Showing 9 of 385 Publications in Intellectual Property & Licensing

The Value of Injunctions — Douglas Dynamics v. Buyers Products Co. (Fed. Cir. May 21, 2013)

Popular Media Over at the blog for the Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property, I posted a short essay discussing the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in . . .

Over at the blog for the Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property, I posted a short essay discussing the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Douglas Dynamics v. Buyers Products (Fed. Cir. May 21, 2013).  Here’s a small taste:

The Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Douglas Dynamics, LLC, v. Buyers Products Co. (Fed. Cir. May 21, 2013) is very important given the widespread, albeit mistaken, belief today that the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay v. MercExchange (2005) established that damages and not injunctions are the presumptive remedy for patent infringement. ….

On appeal, Chief Judge Randall Rader resoundingly disagreed with Judge Conley’s belief that the “public interest” is always better served by the introduction of a new competitor who is selling cheaper products.  This is what happened in this case, as Douglas Dynamics and Buyers Products Company are competitors in the sale of snowplow blades.  Instead, Chief Judge Rader recognized that its act of infringement as such is what gave Buyers Products Company its market advantage in undercutting Douglas Dynamics’ prices.  Because it did not have to incur Douglas Dynamics’ ex ante expenses in engaging in innovative research and development, Buyers Products Company’s infringement permitted it the economic advantage of being able to undercut Douglas Dynamics prices’ and thus enter the allegedly “untapped market segment” of cheaper snowplow blades. It was precisely this expansion of a consumer market that the district court relied on in its denial of Douglas Dynamics’ requested injunction. In sum, the district court used an infringement-created expansion of the market to justify denying an injunction and awarding a compulsory license to the patent-owner, which effectively rewarded Buyer Products Company for its act of infringement.

In reversing the district court’s award of a reasonable royalty, Chief Judge Rader explained the basic economic principle of dynamic efficiency that animates the Patent Act in securing property rights to inventors in their patented innovation ….

As bloggers are wont to say, go read the whole thing.

Filed under: intellectual property, patent Tagged: Chief Judge Randall Rader, compulsory license, douglas dynamics, EBay, Patent, patent enforcement, Patent infringement, patent litigation, reasonable royalty

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Intellectual Property & Licensing

Why the ITC is actually a good place to adjudicate standard-essential patents

Popular Media Interest in patent cases — particularly those involving standard-essential patents — at the U.S. International Trade Commission has increased lately, especially in light of recent attention from the White House and Congress.

Excerpt

Interest in patent cases — particularly those involving standard-essential patents — at the U.S. International Trade Commission has increased lately, especially in light of recent attention from the White House and Congress. Critics have argued that the ITC is an inappropriate forum for adjudication of patent suits involving FRAND-encumbered SEPs (required by their owner to be offered to willing licensees on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms) because it has the authority to issue only import and sales bans — injunctions — and not monetary damages….

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Intellectual Property & Licensing

The FTC and Innovative Business Models for Patented Innovation

Popular Media The Federalist Society has started a new program, The Executive Branch Review, which focuses on the myriad fields in which the Executive Branch acts outside of . . .

The Federalist Society has started a new program, The Executive Branch Review, which focuses on the myriad fields in which the Executive Branch acts outside of the constitutional and legal limits imposed on it, either by Executive Orders or by the plethora of semi-independent administrative agencies’ regulatory actions.

I recently posted on the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) ongoing investigations into the patent licensing business model and the actions (“consent decrees”) taken by the FTC against Bosch and Google.  These “consent decrees” constrain Bosch’s and Google’s rights in enforce patents they have committed to standard setting organizations (these patents are called “standard essential patents”). Here’s a brief taste:

One of the most prominent participants at the FTC-DOJ workshop back in December, former DOJ antitrust official and UC-Berkeley economics professor Carl Shapiro, explained in his opening speech that there was still insufficient data on patent licensing companies and their effects on the market.  This is true; for instance, a prominent study cited by Google et al. in support of their request to the FTC to investigate patent licensing companies has been described as being fundamentally flawed on both substantive and methodological grounds. Even more important, Professor Shapiro expressed skepticism at the workshop that, even if there was properly acquired, valid data, the FTC lacked the legal authority to sanction patent licensing firms for being allegedly anti-competitive.

Commentators have long noted that courts and agencies have a lousy historical track record when it comes to assessing the merits of new innovation, whether in new products or new business models. They maintain that the FTC should not continue such mistakes by letting its decision-making today be driven by rhetoric or by the widespread animus against certain commercial firms. Restraint and fact-gathering, institutional virtues reflected in a government animated by the rule of law and respect for individual rights, are key to preventing regulatory overreach and harm to future innovation.

Go read the whole thing, and, while you’re at it, check out Commissioner Joshua Wright’s similar comments on the FTC’s investigations of patent licensing companies, which the FTC calls “patent assertion entities.”

Filed under: antitrust, doj, error costs, federal trade commission, intellectual property, licensing, patent, regulation Tagged: bosch, consent decree, Executive Branch Review, Federal Trade Commission, Federalist Society, FTC-DOJ workshop, google, joshua wright, patent assertion entity, patent licensing, patent troll, regulatory overreach

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Intellectual Property & Licensing

“A Line in the Sand on the Calls for New Patent Legislation,” by Wayne Sobon

Popular Media Over at the blog for the Center for the Protection for Intellectual Property, Wayne Sobon, the Vice President and General Counsel of Inventergy, has posted an . . .

Over at the blog for the Center for the Protection for Intellectual Property, Wayne Sobon, the Vice President and General Counsel of Inventergy, has posted an important essay that criticizes the slew of congressional bills that have been proposed in Congress in recent months. 

In A Line in the Sand on the Calls for New Patent Legislation, Mr. Sobon responds to the heavy-handed rhetoric and emotionalism that dominates the debate today over patent licensing and litigation. He calls for a return to the real first principles of the patent system in discussions about patent licensing, as well as for more measured thinking and analysis about the costs of uncertainty created by never-ending systemic changes from legislation produced by heavy lobbying by interested parties.  Here’s a small taste:

One genius of our patent system has been an implicit recognition that since its underlying subject matter, innovation, remains by definition in constant flux, the scaffolding of our system and the ability of all stakeholders to make reasonably consistent, prudent and socially efficient choices, should remain as stable as possible.  But now these latest moves, demanding yet further significant changes to our patent laws, threaten that stability.  And it is in fact systemic instability, from whatever source, that allows the very parasitic behaviors we have termed “troll”-like, to flourish.

It is silly and blindly ahistoric to lump anyone who seeks to license or enforce a patent right, but who does not themselves make a corresponding product, as a “troll.” 

Read the whole thing here. Mr. Sobon’s essay reflects similar concerns expressed by Commissioner Joshua Wright this past April on the Federal Trade Commission’s investigation of what the FTC identifies as “patent assertion entities.”

Filed under: intellectual property, licensing, patent, politics Tagged: Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property, Josh Wright, PAE, patent assertion entity, patent licensing, patent reform, patent troll, Patents, SHIELD Act, wayne sobon

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Intellectual Property & Licensing

How Copyright Drives Innovation in Scholarly Publishing

Popular Media [Cross posted at the Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property blog.] Today’s public policy debates frame copyright policy solely in terms of a “trade . . .

[Cross posted at the Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property blog.]

Today’s public policy debates frame copyright policy solely in terms of a “trade off” between the benefits of incentivizing new works and the social deadweight losses imposed by the access restrictions imposed by these (temporary) “monopolies.” I recently posted to SSRN a new research paper, called How Copyright Drives Innovation in Scholarly Publishing, explaining that this is a fundamental mistake that has distorted the policy debates about scholarly publishing.

This policy mistake is important because it has lead commentators and decision-makers to dismiss as irrelevant to copyright policy the investments by scholarly publishers of $100s of millions in creating innovative distribution mechanisms in our new digital world. These substantial sunk costs are in addition to the $100s of millions expended annually by publishers in creating, publishing and maintaining reliable, high-quality, standardized articles distributed each year in a wide-ranging variety of academic disciplines and fields of research. The articles now number in the millions themselves; in 2009, for instance, over 2,000 publishers issued almost 1.5 million articles just in the scientific, technical and medical fields, exclusive of the humanities and social sciences.

The mistaken incentive-to-invent conventional wisdom in copyright policy is further compounded by widespread misinformation today about the allegedly “zero cost” of digital publication. As a result, many people are simply unaware of the substantial investments in infrastructure, skilled labor and other resources required to create, publish and maintain scholarly articles on the Internet and in other digital platforms.

This is not merely a so-called “academic debate” about copyright policy and publishing.

The policy distortion caused by the narrow, reductionist incentive-to-create conventional wisdom, when combined with the misinformation about the economics of digital business models, has been spurring calls for “open access” mandates for scholarly research, such as at the National Institute of Health and in recently proposed legislation (FASTR Act) and in other proposed regulations. This policy distortion even influenced Justice Breyer’s opinion in the recent decision in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons (U.S. Supreme Court, March 19, 2013), as he blithely dismissed commercial incentivizes as being irrelevant to fundamental copyright policy. These legal initiatives and the Kirtsaeng decision are motivated in various ways by the incentive-to-create conventional wisdom, by the misunderstanding of the economics of scholarly publishing, and by anti-copyright rhetoric on both the left and right, all of which has become more pervasive in recent years.

But, as I explain in my paper, courts and commentators have long recognized that incentivizing authors to produce new works is not the sole justification for copyright—copyright also incentivizes intermediaries like scholarly publishers to invest in and create innovative legal and market mechanisms for publishing and distributing articles that report on scholarly research. These two policies—the incentive to create and the incentive to commercialize—are interrelated, as both are necessary in justifying how copyright law secures the dynamic innovation that makes possible the “progress of science.” In short, if the law does not secure the fruits of labors of publishers who create legal and market mechanisms for disseminating works, then authors’ labors will go unrewarded as well.

