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TOTM Becker and Posner take on “libertarian paternalism” this week. The entries are both worth reading, especially for the parts where these co-bloggers disagree. Here are . . .
Becker and Posner take on “libertarian paternalism” this week. The entries are both worth reading, especially for the parts where these co-bloggers disagree. Here are my favorite passages from each. First, Posner attempts to distinguish his previous defense of the NYC trans-fat ban from good old-fashioned paternalism…
Read the full piece here.
TOTM Last Friday was the first day of my Business Organizations class. We began with two articles that have profoundly influenced my thinking about the world . . .
Last Friday was the first day of my Business Organizations class. We began with two articles that have profoundly influenced my thinking about the world in general and the business world in particular. To inaugurate the new semester, I thought I’d take a moment and pay tribute to the insights in those articles (and solicit first day ideas from other business law profs!).
TOTM Professor D’Amato is at it again. And by “it,” I mean making overblown claims that economics is useless (you might recall our last exchange where . . .
Professor D’Amato is at it again. And by “it,” I mean making overblown claims that economics is useless (you might recall our last exchange where I responded to his mistaken assertion that economics had not changed antitrust in “any noticeable way”). Here’s his latest from a comment over at Prawfs.
TOTM Henry Manne is back with another article in the WSJ. This time Manne goes toe-to-toe with the “corporate democrats.” Read the full piece here.
Henry Manne is back with another article in the WSJ. This time Manne goes toe-to-toe with the “corporate democrats.”
Scholarship Summary This article argues that mandatory securities disclosure regulation has unanticipated and ill-considered consequences. Disclosure regulation makes some forms of behavior more expensive relative to . . .
This article argues that mandatory securities disclosure regulation has unanticipated and ill-considered consequences. Disclosure regulation makes some forms of behavior more expensive relative to others. Rational actors will respond by shifting some conduct into comparatively cheaper outlets. And these alternative behaviors may actually be less beneficial than the regulated, deterred behavior. Likewise, required disclosure of corporate information to investors makes shareholder governance less costly and more likely, even where it should be deterred. In essence, disclosure regulation effectively proscribes, it does not prescribe. Thus, depending on the viability of other behaviors, forced disclosure may induce unwanted behavioral responses. The article identifies two broad concepts that encapsulate these dynamics. The first is a “hydraulic theory” of securities disclosure regulation. Under this theory, disclosure regulation triggers behavioral hydraulics which may lead to an undesirable shift in executive behavior, as well as an undesirable shift in the pool of candidates for corporate executive positions. The second is an information cost theory of securities disclosure regulation. Under this theory, mandated disclosure is both unnecessary to market efficiency and affirmatively harmful to firms’ competitive schemes of corporate governance.
TOTM Elizabeth Warren (Credit Slips) points to an interesting empirical study by Agarwal, Liu, Souleses, and Chomsisengphet (“ALSC”) which examines consumer credit card selection in a . . .
Elizabeth Warren (Credit Slips) points to an interesting empirical study by Agarwal, Liu, Souleses, and Chomsisengphet (“ALSC”) which examines consumer credit card selection in a natural experiment setting in which a card company offers two cards to consumers: (1) a high interest rate, no annual fee card and (2) a low rate card with an annual fee.
TOTM Ed Morrison (Columbia) has a great series of guest blogs at the always worth reading ELS Blog on a few research questions in bankruptcy and . . .
Ed Morrison (Columbia) has a great series of guest blogs at the always worth reading ELS Blog on a few research questions in bankruptcy and torts as well as a methodological entry. I am a little bit late with the link (his guest stint ended December 8th ), but I really enjoyed the posts.
TOTM One of the more interesting parts of the November 29 DOJ/FTC hearing on loyalty discounts (where I presented these remarks) was the panelists’ discussion of . . .
One of the more interesting parts of the November 29 DOJ/FTC hearing on loyalty discounts (where I presented these remarks) was the panelists’ discussion of a number of “propositions” advanced, for purposes of discussion only, by the agencies. Unfortunately, we didn’t have time to discuss all the propositions. I’ve reproduced them below the fold, along with my own thoughts on whether they’re sound. (Please note the agencies’ insistence that “[t]hese propositions are solely for the purpose of discussion and do not necessarily represent the agencies’ views.”)
TOTM Huh? This statement appears in this article by Professor Anthony D’Amato (Northwestern) on the failure of interdisciplinary scholarship in the legal academy. HT: Brian Leiter. . . .
Huh? This statement appears in this article by Professor Anthony D’Amato (Northwestern) on the failure of interdisciplinary scholarship in the legal academy. HT: Brian Leiter. Quite frankly, I was very surprised to see a claim like this in a paper written after 1970 or so. Even in corners of the academy hostile to economic analysis, antitrust is conventionally distinguished as a special case where economics is useful, typically along with some statement about the uniqueness of antitrust. D’Amato reserves no such special treatment for antitrust, criticizing that field in the context of a more general critique of what he describes as the “interdisciplinary turn” in the legal academy on three grounds…
