Microsoft and its allies (the Microsoft-funded trade organization FairSearch and the prolific Google critic Ben Edelman) have been highly critical of Google’s use of “secret” contracts to license its proprietary suite of mobile apps, Google Mobile Services, to device manufacturers.

I’ve written about this at length before. As I said previously,

In order to argue that Google has an iron grip on Android, Edelman’s analysis relies heavily on ”secret” Google licensing agreements — “MADAs” (Mobile Application Distribution Agreements) — trotted out with such fanfare one might think it was the first time two companies ever had a written contract (or tried to keep it confidential).

For Edelman, these agreements “suppress competition” with “no plausible pro-consumer benefits.”

Microsoft (via another of its front groups, ICOMP) responded in predictable fashion.

While the hysteria over private, mutually beneficial contracts negotiated between sophisticated corporations was always patently absurd (who ever heard of sensitive commercial contracts that weren’t confidential?), Edelman’s claim that the Google MADAs operate to “suppress competition” with “no plausible pro-consumer benefits” was the subject of my previous post.

I won’t rehash all of those arguments here, but rather point to another indication that such contract terms are not anticompetitive: The recent revelation that they are used by others in the same industry — including, we’ve learned (to no one’s surprise), Microsoft.

Much like the release of Google’s MADAs in an unrelated lawsuit, the ongoing patent licensing contract dispute between Microsoft and Samsung has obliged the companies to release their own agreements. As it happens, they are at least as restrictive as the Google agreements criticized by Edelman — and, in at least one way, even more so.

Some quick background: As I said in my previous post, it is no secret that equipment manufacturers have the option to license a free set of Google apps (Google Mobile Services) and set Google as the default search engine. However, Google allows OEMs to preinstall other competing search engines as they see fit. Indeed, no matter which applications come pre-installed, the user can easily download Yahoo!, Microsoft’s Bing, Yandex, Naver, DuckDuckGo and other search engines for free from the Google Play Store.

But Microsoft has sought to impose even-more stringent constraints on its device partners. One of the agreements disclosed in the Microsoft-Samsung contract litigation, the “Microsoft-Samsung Business Collaboration Agreement,” requires Samsung to set Bing as the search default for all Windows phones and precludes Samsung from pre-installing any other search applications on Windows-based phones. Samsung must configure all of its Windows Phones to use Microsoft Search Services as the

default Web Search  . . . in all instances on such properties where Web Search can be launched or a Query submitted directly by a user (including by voice command) or automatically (including based on location or context).

Interestingly, the agreement also requires Samsung to install Microsoft Search Services as a non-default search option on all of Samsung’s non-Microsoft Android devices (to the extent doing so does not conflict with other contracts).

Of course, the Microsoft-Samsung contract is expressly intended to remain secret: Its terms are declared to be “Confidential Information,” prohibiting Samsung from making “any public statement regarding the specific terms of [the] Agreement” without Microsoft’s consent.

Meanwhile, the accompanying Patent License Agreement provides that

all terms and conditions in this Agreement, including the payment amount [and the] specific terms and conditions in this Agreement (including, without limitation, the amount of any fees and any other amounts payable to Microsoft under this Agreement) are confidential and shall not be disclosed by either Party.

In addition to the confidentiality terms spelled out in these two documents, there is a separate Non-Disclosure Agreement—to further dispel any modicum of doubt on that score. Perhaps this is why Edelman was unaware of the ubiquity of such terms (and their confidentiality) when he issued his indictment of the Google agreements but neglected to mention Microsoft’s own.

In light of these revelations, Edelman’s scathing contempt for the “secrecy” of Google’s MADAs seems especially disingenuous:

MADA secrecy advances Google’s strategic objectives. By keeping MADA restrictions confidential and little-known, Google can suppress the competitive response…Relatedly, MADA secrecy helps prevent standard market forces from disciplining Google’s restriction. Suppose consumers understood that Google uses tying and full-line-forcing to prevent manufacturers from offering phones with alternative apps, which could drive down phone prices. Then consumers would be angry and would likely make their complaints known both to regulators and to phone manufacturers. Instead, Google makes the ubiquitous presence of Google apps and the virtual absence of competitors look like a market outcome, falsely suggesting that no one actually wants to have or distribute competing apps.

If, as Edelman claims, Google’s objectionable contract terms “serve both to help Google expand into areas where competition could otherwise occur, and to prevent competitors from gaining traction,” then what are the very same sorts of terms doing in Microsoft’s contracts with Samsung? The revelation that Microsoft employs contracts similar to — and similarly confidential to — Google’s highlights the hypocrisy of claims that such contracts serve anticompetitive aims.

In fact, as I discussed in my previous post, there are several pro-competitive justifications for such agreements, whether undertaken by a market leader or a newer entrant intent on catching up. Most obviously, such contracts help to ensure that consumers receive the user experience they demand on devices manufactured by third parties. But more to the point, the fact that such arrangements permeate the market and are adopted by both large and small competitors is strong indication that such terms are pro-competitive.

At the very least, they absolutely demonstrate that such practices do not constitute prima facie evidence of the abuse of market power.

[Reminder: See the “Disclosures” page above. ICLE has received financial support from Google in the past, and I formerly worked at Microsoft. Of course, the views here are my own, although I encourage everyone to agree with them.]

