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Popular Media In 1914, Congress gave the FTC sweeping jurisdiction and broad powers to enforce flexible rules, to ensure that it would have the ability to serve . . .
In 1914, Congress gave the FTC sweeping jurisdiction and broad powers to enforce flexible rules, to ensure that it would have the ability to serve as the regulator of trade and business that Congress intended it be. Much, perhaps even the great majority, of what the FTC does is uncontroversial and is widely supported, even by critics of the regulatory state. However, both Congress and the courts have expressed concern about how the FTC has used its considerable discretion in some areas, particularly in its evolving interpretation of “unfairness.” Now, as the FTC approaches its 100th anniversary, the FTC, courts and Congress face a series of decisions about how to apply or constrain that discretion. These questions will become especially pressing as the FTC uses is its authority in new ways, expands its authority into new areas, or gains new authority from Congress. The purpose of this report is not to lambaste the agency, but rather to ask whether more should be done to improve how the agency exercises its discretion, and, if so, how to do so without hamstringing the agency. Indeed, improving the well-considered constraints on the FTC’s use of its discretion may make the Commission more, not less, effective by bringing about clearer, more consistent guidance, in turn increasing the FTC’s credibility and achieving greater compliance. Ultimately, the measure of the FTC’s success should not be how “active” it is, how far it extends its jurisdiction or how far it pushes the boundaries of its discretion, but rather how well it achieves its overarching purpose of maximizing consumer welfare.
In 1914, Congress gave the FTC sweeping jurisdiction and broad powers to enforce flexible rules, to ensure that it would have the ability to serve as the regulator of trade and business that Congress intended it be. Much, perhaps even the great majority, of what the FTC does is uncontroversial and is widely supported, even by critics of the regulatory state. However, both Congress and the courts have expressed concern about how the FTC has used its considerable discretion in some areas, particularly in its evolving interpretation of “unfairness.” Now, as the FTC approaches its 100th anniversary, the FTC, courts and Congress face a series of decisions about how to apply or constrain that discretion. These questions will become especially pressing as the FTC uses is its authority in new ways, expands its authority into new areas, or gains new authority from Congress.
The purpose of this report is not to lambaste the agency, but rather to ask whether more should be done to improve how the agency exercises its discretion, and, if so, how to do so without hamstringing the agency. Indeed, improving the well-considered constraints on the FTC’s use of its discretion may make the Commission more, not less, effective by bringing about clearer, more consistent guidance, in turn increasing the FTC’s credibility and achieving greater compliance. Ultimately, the measure of the FTC’s success should not be how “active” it is, how far it extends its jurisdiction or how far it pushes the boundaries of its discretion, but rather how well it achieves its overarching purpose of maximizing consumer welfare.
Download: Consumer Protection & Competition Regulation in a High Tech World: Discussing the Future of the Federal Trade Commission
Scholarship Increasingly, the wired and wireless networks are converging in architecture and function. For example, the further fiber moves towards the customer, the more wireless capabilities are available in cellular networks.
Increasingly, the wired and wireless networks are converging in architecture and function. For example, the further fiber moves towards the customer, the more wireless capabilities are available in cellular networks. As wireless offers more bandwidth, it can deliver video and other functions previously thought to require more substantial broadband pipes. The question then arises, to what extent are wireless offerings substitutable for wireline services, and vice versa? The 2013 Aspen Institute Roundtable on Spectrum Policy (AIRS), “Spectrum Policy for the Wired Network,” met on November 13-15, 2013 to consider what spectrum policies would foster best the goals of a robust, reliable and effective communications system in the United States.
The 24 leading communications policy experts who met at the Aspen Wye River Conference Center in Queenstown, Maryland began by looking at the characteristics of network architecture, both wired and wireless, that are relevant to a robust communications network. In the course of this exploration, the group considered public goods that need to reach consumers, and the desire for consumer choice of competitive services. They also investigated what essential elements of the wired network are required by public policy, and which of these can wireless services substitute for. The overall goal was to discover how spectrum services and spectrum policy can advance overall communications policy goals, e.g., robust, reliable, and effective communications with choice where possible.
As the following report details, the discussions were lively and knowledgeable. Throughout the report, the Roundtable rapporteur, Geoff Manne, sets forth a number of recommendations that he gleaned from the conference dialogue, specifically concerning the issues of rural communications, public services, and competition. While these recommendations generally reflect the sense of the meeting, there were some opponents to the viewpoints recorded and there were no votes taken. Accordingly, participation in the dialogue should not be construed as agreement with any particular statement in the report by the participant or his or her employer.
