Haas-Sloan Conference on 

The Law & Economics of Organization: New Challenges and Directions

Nov. 30-Dec. 1, 2012

The Walter A. Haas School of Business, with support from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, is issuing a call for original research papers to be presented at the Conference on The Law & Economics of Organization: New Challenges and Directions. The conference will be held at the Haas School of Business in Berkeley, CA, on Friday, November 30, and Saturday, December 1, 2012. A reception and dinner will follow a keynote address by Nobel Laureate Oliver Williamson on Friday.

The purpose of the conference is to take stock of recent advances in the analysis of economic organization and institutions inspired by the work of 2009 Nobel Laureate Oliver Williamson and to examine its implications for contemporary problems of organization and regulation. Empirical research and research informed by detailed industry and institutional knowledge is especially welcome.

Relevant topics include but are not limited to

• the nature, role, and implications of bounded rationality and opportunism as they relate to issues of contracting and the institutional framework governing contractual relationships
• government intervention in the market through regulation, antitrust policies, and direct investment (e.g., energy market and health care regulation; patent enforcement; concession contracts in alternative legal environments; government tax preferences for and subsidization of technologies and markets)
• the operation and regulation of financial markets and institutions (e.g., the origins of and responses to the financial crisis; the role of credit rating agencies; financial and futures market organization and regulation)
• legal and economic determinants of corporate organization, from joint ventures to the organization of corporate boards (e.g, labor restrictions and corporate organization; organization of high technology companies; regulation of corporate boards)

Paper proposals or, if available, completed papers should be submitted on line at http://www.bus.umich.edu/Conferences/Haas-Sloan-LEO-Conference by March 31, 2012. The deadline for completed papers is November 1, 2012. Selections will be made by the conference organizers, Professors Pablo Spiller (Berkeley), Scott Masten (Michigan), and Alan Schwartz (Yale). Conference papers will be published in a special issue of the Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization.

Filed under: antitrust, behavioral economics, economics

Stan Liebowitz (UT-Dallas) offers a characteristically thoughtful and provocative op-ed in the WSJ today commenting on SOPA and the Protect IP Act.  Here’s an excerpt:

You may have noticed last Wednesday’s blackout of Wikipedia or Google’s strange blindfolded-logo screen. These were attempts to kill the Protect IP Act and the Stop Online Piracy Act, proposed legislation intended to hinder piracy and counterfeiting. The laws now before Congress may not be perfect, and they can still be amended. But to do nothing and stay with the status quo is to keep our creative industries at risk by failing to enforce their property rights.

Critics of these proposed laws claim that they are unnecessary and will lead to frivolous claims, reduce innovation and stifle free speech. Those are gross exaggerations. The same critics have been making these claims about every previous attempt to rein in piracy, including the Digital Millennium Copyright Act that was called a draconian antipiracy measure at the time of its passage in 1998. As we all know, the DMCA did not kill the Internet, or even do any noticeable damage to freedom—or to pirates.

…

Scads of Internet pundits and bloggers have vehemently argued that piracy is really a sales-promoting activity—because it gives people a free sample that might lead to a purchase—or that any piracy problems have been due to a failure of industry to embrace the Internet. Yet these claims are little more than wishful thinking. Some reflect a hostility to commercial activities—think Occupy Wall Street, or self-interest. Others make “freedom” claims on behalf of sites that profit by helping individuals find pirate sites, makers of complementary hardware, or companies that benefit from Internet usage and collect revenues whether the material being accessed was legally obtained or not.

In my examination of peer-reviewed studies, the great majority have results that conform to common sense: Piracy harms copyright owners. I was also somewhat surprised to discover that the typical finding of such academic studies was that the entire enormous decline that has occurred is due to piracy.

Contrary to an often-repeated myth, providing consumers with convenient downloads at reasonable prices, as iTunes did, does not appear to have ameliorated piracy at all. The sales decline after iTunes exploded on the scene was about the same as the decline before iTunes existed. Apparently it really is difficult to compete with free. Is that really such a surprise?

