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TOTM David Balto has penned a short apologia of the FTC’s Intel case (HT: Danny Sokol). Unfortunately his defense (and, unfortunately, the FTC’s case) is woefully . . .
David Balto has penned a short apologia of the FTC’s Intel case (HT: Danny Sokol). Unfortunately his defense (and, unfortunately, the FTC’s case) is woefully misguided.
Balto writes…
Read the full piece here.
Scholarship Abstract This essay criticizes the Federal Trade Commission’s defense of its use Section 5 of the FTC Act in the Intel case. The FTC’s (and . . .
This essay criticizes the Federal Trade Commission’s defense of its use Section 5 of the FTC Act in the Intel case. The FTC’s (and particularly Chairman Leibowitz’) claims that the error cost concerns that figure prominently in recent Supreme Court Sherman Act cases ought not to apply, and are not intended to apply, to government enforcers are misguided and dangerous.
TOTM Economist, co-author, and sometimes TOTM guest David Evans (UCL, University of Chicago School of Law) has an excellent note on “Why Now is Not the . . .
Economist, co-author, and sometimes TOTM guest David Evans (UCL, University of Chicago School of Law) has an excellent note on “Why Now is Not the Right Time To Revamp Consumer Protection,” based on remarks made at the New York Federal Reserve Board-New York University Conference on Regulating Consumer Financial Products yesterday in New York. Evans makes some of the points we discuss in our joint work criticizing the intellectual basis for the Consumer Financial Protection Agency, but also offers a concise and powerful case against “revamping” consumer protection too hastily, or without attention to the institutional details or the economic evidence. Geoff’s post the other day on credit card regulation, for example, points out precisely the types of harmful errors that can be made on “behalf” of consumers when invoking the behavioral economics literature without analyzing it (or the related empirical evidence) closely. Evans makes six essential points — and I’m excerpting here — but I suggest readers check out the whole thing…
TOTM The Searle Center Civil Justice Institute has announced the release of its preliminary report on State Consumer Protection Acts: An Empirical Investigation of Private Litigation. . . .
The Searle Center Civil Justice Institute has announced the release of its preliminary report on State Consumer Protection Acts: An Empirical Investigation of Private Litigation. You can read the Executive Summary here. As the Searle Center State Consumer Protection Acts Task Force Chair, I’ve been involved in the data collection, analysis, and drafting of this project over the last couple of years along with the rest of the Task Force (the Searle Center’s Executive Director Henry Butler, Jason Johnston (Penn), Jeffrey Jarosh, and Samantha Zyontz) and really is the product of a team effort including the Task Force, Searle Center research assistants (Micah Hughes, Jonathan Hillel, Matthew Sibery, Hayley Smith, and Judd Stone) and Research Coordinator Elise Nelson. I’m incredibly grateful to have worked with such a skilled group. This preliminary report is the first research project released growing out of a larger research agenda on state consumer protection regulation. Some exciting projects are to follow.
TOTM I will focus my blog post on one of the proposals for reducing interchange fees: the requirement that the fees be disclosed to consumers. I . . .
I will focus my blog post on one of the proposals for reducing interchange fees: the requirement that the fees be disclosed to consumers. I am not sure how seriously this option is taken by the GAO report. Indeed, the report concedes that mandated disclosures in this context are not very likely to be effective, because “consumers are likely to disregard this kind of information.” But I will not be surprised if, of all the regulatory options discussed in the report, in the end it will be the disclosure rule that is enacted.
Popular Media In Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) nexus-of-contracts approach to the firm, bosses don’t necessarily hire workers; workers may just as easily hire bosses. Recall Cheung’s (1983, p. 8) famous illustration: . . .
In Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) nexus-of-contracts approach to the firm, bosses don’t necessarily hire workers; workers may just as easily hire bosses. Recall Cheung’s (1983, p. 8) famous illustration: “My own favorite example is riverboat pulling in China before the communist regime, when a large group of workers marched along the shore towing a good-sized wooden boat. The unique interest of this example is that the collaborators actually agreed to the hiring of a monitor to whip them.” In Alchian and Demsetz’s example, the employee can “fire” his employer by quitting, just as I can “fire” my grocer by shopping at a different store.
TOTM Chairman Kovacic has posted a paper announcing a major self-assessment initiative at the FTC: The FTC at 100: Into our Second Century. Here is the . . .
Chairman Kovacic has posted a paper announcing a major self-assessment initiative at the FTC: The FTC at 100: Into our Second Century. Here is the opening paragraph…
TOTM After a year long investigation, Michael Giberson (of the excellent Knowledge Problem) points to the DC Attorney General’s announcement that a single retailer has agreed . . .
After a year long investigation, Michael Giberson (of the excellent Knowledge Problem) points to the DC Attorney General’s announcement that a single retailer has agreed to pay a fine of $897.61 without admitting any wrongdoing. Yes, 900 bucks.
TOTM Economist Michael Salinger, Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Economics for the past year, comments on the recent FTC Report and price gouging . . .
Economist Michael Salinger, Director of the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Economics for the past year, comments on the recent FTC Report and price gouging in Sunday’s WSJ (HT: Greg Mankiw). I have blogged a bit about the FTC Report previously: once about its findings (that “market manipulation” did not explain post-Katrina price increases), once about media reactions to the Report, and again criticizing the ill-advised proposed federal price gouging legislation.