Popular Media The debates over mobile spectrum aggregation and the auction rules for the FCC’s upcoming incentive auction — like all regulatory rent-seeking — can be farcical. . . .
The debates over mobile spectrum aggregation and the auction rules for the FCC’s upcoming incentive auction — like all regulatory rent-seeking — can be farcical. One aspect of the debate in particular is worth highlighting, as it puts into stark relief the tendentiousness of self-interested companies making claims about the public interestedness of their preferred policies: The debate over how and whether to limit the buying and aggregating of lower frequency (in this case 600 MHz) spectrum.
Read the full piece here.
Popular Media In recent years, some Canadian politicians and powerful interest groups have issued increasingly vocal calls for dramatic regulatory interventions into the country’s payment cards system. In particular, they have called for a "hard cap" price-controls on interchange fees, a ban on contractual terms that prohibit card-accepting merchants from imposing surcharges on consumers that use payment cards, and a ban on so-called "honour all cards" rules that require a merchant to accept all payment cards issued under any payment network’s logo.
In recent years, some Canadian politicians and powerful interest groups have issued increasingly vocal calls for dramatic regulatory interventions into the country’s payment cards system. In particular, they have called for a “hard cap” price-controls on interchange fees, a ban on contractual terms that prohibit card-accepting merchants from imposing surcharges on consumers that use payment cards, and a ban on so-called “honour all cards” rules that require a merchant to accept all payment cards issued under any payment network’s logo. Advocates claim that these interventions will benefit businesses (especially small and medium-sized merchants) and consumers. An examination of economic theory and available empirical evidence, however, demonstrates that these claims of the benefits of intervention are unsupported. In particular, review of the effects of payment card regulation in the U.S., Australia, and elsewhere suggests that price controls and other interventions result in higher banking and credit card fees for consumers, while retailers are unlikely to pass on much of the savings to consumers. There is every reason to believe the same outcome will continue to occur in Canada if current efforts to regulate are enacted and unless existing regulations are relaxed. Instead of imposing regulations on the operators of payment card networks, which would undermine competition and harm consumers, Canada should seek to promote increased competition. The most effective way it can do that is by removing currently-existing legal barriers to competition that support a monopolistic structure in the debit card market and prevent Interac and other card networks from competing fairly with each other. Equally important is avoiding the imposition of costly new restrictions that would interfere with freely-bargained contractual rules between card networks and merchants that benefit consumers, such as no-surcharge rules (which protect consumers from surprise price increases at the register) or honour-all-cards rules (which guarantees ubiquitous acceptance of consumers’ cards).
In recent years, some Canadian politicians and powerful interest groups have issued increasingly vocal calls for dramatic regulatory interventions into the country’s payment cards system. In particular, they have called for a “hard cap” price-controls on interchange fees, a ban on contractual terms that prohibit card-accepting merchants from imposing surcharges on consumers that use payment cards, and a ban on so-called “honour all cards” rules that require a merchant to accept all payment cards issued under any payment network’s logo.
Advocates claim that these interventions will benefit businesses (especially small and medium-sized merchants) and consumers. An examination of economic theory and available empirical evidence, however, demonstrates that these claims of the benefits of intervention are unsupported. In particular, review of the effects of payment card regulation in the U.S., Australia, and elsewhere suggests that price controls and other interventions result in higher banking and credit card fees for consumers, while retailers are unlikely to pass on much of the savings to consumers. There is every reason to believe the same outcome will continue to occur in Canada if current efforts to regulate are enacted and unless existing regulations are relaxed.
Instead of imposing regulations on the operators of payment card networks, which would undermine competition and harm consumers, Canada should seek to promote increased competition. The most effective way it can do that is by removing currently-existing legal barriers to competition that support a monopolistic structure in the debit card market and prevent Interac and other card networks from competing fairly with each other. Equally important is avoiding the imposition of costly new restrictions that would interfere with freely-bargained contractual rules between card networks and merchants that benefit consumers, such as no-surcharge rules (which protect consumers from surprise price increases at the register) or honour-all-cards rules (which guarantees ubiquitous acceptance of consumers’ cards).
Download: “Credit Where It’s Due: How Payment Cards Benefit Consumers and Merchants and How Regulation Can Harm Them”
Regulatory Comments "It’s been said, of the newest technology, that speed could change everything. If only we could cross a certain speed threshold, our basic infrastructure would catalyze new opportunities we can scarcely even conceive of..."