Do check out the whole thing.

 

 

Filed under: business, copyright, economics, intellectual property, music, technology

The fight over SOPA is about the ownership of intellectual property.  Rights to intellectual property have two effects.  The benefits of intellectual property are the incentives for creation.  The costs are that after some work is created any price above marginal cost (which is often zero for digital property) will discourage valuable use.

Every piece of intellectual property than now exists was created with the incentives that were in place when it was created.  No change in intellectual property rights can have any effect on existing works.  Therefore, any change in property rights should be entirely prospective.  That is, any change in property rights should effect only works copyrighted after the passage of the legislation.

Of course, there are huge rents associated with the ownership of existing rights, and fights over these rents will  continue.  But we should recognize that these fights are over rents — payments which have no incentive effects.  If our goal is efficiency, we should stop wasting resources on these fights and start from now.

Filed under: copyright, intellectual property, truth on the market

A Congressional Bill proposing a “Reasonable Profits Board” so that profits on the sale of oil and gas in excess of what is “reasonable” can be subjected to a windfall tax.  A brief description:

According to the bill, a windfall tax of 50 percent would be applied when the sale of oil or gas leads to a profit of between 100 percent and 102 percent of a reasonable profit. The windfall tax would jump to 75 percent when the profit is between 102 and 105 percent of a reasonable profit, and above that, the windfall tax would be 100 percent. The bill also specifies that the oil-and-gas companies, as the seller, would have to pay this tax.

We have a long archives of posts here at TOTM on a variety of forms of price gouging legislation in oil and gas.   Most recently, in discussing a White House Task Force aimed to detect price gouging and usurping jurisdiction from the Federal Trade Commission, I wrote:

One need only read the FTC’s 222 page report on gasoline prices post-Katrina and Rita to appreciate the Commission’s expertise in this area.  But perhaps most importantly, and undoubtedly related to the appointment of a working group outside the Commission, is that the Commission understands the relevant economics.  Indeed, as I noted just recently, then Bureau of Economics Director Michael Salinger gets it right when he observed  “as unpleasant as high-priced gasoline is, running out will be even worse.”  Further, it was the Commission Report that found not only scant evidence of what might be described as “gouging” — but did find examples of gas stations that shut down rather than risk a suit under a state price gouging law.  “Price Gouging Helps Consumers” doesn’t make for much of an election slogan, so perhaps this is all to be expected.  But nobody should be fooled into believing that enforcement of existing state price gouging laws, or a new federal task force devoted investigate “price gouging,” are going to make consumers better off.

The criticisms against price gouging laws become even stronger against a “Reasonable Profits Board,” which is even more blatantly political, even more likely to harm consumers, and even more likely to waste social resources than enforcement of state price gouging laws.

 

Filed under: economics, federal trade commission

Regular readers will know that several of us TOTM bloggers are fans of the “decision-theoretic” approach to antitrust law.  Such an approach, which Josh and Geoff often call an “error cost” approach, recognizes that antitrust liability rules may misfire in two directions:  they may wrongly acquit harmful practices, and they may wrongly convict beneficial (or benign) behavior.  Accordingly, liability rules should be structured to minimize total error costs (welfare losses from condemning good stuff and acquitting bad stuff), while keeping in check the costs of administering the rules (e.g., the costs courts and business planners incur in applying the rules).  The goal, in other words, should be to minimize the sum of decision and error costs.  As I have elsewhere demonstrated, the Roberts Court’s antitrust jurisprudence seems to embrace this sort of approach.

One of my long-term projects (once I jettison some administrative responsibilities, like co-chairing my school’s dean search committee!) will be to apply the decision-theoretic approach to regulation generally.  I hope to build upon some classic regulatory scholarship, like Alfred Kahn’s Economics of Regulation (1970) and Justice Breyer’s Regulation and Its Reform (1984), to craft a systematic regulatory model that both avoids “regulatory mismatch” (applying the wrong regulatory fix to a particular type of market failure) and incorporates the decision-theoretic perspective. 