As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor famously observed in the 1984 decision in Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises: “In our haste to disseminate news, it should not be forgotten the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.” Thus, in Harper & Row, the Supreme Court reached the uncontroversial conclusion that copyright secures the fruits of productive labors “where an author and publisher have invested extensive resources in creating an original work.” (emphases added)

This concern with commercial incentives in copyright law is not just theory; in fact, it is most salient in scholarly publishing because researchers are not motivated by the pecuniary benefits offered to authors in conventional publishing contexts. As a result of the policy distortion caused by the incentive-to-create conventional wisdom, some academics and scholars now view scholarly publishing by commercial firms who own the copyrights in the articles as “a form of censorship.” Yet, as courts have observed: “It is not surprising that [scholarly] authors favor liberal photocopying . . . . But the authors have not risked their capital to achieve dissemination. The publishers have.” As economics professor Mark McCabe observed (somewhat sardonically) in a research paper released last year for the National Academy of Sciences: he and his fellow academic “economists knew the value of their journals, but not their prices.”

The widespread ignorance among the public, academics and commentators about the economics of scholarly publishing in the Internet age is quite profound relative to the actual numbers.  Based on interviews with six different scholarly publishers—Reed Elsevier, Wiley, SAGE, the New England Journal of Medicine, the American Chemical Society, and the American Institute of Physics—my research paper details for the first time ever in a publication and at great length the necessary transaction costs incurred by any successful publishing enterprise in the Internet age.  To take but one small example from my research paper: Reed Elsevier began developing its online publishing platform in 1995, a scant two years after the advent of the World Wide Web, and its sunk costs in creating this first publishing platform and then digitally archiving its previously published content was over $75 million. Other scholarly publishers report similarly high costs in both absolute and relative terms.

Given the widespread misunderstandings of the economics of Internet-based business models, it bears noting that such high costs are not unique to scholarly publishers.  Microsoft reportedly spent $10 billion developing Windows Vista before it sold a single copy, of which it ultimately did not sell many at all. Google regularly invests $100s of millions, such as $890 million in the first quarter of 2011, in upgrading its data centers.  It is somewhat surprising that such things still have to be pointed out a scant decade after the bursting of the dot.com bubble, a bubble precipitated by exactly the same mistaken view that businesses have somehow been “liberated” from the economic realities of cost by the Internet.

Just as with the extensive infrastructure and staffing costs, the actual costs incurred by publishers in operating the peer review system for their scholarly journals are also widely misunderstood.  Individual publishers now receive hundreds of thousands—the large scholarly publisher, Reed Elsevier, receives more than one million—manuscripts per year. Reed Elsevier’s annual budget for operating its peer review system is over $100 million, which reflects the full scope of staffing, infrastructure, and other transaction costs inherent in operating a quality-control system that rejects 65% of the submitted manuscripts. Reed Elsevier’s budget for its peer review system is consistent with industry-wide studies that have reported that the peer review system costs approximately $2.9 billion annually in operation costs (translating into dollars the British £1.9 billion pounds reported in the study). For those articles accepted for publication, there are additional, extensive production costs, and then there are extensive post-publication costs in updating hypertext links of citations, cyber security of the websites, and related digital issues.

In sum, many people mistakenly believe that scholarly publishers are no longer necessary because the Internet has made moot all such intermediaries of traditional brick-and-mortar economies—a viewpoint reinforced by the equally mistaken incentive-to-create conventional wisdom in the copyright policy debates today. But intermediaries like scholarly publishers face the exact same incentive problems that is universally recognized for authors by the incentive-to-create conventional wisdom: no will make the necessary investments to create a work or to distribute if the fruits of their labors are not secured to them. This basic economic fact—dynamic development of innovative distribution mechanisms require substantial investment in both people and resources—is what makes commercialization an essential feature of both copyright policy and law (and of all intellectual property doctrines).

It is for this reason that copyright law has long promoted and secured the value that academics and scholars have come to depend on in their journal articles—reliable, high-quality, standardized, networked, and accessible research that meets the differing expectations of readers in a variety of fields of scholarly research. This is the value created by the scholarly publishers. Scholarly publishers thus serve an essential function in copyright law by making the investments in and creating the innovative distribution mechanisms that fulfill the constitutional goal of copyright to advance the “progress of science.”

DISCLOSURE: The paper summarized in this blog posting was supported separately by a Leonardo Da Vinci Fellowship and by the Association of American Publishers (AAP). The author thanks Mark Schultz for very helpful comments on earlier drafts, and the AAP for providing invaluable introductions to the five scholarly publishers who shared their publishing data with him.

NOTE: Some small copy-edits were made to this blog posting.

 

Filed under: copyright, economics, intellectual property, legal scholarship, markets, scholarship, SSRN, technology Tagged: American Chemical Society, American Institute of Physics, commercialization, copyright policy, Kirtsaeng, New England Journal of Medicine, open access, Reed Elsevier, SAGE, scholarly publishers, Wiley

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Intellectual Property & Licensing

The SHIELD Act: When Bad Economic Studies Make Bad Laws

Popular Media Earlier this month, Representatives Peter DeFazio and Jason Chaffetz picked up the gauntlet from President Obama’s comments on February 14 at a Google-sponsored Internet Q&A . . .

Earlier this month, Representatives Peter DeFazio and Jason Chaffetz picked up the gauntlet from President Obama’s comments on February 14 at a Google-sponsored Internet Q&A on Google+ that “our efforts at patent reform only went about halfway to where we need to go” and that he would like “to see if we can build some additional consensus on smarter patent laws.” So, Reps. DeFazio and Chaffetz introduced on March 1 the Saving High-tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes (SHIELD) Act, which creates a “losing plaintiff patent-owner pays” litigation system for a single type of patent owner—patent licensing companies that purchase and license patents in the marketplace (and who sue infringers when infringers refuse their requests to license). To Google, to Representative DeFazio, and to others, these patent licensing companies are “patent trolls” who are destroyers of all things good—and the SHIELD Act will save us all from these dastardly “trolls” (is a troll anything but dastardly?).

As I and other scholars have pointed out, the “patent troll” moniker is really just a rhetorical epithet that lacks even an agreed-upon definition.  The term is used loosely enough that it sometimes covers and sometimes excludes universities, Thomas Edison, Elias Howe (the inventor of the lockstitch in 1843), Charles Goodyear (the inventor of vulcanized rubber in 1839), and even companies like IBM.  How can we be expected to have a reasonable discussion about patent policy when our basic terms of public discourse shift in meaning from blog to blog, article to article, speaker to speaker?  The same is true of the new term, “Patent Assertion Entities,” which sounds more neutral, but has the same problem in that it also lacks any objective definition or usage.

Setting aside this basic problem of terminology for the moment, the SHIELD Act is anything but a “smarter patent law” (to quote President Obama). Some patent scholars, like Michael Risch, have begun to point out some of the serious problems with the SHIELD Act, such as its selectively discriminatory treatment of certain types of patent-owners.  Moreover, as Professor Risch ably identifies, this legislation was so cleverly drafted to cover only a limited set of a specific type of patent-owner that it ended up being too clever. Unlike the previous version introduced last year, the 2013 SHIELD Act does not even apply to the flavor-of-the-day outrage over patent licensing companies—the owner of the podcast patent. (Although you wouldn’t know this if you read the supporters of the SHIELD Act like the EFF who falsely claim that this law will stop patent-owners like the podcast patent-owning company.)

There are many things wrong with the SHIELD Act, but one thing that I want to highlight here is that it based on a falsehood: the oft-repeated claim that two Boston University researchers have proven in a study that “patent troll suits cost American technology companies over $29 billion in 2011 alone.”  This is what Rep. DeFazio said when he introduced the SHIELD Act on March 1. This claim was repeated yesterday by House Members during a hearing on “Abusive Patent Litigation.” The claim that patent licensing companies cost American tech companies $29 billion in a single year (2011) has become gospel since this study, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, was released last summer on the Internet. (Another name of patent licensing companies is “Non Practicing Entity” or “NPE.”)  A Google search of “patent troll 29 billion” produces 191,000 hits. A Google search of “NPE 29 billion” produces 605,000 hits. Such is the making of conventional wisdom.

The problem with conventional wisdom is that it is usually incorrect, and the study that produced the claim of “$29 billion imposed by patent trolls” is no different. The $29 billion cost study is deeply and fundamentally flawed, as explained by two noted professors, David Schwartz and Jay Kesan, who are also highly regarded for their empirical and economic work in patent law.  In their essay, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, also released late last summer, they detailed at great length serious methodological and substantive flaws in The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes. Unfortunately, the Schwartz and Kesan essay has gone virtually unnoticed in the patent policy debates, while the $29 billion cost claim has through repetition become truth.

In the hope that at least a few more people might discover the Schwartz and Kesan essay, I will briefly summarize some of their concerns about the study that produced the $29 billion cost figure.  This is not merely an academic exercise.  Since Rep. DeFazio explicitly relied on the $29 billion cost claim to justify the SHIELD Act, and he and others keep repeating it, it’s important to know if it is true, because it’s being used to drive proposed legislation in the real world.  If patent legislation is supposed to secure innovation, then it behooves us to know if this legislation is based on actual facts. Yet, as Schwartz and Kesan explain in their essay, the $29 billion cost claim is based on a study that is fundamentally flawed in both substance and methodology.

In terms of its methodological flaws, the study supporting the $29 billion cost claim employs an incredibly broad definition of “patent troll” that covers almost every person, corporation or university that sues someone for infringing a patent that it is not currently being used to manufacture a product at that moment.  While the meaning of the “patent troll” epithet shifts depending on the commentator, reporter, blogger, or scholar who is using it, one would be extremely hard pressed to find anyone embracing this expansive usage in patent scholarship or similar commentary today.