“It’s been said, of the newest technology, that speed could change everything. If only we could cross a certain speed threshold, our basic infrastructure would catalyze new opportunities we can scarcely even conceive of. All government needs to do is prime the pump: fund a demonstration project to prove that we can do it, and markets will follow. The demand may not be there yet, but “if you build it, they will come…”
“There are some impediments to the sort of broadband connectivity people actually do want — most importantly local and state regulations that reduce competition and increase the cost of new facilities. The FCC should consider ways to encourage state and local governments to reduce these regulatory barriers rather than create an expensive new program to subsidize a particular technology (fiber) picked because of an arbitrary, top-down decision that people should have a certain speed – even if they don’t yet want it. The FCC should heed the wisdom of Australia’s new Communications Minister who explained his government’s decision to abandon plans for a national fiber-to-the-home network in favor of subsidizing far less expensive, but slightly slower, fiber-to-the node connectivity…”
“It’s been said, of the newest technology, that speed could change everything. If only we could cross a certain speed threshold, our basic infrastructure would catalyze new opportunities we can scarcely even conceive of. All government needs to do is prime the pump: fund a demonstration project to prove that we can do it, and markets will follow. The demand may not be there yet, but “if you build it, they will come.”
Popular Media You may not know much about the most important agency in Washington when it comes to regulating new technologies. Founded 99 years ago today, the Federal Trade Commission has become, for better or worse, the Federal Technology Commission.
You may not know much about the most important agency in Washington when it comes to regulating new technologies. Founded 99 years ago today, the Federal Trade Commission has become, for better or worse, the Federal Technology Commission.
The FTC oversees nearly every company in America. It polices competition by enforcing the antitrust laws. It tries to protect consumers by punishing deception and practices it deems “unfair.” It’s the general enforcer of corporate promises. It’s the de facto regulator of the media, from traditional advertising to Internet search and social networks. It handles novel problems of privacy, data security, online child protection, and patent claims, among others. Even Net neutrality may soon wind up in the FTC’s jurisdiction if the Federal Communications Commission’s rules are struck down in court.
But how should the FTC regulate technology? What’s the right mix of the certainty businesses need and the flexibility technological progress demands?
There are essentially three models: regulatory, discretionary and evolutionary.
The epitome of traditional regulatory model is the FTC’s chief rival: the FCC. The 1996 Telecom Act runs nearly 47,000 words — 65 times longer than the Sherman Act of 1890, the primary antitrust law enforced by the FTC. The FCC writes tech-specific before technology has even developed. Virginia Postrel described the mentality best in The Future and Its Enemies:
Technocrats are “for the future,” but only if someone is in charge of making it turn out according to plan. They greet every new idea with a “yes, but,” followed by legislation, regulation, and litigation…. By design, technocrats pick winners, establish standards, and impose a single set of values on the future.
The less technocratic alternative is the evolutionary model: build flexible law that evolves alongside technology. Learn from, and adapt to, the ever-changing technological and business environments.
On antitrust, that’s essentially what the FTC (along with the Department of Justice) does today. Judicial decisions are firmly grounded in economics, and this feeds back into the agencies’ enforcement actions. Antitrust law has become nearly synonymous with antitrust economics: both courts and agencies weigh the perils of both under- and over-enforcement in the face of unavoidable uncertainty about the future.
But much of what the FTC does falls into the discretionary model, unmoored from both sound economics and judicial oversight. The discretionary and evolutionary models share a similar legal basis and so are often confused, but they’re profoundly different: The discretionary model harms technological progress and undermines the rule of law, while the evolutionary model promotes both.
Continue reading on Tech Dirt
Popular Media Like most libertarians I’m concerned about government abuse of power. Certainly the secrecy and seeming reach of the NSA’s information gathering programs is worrying. But . . .
Like most libertarians I’m concerned about government abuse of power. Certainly the secrecy and seeming reach of the NSA’s information gathering programs is worrying. But we can’t and shouldn’t pretend like there are no countervailing concerns (as Gordon Crovitz points out). And we certainly shouldn’t allow the fervent ire of the most radical voices — those who view the issue solely from one side — to impel technology companies to take matters into their own hands. At least not yet.
Rather, the issue is inherently political. And while the political process is far from perfect, I’m almost as uncomfortable with the radical voices calling for corporations to “do something,” without evincing any nuanced understanding of the issues involved.
