Abstract

The market definition analysis endorsed by the 2010 Proposed Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“new HMGs”) tends toward narrower relevant markets. Because the merging parties cannot point to the consumer gains outside of the narrowly defined product market, the new approach could lead to Section 7 liability for mergers that result in net increases in consumer welfare. This “out of market” efficiency problem obviously does not originate with the new HMGs, nor with the HMGs at all. However, the value of diversion approach to market definition is likely to dramatically increase its practical significance. Failure to incorporate “out of market” efficiencies into merger analysis flies in the face of the modern trend in favor of analyzing actual competitive effects rather than adopting simplifying and potentially misleading proxies. Further, the value of diversion approach adopted by the new HMGs is likely to increase the need for guidance on this score. This comment proposed that the new HMGs amend note 11 to make clear that they would not bring enforcement actions where the Agencies can prove anticompetitive effects in a narrower market, but where the evidence also supports the conclusion that out of market efficiencies are sufficient to eliminate consumer harm in the aggregate. A commitment to forbear from challenging mergers where out of market efficiencies outweigh anticompetitive effects merely updates the new HMGs in a manner consistent with the modern intellectual foundation of merger analysis.

There are hundreds and hundreds of academic articles in law, finance, economics, business, and other social sciences discussing the issue of executive compensation broadly and down to the smallest detail. There are none — actually, one working paper in draft form on one issue — that I can find on the issue of how much and how union bosses are paid. There are scattered news reports here and there, but nothing systematic. This is shocking. The problems are the same — agency costs and the potential for self-serving behavior — as in the corporate context. Although the amounts are likely lower than for CEOs, the agency costs may be higher. I’m working on trying to make some progress on these issues, but the lack of data may make them tough to get at.

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In this morning’s New York Times, Professor Paul Krugman laments the state of America, and, as a remedy, proposes . . . surprise! . . .  more government spending. He writes: “When we save a schoolteacher’s job, that unambiguously aids employment; when we give millionaires more money instead, there’s a good chance that most of that money will just sit idle.” I’m not an economist, but this sentence seems horribly flawed for someone who is. I agree that in a world with zero interest rates and 10 percent unemployment, some government priming of the pump might make sense. Macro-economic conditions need to be changed, and the government is uniquely positioned to do this. After all, it sets the rules, prints the money, sets the level of taxes, and determines through public policy where investment will flow. But the question is how and where to act. Krugman believes taxing us to raise money to pay teachers is part of the answer. I doubt it, for several reasons.

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Earlier this year, the US Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to Costco in the case of OMEGA SA v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (541 F. 3d 982 (2008)).  At issue is whether the ‘first sale doctrine’ of US copyright law (17 U.S.C. § 109(a)), which limits the copyright owner’s ability to restrict distribution of its product after first sale, applies to foreign-manufactured products whose first sale was outside the U.S. and whose importation to the U.S. was not authorized by the manufacturer. (I happened to run across a July 31 op-ed by Eric Felten at the WSJ lamenting the potential for the case to limit the ability of libraries to lend books, particularly books originally published and purchased overseas.) The case raises some interesting issues about the role and purpose of copyright protection, segregated market price discrimination in a global economy, and the role of the gray markets in arbitraging global price disparities.

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One of the first reactions I had when reading the settlement is that it is quite striking how much and at what level of detail the settlement micro-manages Intel’s business decisions.  Lets consider a just a handful of provisions and look at the language in the settlement.  Again, I think these provisions should be read with the benefit of some perspective in market performance during the relevant time period.

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Let me add on a few brief observations on the Intel settlement to Dan’s earlier comments, with which I largely agree.  There is a lot to say about the settlement: the predatory design aspects, Section 5, the (I found) quite odd self-congratulatory settlement press conference and webcast, and of course, what the settlement means for consumers.  I’m very interested in all of these issues, but perhaps none is more important than the last.   We cannot simply assume that the settlement equates to a victory for consumers.  Readers of this blog will be very familiar with the argument that merely counting cases, or agency activity, and of course settlements, are not reliable measures of the quality of agency performance or meaningful from a consumer welfare perspective.  But problems with this case make that warning especially appropriate here.  Thus, before delving into some first reactions based on language in the settlement over the days and maybe weeks to come, some perspective is in order.

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The Comprehensive Alcohol Regulatory Effectiveness Act — yes, the “CARE Act” — or HR 5034, is a piece of legislation aimed at supporting “State-based alcohol regulation.”  Recall the Supreme Court’s decision in Granholm v. Heald, which held that states could either allow in-state and out-of-state retailers to directly ship wine to consumers or could prohibit it for both, but couldn’t ban direct shipment only for out-of-state sellers while allowing in for in-state sellers.  Most states thus far have opened up direct shipping laws to the benefit of consumers.    While we occasionally criticize the Federal Trade Commission from time to time here at TOTM, its own research demonstrating that state regulation banning direct shipment and e-commerce harmed consumers is an excellent example of the potential for competition research and development impacting regulatory debates.  Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Granholm cites the FTC study (not to mention co-blogger Mike Sykuta’s work here) a number of times.  But in addition to direct shipment laws, there are a whole host of state laws regulating the sale and distribution of alcohol.  Some of them have obviously pernicious competitive consequences for consumers as well as producers.  The beneficiaries are the wholesalers who have successfully lobbied for the protection of the state.  Fundamentally, the CARE Act aims to place these laws beyond the reach of any challenge under the Commerce Clause as per Granholm, the Sherman Act, or any other federal legislation.  Whether the CARE Act has any ancillary social benefits is an important empirical question — but you can bet that the first-order effect of the law, if it were to go into effect, would be to increase beer, wine and liquor prices.  More on the CARE Act and state regulation of alcoholic beverages below the fold.

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Connecticut AG Richard Blumenthal has reportedly contacted Apple and Amazon concerning their pricing arrangements with publishers (WSJ, CNN):

Mr. Blumenthal said he has sent letters to Amazon and Apple asking them to “meet with his office” to address his concerns that agreements in place may restrict rivals from offering cheaper e-books. For instance, he said, “both Amazon and Apple have reached agreements with the largest e-book publishers that ensure both will receive the best prices for e-books over any competitors.”

A “most favored nation” (MFN) clause is a contractual agreement between a supplier and a customer that requires the supplier to sell to the customer on pricing terms at least as favorable as the pricing terms on which that supplier sells to other customers.

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Dan Crane’s post on the DOJ’s antitrust activity, and in particular, monopolization enforcement, during the Obama administration notes the dissonance between rhetoric and reality.  I thought I’d post the following data from the DOJ website concerning Section 2 investigations initiated and cases won over the last 40 years for some perspective.

Read the full piece here.