There are several reasons why the extremely broad definition of “NPE” or “patent troll” in the study is unusual even compared to uses of this term in other commentary or studies. First, and most absurdly, this definition, by necessity, includes every university in the world that sues someone for infringing one of its patents, as universities don’t manufacture goods.  Second, it includes every individual and start-up company who plans to manufacture a patented invention, but is forced to sue an infringer-competitor who thwarted these business plans by its infringing sales in the marketplace.  Third, it includes commercial firms throughout the wide-ranging innovation industries—from high tech to biotech to traditional manufacturing—that have at least one patent among a portfolio of thousands that is not being used at the moment to manufacture a product because it may be “well outside the area in which they make products” and yet they sue infringers of this patent (the quoted language is from the study). So, according to this study, every manufacturer becomes an “NPE” or “patent troll” if it strays too far from what somebody subjectively defines as its rightful “area” of manufacturing. What company is not branded an “NPE” or “patent troll” under this definition, or will necessarily become one in the future given inevitable changes in one’s business plans or commercial activities? This is particularly true for every person or company whose only current opportunity to reap the benefit of their patented invention is to license the technology or to litigate against the infringers who refuse license offers.

So, when almost every possible patent-owning person, university, or corporation is defined as a “NPE” or “patent troll,” why are we surprised that a study that employs this virtually boundless definition concludes that they create $29 billion in litigation costs per year?  The only thing surprising is that the number isn’t even higher!

There are many other methodological flaws in the $29 billion cost study, such as its explicit assumption that patent litigation costs are “too high” without providing any comparative baseline for this conclusion.  What are the costs in other areas of litigation, such as standard commercial litigation, tort claims, or disputes over complex regulations?  We are not told.  What are the historical costs of patent litigation?  We are not told.  On what basis then can we conclude that $29 billion is “too high” or even “too low”?  We’re supposed to be impressed by a number that exists in a vacuum and that lacks any empirical context by which to evaluate it.

The $29 billion cost study also assumes that all litigation transaction costs are deadweight losses, which would mean that the entire U.S. court system is a deadweight loss according to the terms of this study.  Every lawsuit, whether a contract, tort, property, regulatory or constitutional dispute is, according to the assumption of the $29 billion cost study, a deadweight loss.  The entire U.S. court system is an inefficient cost imposed on everyone who uses it.  Really?  That’s an assumption that reduces itself to absurdity—it’s a self-imposed reductio ad absurdum!

In addition to the methodological problems, there are also serious concerns about the trustworthiness and quality of the actual data used to reach the $29 billion claim in the study.  All studies rely on data, and in this case, the $29 billion study used data from a secret survey done by RPX of its customers.  For those who don’t know, RPX’s business model is to defend companies against these so-called “patent trolls.”  So, a company whose business model is predicated on hyping the threat of “patent trolls” does a secret survey of its paying customers, and it is now known that RPX informed its customers in the survey that their answers would be used to lobby for changes in the patent laws.

As every reputable economist or statistician will tell you, such conditions encourage exaggeration and bias in a data sample by motivating participation among those who support changes to the patent law.  Such a problem even has a formal name in economic studies: self-selection bias.  But one doesn’t need to be an economist or statistician to be able to see the problems in relying on the RPX data to conclude that NPEs cost $29 billion per year. As the classic adage goes, “Something is rotten in the state of Denmark.”

Even worse, as I noted above, the RPX survey was confidential.  RPX has continued to invoke “client confidences” in refusing to disclose its actual customer survey or the resulting data, which means that the data underlying the $29 billion claim is completely unknown and unverifiable for anyone who reads the study.  Don’t worry, the researchers have told us in a footnote in the study, they looked at the data and confirmed it is good.  Again, it doesn’t take economic or statistical training to know that something is not right here. Another classic cliché comes to mind at this point: “it’s not the crime, it’s the cover-up.”

In fact, keeping data secret in a published study violates well-established and longstanding norms in all scientific research that data should always be made available for testing and verification by third parties.  No peer-reviewed medical or scientific journal would publish a study based on a secret data set in which the researchers have told us that we should simply trust them that the data is accurate.  Its use of secret data probably explains why the $29 billion study has not yet appeared in a peer-reviewed journal, and, if economics has any claim to being an actual science, this study never will.  If a study does not meet basic scientific standards for verifying data, then why are Reps. DeFazio and Chaffetz relying on it to propose national legislation that directly impacts the patent system and future innovation?  If heads-in-the-clouds academics would know to reject such a study as based on unverifiable, likely biased claptrap, then why are our elected officials embracing it to create real-world legal rules?

And, to continue our running theme of classic clichés, there’s the rub. The more one looks at the actual legal requirements of the SHIELD Act, the more, in the words of Professor Risch, one is left “scratching one’s head” in bewilderment.  The more one looks at the supporting studies and arguments in favor of the SHIELD Act, the more one is left, in the words of Professor Risch, “scratching one’s head.”  The more and more one thinks about the SHIELD Act, the more one realizes what it is—legislation that has been crafted at the behest of the politically powerful (such as an Internet company who can get the President to do a special appearance on its own social media website) to have the government eliminate a smaller, publicly reviled, and less politically-connected group.

In short, people may have legitimate complaints about the ways in which the court system in the U.S. generally has problems.  Commentators and Congresspersons could even consider revising the general legal rules governing patent ligtiation for all plaintiffs and defendants to make the ligitation system work better or more efficiently (by some established metric).   Professor Risch has done exactly this in a recent Wired op-ed.  But it’s time to call a spade a spade: the SHIELD Act is a classic example of rent-seeking, discriminatory legislation.

Filed under: cost-benefit analysis, economics, intellectual property, law and economics, licensing, litigation, patent, politics Tagged: Criticism of patents, economic studies, Law and economics, legislation, litigation, non practicing entity, NPE, PAE, patent assertion entity, Patent infringement, patent licensing, patent trolls, Patents, rent seeking, SHIELD Act

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Intellectual Property & Licensing

Comment, Technological Transition of the Nation's Comm. Infrastructure

Regulatory Comments AT&T's petition presents the FCC with a stark choice: Bootstrap the regulations of a dying 20th century technology platform onto the networks of the future, to ever-diminishing consumer benefits, or take the lead in coordinating the transition to “Internet Everywhere”...

Summary

AT&T’s petition presents the FCC with a stark choice: Bootstrap the regulations of a dying 20th century technology platform onto the networks of the future, to ever-diminishing consumer benefits, or take the lead in coordinating the transition to “Internet Everywhere”—Internet analyst Larry Downes’ term for a single IP-based networking standard built into all next-generation infrastructure and equipment.

A wide range of disparate, private wired and wireless networks using a variety of different hardware and software protocols are now converging on native IP technologies—sometimes by accident but increasingly by design. Once doubted, IP has now been embraced by traditional wireline, mobile, cable and satellite providers, as well as incumbent and next-generation content providers. Data, voice, and video are all converging onto a single standard, available wherever and whenever consumers want it. Internet Everywhere in the near future is within our grasp—if only the Commission does what is necessary to allow and encourage it.

While we believe the FCC has a crucial, long-term role to play in shepherding the IP Transition, as outlined in TechFreedom’s Comment, this Reply Comment argues that the FCC should resist the urging of many commenters in this docket to erect regulatory barriers, however well-meaning, to protect consumers from harms that have not materialized and are unlikely ever to do so.

Instead, the Commission should adopt a clear program to facilitate the successful transition to an all-IP network by ensuring that it is unencumbered by inappropriate, legacy regulations. To start, the FCC should approve AT&T’s petition. While the resulting trials are carried out, the agency should move to identify a date certain for concluding the IP Transition. And at the same time, the agency should make clear its intention to refrain from applying interconnection mandates and the apparatus of Title II to the IP network, thereby preempting conflicting state regulations that would otherwise derail the agency’s efforts.

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Telecommunications & Regulated Utilities

Comment, Proposed Consent Order In the Matter of Motorola Mobility & Google

Regulatory Comments We appreciate this opportunity to comment on the proposed Consent Agreement and Order in this matter. The Order is aimed at imposing some limits on an area of great complexity and vigorous debate among industry, patent experts and global standards bodies...

File No.121-0120

Introduction

We appreciate this opportunity to comment on the proposed Consent Agreement and Order in this matter.  The Order is aimed at imposing some limits on an area of great complexity and vigorous debate among industry, patent experts and global standards bodies: the allowable process for enforcing FRAND licensing of SEPs.  The most notable aspect of the order is its treatment of the process by which Google and, if extended, patent holders generally may attempt to enforce their FRAND-obligated SEPs through injunctions.

As an initial and highly relevant matter, it is essential to note that the FTC’s enforcement action in this matter had no proper grounding in antitrust law.  Under the doctrines set down in Trinko[1] and NYNEX,[2] among other cases,[3] there is no basis for liability under Section 2 because the exercise of lawfully acquired monopoly power is not actionable under the antitrust laws.  Even under Section 5 the action has no basis:  The commissioners who supported the action could not agree whether its legal basis rested in unfair acts or practices or unfair methods of competition, and under an unfair methods of competition analysis (which was supported by most of the commissioners), the action is unsound because there is no evidence of consumer harm.

With respect to the terms of the Order itself, we believe that superimposing process restraints from above is not the best approach in dealing with what is, in essence, a contract dispute.  Few can doubt the benefits of greater clarity in this process; the question is whether the FTC’s particular approach to the problem sacrifices too much in exchange for such clarity.  FRAND terms are inherently indeterminate and flexible.  Indeed, they often apply precisely in situations where licensors and licensees need flexibility because each licensing circumstance is nuanced and a one-size-fits-all approach is not workable.  Enforced “certainty” by the Commission, without proper grounding in antitrust principles and doctrine, may impose costly constraints on innovation without commensurate gains.[4]

Instead, we believe that parties should be held to the agreements they make with SSOs, whose role is to ensure that standards are workable and that the licensing of patents that read on them is not abused.  This approach has worked in the past and still functions well today.  The proposed Order alters the current incentive structure, encourages infringement by lowering its costs, and creates a disincentive to standardize and to license.  Where anticompetitive practices occur, as with unlawful collusion, the FTC clearly has authority to act.  However, blanket constraints on a crucial method of patent enforcement will weaken the very structure the FTC is trying to strengthen.

