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TOTM As regular readers know, interchange fees are a frequent topic of conversation around the blog. Taking the conversation from the ether to the real world, . . .
As regular readers know, interchange fees are a frequent topic of conversation around the blog. Taking the conversation from the ether to the real world, ICLE has funded a white paper and is putting on a conference next week on the topic. The conference, in fact, grows out of the successful online symposium we held here at Truth on the Market a few months ago. An e-book/pdf version of the posts and comments from that sympoisum can be downloaded here, by the way. A few of the participants from the symposium will be participating in the conference, as well (more below).
Read the full piece here.
Scholarship Abstract State Consumer Protection Acts (CPAs) were designed to supplement the Federal Trade Commission’s mission of protecting consumers and are often referred to as “little-FTC . . .
State Consumer Protection Acts (CPAs) were designed to supplement the Federal Trade Commission’s mission of protecting consumers and are often referred to as “little-FTC Acts.” There is growing concern that enforcement under these acts is not only qualitatively different than FTC enforcement, but may be counterproductive for consumers. This article examines a sample of CPA claims and compares them to the FTC standard. It identifies qualitative differences between CPA and FTC claims by commissioning a “Shadow Federal Trade Commission” of experts in consumer protection. The study finds that many CPA claims include conduct that would not be illegal under the FTC standards and that most of the cases with illegal conduct would not warrant FTC enforcement. Even among CPA cases where the plaintiff prevailed, nearly half do not include illegal conduct under the FTC standard and most of the cases with illegal conduct would not invoke FTC enforcement. The results clearly suggest private litigation under little-FTC Acts tends to pursue a different consumer protection mission than the Bureau of Consumer Protection at the Federal Trade Commission.
TOTM David Balto has penned a short apologia of the FTC’s Intel case (HT: Danny Sokol). Unfortunately his defense (and, unfortunately, the FTC’s case) is woefully . . .
David Balto has penned a short apologia of the FTC’s Intel case (HT: Danny Sokol). Unfortunately his defense (and, unfortunately, the FTC’s case) is woefully misguided.
Balto writes…
Scholarship Abstract This essay criticizes the Federal Trade Commission’s defense of its use Section 5 of the FTC Act in the Intel case. The FTC’s (and . . .
This essay criticizes the Federal Trade Commission’s defense of its use Section 5 of the FTC Act in the Intel case. The FTC’s (and particularly Chairman Leibowitz’) claims that the error cost concerns that figure prominently in recent Supreme Court Sherman Act cases ought not to apply, and are not intended to apply, to government enforcers are misguided and dangerous.
TOTM Economist, co-author, and sometimes TOTM guest David Evans (UCL, University of Chicago School of Law) has an excellent note on “Why Now is Not the . . .
Economist, co-author, and sometimes TOTM guest David Evans (UCL, University of Chicago School of Law) has an excellent note on “Why Now is Not the Right Time To Revamp Consumer Protection,” based on remarks made at the New York Federal Reserve Board-New York University Conference on Regulating Consumer Financial Products yesterday in New York. Evans makes some of the points we discuss in our joint work criticizing the intellectual basis for the Consumer Financial Protection Agency, but also offers a concise and powerful case against “revamping” consumer protection too hastily, or without attention to the institutional details or the economic evidence. Geoff’s post the other day on credit card regulation, for example, points out precisely the types of harmful errors that can be made on “behalf” of consumers when invoking the behavioral economics literature without analyzing it (or the related empirical evidence) closely. Evans makes six essential points — and I’m excerpting here — but I suggest readers check out the whole thing…
TOTM The Searle Center Civil Justice Institute has announced the release of its preliminary report on State Consumer Protection Acts: An Empirical Investigation of Private Litigation. . . .
The Searle Center Civil Justice Institute has announced the release of its preliminary report on State Consumer Protection Acts: An Empirical Investigation of Private Litigation. You can read the Executive Summary here. As the Searle Center State Consumer Protection Acts Task Force Chair, I’ve been involved in the data collection, analysis, and drafting of this project over the last couple of years along with the rest of the Task Force (the Searle Center’s Executive Director Henry Butler, Jason Johnston (Penn), Jeffrey Jarosh, and Samantha Zyontz) and really is the product of a team effort including the Task Force, Searle Center research assistants (Micah Hughes, Jonathan Hillel, Matthew Sibery, Hayley Smith, and Judd Stone) and Research Coordinator Elise Nelson. I’m incredibly grateful to have worked with such a skilled group. This preliminary report is the first research project released growing out of a larger research agenda on state consumer protection regulation. Some exciting projects are to follow.
TOTM I will focus my blog post on one of the proposals for reducing interchange fees: the requirement that the fees be disclosed to consumers. I . . .
I will focus my blog post on one of the proposals for reducing interchange fees: the requirement that the fees be disclosed to consumers. I am not sure how seriously this option is taken by the GAO report. Indeed, the report concedes that mandated disclosures in this context are not very likely to be effective, because “consumers are likely to disregard this kind of information.” But I will not be surprised if, of all the regulatory options discussed in the report, in the end it will be the disclosure rule that is enacted.
Popular Media In Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) nexus-of-contracts approach to the firm, bosses don’t necessarily hire workers; workers may just as easily hire bosses. Recall Cheung’s (1983, p. 8) famous illustration: . . .
In Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) nexus-of-contracts approach to the firm, bosses don’t necessarily hire workers; workers may just as easily hire bosses. Recall Cheung’s (1983, p. 8) famous illustration: “My own favorite example is riverboat pulling in China before the communist regime, when a large group of workers marched along the shore towing a good-sized wooden boat. The unique interest of this example is that the collaborators actually agreed to the hiring of a monitor to whip them.” In Alchian and Demsetz’s example, the employee can “fire” his employer by quitting, just as I can “fire” my grocer by shopping at a different store.
TOTM Chairman Kovacic has posted a paper announcing a major self-assessment initiative at the FTC: The FTC at 100: Into our Second Century. Here is the . . .
Chairman Kovacic has posted a paper announcing a major self-assessment initiative at the FTC: The FTC at 100: Into our Second Century. Here is the opening paragraph…
