In our second post, we want to discuss some of the implications of the study (the details of which we described in our first post). One of the consistent concerns about BL&E in this symposium is about the too-quick jump from data to policy. We should emphasize that we think more work needs to be done to support these potential policy suggestions, but, importantly, we think that the answers to the policy issues rest fundamentally on empirical questions.

Read the full piece here. 

Having started my career as an experimental economist I probably have a little different, but I hope complimentary, perspective on behavioral economics and other experimental programs in general.

I view the difference between experimental and behavioral economics in terms of (1) what is studied, and (2) how it is studied.  Experimental economists are interested in institutional and organizational rules and how these rules affect both, the joint behavior of participants, and the outcome generating, or process, performance of the institutional rules in question.  To study this the experimental economist induces preferences and implements a microeconomic system.  One major problem for this approach is that ‘risk preferences’ are very noisy, when induced, due either to, the added complexity imposed on subjects of having to work with induced preferences, or that the induced preferences conflict with a subject’s actual preferences.  A second major problem with this approach is that institutional rules that are isolated in the lab often depend on on additional rules that are not being studied, or social and cultural norms that are not present in the lab.  Experimental economists have learned to manage these problems and many interesting research papers have been produced.

Read the full piece here. 

I want to challenge what seems to be a premise of this symposium: that much of the behavioral “contribution” to economics is about people’s “mistakes” (either cognitive mistakes or “weakness of the will”) and the consequent need for paternalistic intervention.   I think the behavioral perspective has much more to offer; I also think that the focus on mistakes is overblown and pernicious.  Behavioral law and economics was supposed to bring more realism to law and economics.  The worldview in which people are either making mistakes or “getting it right” isn’t much more realistic than the one in which people are always “getting it right.”  Moreover, advancing such a worldview as realistic is a step backwards:  the admittedly “unrealistic” but ostensibly “useful” law and economics is being supplanted by the supposedly more realistic binary world in which people either make mistakes or get it right.  To be sure, of course people sometimes do make “mistakes.” A focus on mistakes that is more methodology (how we proceed) than ontology (how the world is) is quite useful:  of all the ways people act other than as the traditional paradigm predicts, the subset we can label as “mistakes” (and, to be more precise, cognitive mistakes rather than “weakness of the will”) may present a particularly good case for regulatory interventions.  Indeed, the label “mistake” is often used for what is actually “weakness of the will” – not a mistake at all, since a person really does want both cake and good health (and, according to some evidence, she may regret more regularly choosing health over the cake than the cake over health).  In those cases, any regulatory intervention is more appropriately justified by externalities.

Read the full piece here. 

Few academic publications have had as much direct public influence on the law as the 2008 article by my NYU colleague Oren Bar-Gill and then Harvard Law Professor Elizabeth Warren.  In “Making Credit Safer,” they seek to combine two strands of academic thought in support of one great cause—more regulation of financial markets.  They start with the central claim of behavioral economics that sophisticated entrepreneurs are able to take advantage of the systematic foibles of ordinary people, by rigging their products in ways that work systematically to their own advantage.  By plying ordinary individuals will carefully packaged payment contracts, firms can undercut the central postulate of rational choice economics that all voluntary transactions produce mutual gains for the parties.  In its stead we get the wreckage of families and fortunes brought about by unscrupulous bankers in search of a buck.  Warren and Bar-Gill repeatedly talk about the importance of empirical evidence.  Her own work, however, is exceptionally shoddy, as Todd Zywicki has recently pointed out in the Wall Street Journal.

Read the full piece here. 

The idea that the regularity of behavioral departures from full rationality justifies regulatory intervention has rarely gained more credence than in the context of consumer finance.  The Credit CARD Act of 2009 rests on nothing so much as the supposition that cardholder decisions about spending and repayment reflect systematic misapprehension of the likely patterns of future behavior.  And given Elizabeth Warren’s prior writings with Oren Bar-Gill, we can expect the new CFPB to rely heavily on such regulation.

Read the full piece here. 

Behavioral law and economics has arisen to international prominence; between Cass Sunstein’s appointment to head the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs the United Kingdom’s appointment of a “nudge” bureau, behavioralism has enjoyed a meteoric impact on policymakers.  Thus far, behavioral economists have almost exclusively focused on the myriad foibles or purported cognitive errors which hamper consumer decision-making.  These traits include “optimism bias,” the tendency for an individual to underestimate the likelihood of negative results from their behavior, and hyperbolic discounting, where individuals reveal time-inconsistent preferences (often by over-valuing immediate consumption, at least as measured against some third party’s valuation).

Read the full piece here.

We would like to start by thanking Josh for inviting us to participate in what promises to be a fascinating discussion on an important subject.  We’re looking forward to engaging with the other members of the symposium.

To begin with, we would like to talk about some of our own experimental research on the valuation anomaly widely known as the “endowment effect.”  Over the past quarter century, laboratory and field research in the social sciences has provided considerable evidence for the existence of a significant gap between the valuations that people attach to goods that they own and the valuations they attach to goods they are considering purchasing.  Thus, in one classic and well-replicated study, subjects to whom a university coffee mug was given indicated substantially higher willingness-to-accept values than subjects who indicated their willingness-to-pay for the mug.  This and similar studies suggest that aspects of goods that should be irrelevant from the perspective of neoclassical economics – such as the fact of prior ownership – can systematically bias valuations of those goods and lead to sub-optimal exchanges and inefficiencies.

Read the full piece here.

Behavioralism is mesmerizing.  Ever since I took Cass Sunstein’s outstanding Elements of the Law course as a 1L at the University of Chicago Law School, I’ve been fascinated by studies purporting to show how humans are systematically irrational.

Read the full piece here. 

The problem with behavioral law and economics (and its behavioral economics cousin) is not that it has nothing interesting to say, but rather that the interesting things it has to say do not mean what its proponents think they mean.  It is one thing to claim that people are less rational than we thought.  It even one thing to claim that people are systematically less rational than we thought, in predictable and important ways.  But it is entirely another to presume that the implication of this is a larger scope for government regulation to protect the market and market actors from the depredations of this irrationality.

Read the full piece here.