In the meantime, I’ve been thinking about insider trading regulation.  Our friend Professor Bainbridge recently invited me to contribute to a volume he’s editing on insider trading.  I’m planning to conduct a decision-theoretic analysis of actual and proposed insider trading regulation.

Such regulation is a terrific candidate for decision-theoretic analysis because stock trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information itself is a “mixed bag” practice:  Some instances of insider trading are, on net, socially beneficial; others create net welfare losses.  Contrast, for example, two famous insider trading cases:

• In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, mining company insiders who knew of an unannounced ore discovery purchased stock in their company, knowing that the stock price would rise when the discovery was announced.  Their trading activity caused the stock price to rise over time.  Such price movement might have tipped off landowners in the vicinity of the deposit and caused them not to sell their property to the company (or to do so only at a high price), in which case the traders’ activity would have thwarted a valuable corporate opportunity.  If corporations cannot exploit their discoveries of hidden value (because of insider trading), they’ll be less likely to seek out hidden value in the first place, and social welfare will be reduced.  TGS thus represents “bad” insider trading.  
• Dirks v. SEC, by contrast, illustrates “good” insider trading.  In that case, an insider tipped a securities analyst that a company was grossly overvalued because of rampant fraud.  The analyst recommended that his clients sell (or buy puts on) the stock of the fraud-ridden corporation.  That trading helped expose the fraud, creating social value in the form of more accurate stock prices.

These are just two examples of how insider trading may reduce or enhance social welfare.  In general, instances of insider trading may reduce social welfare by preventing firms from exploiting and thus creating valuable information (as in TGS), by creating incentives for deliberate mismanagement (because insiders can benefit from “bad news” and might therefore be encouraged to “create” it), and perhaps by limiting stock market liquidity or reducing market efficiency by increasing bid-ask spreads.  On the other hand, instances of insider trading may enhance social welfare by making stock markets more efficient (so that prices better reflect firms’ expected profitability and capital is more appropriately channeled), by reducing firms’ compensation costs (as the right to engage in insider trading replaces managers’ cash compensation—on this point, see the excellent work by our former blog colleague, Todd Henderson), and by reducing the corporate mismanagement and subsequent wealth destruction that comes from stock mispricing (mainly overvaluation of equity—see work by Michael Jensen and yours truly).

Because insider trading is sometimes good and sometimes bad, rules restricting it may err in two directions:  they may acquit/encourage bad instances, or they may condemn/prevent good instances.  In either case, social welfare suffers.  Accordingly, the optimal regulatory regime would seek to minimize the sum of losses from improper condemnations and improper acquittals (total error costs), while keeping administrative costs in check.

My contribution to Prof. Bainbridge’s insider trading book will employ decision theory to evaluate three actual or proposed approaches to regulating insider trading:  (1) the “level playing field” paradigm, apparently favored by many prosecutors and securities regulators, which would condemn any stock trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information; (2) the legal status quo, which deems “fraudulent” any insider trading where the trader owes either a fiduciary duty to his trading partner or a duty of trust or confidence to the source of his nonpublic information; and (3) a laissez-faire, “contractarian” approach, which would permit corporations and sources of nonpublic information to posit their own rules about when insiders and informed outsiders may trade on the basis of material, nonpublic information.  I’ll then propose a fourth disclosure-based alternative aimed at maximizing social welfare by enhancing the social benefits and reducing the social costs of insider trading, while keeping decision costs in check. 

Stay tuned…I’ll be trying out a few of the paper’s ideas on TOTM.  I look forward to hearing our informed readers’ thoughts.

Filed under: 10b-5, error costs, insider trading, law and economics, markets, regulation, securities regulation

Regulated firms and their Washington lawyers study agency reports and public statements carefully to figure out the rules of the road; the clearer the rules, the easier it is for regulated firms to understand how the rules affect their businesses and to plan accordingly. So long as the regulator and the regulated firm are on the same page, resources will be put to the most valuable use allowed under the regulations.

Read the full piece here.

