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Showing 9 of 271 Results in Monopolization
TOTM How should an economist interpret the fact that Microsoft appears to be “behind” recent enforcement actions against Google in the United States and, especially, in . . .
How should an economist interpret the fact that Microsoft appears to be “behind” recent enforcement actions against Google in the United States and, especially, in Europe?
“With skepticism!” Is the answer I suspect many readers will offer upon first glance. There is a long public choice literature, and long history in antitrust itself, that suggests that one should be weary of private enforcement of the antitrust laws against rivals both in the form of litigation and attempts to delegate the enforcement effort (and costs) to the government.
Read the full piece here.
TOTM One of the first reactions I had when reading the settlement is that it is quite striking how much and at what level of detail . . .
One of the first reactions I had when reading the settlement is that it is quite striking how much and at what level of detail the settlement micro-manages Intel’s business decisions. Lets consider a just a handful of provisions and look at the language in the settlement. Again, I think these provisions should be read with the benefit of some perspective in market performance during the relevant time period.
TOTM Let me add on a few brief observations on the Intel settlement to Dan’s earlier comments, with which I largely agree. There is a lot . . .
Let me add on a few brief observations on the Intel settlement to Dan’s earlier comments, with which I largely agree. There is a lot to say about the settlement: the predatory design aspects, Section 5, the (I found) quite odd self-congratulatory settlement press conference and webcast, and of course, what the settlement means for consumers. I’m very interested in all of these issues, but perhaps none is more important than the last. We cannot simply assume that the settlement equates to a victory for consumers. Readers of this blog will be very familiar with the argument that merely counting cases, or agency activity, and of course settlements, are not reliable measures of the quality of agency performance or meaningful from a consumer welfare perspective. But problems with this case make that warning especially appropriate here. Thus, before delving into some first reactions based on language in the settlement over the days and maybe weeks to come, some perspective is in order.
TOTM Connecticut AG Richard Blumenthal has reportedly contacted Apple and Amazon concerning their pricing arrangements with publishers (WSJ, CNN): Mr. Blumenthal said he has sent letters . . .
Connecticut AG Richard Blumenthal has reportedly contacted Apple and Amazon concerning their pricing arrangements with publishers (WSJ, CNN):
Mr. Blumenthal said he has sent letters to Amazon and Apple asking them to “meet with his office” to address his concerns that agreements in place may restrict rivals from offering cheaper e-books. For instance, he said, “both Amazon and Apple have reached agreements with the largest e-book publishers that ensure both will receive the best prices for e-books over any competitors.”
A “most favored nation” (MFN) clause is a contractual agreement between a supplier and a customer that requires the supplier to sell to the customer on pricing terms at least as favorable as the pricing terms on which that supplier sells to other customers.
TOTM Dan Crane’s post on the DOJ’s antitrust activity, and in particular, monopolization enforcement, during the Obama administration notes the dissonance between rhetoric and reality. I . . .
Dan Crane’s post on the DOJ’s antitrust activity, and in particular, monopolization enforcement, during the Obama administration notes the dissonance between rhetoric and reality. I thought I’d post the following data from the DOJ website concerning Section 2 investigations initiated and cases won over the last 40 years for some perspective.
ICLE White Paper Abstract The Federal Trade Commission’s recent complaint targets the Intel Corporation for antitrust scrutiny under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and Section . . .
The Federal Trade Commission’s recent complaint targets the Intel Corporation for antitrust scrutiny under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Commission alleges that, through the use of loyalty discounts offered to microprocessor purchasers, Intel unlawfully excluded rivals and harmed consumers in the microprocessor and graphics processor markets. This article analyzes the Commission’s claims. The Commission’s reliance on Section 5 should be viewed with suspicion because it allows the Commission to evade the more stringent standards of proof that have been emerged in the Supreme Court’s Section 2 jurisprudence. Furthermore, the Commission’s actions surrounding its prosecution of Intel reflect an adversarial attitude that undermines the Commission’s stated comparative advantages over private litigants. Moreover, the Commission’s allegations form a weak case when evaluated under the conventional Section 2 standard. Unlike many Section 2 cases alleging speculative future consumer harm, the disputed conduct in this case has been in the marketplace for nearly a decade, and its competitive footprint is readily observable. The available data do not support the Commission’s theory that Intel’s behavior harmed consumers. To the contrary, it is almost certain that Intel’s distribution contracts led to tangible, demonstrable consumer welfare gains in the form of lower prices. Accordingly, the Commission’s complaint against Intel threatens to harm consumers directly in the computer industry as well as indirectly by undermining the stability and certainly which longstanding Section 2 jurisprudence has afforded the business community by requiring the plaintiffs offer rigorous proof of competitive harm.
TOTM I’ve recently finished reading Jonathan Baker’s Preserving a Political Bargain: The Political Economy of the Non-Interventionist Challenge to Monopolization Enforcement, forthcoming in the Antitrust Law . . .
I’ve recently finished reading Jonathan Baker’s Preserving a Political Bargain: The Political Economy of the Non-Interventionist Challenge to Monopolization Enforcement, forthcoming in the Antitrust Law Journal.
Baker’s central thesis in Preserving a Political Bargain builds on earlier work concerning competition policy as an implicit political bargain that was reached during the 1940s between the more extreme positions of laissez-faire on the one hand and regulation on the other. The new piece tries to explain what Baker describes as the “non-interventionist” critique of monopolization enforcement within this framework.
TOTM The Amazon vs. Macmillan controversy has been beaten to a pulp in the blogosphere. See Megan McArdle, John Scalzi, Joshua Gans, Virginia Postrel, Lynne Kiesling, . . .
The Amazon vs. Macmillan controversy has been beaten to a pulp in the blogosphere. See Megan McArdle, John Scalzi, Joshua Gans, Virginia Postrel, Lynne Kiesling, Lynne Kielsing and Lynne Kiesling, among others. Pulp or no (get it? It’s a book/e-book pun), I haven’t seen anyone hit squarely on what I think is the crux of the issue: control rights.
Presentations & Interviews Last June, Christine Varney, then a lawyer in private practice, now President Obama's nominee to be the next Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, warned that Google, not Microsoft, is the monopolist of the future.
Last June, Christine Varney, then a lawyer in private practice, now President Obama’s nominee to be the next Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, warned that Google, not Microsoft, is the monopolist of the future.
“For me, Microsoft is so last century. They are not the problem,” Varney said at a June 19 panel discussion sponsored by the American Antitrust Institute. The U.S. economy will “continually see a problem — potentially with Google” because it already “has acquired a monopoly in Internet online advertising.” Concerns of this nature ultimately led Tom Barnett, the last Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, to threaten a Sherman Act monopolization lawsuit if Google went through with plans to buy Yahoo.
Google, on the other hand, contends that the concerns are completely misplaced. “The nature of the Internet is just a fundamentally different world from the sale of packaged software or the bundling of software with OEMs (original equipment manufacturers),” according to Kent Walker, Google’s General Counsel. “The standard line we have is that competition is just one click away.
Panelists:
http://icle.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/IsGoogleMonopolizingSomething-12-7-09.mp3