Lack of Basis for Antitrust Liability under Section 2

The Commission’s antitrust concerns about Motorola seeking injunctions have no Section 2 basis, as made clear by the Supreme Court in a line of cases including the NYNEX and Trinko decisions. The facts of this case show that Motorola willingly licensed its standards-essential patents on customary FRAND terms, in accordance with SSO policies and in the absence of any allegations of deception.  It also attempted to enforce its properly acquired patents by means of an injunction, in accordance with US patent law and SSO policies.  Although, as we will discuss below, the seeking of an injunction is not a violation of Motorola’s FRAND commitments, even if it were, that fact would not trigger antitrust liability.  As Professor Bruce Kobayashi and now-Commissioner Joshua Wright explain:

The Court’s holding in NYNEX appears to be fatal to these arguments as price increasing conduct by a lawful monopolist, even when post-acquisition conduct involves fraud or deceit, is not exclusionary. . . .

[I]n NYNEX, the Supreme Court considered and rejected the underlying economic foundations of the FTC’s theory and, for that matter, any other theory that would assign Section 2 liability for a breach of a FRAND commitment made in good faith and without evidence of deception or other exclusionary conduct. . . .

Specifically, the view that ex-post deviations, breaches or renegotiations of ex-ante pricing commitments that result in consumer welfare losses are antitrust violations is based on an erroneous interpretation of the “exclusionary conduct” requirement under Section 2 of the Sherman Act as articulated by the Supreme Court. . . .

[T]he Court distinguished the attempt to evade the pricing constraint from the unlawful acquisition or exercise of monopoly power by pointing out that “consumer injury flowed . . . from the exercise of market power that is lawfully in the hands of a monopolist.” [5]

Seeking injunctions as Motorola did, without deception, even more clearly does not rise to the level of exclusionary conduct required by the law.  The fact that license terms may shift in the patentee’s favor or that licensed products may be more expensive is immaterial to the analysis.  Not only is the existence of welfare losses insufficient to establish exclusionary conduct, but the mere fact that prices might be higher under one set of legal rules and contractual obligations than another does not even establish welfare losses in the first place.

Prices negotiated in an environment where injunctions are available may indeed be higher than those negotiated without the threat of injunction, but there is no legitimate basis for holding out prices under the one legal regime as “efficient” and thus the other as “supracompetitive.”  Rather, as Supreme Court jurisprudence makes clear, the relevant test is “harm to the competitive process,” not the existence of higher prices.[6]  That one party to a contract negotiation has greater bargaining power, whether because of a lawfully acquired monopoly or because of helpful aspects of civil procedure rules, does not create liability under the antitrust laws.

These very same conditions may also increase innovation, the willingness to license generally and the willingness to enter into FRAND commitments in particular – all to the likely benefit of consumer welfare.  Notably, the FTC itself has recognized this.  Discussing the role of ITC exclusion orders, which are functionally similar to injunctions, the Commission notes:

We agree that an appropriately granted exclusion order preserves the exclusivity that forms the foundation of the patent system’s incentives to innovate, and the threat of an exclusion order can provide a significant deterrent to infringement.[7]

Even if Motorola were in breach of SSO policies or specific licensing agreements by seeking injunctions (although there is no evidence that this is the case), the Commission fails to explain how that constitutes an exclusionary act leading to competitive harm rather than a mere breach of contract.

One paper argues that contract law is insufficient because implementers are not parties to the FRAND agreement and are not protected by contract law.[8]  This, however, is mistaken. Implementers become beneficiaries of the SSO agreement when they use the standard in their products.[9]  Thus implementers have both the interest and ability to assert breach of contract claims based on SSO policies – and, of course, based on the terms of their particular licensing agreements.

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Renata Hesse has noted that some commentators believe that Section 2 is applicable in a situation where the patent holder honestly promised to encumber its patents with F/RAND commitments but later changed course.  For whatever business reason, the firm—now armed with SEPs—intentionally violates its F/RAND commitments after the standard is set.”[10]

This line of thought makes the same mistake and misses a major step, as there is no discussion of whether contract law could adequately deal with a breach of the FRAND contract and thus avoid overstretching antitrust jurisprudence and economics.  But patent implementers are not without recourse, and patent holders cannot wield their monopoly power in the way those commentators fear.

Another theory of liability would argue that Motorola was attempting to evade the FRAND pricing constraint, and that this confers the necessary exclusionary conduct to trigger antitrust liability.[11]  But this is a similarly weak argument.

In the first place, SSOs are intentionally structured to permit SEP holders to gain from ex post negotiation of licenses, fully able to capitalize on whatever monopoly power participation in the standard confers.  As one commenter notes:

SSOs have chosen to forgo ex ante negotiations. So even though an SSO may possess all the information needed to make informed decisions, which ensures that implementers are not surprised about having to negotiate royalties ex post, patentees can nonetheless rationally demand fees in excess of the value underlying the technology after an industry locks into a standard.[12]

Moreover, in terms of antitrust liability, as Kobayashi and Wright explain:

Consider the application of NYNEX to the theory of patent holdup without deception in N-Data. The Commission’s theory of antitrust liability was not that N-Data acquired monopoly power when [its technology was adopted into the standard]. Rather, the theory was that N-Data unlawfully acquired monopoly power at the moment that it violated [a] contractual pricing constraint with its attempt to renegotiate those prior $1,000 licensing commitments. The proponents of this theory cannot argue that monopoly power was acquired at the time the technology was incorporated into the standard because Trinko clearly allows the setting of monopoly prices after monopoly power was lawfully obtained. The alternative is to rely on the evasion of pricing constraint theory, which asserts that the exclusionary conduct and acquisition of monopoly power occur at the moment N-Data attempts to evade its licensing commitments. However, the Court’s reasoning in NYNEX indicates that it would have concluded that N-Data lawfully obtained monopoly power at the time its technology was included in the standard and would characterize the renegotiation as the exercise of that power. Indeed, NYNEX concludes that regulatory fraud by a monopolist, conduct far less economically meritorious than breach of contract, which can be efficient, is not exclusionary even when it generates actual harm to consumers. In sum, there should be little doubt that the Court’s decision in NYNEX compels the conclusion that ex-post opportunism without deception is not exclusionary conduct and not actionable under Section 2.[13]

Simply put, Section 2 does not, as the Commissions claims, permit a case based on “the exercise of leverage acquired solely through the standard-setting process”[14] where there is no deception and where monopoly power was lawfully attained:

This is all to say that antitrust law plays an important role in cases where a party unlawfully acquires market power by engaging in a deception during the SSO process. But . . . in cases involving ex post opportunistic behavior undertaken after a good-faith RAND assurance, the resulting harm from patent holdup does not flow so much from a less competitive market as from the exercise of lawfully acquired market power.[15]

Lack of Basis for Antitrust Liability under Section 5

Perhaps even more significant, the Commission’s settlement continues the agency’s recent trend of expanding its Section 5 authority.  As Commissioner Ohlhausen has noted once before, in dissenting from the Commission’s settlement in In re Bosch, [16] the FTC is charting a dangerously unprincipled course on Section 5, particularly with respect to its interpretation of its unfair act or practice jurisdiction.  In his Separate Statement in Google, Commissioner Rosch sounds a similar concern about the absence of “limiting principles” on the scope of the Commission’s authority to bring Section 5 cases under the Act’s unfair methods of competition prong.[17]

In the Google case, the Commission asserts unfairness jurisdiction without even the minimal limitations the agency itself has adopted.  As Commissioner Ohlhausen pointedly notes:

[T]he Commission gives no principled basis for expanding liability beyond an unfair method of competition to include an “unfair act or practice” on what is essentially the same conduct here as in Bosch. This expansion of liability sows additional seeds of confusion as to what can create liability and even the statutory basis of that liability. . . . The allegations in the complaint that Google and Motorola’s conduct constitutes an “unfair act or practice” fail this agency’s unfairness standard. . . . In this matter, we are essentially treating sophisticated technology companies, rather than end-users, as “consumers” under our consumer protection authority. . . . Further, the unfairness count in the complaint alleges merely speculative consumer harm, at best, and thus fails to comply with the Commission’s Unfairness Statement.[18]

The Commission’s N-Data decision presented very similar concerns about unprincipled expansion of authority under Section 5.  Again, this case mirrors prior Commission actions and presents the same serious concerns that antitrust liability in such cases predicated on Section 5 amount to nothing more than attempts to evade the judicial constraints under Section 2 and are without merit and potentially costly:

[T]he truth is that there was little chance the FTC could have prevailed [in N-Data] under the more rigorous Section 2 standard that anchors the liability rule to a demanding standard requiring proof of both exclusionary conduct and competitive harm. One must either accept the proposition that the FTC sought Section 5 liability precisely because there was no evidence of consumer harm or that the FTC believed there was evidence of consumer harm but elected to file the Complaint based only upon the Section 5 theory to encourage an expansive application of that Section, a position several Commissioners joining the Majority Statement have taken in recent years. Neither of these interpretations offers much evidence that N-Data is sound as a matter of prosecutorial discretion or antitrust policy.[19]

Precisely the same could be said of the Google settlement in regard to the issue of SEP injunctions, and the Commission’s action in this case demonstrates its willingness to continue to operate in this realm without meaningful limits.

And this is a problem.  Following Sherman Act jurisprudence, traditionally the FTC has understood (and courts have demanded) that antitrust enforcement under Section 5 requires demonstrable consumer harm to apply.  But this case and others before it reveal an agency pursuing an interpretation of Section 5 that would give it unprecedented and largely-unchecked authority.  In particular, the definition of “unfair” competition wouldn’t be confined to the traditional antitrust measures—reduction in output or an output-reducing increase in price—but could expand to just about anything the agency deems improper.

Modern antitrust analysis, both in scholarship and in the courts, quite properly rejects the reductive and unsupported sort of theories that undergird recent Section 5 actions.  That the FTC might have a better chance of winning a Section 5 case, unmoored from the economically sound limitations of Section 2 jurisprudence, is no reason for it to pursue such cases.  Quite the opposite:  When consumer welfare is disregarded for the sake of the agency’s power, it ceases to further its mandate.

