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TOTM So it looks like Dr. Miles is going down. That’s a good thing. For non-antitrusters, Dr. Miles is a 1911 Supreme Court decision holding that . . .
So it looks like Dr. Miles is going down. That’s a good thing.
For non-antitrusters, Dr. Miles is a 1911 Supreme Court decision holding that “minimum vertical resale price maintenance” is per se illegal — that is, automatically illegal without inquiry into the practice’s actual effect on competition. Minimum vertical resale price maintenance (or “RPM”) occurs when a manufacturer requires dealers who sell its product to charge no less than a set price for that product. For example, Ford might require its dealers to charge at least $30,000 for an Explorer.
Read the full piece here.
TOTM Dan Crane and Thom (who has promised more remarks!) have now both posted their prepared remarks for the Section 2 hearings panel on bundled discounts. . . .
Dan Crane and Thom (who has promised more remarks!) have now both posted their prepared remarks for the Section 2 hearings panel on bundled discounts. Both call for bright-line, administrable liability rules for all forms of unilateral exclusionary conduct, and have important things to say about designing antitrust rules for bundled discounts. Both are worth reading in their entirety. Administrable rules that sensibly balance Type I and II errors are certainly an indisputably admirable goal for antitrust analysis and bundled discounts have proven to be a particularly tricky form of conduct for Section 2 analysis. Despite all of the agreement around here between Thom, Dan and I on the design of antitrust rules in a world of costly Type I errors, I think I have found a topic upon which I can at least offer a mild dissent (or at least a different perspective) regarding the usefulness of the analogy of various anticompetitive theories of bundled discounting practices to exclusive dealing.
TOTM In response to Josh’s gentle nudge, here are my remarks from Wednesday’s DOJ/FTC hearing on loyalty discounts. I focus entirely on bundled discounts (as opposed . . .
In response to Josh’s gentle nudge, here are my remarks from Wednesday’s DOJ/FTC hearing on loyalty discounts. I focus entirely on bundled discounts (as opposed to single-product loyalty discounts, like volume or market-share discounts). Bundled discounts are discounts (or rebates) that are conditioned upon purchasing separate products from disparate product markets — e.g., “we’ll give you a 25% discount on all your A and B purchases if you buy 70% of your A requirements and 80% of your B requirements from us.”
TOTM Dan Crane (Antitrust Review, Cardozo) has graciously posted his testimony for Wednesday’s FTC/ DOJ Section 2 Hearings on Loyalty Discounts. Readers familiar with Crane’s scholarship . . .
TOTM Dennis Carlton and Randy Picker have posted Antitrust and Regulation on SSRN. It looks like a very interesting paper on the relationship between antitrust and . . .
Dennis Carlton and Randy Picker have posted Antitrust and Regulation on SSRN. It looks like a very interesting paper on the relationship between antitrust and regulation to control competition. Here’s the abstract…
TOTM As promised, I am posting here my powerpoint slides for my testimony on exclusive dealing at the FTC/DOJ Section 2 Hearings, as well as the . . .
As promised, I am posting here my powerpoint slides for my testimony on exclusive dealing at the FTC/DOJ Section 2 Hearings, as well as the two papers upon which my analysis is based…
TOTM Eugene Volokh has posted a series discussing his new article (forthcoming in Harvard L. Rev.) “Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs,” which . . .
Eugene Volokh has posted a series discussing his new article (forthcoming in Harvard L. Rev.) “Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs,” which I point out because the article claims that bans on organ payments violate patients’ medical self-defense rights. As readers of TOTM know, organ markets are a topic of substantial interest around here. Eugene dedicates a separate post to refuting the oft-repeated mantra that the ban on compensation is necessary to prevent the wealthy from buying up all of the organs.
TOTM Cardozo professor Dan Crane and I are living parallel lives. We both attended Wheaton College and the University of Chicago Law School (Dan was two . . .
Cardozo professor Dan Crane and I are living parallel lives. We both attended Wheaton College and the University of Chicago Law School (Dan was two years ahead of me). We began teaching at the same time. We both teach antitrust law and have written on bundled discounts. Like Josh, we’re both presenting at the DOJ/FTC hearings on single-firm conduct. And we’ve both recently written reviews of Herbert Hovenkamp’s terrific new book,
TOTM The eSapience Center for Competition Policy (eCCP) has launched its website, and it looks like a very promising resource for competition policy lawyers and economists. . . .
The eSapience Center for Competition Policy (eCCP) has launched its website, and it looks like a very promising resource for competition policy lawyers and economists. The site includes access to eCCP’s Competition Policy International journal (which has already attracted articles from a number of top competition policy writers; here is the link to the latest issue), case notes, op-eds, collections of works, and book reviews.