As has become customary with just about every new product announcement by Google these days, the company’s introduction on Tuesday of its new “Search, plus Your World” (SPYW) program, which aims to incorporate a user’s Google+ content into her organic search results, has met with cries of antitrust foul play. All the usual blustering and speculation in the latest Google antitrust debate has obscured what should, however, be the two key prior questions: (1) Did Google violate the antitrust laws by not including data from Facebook, Twitter and other social networks in its new SPYW program alongside Google+ content; and (2) How might antitrust restrain Google in conditioning participation in this program in the future?

Read the full piece here.

I am very pleased to pass along this information about the 15th Annual Symposium on Antitrust Law on January 26th, 2012 sponsored by the George Mason Law Review, GMU Law & Economics Center, and Kelley Drye & Warren LLP.

 

The George Mason Law Review, in partnership with the George Mason University Law & Economics Center and sponsor Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, is pleased to present its 15^th Annual Symposium on Antitrust Law on January 26, 2012. The symposium, entitled “Antitrust in High-Tech Industries,” will be held in the Founders Hall Auditorium at George Mason University School of Law, located at 3301 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, Virginia.

The program will focus on the proper role of antitrust in high technology industries, including the extent to which current competition policy is adequate to address dynamic competition concerns that are prevalent in rapidly evolving sectors.  Specifically, panels will explore the application of antitrust laws to social media, mergers, online search, and online advertising.

The Keynote Address will be delivered by William Kovacic, former Chairman of the US Federal Trade Commission.

Please join us on January 26, 2012! To register, click here.

For a detailed description of the Symposium Panels, click here.

Fees:
General Admission: $150.00
Government/Academic: $50.00
Student: $50.00

Note: 5.5 CLE credit hours from the Virginia Bar Association are available for program attendees.

For more information, contact Katie Brown at [email protected] or call (703) 375-9529.

15th Annual Symposium Brochure

Speakers and Agenda:

8:00 – 8:30am            Registration and Continental Breakfast

8:30 – 8:35am             Welcome and Introduction

8:35 – 10:00am          Panel 1: Perspectives on High-Tech Antitrust

Howard Shelanski, Georgetown University Law Center

Herbert Hovenkamp, University of Iowa College of Law

George L. Priest, Yale Law School

Keith Hylton, Boston University School of Law

10:15 – 11:45pm        Panel 2: Social Media

Catherine E. Tucker, MIT Sloan School of Management

Spencer W. Waller, Loyola University, Chicago School of Law

Frank Pasquale, Seton Hall Law School

11:45 – 1:45pm          Luncheon and Keynote Address

William E. Kovacic, The George Washington University Law School

1:45 – 3:15pm             Panel 3: Mergers

Luke M. Froeb, Vanderbilt University

Thomas W. Hazlett, George Mason University School of Law

Jonathan B. Baker, American University Washington College of Law

3:30 – 4:45pm           Panel 4: Search and Online Advertising

William C. MacLeod, Kelly Drye & Warren LLP

Joshua D. Wright, George Mason University School of Law

Daniel Crane, University of Michigan Law School

Scott A. Sher, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati

4:45 – 5:00pm           Closing Remarks

5:00 – 6:00pm           Refreshments/ Reception

Location:
George Mason University School of Law
Founders Hall Auditorium
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201

For directions, click here.

Filed under: antitrust, george mason university school of law

For years the public has been clamoring for a playoff system to crown a champion in college football. Yet the geniuses at the BCS stubbornly defended—at least until now—their computer-knows-best system for inviting the two most worthy teams. By injecting doubt over the legitimacy of its invitees, the current system diminishes the meaning of the BCS title game, as evidenced by the abysmal Nielsen ratings for Monday night’s Alabama-LSU game (only 13.8 percent of U.S. television households tuned in to watch the television equivalent of paint drying) and last year’s Auburn-Oregon title game (15.3 percent). By comparison, the title game between Alabama and Texas just two years ago drew 17.2 percent of U.S. households; if this were a publicly traded firm, its shares would be falling fast.

Read the full piece here.