Former Chairman Kovacic has voiced similar concerns, noting that:

More generally, it seems that the Commission’s view of unfairness would permit the FTC in the future to plead all of what would have been seen as competition-related infringements as constituting unfair acts or practices.[20]

Noting that courts are likely to look on such unprincipled Section 5 actions with disapproval, Kovacic (along with Mark Winerman) further suggests that:

[unfair methods of competition] should be a competition-based concept, in the modern sense of fostering improvements in economic performance rather than equating the health of the competitive process with the wellbeing of individual competitors, per se. It should not, moreover, rely on the assertion . . . that the Commission could use its [unfair methods of competition] authority to reach practices outside both the letter and spirit of the antitrust laws.[21]

It is a problem that some in Congress, as well, have begun to notice.[22]

But it isn’t only antitrust experts and congressmen who point to this limitation:  The FTC Act itself contains such a limitation.  Section 5(n) of the Act, the provision added by Congress in 1994 to codify the core principles of the FTC’s 1980 Unfairness Policy Statement,[23] says that:

The Commission shall have no authority under this section or section 57a of this title to declare unlawful an act or practice on the grounds that such act or practice is unfair unless the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. [Emphasis added].[24]

The Commission has tried — and failed — to bring similar Section 5 cases before the courts in recent years.  But the judiciary has not been receptive to an invigoration of Section 5 for several reasons.  Chief among these is that the agency has failed to define the scope of its power over unfair competition under the Act, and the courts hesitate to let the Commission set the limits of its own authority.  As Kovacic and Winerman have noted:

The first [reason for judicial reluctance in Section 5 cases] is judicial concern about the apparent absence of limiting principles. The tendency of the courts has been to endorse limiting principles that bear a strong resemblance to standards familiar to them from Sherman Act and Clayton Act cases. The cost-benefit concepts devised in rule of reason cases supply the courts with natural default rules in the absence of something better.

The Commission has done relatively little to inform judicial thinking, as the agency has not issued guidelines or policy statements that spell out its own view about the appropriate analytical framework. This inactivity contrasts with the FTC’s efforts to use policy statements to set boundaries for the application of its consumer protection powers under Section 5.[25]

SSO Policies, Royalty Rates and Injunctions

A significant problem with the SEP settlement as configured by the FTC is that it seems to make illegal the use of injunctions even to enforce perfectly reasonable royalty rates.  Motorola has, since before it was purchased by Google, sought a royalty rate of 2.25% for its SEPs.  That is an amount well in-line with rates charged by others with SEPs that read on the same standards.[26]  In its litigation with Microsoft, it is precisely this royalty that Motorola was seeking to enforce—and Microsoft was refusing to pay.  It is no more inherently inappropriate for Microsoft to rake in similar royalties on Android devices than it is for Motorola to net 2.25% of the price of each Windows-operated computer sold.[27]  If these rates are common and reasonable, where is the crucial Section 5 element of consumer harm found?

There is a legitimate dispute over how the royalty amount is to be calculated, but this is the very definition of a contract dispute, and both Motorola’s past practice as well as overall industry practice suggest it is perfectly consistent with Motorola’s FRAND obligation to seek such royalties.

Importantly, it is not even clear that the SSO disallows injunctions, weakening the argument that a contractual breach occurred.  For example, “European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) policies do not contain any provision precluding members from seeking injunctive relief when an infringer and potential licensee has rejected a FRAND licensing offer from the patent holder.”[28]  What’s more, ETSI and other SSOs have considered such limitations and determined that they were inappropriate:

Most of the SSOs and their stakeholders that have considered these proposals over the years have determined that there are only a limited number of situations where patent hold-up takes place in the context of standards-setting. The industry has determined that those situations generally are best addressed through bi-lateral negotiation (and, in rare cases, litigation) as opposed to modifying the SSO’s IPR policy [by precluding injunctions or mandating a particular negotiation process].[29]

Even if an SSO agreement (or a specific license) did disallow them, seeking an injunction would therefore be a simple breach of contract.  Reading a limitation on injunctions into the SSO agreement is in severe tension with the normal rules of contract interpretation, such as emphasizing intent of the parties and plain language, which point away from the limitation.[30]  To turn Motorola’s effort to receive a reasonable royalty for its patents by means of an injunction against a willing, but not willing enough, licensee into an antitrust problem seems directly to undermine the standard-setting process. It also seems to have no basis in law.

The risk of making such conduct—essentially, any breach of contract—into an antitrust offense is substantial.  But as Kobayashi and Wright point out, such reasoning under Section 5 would do exactly that:

What is left is the view that the theory in N-Data could be extended to any breach of a contractual commitment that might result in increased royalties, or even a good faith modification of a FRAND commitment to the same effect, always violates the antitrust laws. . . . The breach itself is the exclusionary act and evidence of the requisite monopoly power. No evidence of consumer harm is required. An attempt to renegotiate higher royalty rates is all that is needed. This is unsound antitrust policy. A basic lesson of the holdup literature is that the very asset specificity creating the potential for ex-post opportunism also creates the incentives for parties to build flexibility into their contractual relationships, which allows them to reasonably deal with unanticipated post-contractual shocks. However, even good faith modifications of SSO contractual commitments, whether those commitments relate to pricing or other elements of the agreement, would satisfy the N-Data standard for liability. Thus, there is no principle that would prevent the extension of the N-Data theory to the breach of any contractual commitment by a firm resulting in higher prices to some consumers.[31]

This seems to be precisely the case here, made all the more notable by the fact that, arguably unlike N-Data, Motorola was seeking not an increase from previously agreed-to royalty rates, but rather the enforcement of royalty rates perfectly consistent with its past practice.

One of the clearest statements of the need for antitrust restraint in the standard setting context comes from a June 2011 comment filed with the FTC, authored by Microsoft:

[T]he existence of a RAND commitment to offer patent licenses should not preclude a patent holder from seeking preliminary injunctive relief. . . . Any uniform declaration that such relief would not be available if the patent holder has made a commitment to offer a RAND license for its essential patent claims in connection with a standard may reduce any incentives that implementers might have to engage in good faith negotiations with the patent holder. . . .[32]

Patents are an important tool for encouraging the development and commercialization of advanced technology, as are standard setting organizations.  Antitrust authorities should exercise great restraint before intervening in the complex commercial negotiations over technology patents and standards.  In Motorola’s case, the evidence of conduct that might harm competition is absent, and all that remains are, in essence, allegations that Motorola is bargaining hard and enforcing its property rights.  These are not antitrust offenses.

The Role of Injunctions

The crux of our concern with this consent decree, and the most controversial aspect of SEP licensing negotiations, is the role of injunctions.  The consent decree requires that, before Google seek to enjoin a manufacturer from using its SEPs without a license, the company must follow a prescribed path in licensing negotiations.

To the extent that the settlement reinforces what Google and other licensors already do, and even to the extent that it imposes nothing more than an obligation to inject a neutral third party into FRAND negotiations to assist the parties in resolving rate disputes, there is little of concern.  Indeed, this is the core of the agreement, and importantly it seems to preserve Google’s right to seek injunctions to enforce its patents, subject to the agreement’s process requirements.

As noted above, industry participants and standard-setting organizations have supported injunctions, and the seeking and obtaining of injunctions against infringers is not in conflict with SEP patentees’ obligations.[33]  Even the FTC, in its public comments, has stated that patent owners should be able to obtain injunctions on SEPs when an infringer has rejected a reasonable license offer.[34]

Nevertheless, U.S. regulators, including the FTC, have sometimes opined that seeking injunctions on products that infringe SEPs is not in the spirit of FRAND.  Those partaking in the debate seem to agree that more certainty is preferable; the real matter at issue is whether and when injunctions further that aim or not, and whether and when they are anticompetitive.

In its own 2011 report on the “IP Marketplace,” the FTC acknowledged the fluidity and ambiguity surrounding the meaning of “reasonable” licensing terms and the problems of patent enforcement.[35]  While noting that injunctions may confer a costly “hold-up” power on patentees that wield them, the FTC nevertheless acknowledged the important role of injunctions in preserving the value of patents and in encouraging efficient private negotiation:

Three characteristics of injunctions that affect innovation support generally granting an injunction. The first and most fundamental is an injunction’s ability to preserve the exclusivity that provides the foundation of the patent system’s incentives to innovate. Second, the credible threat of an injunction deters infringement in the first place. This results from the serious consequences of an injunction for an infringer, including the loss of sunk investment. Third, a predictable injunction threat will promote licensing by the parties. Private contracting is generally preferable to a compulsory licensing regime because the parties will have better information about the appropriate terms of a license than would a court, and more flexibility in fashioning efficient agreements. . . . But denying an injunction every time an infringer’s switching costs exceed the economic value of the invention would dramatically undermine the ability of a patent to deter infringement and encourage innovation. For this reason, courts should grant injunctions in the majority of cases. . . .[36]

Consistent with this view, “[t]he European Commission’s Deputy Director-General for Antitrust Cecilio Madero Villarejo expressed concern that some technology companies who complain of being denied a license on FRAND terms never truly intended to acquire a license, but rather ‘wanted to create conditions for a competition case to be brought.’  This reflects a more sophisticated understanding of the relationship between SEP holders and potential licensees, and bodes well for consumers who increasingly use products that rely on standards.”[37]

But with the Google case, the Commission appears to back away from its seeming support for injunctions, claiming that:

Seeking and threatening injunctions against willing licensees of FRAND-encumbered SEPs undermines the integrity and efficiency of the standard-setting process and decreases the incentives to participate in the process and implement published standards. Such conduct reduces the value of standard setting, as firms will be less likely to rely on the standard-setting process.[38]

However, it is rarely mentioned that “an implementer’s decision to reject a certifiably RAND license and continue to infringe is contrary to the spirit of the RAND framework as well.”[39]  In such situations, the threat of an injunction is plainly important.  But it is worth noting what it is important for.