Filed under: antitrust, contracts, exclusionary conduct, google, licensing, monopolization, technology, tying, tying Tagged: Android, Ben Edelman, google, Google Mobile Services, microsoft

President Obama has come out in support of net-neutrality rules. Critics argue that the Internet should not, however, be treated as a utility like electricity. Joining Brian Lehrer to dissect both sides are Timothy Karr, senior director of strategy at Free Press, and on Skype from D.C., Geoffrey Manne, founder of the International Center for Law and Economics.

Panelists talked about the concept of “open Internet,” also know as “net neutrality,” and whether the Internet is a public utility. “Open Internet” refers to the idea that Internet providers must allow all legal content to move through their networks uninhibited. At the time of the program, the Federal Communications Commission was considering a plan that would allow the agency to regulate how Internet traffic flows between content providers and Internet service providers, and was expected to issue a final rule by the end of 2014.

Summary

“The International Center for Law and Economics (ICLE) and TechFreedom filed initial comments in these proceedings urging the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC” or
“Commission”) not to preempt the state laws at issue in North Carolina and Tennessee because (1) the Commission lacks the legal authority to do so under Section 706, (2) even if the
FCC had such authority, it would be a double-edged sword, which could be used to ban government-owned networks in the future, so it should not be exercised in this case, (3) such a
reversal in approaches could be premised on the rather obvious economic point that government provision of broadband may in fact decrease broadband deployment and investment in the aggregate by deterring private broadband competition; and (4) in general, government-run broadband, which lacks profit-driven feedback loop, is unlikely to serve consumers better in the long-run than private provision of broadband…”

Summary

“The International Center for Law & Economics (“ICLE”) and eleven independent professors and scholars of law and economics file these comments to address general merger review issues and certain specific concerns that were raised in some of the Comments and Petitions to Deny filed in this proceeding…”

“The FCC’s inquiry is limited to the proposed merger’s likely effect on the public interest. But many of the comments in opposition to the merger take issue with various aspects of the marketplace for residential broadband and video as it exists to- day. Indeed, much of the criticism seems leveled at decisions made decades ago with regard to cable franchising. But those criticisms, whether valid or not, do not speak to whether – against the backdrop of the relevant markets as they exist today and are likely to exist in the near future – the merger of Comcast and Time Warner Cable (“TWC”) is in the public interest. Among many other things, for example, the Comments of the American Antitrust Institute urge the FCC to consider the issue of network neutrality in reviewing the merger. But there is nothing merger-specific about net neutrality, and consideration of that issue (other than as a potentially relevant aspect of the market backdrop) is wholly inappropriate for merger review….”

Excerpt

Meet iHolo. This innovative (though hypothetical) startup sells a tiny cube that hooks into smartphones and projects a holographic image above the screen. Now we can see actual 3D holographic characters and movie explosions, hovering right in front of us! There’s just one problem: “Holovids” require an incredibly fast connection, and tons of bandwidth. The typical smartphone user has neither the speed nor the data capacity to use the new technology: after extended buffering waiting for the holovid to load, a user would exhaust his data plan within minutes.

Worried that users won’t materialize, iHolo offers a deal to the big wireless carriers: To any carrier that will boost the speed of iHolo customers and exempt iHolo material from users’ data caps, iHolo will sell a minority interest in its fledgling company.

It’s a potential win-win. iHolo gets access to much-needed capital, boosts demand for its product, and gains the stability that comes from having a big backer. That institutional support would mollify investors who would otherwise be wary of betting on an unproven technology. The carrier could differentiate itself in the wireless market, and the two companies could work together to figure out how to stream holovids efficiently.What’s not to love? Well, the business model that could make this innovation possible isn’t “neutral.” It could be banned if Net neutrality hardliners get their way.

Net neutrality — the idea that all data should be treated the same as it zips over the Internet — sounds appealing in principle. Who wouldn’t want every competitor to have a fair shot, and for the best ideas to rise to the top? But in practice, rigid Net neutrality regulation could cripple the potential business arrangements that help launch new companies.

Continue reading on Computer World

In the 2014 Open Internet NPRM, the Commission began the process of closing the gap created by the Verizon decision, which left no legally enforceable rules for the Commission to prevent broadband providers from acting to limit Internet openness. The2014 Open Internet NPRM sought broad public comment on how the Commission should ensure that the Internet remains open, and proposed new rules and enhancements to current rules.

To further develop our understanding of the issues, the Commission is hosting a series of staff-led Open Internet Roundtable Discussions that are free and open to the public. The Open Internet Roundtable Discussions provide an opportunity for the Commission staff and interested parties to further examine the actions the Commission should take for its goal of determining the best approach to protecting and promoting Internet openness.

The roundtable discussions will focus on public policy considerations and how they should be addressed to protect and promote Internet openness in both the fixed and mobile markets; the technological considerations involved in protecting the open Internet; how the competitive landscape and the economics of providing broadband and online services affects Internet openness; how the Commission can effectively enforce the current and proposed open Internet requirements; and the various legal theories underlying possible Commission actions in this area.

Roundtable 3: Enhancing Transparency
This roundtable will consider proposed enhancements to the existing transparency rule, which currently requires providers of broadband Internet access services to disclose accurate information about their service offerings and make this information accessible to the public.

Click here to view the roundtable