Chris Hoofnagle writing at the TAP blog about Facebook’s comprehensive privacy options (“To opt out of full disclosure of most information, it is necessary to click through more than 50 privacy buttons, which then require choosing among a total of more than 170 options.”) claims that…

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Much has been made of Judge Sullivan’s recent decision in City of New York v. Group Health Incorporated and its implications for the UPP test and market definition in merger cases under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.  Given the 2010 Proposed Horizontal Merger Guidelines’ (2010 HMGs) shift toward diversion ratios and margins and away from market shares, the blogosphere has sold Judge Sullivan’s decision as sign that the agencies might have a tough time selling the UPP to federal courts in the post-2010 HMG world.

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Abstract

This Paper presents evidence boards of directors “bargain” with executives about the profits they expect to make from trades in firm stock. The evidence suggests executives whose trading freedom is increased using Rule 10b5-1 trading plans experienced reductions in other forms of pay to offset the potential gains from trading. There are two benefits from trading—portfolio optimization and informed trading profits—and this Paper allows us to isolate them. The data show boards pay executives in a way that reflects the profits they are expected to earn from informed trades. The legal issues about paying using illegal profits are explored. As a matter of policy, the data seriously undercut criticisms of the laissez-faire view of insider trading most closely associated with Henry Manne. At least with respect to classic insider trading (that is, a manager of a firm trading on the basis of information about the firm where she works), if boards are taking potential trading profits into consideration when setting pay, it is difficult to locate potential victims of this trading. Current shareholders should be happy with a deal that pays managers in part out of the hide of future shareholders, and the firm should internalize any costs arising from this payment scheme, since future shareholders should take this into account when deciding whether and what price to buy shares. While there still may be good reasons to prohibit some individuals from trading on material, non-public information, the case for classic insider trading is made much weaker by this data.

Here (HT: Danny Sokol).   The post by Andreas Stephan implies that the OFT’s mistakes in the BA prosecution threaten to undermine the effectiveness of cartel enforcement in the UK generally and predicts that the OFT will not bring more criminal prosecutions in the near future.   Stephan also provides some more detail on what apparently went wrong…

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Taking a page from Rahm Emanuel’s never let a serious crisis go to waste playbook, our esteemed senators are loading the pending financial reform legislation, ostensibly aimed at preventing future financial meltdowns, with all sorts of wish-list items that have nothing to do with financial crises.

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Abstract

State Consumer Protection Acts (CPAs) were designed to supplement the Federal Trade Commission’s mission of protecting consumers and are often referred to as “little-FTC Acts.” There is growing concern that enforcement under these acts is not only qualitatively different than FTC enforcement, but may be counterproductive for consumers. This article examines a sample of CPA claims and compares them to the FTC standard. It identifies qualitative differences between CPA and FTC claims by commissioning a “Shadow Federal Trade Commission” of experts in consumer protection. The study finds that many CPA claims include conduct that would not be illegal under the FTC standards and that most of the cases with illegal conduct would not warrant FTC enforcement. Even among CPA cases where the plaintiff prevailed, nearly half do not include illegal conduct under the FTC standard and most of the cases with illegal conduct would not invoke FTC enforcement. The results clearly suggest private litigation under little-FTC Acts tends to pursue a different consumer protection mission than the Bureau of Consumer Protection at the Federal Trade Commission.

Let’s get one thing straight: At the end of the day, our recent financial woes were primarily caused by the mispricing of assets. A housing bubble (or, more accurately, a number of local housing bubbles) emerged as home prices grew much faster than home values. People were buying homes that they knew were on the pricey side because they figured they could always sell them to a “greater fool” who’d pay even more. Lenders financed these transactions because they knew they could sell their mortgages to federally-backed greater fools, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Eventually, though, it became apparent that prices were out of line with values, the stream of greater fools dried up, and lots of folks found themselves in the unfortunate position of owing more on their homes than the homes are worth. Homeowners began defaulting on their mortgages, many of which had been sold off and packaged into securities that were purchased by financial institutions. Those defaults caused the mortgage-backed securities to fall in value, reducing the capital of the financial institutions that held them and causing insurers of those securities (e.g., sellers of credit default swaps) to have to pay large claims. It’s a somewhat complicated story, but at the end of the day there’s a clear culprit: real estate (and real estate-related) bubbles.

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Abstract

There are very few industries that can attract the attention of Congress, multiple federal and state agencies, consumer groups, economists, antitrust lawyers, the business community, farmers, ranchers, and academics as the agriculture workshops have. Of course, with intense interest from stakeholders comes intense pressure from potential winners and losers in the political process, heated disagreement over how gains from trade should be distributed among various stakeholders, and certainly a variety of competing views over the correct approach to competition policy in agriculture markets. These pressures have the potential to distract antitrust analysis from its core mission: protecting competition and consumer welfare. While imperfect, the economic approach to antitrust that has generated remarkable improvements in outcomes over the last fifty years has rejected simplistic and misleading notions that antitrust is meant to protect “small dealers and worthy men” or to fulfill non-economic objectives; that market concentration is a predictor of market performance; or that competition policy and intellectual property cannot peacefully co-exist. Unfortunately, in the run-up to and during the workshops much of the policy rhetoric encouraged adopting these outdated antitrust approaches, especially ones that would favor one group of stakeholders over another rather than protecting the competitive process. In this essay, we argue that a first principles approach to antitrust analysis is required to guarantee the benefits of competition in the agricultural sector, and discuss three fundamental principles of modern antitrust that, at times, appear to be given short-shrift in the recent debate.

Abstract

Consolidation and increased concentration in the agrifood sector over the past two decades, combined with an increased use of alternative marketing agreements in the poultry and livestock industries, have fueled concerns of anti-competitive behavior among large agribusinesses such as the major meat packing companies. The DOJ and USDA have partnered together in a pledge to strengthen enforcement both of antitrust restrictions and of the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 (“PSA”). This paper provides a brief overview of the ongoing changes in the meat and livestock industries and the role of the PSA. The paper then outlines several challenges facing the successful and efficient use of the PSA as a competition policy from both theoretical and empirical economic perspectives. I argue that regulators need to tread carefully into their newly launched enforcement partnership given how little is well understood of the factors leading to the existing system and, therefore, the likely consequences associated with more aggressive enforcement in the name of competition.