It is not likely the case that a negotiation process would ever end with an injunction and a refusal to license, as critics allege.  Rather, the threat of an injunction is important in hastening an infringing implementer to the table, ensuring that protracted litigation to determine the appropriate royalty (which is how such disputes do actually end) is costly not only to the patentee, but also the infringer.  As Ratliff and Rubinfeld note:

[T]he existence of that threat does not lead to holdup as feared by those who propose that a RAND pledge implies (or should embody) a waiver of seeking injunctive relief. If RAND terms are reached by negotiation, the negotiation is not conducted in the shadow of an injunctive threat but rather in the shadow of knowledge that the court will impose a set of terms if the parties do not reach agreement themselves. The crucial element of this model that substantially diminishes the likelihood that the injunctive threat will have real bite against an implementer willing to license on RAND terms is the assumption that an SEP owner maintains its obligation to offer a RAND license even if its initial offer is challenged by the implementer and, further, even if the court agrees with the SEP owner that its initial offer was indeed RAND. Thus any implementer that is willing to license on court-certified RAND terms can avoid an injunction by accepting those RAND terms without eschewing any of its challenges to the RAND-ness of the SEP owner’s earlier offers.[40]

Concerns about the hold-up threat of injunctions are unfounded because the implementer can always accept a royalty rate that is either offered by the patent holder or certified by a court, without waiving its right to contest whether such a rate is RAND.  If it will not do either, then it is an unwilling licensee, appropriately enjoined from implementing the patent.

Properly Defining the Willing Licensee

Reconciling the FTC’s seemingly disparate views turns on the question of what a “willing licensee” is.  And while the proposed Google consent decree itself may not magnify the problems surrounding the definition of that term, it does not provide any additional clarity.

The problem is that even in its 2011 report, in which FTC noted the importance of injunctions, it defines a willing licensee as one who would license at a hypothetical, ex ante rate absent the threat of an injunction and with a different risk profile than an after-the-fact infringer.[41]  In other words, the FTC’s definition of willing licensee assumes a willingness to license only at a rate determined when an injunction is not available, and under the unrealistic assumption that the true value of a SEP can be known ex ante.  Not surprisingly, then, the Commission finds it easy to declare an injunction invalid when a patentee demands a higher royalty rate in an actual negotiation, with actual knowledge of a patent’s value and under threat of an injunction.

The FTC’s definition of willing licensee ignores a crucial difference between the two situations.  One should expect that a patent will be worth more when its value is clear from its use in the market, it has been determined to be valid and there is a threat of injunction.  “[A]verage ‘reasonable royalty’ damage awards set rates more than double estimated average negotiated patent royalties.  [T]his difference is at least in part attributable to the uncertainty surrounding the strength and value of untested patents.”[42]

As Richard Epstein, Scott Kieff and Dan Spulber discuss in critiquing the FTC’s 2011 Report:

In short, there is no economic basis to equate a manufacturer that is willing to commit to license terms before the adoption and launch of a standard, with one that instead expropriates patent rights at a later time through infringement. The two bear different risks and the late infringer should not pay the same low royalty as a party that sat down at the bargaining table and may actually have contributed to the value of the patent through its early activities. There is no economically meaningful sense in which any royalty set higher than that which a “willing licensee would have paid” at the pre-standardization moment somehow “overcompensates patentees by awarding more than the economic value of the patent. . . .

Even with a RAND commitment, the patent owner retains the valuable right to exclude (not merely receive later compensation from) manufacturers who are unwilling to accept reasonable license terms. Indeed, the right to exclude influences how those terms should be calculated, because it is quite likely that prior licensees in at least some areas will pay less if larger numbers of parties are allowed to use the same technology. Those interactive effects are ignored in the FTC calculations.”[43]

In fact, equating the ex-ante potential licensee with the ex-post infringer creates a serious probability of opportunism by the infringer, not, as is usually feared, the patentee:

There is no a priori reason that retrospective damages must be calculated according to the same “reasonable royalty” that the SEP owner offered for a prospective license. This is particularly true in the case of willful infringement. More generally, if implementers knew with certainty that the greatest royalty rate they would pay retrospectively if they delayed taking an offered RAND license until it had been found RAND by a court is the RAND rate they were originally offered, there would be little incentive for an implementer to take a license earlier: The implementer could litigate and hope for a finding that the patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed. Failing that, the implementer would avail itself of the RAND license terms originally offered.[44]

With this circular logic, all efforts by patentees to negotiate royalty rates after infringement has occurred can be effectively rendered anticompetitive if the patentee uses an injunction or the threat of an injunction against the infringer to secure any increase in its royalty, even if reasonable.

The idea behind FRAND is rather simple: rewarding risky innovation and protecting competition,[45]  but the practice of SEP licensing is much more complicated.  Circumstances differ from case to case, and, more importantly, so do the parties’ views on what may constitute an appropriate licensing rate under FRAND.  A single company may have very different views on the meaning of FRAND depending on whether it is the licensor or licensee in a given negotiation and depending on whether it has already implemented a standard or not.[46] In fact,

with the notable exception of some SSOs that require royalty-free licensing of SEPs, many SSOs appear to expressly envision bilateral negotiation between the patentee and implementers of the specific terms that will apply to each license. While such license negotiations are constrained by the non-discrimination component of RAND, it is recognized that specific arrangements (including how much royalty is paid in cash, what cross-licenses are included, etc.) may vary not just from patentee to patentee, but even among different licensees of the same patent.[47]

This variance should come as no surprise, given that the standard at issue, and any particular patent that reads on that standard, may be either a more or less valuable component of the implementer’s product.  For example, the function that the standard supports could be merely a secondary aspect of a particular product.  That implementer would have less demand, and a lower willingness to pay, than an implementer whose product focuses directly on the function the standard supports.

Meanwhile, for the same reasons and also because different patents have different possible work-arounds, some patents are likely worth orders of magnitude more than others and one should expect to find that license rates are a complicated function of the contracting parties’ particular negotiating positions and circumstances.  As one court looking at the very SEPs at issue in the Google case has pointed out:

[T]he court is mindful that at the time of an initial offer, it is difficult for the offeror to know what would in fact constitute RAND terms for the offeree. Thus, what may appear to be RAND terms from the offeror’s perspective may be rejected out-of-pocket as non-RAND terms by the offeree. Indeed, it would appear that at any point in the negotiation process, the parties may have a genuine disagreement as to what terms and conditions of a license constitute RAND under the parties’ unique circumstances.[48]

The fact that many firms engaged in SEP negotiations are simultaneously and repeatedly both licensors and licensees of patents governed by multiple SSOs further complicates the process.  However, it also helps to ensure that it will reach a conclusion that promotes innovation and ensures that consumers reap the rewards—no matter how “unwilling” licensees (or patentees) may seem at various points in the negotiating process.

This is because for firms that both license out their own patents and license in those held by other firms, which is the majority of IT firms and certainly the norm for firms participating in SSOs, continued interactions on both sides of such deals help to ensure that licensing, and not withholding, is the norm.  In fact, an important issue in assessing the propriety of injunctions is the recognition that, in most cases, firms would rather license their patents and receive royalties than exclude access to their IP and receive no compensation and perhaps incur the costs of protracted litigation.

These realities significantly diminish the risk of patent hold-up, and support the notion that the mere existence of higher prices cannot establish the existence of exclusionary conduct or consumer harm necessary to support antitrust intervention.

SEPs and the Smartphone Market

While some commentators make it sound as if injunctions threaten to cripple smartphone makers by preventing them from licensing essential technology on viable terms,[49] companies in this space have been perfectly capable of orchestrating large-scale patent licensing campaigns.  That these may increase costs to competitors is a feature, not a bug, of the system, representing the return on risk and innovation that patents are intended to secure.  Nevertheless, the theoretical fear of patent hold-up (or “royalty-stacking” or “patent thickets”) and the costs it may impose are not ridiculous and, of course, while innovation in this space is legion, there is no way to know how much more there might be if the laws and policies governing licensing practices were different.

Given [the] diversity of SEPs and SEP owners (let alone the diversity of standards that, for example, a single smartphone or computer might implement), patent holdup can have far-reaching consequences. If each of the many patent owners were to attempt to win a disproportionately large share of the patents’ collective value, a “royalty-stacking” problem could arise in which excessive licensing costs discourage reliance on an otherwise efficient standard. Conversely, if courts or regulators put substantial limitations on the ability of innovators to appropriate value from their investment in technologies that are essential to a standard, the incentives of firms either to invest in innovative technologies or to participate in the standard-setting process may be reduced.[50]

There are trade-offs, to be sure.  But there is no basis for the one-sided presumption that patentees, not implementers, have the upper hand and merit antitrust-based restraint.  For one thing, the empirical literature on the topic is inconclusive, at best.[51]  Moreover, as experience suggests,

it is possible for private-ordering solutions to be formed in the face of patent thickets, and . . . it is unnecessary to eliminate or “creatively adapt[] property rights” secured to inventors by the patent system. . . . The fact that the very first patent thicket in American history was resolved by the very first patent pool in American history is dramatic evidence of how private-ordering problems and private-ordering solutions go hand-in-hand between property owners.[52]

Companies are coming to the SEP debate with very different track records on SSO participation.  Apple, for example, is relatively new to the mobile communications space and has relatively few SEPs.[53]  Other firms, like Samsung and Motorola, are long-time players in the space with histories of extensive licensing in both directions.  But, current posturing aside, all of these firms have an incentive to license their patents.  As one commenter notes:

Apple’s best course of action will most likely be to enter into licensing agreements with its competitors, which will not only result in significant revenues, but also push up the prices (or reduce the margins) on competitive products.[54]

Microsoft has wielded its sizeable patent portfolio to drive up the licensing fees paid by Android device manufacturers,[55] and some commentators have even speculated that Microsoft makes more revenue from Android than it does from Windows Phone.[56]  But while Microsoft might prefer to kill Android with its patents, given the unlikeliness of this,

the next best option is to catch a free ride on the Android train. Patent licensing deals already in place with HTC, General Dynamics, and others could mean revenues of over $1 billion by next year, as Forbes reports. And if they’re able to convince Samsung to sign one as well (which could effectively force every Android partner to sign one), we could be talking multiple billions of dollars of revenue each year.[57]

The risk of consumer harm from conduct by patentees in the standards space can’t be ruled out completely, but its existence is by no means assured.  More important, the procompetitive justifications for injunctions, the absence of evidence of consumer harm, the absence of SSO restrictions against injunctions and the incentives for negotiation by the very sorts of companies targeted by this action all counsel strongly against the enforcement action at issue in this case.

