Search Results

One of the most significant challenges facing competition policy today is defining the appropriate role of antitrust law within the context of intellectual property right licensing by standard-setting organizations (“SSOs”).  Many commentators believe it is necessary to apply the full force of the antitrust laws, and sometimes special rules that would increase the scope of antitrust, to the standard-setting process in order to adequately oversee what they perceive as a unique opportunity for anticompetitive behavior.  Indeed, antitrust agencies both in the United States and around the world have expressed agreement with the notion that the standard setting process requires strong enforcement of antitrust liability rules in order to ensure efficient outcomes that benefit consumers.  However, this view largely fails to consider the costs of antitrust.  In particular, it fails to recognize the limits of antitrust when the marginal benefit of antitrust enforcement is slight and the potential for erroneous enforcement (“false positives”) and thus, the likelihood that procompetitive behavior will be deterred, is high.  The Supreme Court itself has emphasized repeatedly that the scope of the antitrust laws should be responsive to such a cost-benefit analysis.

Read the full piece here.

The WSJ Reports that the American Booksellers Association has knocked on Christine Varney’s door at the Antitrust Division to complain about the new low prices resulting from the price war between Amazon, Target and Wal-Mart.  The complaint?

Read the full piece here.

According to the Wall Street Journal, the FTC is investigating whether retailer Toys-R-Us has violated the antitrust laws by inducing certain manufacturers to set minimum resale prices for their products (i.e., to engage in resale price maintenance, or “RPM”).

Read the full piece here.

Steve’s post responding to me and Josh on antitrust exemptions and buyer cartels raised a number of interesting issues.   A few points in response…

Read the full piece here.

I have no intention of wading into the debate over the climate change chapter in Superfreakonomics.  I’m sure you all know the controversy:  Levitt and Dubner had the temerity to suggest that global warming was a huge problem, that we should look hard for really expensive solutions, and we need to do something.  And the outcry was from . . . the global warming alarmists. Curious.

Read the full piece here.

Geoff mentions the pending bills on the Hill that would grant merchants an antitrust exemption to negotiate interchange fees.  The insurance industry exemption has also been in the news of late in the wake of the Democrats’ threats of repeal.  Here’s what I’m puzzled about.  Other than self-interested parties that have a lot to gain from an exemption (I’d like an exemption from income taxes if anybody cares), why won’t anybody say that industry exemptions from the Sherman Act price-fixing prohibitions are decidedly not a good thing for consumers?

Read the full piece here.

Many useful summaries of Williamson’s (and Ostrom’s) contributions are appearing online, such as those by Ed Glaeser, David Henderson, John Nye, Jeff Ely, and Alex Tabarrok. I think the first few pages of my “make-or-buy” chapter in the NIE Handbook provide a decent overview too. I also have some slides on transaction cost economics (part 1, part 2) that may be helpful for those seeking more detail.

Read the full piece here.

Today David Henderson has penned the traditional Wall Street Journal commentary on yesterday’s Nobel award to Elinor Ostrom and Oliver Williamson. He provides an excellent summary of the importance of their work, and I recommend it to you highly. In fact, David’s theme reconciles what some commenters have observed as a political or ideological contradiction. For example, Cheryl Morgan notes that both Henry Farrell and I are thrilled at the prize, and that…

Read the full piece here.

Abstract

The U.S. Department of the Treasury has submitted the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009 to Congress for the purpose of overhauling consumer financial regulation. This study has examined the likely effect of the Act on the availability of credit to American consumers. To do so we have examined the legislation in detail to assess how it would alter current consumer protection regulation, reviewed the rationales provided for the new legislation by those who designed its key features, considered why consumers borrow money and benefit from doing so, and reviewed the factors behind the expansion of credit availability over the last thirty years. Based on our analysis we have concluded that the CFPA Act of 2009 would make it harder and more expensive for consumers to borrow. Under plausible yet conservative assumptions the CFPA would:

• increase the interest rates consumers pay by at least 160 basis points;
• reduce consumer borrowing by at least 2.1 percent; and,
• reduce the net new jobs created in the economy by 4.3 percent.

By reducing borrowing the Act would also reduce consumer spending that further drives job creation and economic growth. In addition to restricting the availability of credit over the long term, the CFPA Act of 2009 would also slow the recovery from the deep recession the economy is now in by reducing borrowing, spending, and business formation.

The financial crisis has surfaced a number of serious consumer financial protection problems that were not dealt with adequately by federal regulators. Rather than proposing expeditious and practical reforms that can deal with those problems, the Treasury Department has put forward a proposal that would disrupt current regulatory agency efforts to deal with these issues.

This paper focuses on the CFPA Act that the Administration introduced in July 2009. House Finance Committee Chairman Frank has proposed changes to this Act which the Treasury Secretary Geithner appears to be willing to accept. However, given that these changes could be reversed or other changes could be made as the legislation works its way through Congress, we focus on the Administration’s original bill rather than a moving target. Chairman Frank’s proposed changes do not significantly alter any of our conclusions.