new. Milton Friedman famously drew a distinction between “positive” and “normative” . . .

Interrogations concerning the role that economic theory should play in policy decisions are nothing new. Milton Friedman famously drew a distinction between “positive” and “normative” economics, notably arguing that theoretical models were valuable, despite their unrealistic assumptions. Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu’s highly theoretical work on General Equilibrium Theory is widely acknowledged as one of the most important achievements of modern economics.

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Dirk Auer on the digital economy

Presentations & Interviews ICLE Senior Fellow of Law & Economics Dirk Auer joined the Institute for Internet & the Just Society’s Just Talking series for a discussion of . . .

ICLE Senior Fellow of Law & Economics Dirk Auer joined the Institute for Internet & the Just Society’s Just Talking series for a discussion of competition policy and the digital economy. Video of the full event is embedded below.

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Apple v Epic: The Value of Closed Systems

TL;DR Background… Apple Inc. and Epic Games are currently locked in a high-stakes antitrust dispute. Epic is challenging Apple’s rules that require apps to use Apple . . .

Background…

Apple Inc. and Epic Games are currently locked in a high-stakes antitrust dispute. Epic is challenging Apple’s rules that require apps to use Apple Pay for in-app purchases and that ban alternative app stores from iOS devices like iPhones and iPads. 

The suit is part Epic’s broader strategy, dubbed Project Liberty, to pay lower fees to online platforms. If it succeeds, Epic would be able to steer its users toward lower-priced payment processors. This would increase the competitive constraints that Apple faces when it sets platform fees.

But…

Epic’s proposals would allow large developers and rival payment processors to get the benefit of Apple’s investments in iOS and the App Store without paying for them. It could also undermine other online platforms that rely on commissions to earn a positive return on their upfront investments. This could shrink investments in platform creation and upkeep, hurting users and leading to worse platforms overall.

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Encouraging AI adoption by EU SMEs

Scholarship In a new paper published by the Progressive Policy Institute, ICLE Senior Fellow Dirk Auer and PPI’s Caleb Watney make the case that while the . . .

In a new paper published by the Progressive Policy Institute, ICLE Senior Fellow Dirk Auer and PPI’s Caleb Watney make the case that while the EU desires to be at the forefront of developing regulations to manage emerging issues relevant to artificial intelligence, the European Commission’s leadership have failed to grapple meaningfully with the significant tradeoffs that regulation of these new technologies entails.

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Innovation & the New Economy

Should ASEAN Antitrust Laws Emulate European Competition Policy?

Scholarship Unlike many other trading blocs (most notably the EU), the ASEAN nations are yet to agree upon a common, unified set of competition law provisions. . . .

Unlike many other trading blocs (most notably the EU), the ASEAN nations are yet to agree upon a common, unified set of competition law provisions. Nevertheless, recent years have seen the ASEAN members embark upon various initiatives that seek to harmonize their competition regimes (though these stop well short of common rules). In 2016, for instance, the member states adopted the ASEAN Competition Action Plan (“ACAP”). Among other things, the plan seeks to ensure that all ASEAN states implement competition regimes that meet a set of minimal standards, and eventually to harmonize competition policy across the ASEAN region.

These ongoing efforts to modernize and harmonize ASEAN competition laws do not arise in a vacuum. Rather, they take place amid a longstanding effort by both the European Union and the United States to export their respective competition laws throughout the world:

The EU and the US . . . want the rest of the world to follow their respective regulatory models. Both jurisdictions have actively promoted their competition laws as “best practices” abroad, urging developed and developing countries alike to adopt domestic competition laws and build institutions to enforce them. They promote their models through a specialized network of competition regulators—the International Competition Network (ICN)—and also more general bodies—notably the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). They also employ bilateral tools in their promotion effort—including offering technical assistance to emerging competition law jurisdictions. In its trade agreements, the EU also explicitly conditions access to its markets on the adoption of a competition law, exporting its own law in the process, while the US relies primarily in its persuasive powers rather than on formal treaties in exporting its laws.

No doubt the EU and US competition regimes are the most developed and dominant exemplars; following the policies of one or both to some extent is virtually inevitable. But this raises a critical question: should the ASEAN countries attempt to mimic the competition regimes of other developed nations, notably those that are in force in the EU and the US? And, if so, which one of these regimes should they draw more inspiration from?

While we certainly do not purport to know what type of regime would best fit the idiosyncratic needs of the ASEAN countries, we seek to dispel the myth that the European model of competition enforcement would necessarily provide a superior blueprint. To the contrary, we show that the evolutionary, common-law-like regime that has emerged in the US has many strengths that are often overlooked by contemporary competition policy scholarship, and which might provide a particularly good fit for the economic and political realities of the ASEAN member states.

Our paper also falls squarely within a much broader debate. Over the past couple of years, there have been renewed calls for policymakers to reform existing competition regimes in order to better address the challenges that are, purportedly, posed by the emergence of the digital economy. This has notably resulted in a series of high-profile reports, papers, and draft legislation, concluding that more interventionist tools are required to effectively deal with competition issues in digital markets. The draft European Digital Markets Act, the US House Judiciary report on competition in digital markets, as well as the draft bill put forward by US Senator Amy Klobuchar all mark the culmination of this antitrust reform movement.

Although the connection is often implicit, these calls for reform ultimately seek to implement (and amplify) features that are currently at the forefront of European competition enforcement. Potential reforms thus include broadening the goals of competition policy, as well as relying more heavily on structural and behavioral presumptions (rather than outcome-oriented reasoning).