Why the Constraint on Injunctions Is Harmful

Concern about patents is the norm, but so is licensing. It is precisely because licensing is the norm that smartphones exist, even with the allegedly thousands of patents that read on the devices, and at prices consumers afford.  The inability to seek an injunction against an infringer, however, would ensure instead that patentees operate with reduced incentives to invest in technology and to enter into standards because they are precluded from benefiting from any subsequent increase in the value of their patents once they do so.  As Epstein, Kieff, and Spulber write:

The simple reality is that before a standard is set, it just is not clear whether a patent might become more or less valuable. Some upward pressure on value may be created later to the extent that the patent is important to a standard that is important to the market. In addition, some downward pressure may be caused by a later RAND commitment or some other factor, such as repeat play. The FTC seems to want to give manufacturers all of the benefits of both of these dynamic effects by in effect giving the manufacturer the free option of picking different focal points for elements of the damages calculations. The patentee is forced to surrender all of the benefit of the upward pressure while the manufacturer is allowed to get all of the benefit of the downward pressure.[58]

Therein the problem with even the limited constraints imposed by the Google settlement: To the extent that the FTC’s settlement amounts to a prohibition on Google seeking injunctions against infringers unless the company accepts the infringer’s definition of “reasonable,” the settlement will harm the industry.  It will reinforce a precedent that will likely reduce the incentives for companies and individuals to innovate, to participate in SSOs, and to negotiate in good faith.

Some point to open-source software as proof that IP will still be produced without any, or with much less, patent protection.[59]  Such software is supported instead by other forms of monetization or no monetization at all.  Although it is true that unpatented software does exist, this argument does not explain why implementers or SSOs do not choose such software.  If the products were sufficient or comparable, there is no reason why any participant would use the more expensive patented options.

Contrary to most assumptions about the patent system, it needs stronger, not weaker, property rules.  With a no-injunction rule, whether explicit or de facto depending on how the definition of “willing licensee” unfolds, a potential licensee has little incentive to negotiate with a patent holder.  Instead, it can refuse to license, infringe, try its hand in court, avoid royalties entirely until litigation is finished, and in the end never be forced to pay a higher royalty than it would have if it had negotiated before the true value of the patents was known.

This sort of strategic behavior by licensees is precisely why injunctions are necessary and appropriate in such cases.  To turn them into antitrust violations seriously threatens to undermine the licensors’ appropriate bargaining power and the efficient functioning of SEP licensing.  Flooding the courts and discouraging innovation and peaceful negotiations hardly seem like benefits to the patent system or the market.  Unfortunately, the FTC’s approach to SEP licensing exemplified by the Google case may do just that.

Undesirable strategic behavior is not limited to licensees, though.

[B]y establishing elaborate procedures that Google must follow before invoking an “unwilling licensee” exception to the general rule, the decree might have the unintended consequence of encouraging opportunistic behavior by SEP owners in an attempt to portray companies as “unwilling licensees.”[60]

In her dissent, Commissioner Ohlhausen articulates the problems with this aspect of the FTC’s proposed settlement.  First, writes Commissioner Ohlhausen,

[T]he majority says little about what “appropriate circumstances” may trigger an FTC lawsuit other than to say that a fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) commitment generally prohibits seeking an injunction. By articulating only narrow circumstances when the Commission deems a licensee unwilling (limitations added since Bosch), and not addressing the ambiguity in the market about what constitutes a FRAND commitment, the Commission will leave patent owners to guess in most circumstances whether they can safely seek an injunction on a SEP.[61]

The FTC’s treatment of Apple as a “willing licensee” betrays the complexity of such issues and the confusion this settlement may engender. In treating Apple as a willing licensee the Commission

[D]isregard[s] a federal judge’s decision that Apple revealed itself as unwilling on the eve of trial. As the judge wrote: “[Apple’s intentions] became clear only when Apple informed the court . . . that it did not intend to be bound by any rate that the court determined.” The judge further concluded Apple was trying to use the FRAND rate litigation simply to determine “a ceiling on the potential license rate that it could use for negotiating purposes. . . . The Order allows Google to seek injunctive relief if a party “has stated in writing or in sworn testimony that it will not license the FRAND Patent on any terms”—as Apple did in federal district court. But the Complaint attempts to skirt this issue by vaguely claiming that “[a]t all times relevant to this Complaint, these implementers [including Apple] were willing licensees. . . .” I believe it is quite “relevant” that Apple told a federal judge after years of negotiation and litigation with Motorola that it would only abide by the court-determined royalty rates to the extent it saw fit. I cannot endorse characterizing this conduct as that of a willing licensee.[62]

While the FTC acknowledges that injunctions are appropriate when a patentee is faced with a licensee who is unwilling to license its patents at a reasonable rate, if even Apple is here considered a “willing licensee,” then such an acknowledgement is a null set.

The definition of “willing licensee” is central for parties to determine appropriate conduct in this area and for everyone to assess the propriety of the FTC’s action and Order in this case.  But the immense uncertainty that remains following this case, coupled with the “circular reasoning” noted above that seems to inform the Commission’s understanding of the term, suggest that confusion, rather than clarity, will prevail.

The Defensive Use Exception

And confusion isn’t limited to the “willing licensee” debate.  Commissioner Rosch, for example, noted his concern with the Order’s defensive use exception for seeking injunctions.[63]  His comments indicate that he hopes it will not be included in the final order, and some industry commentators share his concern.[64]  Whatever the merits of the availability of defensive injunctions (which I support), apparently the language is, indeed, confusing.  Microsoft, for example, states that under the exception,

Google may abandon its promise to make its standard essential patents available on reasonable terms with regard to any firm that has tried to obtain an injunction against any product made by Google on the basis of that firm’s standard essential patents. Google can seek a product injunction even if the other firm is willing to take a license to Google’s patents on reasonable terms. . . . The Google loophole is of particular concern because it appears . . . to say that Google can sue for an injunction even when no firm has sued Google.[65]

However, this alarmism is unfounded; the Order doesn’t seem to say that.  Section IV.F states that if the potential licensee is seeking or has sought on or after the date of the Order an injunction against a Google product based on a FRAND-encumbered SEP, then Google may seek an injunction against the potential licensee unless the potential licensee first offered to license the underlying SEP and to enter binding arbitration to determine FRAND terms (the same process Google is required by the Order to follow before seeking injunctive relief on its FRAND-encumbered SEPs).[66]

As one observer noted,  “So, in Microsoft’s reading, the order suggests that Google can seek an injunction against competitors that have brought any injunction claim based on any essential technology employed in a Google product, even if those suits are against third parties and not Google.”[67]  But even if that’s true, there is nothing to indicate that Google is relieved of offering to license its RAND-encumbered patents on a RAND basis, as it is contractually obligated do.

In sum, the impact of this provision is to ensure that Google will be permitted to seek an injunction if its products are subjected to the same type of conduct that the FTC’s Complaint has described as a violation of Section 5.  Rather than increase the possibility of injunctions on SEPs, this provision in fact attempts to deter firms from seeking injunctions on their SEPs against Google products and permits Google to defend its products, still subject to its RAND obligations, if they do.

Conclusion

As explained above, the proposed settlement threatens to distort the standard-setting process which is so crucial to the innovation we enjoy today.  Without a credible threat to those who infringe on SEPs, there will be less incentive to innovate, less certainty around licensing, and less incentive for patentees to submit patents to FRAND obligations.  The FTC has acknowledged on multiple occasions that the SSO process benefits consumers, patent holders, and potential licensees.  While the Commission has the authority to take enforcement action where anticompetitive harm occurs, there is simply no such evidence here.  As such, the Commission’s blanket restriction on an essential facet of the SSO process will weaken those institutions without commensurate benefit, harming consumers and competitors.

[1] Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004)

[2] NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 133 (1998)

[3] See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 127 S. Ct. 1069, 1078 (2007); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993)

[4] On the problem of error costs in antitrust, particularly in high-tech markets, see Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust, 6 J. Competition L. & Econ. 153 (2010).  See also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1984).

[5] Kobayashi & Wright, Federalism, Substantive Preemption, and Limits on Antitrust: An Application to Patent Holdup, 26 (George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series 08-32), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1143602 (quoting NYNEX, 525 U.S. at 129).

[6] See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993) (“That below-cost pricing may impose painful losses on its target is of no moment to the antitrust laws if competition is not injured: It is axiomatic that the antitrust laws were passed for ‘the protection of competition, not competitors.’”).

[7] Third Party United States Federal Trade Commission’s Statement on the Public Interest, filed June 6, 2012, in In re Certain Wireless Communications Devices, Portable Music & Data Processing Devices, Computers & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-745 at 5, available at www.ftc.gov/os/2012/06/1206ftcwirelesscom.pdf.

[8] See Cary et al., The Case for Antitrust Law to Police the Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 77 Antitrust L. J. 913, 941 (2011) (arguing that contract law is insufficient because implementers are not parties to the FRAND contract and, therefore, cannot assert a breach of contract claim).

[9] DOJ & PTO, Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments, 7 n.14, Jan. 8, 2013, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/290994.pdf (“As courts have found, when a holder of a standards-essential patent makes a commitment to an SDO to license such patents on F/RAND terms, it does so for the intended benefit of members of the SDO and third parties implementing the standard. These putative licensees are beneficiaries with rights to sue for breach of that commitment.”) (citing Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1030-33 (W.D. Wash. 2012); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999-1001 (W.D. Wash. 2012)) (emphasis added).

[10] Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., DOJ, Global Competition Review, 2nd Annual Antitrust Law Leaders Forum (Feb. 8, 2013), IP, Antitrust and Looking Back on the Last Four Years, 21, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/292573.pdf.

[11] See, e.g., Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 Antitrust L..J. 603 (2007).

[12] Rafael Rivera Jr., Antitrust Law, Variant Patent Holdup Theories, and Injunctive Relief in Standard Setting Organizations, 2, Illinois State Bar Association Section of Antitrust and Unfair Competition Law Newsletter, Vol. 50, Issue 2, Jan. 2013, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2186037.