Frankly, I see this as of a piece with much of the privacy debate that points the finger at corporations for collecting data (and ignores the value of their collection of data) while identifying government use of the data they collect as the actual problem. Typically most of my cyber-libertarian friends are with me on this: If the problem is the government’s use of data, then attack that problem; don’t hamstring corporations and the benefits they confer on consumers for the sake of a problem that is not of their making and without regard to the enormous costs such a solution imposes.
Verizon, unlike just about every other technology company, seems to get this. In a recent speech, John Stratton, head of Verizon’s Enterprise Solutions unit, had this to say:
“This is not a question that will be answered by a telecom executive, this is not a question that will be answered by an IT executive. This is a question that must be answered by societies themselves.” “I believe this is a bigger issue, and press releases and fizzy statements don’t get at the issue; it needs to be solved by society.” Stratton said that as a company, Verizon follows the law, and those laws are set by governments. “The laws are not set by Verizon, they are set by the governments in which we operate. I think its important for us to recognise that we participate in debate, as citizens, but as a company I have obligations that I am going to follow.“
“This is not a question that will be answered by a telecom executive, this is not a question that will be answered by an IT executive. This is a question that must be answered by societies themselves.”
“I believe this is a bigger issue, and press releases and fizzy statements don’t get at the issue; it needs to be solved by society.”
Stratton said that as a company, Verizon follows the law, and those laws are set by governments.
“The laws are not set by Verizon, they are set by the governments in which we operate. I think its important for us to recognise that we participate in debate, as citizens, but as a company I have obligations that I am going to follow.“
I completely agree. There may be a problem, but before we deputize corporations in the service of even well-meaning activism, shouldn’t we address this as the political issue it is first?
I’ve been making a version of this point for a long time. As I said back in 2006:
I find it interesting that the “blame” for privacy incursions by the government is being laid at Google’s feet. Google isn’t doing the . . . incursioning, and we wouldn’t have to saddle Google with any costs of protection (perhaps even lessening functionality) if we just nipped the problem in the bud. Importantly, the implication here is that government should not have access to the information in question–a decision that sounds inherently political to me. I’m just a little surprised to hear anyone (other than me) saying that corporations should take it upon themselves to “fix” government policy by, in effect, destroying records. But at the same time, it makes some sense to look to Google to ameliorate these costs. Google is, after all, responsive to market forces, and (once in a while) I’m sure markets respond to consumer preferences more quickly and effectively than politicians do. And if Google perceives that offering more protection for its customers can be more cheaply done by restraining the government than by curtailing its own practices, then Dan [Solove]’s suggestion that Google take the lead in lobbying for greater legislative protections of personal information may come to pass. Of course we’re still left with the problem of Google and not the politicians bearing the cost of their folly (if it is folly).
I find it interesting that the “blame” for privacy incursions by the government is being laid at Google’s feet. Google isn’t doing the . . . incursioning, and we wouldn’t have to saddle Google with any costs of protection (perhaps even lessening functionality) if we just nipped the problem in the bud. Importantly, the implication here is that government should not have access to the information in question–a decision that sounds inherently political to me. I’m just a little surprised to hear anyone (other than me) saying that corporations should take it upon themselves to “fix” government policy by, in effect, destroying records.
But at the same time, it makes some sense to look to Google to ameliorate these costs. Google is, after all, responsive to market forces, and (once in a while) I’m sure markets respond to consumer preferences more quickly and effectively than politicians do. And if Google perceives that offering more protection for its customers can be more cheaply done by restraining the government than by curtailing its own practices, then Dan [Solove]’s suggestion that Google take the lead in lobbying for greater legislative protections of personal information may come to pass. Of course we’re still left with the problem of Google and not the politicians bearing the cost of their folly (if it is folly).
As I said then, there may be a role for tech companies to take the lead in lobbying for changes. And perhaps that’s what’s happening. But the impetus behind it — the implicit threats from civil liberties groups, the position that there can be no countervailing benefits from the government’s use of this data, the consistent view that corporations should be forced to deal with these political problems, and the predictable capitulation (and subsequent grandstanding, as Stratton calls it) by these companies is not the right way to go.
I applaud Verizon’s stance here. Perhaps as a society we should come out against some or all of the NSA’s programs. But ideological moralizing and corporate bludgeoning aren’t the way to get there.
Filed under: business, corporate social responsibility, cost-benefit analysis, national security, politics, privacy, social responsibility, technology Tagged: John Stratton, National Security Agency, NSA, politics, Surveilance, Verizon, Verizon Communications
TOTM Like most libertarians I’m concerned about government abuse of power. Certainly the secrecy and seeming reach of the NSA’s information gathering programs is worrying. But . . .