At times this desire to move closer to the EU model is more explicit. For example, writing in Vox, Matthew Yglesias ventured that “[o]ne idea [for remedying perceived problems with US antitrust] would be for the US to actually move to something more like the European system and abandon the consumer welfare standard.” In a similar vein, Bloomberg featured an article by economics writer Noah Smith heaping praise on the growing populist antitrust wave and its potential to roll back the consumer welfare standard. And, at least according to EU Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, the US executive branch agencies have expressed a “renewed deeper interest and curiosity as to what we are doing in Europe.”

In parallel to these calls for reform, scholars have also analyzed the evolution of competition legislation around the world (as well as regulation, more generally). These scholars observe that recent initiatives have tended to mimic the rules of the European Union, rather than the more laissez faire approach that is often associated with the US. This trend has been referred to as the “Brussels Effect.” Accordingly, these scholars predict a regulatory “race to the top”, where more stringent rules and regulations will become the norm. While ostensibly agnostic, this implicitly conveys a sense that “resistance is futile,” and that the European approach will inevitably continue to spread more rapidly than its US counterpart.

With these policy debates in mind, our paper argues that ASEAN member states should not be too quick to embrace the European model of competition enforcement – be it by adopting more expansive competition laws or by regulating competition in digital markets. While the above-referenced scholars and advocates tend to assert that a more-expansive, EU-oriented approach would improve economic conditions, economic logic and the apparent reality from Europe strongly suggest otherwise.

Antitrust is an attractive regulatory tool for a number of reasons. The vague, terse language of most antitrust laws (including those in both the US and EU) readily lend themselves to “interpretation” imbuing them with virtually limitless scope. Indeed, the urge to treat antitrust as a legal Swiss Army knife capable of correcting all manner of social and economic ills is apparently difficult to resist. Conflating size with market power, and market power with political power, many recent calls for regulation of the tech industry are framed in antitrust terms, even though they are mostly rooted in nothing recognizable as modern, economically informed antitrust legal claims or analysis.

But that attraction is precisely why everyone—and emerging economies like ASEAN members in particular—should care about the scope, process, and economics of antitrust and the extent of its politicization. Antitrust in the US has largely resisted the relentless effort to politicize it. Despite being rooted in vague and potentially expansive statutory language, US antitrust is economically grounded, evolutionary, and limited to a set of achievable social welfare goals. In the EU, by contrast, these sorts of constraints are far weaker.

This conclusion is in no way altered by the fact that US antitrust law has become the “outlier” of global antitrust enforcement, compared to the EU’s more “consensual” approach. What matters is a policy’s actual results, not whether it is widely adopted; the world is full of debunked beliefs that were once widely shared. And it is far from certain that the widespread adoption of the EU model is in any way indicative of superior results. It is equally (or even more) plausible that this model has proliferated because it naturally accommodates politically useful populist narratives—such as “big is bad,” robin hood fallacies and robber baron myths—that are constrained by the US’s more evidence based and rational antitrust decision-making. America’s isolation might thus be a testament to its success rather than an emblem of its failure.

The EU’s more aggressive pursuit of technology platforms under its antitrust laws demonstrates many of the problems with its approach in general. Endorsing the European approach to antitrust, in a naïve attempt to bring high-profile cases against large internet platforms, would prioritize political expediency over the rule of law. It would open the floodgates of antitrust litigation and facilitate deleterious tendencies, such as non-economic decision-making, rent-seeking, regulatory capture, and politically motivated enforcement.

Bringing international antitrust enforcement in line with that of the EU would thus unlock a veritable Pandora’s box of concerns that might otherwise be kept in check. Chief among them is the use of antitrust laws to evade democratically and judicially established rules and legal precedent. When considering this question, it is important to see beyond any particular set of firms that enforcement officials and politicians may currently be targeting. An antitrust law expanded to consider the full scope of soft concerns that the EU aims at will not be employed against only politically disfavored companies, companies in other jurisdictions, or in order to expediently “solve” otherwise political problems. Once antitrust is expanded beyond its economic constraints and imbued with political content, it ceases to be a uniquely valuable tool for addressing real economic harms to consumers, and becomes a tool for routing around legislative and judicial constraints.

Our paper proceeds as follows. Section II analyzes the high-level differences between the American and European approaches to competition policy. Notably, this Section shows that these regimes pursue different goals, rely to varying degrees on economic insights to inform their decision-making, afford very different degrees of judicial deference to antitrust authorities, and exhibit different degrees of politization. Section III shows that the US and Europe also differ substantially in terms of the conduct that may constitute an infringement of competition law—the EU system being significantly more restrictive. Section IV turns to question of competition in digital platform markets. It argues that European competition enforcement in the digital industry provides a cautionary tale that cuts against both the adoption of ex ante regulation and a relaxation of existing antitrust standards (such as the “consumer welfare standard”). Section V posits that reducing economic concentration—sometimes cited as a byproduct of European-style competition enforcement—should not be a self-standing goal of antitrust policy. Finally, Section VI argues that many of the economic and political characteristics of the ASEAN economy cut in favor of using the US model of competition enforcement as a blueprint for further development and harmonization of ASEAN competition law.

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

The Problem of Data Property Rights

TOTM Policy discussions about the use of personal data often have “less is more” as a background assumption; that data is overconsumed relative to some hypothetical . . .

Policy discussions about the use of personal data often have “less is more” as a background assumption; that data is overconsumed relative to some hypothetical optimal baseline. This overriding skepticism has been the backdrop for sweeping new privacy regulations, such as the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) and the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

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Data Security & Privacy