[13] Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 1, at 30.

[14] Statement of the FTC, In the Matter of Google Inc., File No. 121-0120, 4, available at http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130103googlemotorolastmtofcomm.pdf.

[15] Rafael Rivera Jr., supra note 12 at 6.

[16] Maureen Ohlhausen, FTC Commissioner, Dissenting Statement, In the Matter of Robert Bosch GmbH, File No. 121-0081, 2-3, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210081/121126boschohlhausenstatement.pdf.

[17] J. Thomas Rosch, Separate Statement Regarding Google’s Standard Essential Patent Enforcement Practices, In the Matter of Google Inc., File No. 121-0120, 3, available at http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130103googlemotorolaroschstmt.pdf.

[18] Maureen Ohlhausen, Dissenting Statement in the Matter of Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc., FIle No. 121-0120, 2-4, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130103googlemotorolaohlhausenstmt.pdf.

[19] Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 1, at 27.

[20] William E. Kovacic, Dissenting Statement, In the Matter of Negotiated Data Solutions, LLC, File No. 051-0094, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080122kovacic.pdf.

[21] William E. Kovacic & Mark Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 Antitrust L.J. 929, 945 (2010).

[22] Hittinger, Esposito, & Huh, FTC’s Use of Section 5 Under Attack, DLA Piper (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.dlapiper.com/ftc-use-of-section-5-under-attack/.

[23] Letter from the FTC to Hon. Wendell Ford and Hon. John Danforth, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, United States Senate, Commission Statement of Policy on the Scope of Consumer Unfairness Jurisdiction (December 17, 1980), reprinted in International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070, 1073 (1984), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm.

[24] 15 U.S.C §§ 45(n).

[25] Kovacic & Winerman, supra note 21 at 942.

[26] See, e.g., Eric Stasic, Royalty Rates and Licensing Strategies for Essential Patents on LTE (4G) Telecommunication Standards, 115, http://www.investorvillage.com/uploads/82827/files/LESI-Royalty-Rates.pdf.

[27] Geoff Duncan, Book Smarts: Why Barnes & Noble is Wheeling Out Big Legal Guns to Back the Nook, Digital Trends (December1, 2011), http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/barnes-noble-bets-on-nook-and-big-legal-guns/.

[28] James Ratliff & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Use and Threat of Injunctions in the RAND Context, 6, https://bspace.berkeley.edu/access/content/group/db8af46b-36ab-4076-00b0-dff64449708e/Ratliff-Rubinfeld%20_injunctions_in_RAND_setting.pdf.

[29] Microsoft, Comment for Patent Standards Workshop, Project No. P11-1204, 13-17, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/patentstandardsworkshop/00009-60523.pdf.

[30] Brooks & Geradin, Interpreting and Enforcing the Voluntary FRAND Commitment, 34, Cravath, Swaine, & Moore, http://www.cravath.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Publications/Interpreting%20and%20Enforcing%20Vol%20Frand%20Commitment_Brooks%207.20.10.pdf (“Our research shows that, if a FRAND commitment is taken seriously as a contract – as it should be – then efforts to look to FRAND as a source of cumulative royalty caps, particular formulas for calculating or apportioning royalties, or limitations on remedies against unlicensed infringers are not only without basis, but are contradicted by the ordinary methods of contract interpretation.”).

[31] Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 1, at 27.

[32] Microsoft, supra note 29.

[33] Wellford & McCutchen, Reasons to Reject a “No Injunctions” Rule for SEP’s and Other FRAND-Obligated Patents, 3, available at http://www.bingham.com/Publications/Files/2012/04/No-Injunctions-Rule (“FRAND commitments sometimes contain a no-injunction pledge but, if so, they do so as the result of a patent holder’s voluntary commitment. Such a commitment is not the result of merely participating in the activities of a standard setting organization (“SSO”). Adding a new no-injunction pledge to a FRAND obligation by regulatory fiat, where it has not been accepted voluntarily, would be a departure from the law’s usual respect for commercial agreements.”).

[34] FTC, Public Interest Statement, supra note 7.

[35] FTC, The Evolving IP Marketplace, 192, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf (“However, there is much debate over whether such RAND or FRAND commitments can effectively prevent patent owners from imposing excessive royalty obligations on licensees. Panelists complained that the terms RAND and FRAND are vague and ill-defined–particularly with regard to what royalty rate is ‘reasonable.’”).

[36] Id. at 26.

[37] David Balto, Agencies Right to Expand Scrutiny of Patent Transfers and Acquisitions, Huffington Post (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-balto/antitrust-patents_b_2002799.html.

[38] FTC, Analysis of Proposed Consent Order, In the Matter of Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc., File No. 121-0120, 2, available at http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130103googlemotorolaanalysis.pdf.

[39] Ratliff & Rubinfeld, supra note 14, at 14.

[40] Id. at 7.

[41] FTC, The Evolving IP Marketplace, supra note 21 at 190 (“A reasonable royalty damages award that is based on high switching costs, rather than the ex ante value of the patented technology compared to alternatives, overcompensates the patentee. It improperly reflects the economic value of investments by the infringer rather just than the economic value of the invention. To prevent damage awards based on switching costs, courts should set the hypothetical negotiation at an early stage of product development, when the infringer is making design decisions.”).

[42] Brooks & Geradin, supra note 15 at 28.

[43] Epstein, Kieff, & Spulber, The FTC, IP, and SSOs: Government Hold-Up Replacing Private Coordination, 21-23 (Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 414), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1907450.

[44] Ratliff & Rubinfeld, supra note 14, at 12.

[45] Mario Mariniello, Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) Terms: A Challenge for Competition Authorities, 7 J. Competition L. & Econ. 3 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2186052 (noting that “[t]he price of a successful innovation should also cover the risk of failed research attempts”).

[46] Geoffrey Manne, Europe Shouldn’t Intervene In Microsoft-Motorola Patent Dispute, Forbes (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2012/04/05/europe-shouldnt-intervene-in-microsoft-motorola-patent-dispute/.

[47] Ratliff & Rubinfeld, supra note 14 at 10.

[48] Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc., No. C10-1823, Order on Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 15  (W.D. Wa. Feb. 27, 2012).

[49] See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1991 (2007); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and Standard-Setting, in 1 Innovation Policy And The Economy 119–26 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2001); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698, 698 (1998);

[50] Ratliff & Rubinfeld, supra note 14 at 2.

[51] See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1677, 1679– 82 (2007); James Bessen, Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex Technologies 1–4 (Research on Innovation Working Paper, 2003), available at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/thicket.pdf.

[52] Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 Ariz. L. Rev. 165, 209, 211 (2011).

[53] Mark Summerfield, Apple v Android Part V: Open Standards, IP Strategy, Resolution?, Patentology (Apr. 23, 2012), http://blog.patentology.com.au/2012/04/apple-v-android-part-v-open-standards.html.

[54] Id.

[55] M.G. Siegler, Microsoft’s Android Plan: Evil Genius or Just Evil?, TechCrunch (July 13, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/07/13/scott-you-just-dont-get-it-do-ya/.

[56] See, e.g., Woody Leonhard, Microsoft Makes More from Android than Windows on Smartphones, Inforworld (JUne 1, 2011), http://www.infoworld.com/t/android/microsoft-makes-more-android-windows-smartphones-707.

[57] Siegler, supra note 51.

[58] Epstein, Kieff, & Spulber, supra note 29, at 21.

[59] See, e.g., Eric Goldman, The Problems with Software Patents (Part 1 of 3), Forbes (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2012/11/28/the-problems-with-software-patents/.

[60] David Smith, et al., FTC-Google Consent Decree Provides Important Lessons Regarding Standards-Essential Patents, JD Supra (January 7, 2013), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ftc-google-consent-decree-provides-impor-44359/?utm_source=jds&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=banking.

[61] Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Ohlhausen, supra note 8, at 2.

[62] Id. at 3-4.

[63] Separate Statement of Commissioner Rosch, supra note 9, at n.1.

[64] See, e.g., Florian Mueller, Defensive Use Exception in FTC-Google Deal Identified as Primary Area of Concern, Foss Patents (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/01/defensive-use-exception-in-ftc-google.html.

[65] Dave Heiner, DOJ Patent POlicy Means FTC Should Think Again about Google Patent Order, Microsoft on the Issues (Jan. 8, 2013), http://blogs.technet.com/b/microsoft_on_the_issues/archive/2013/01/08/doj-patent-policy-means-ftc-should-think-again-about-google-patent-order.aspx.

[66] Decision and Order, In the Matter of Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc., File No. 121-0120, 2, available at http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/1210120/130103googlemotorolado.pdf.

[67] Allison Frankel, Loophole for Google Order on Essential Patent Injunctions?, Thomson Reuters News and Insight (Jan. 8, 2013), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2013/01_-_January/Loophole_for_Google_in_FTC_order_on_essential_patent_injunctions_/.

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Copyright, Property Rights, and the Free Market

Popular Media Over at Cato Unbound, there has been a discussion this past month on copyright and copyright reform.  In his recent contribution to this discussion, Mark . . .

Over at Cato Unbound, there has been a discussion this past month on copyright and copyright reform.  In his recent contribution to this discussion, Mark Schultz posted an excellent essay today, Where are the Creators? Consider Creators in Copyright Reform, that calls out the cramped, reductionist view of copyright policy that leads some libertarians and conservatives to castigate this property right as “regulation” or as “monopoly.”  Here’s a small taste from his essay:

I am genuinely puzzled when copyright discussions treat creative works if they are a pre-existing resource that the government arbitrarily allocates. They are not. They aren’t an imaginary regulatory entitlement, such as pollution credits. They aren’t leases or mineral rights on public land handed out to political cronies. Creative works are, instead, the productive intellectual labor of private parties. Real people make this stuff.

At this point in the discussion, a common rhetorical move is to reject what some scholars describe as the romantic myth of authorship. Copyright skeptics point out that authors build on the work of others and that many creative works are the work of corporations, not individuals. This argument was provoked by many decades—a couple centuries, really—of rhetoric that put the individual author on a pedestal. Even if one concedes that authors have, perhaps, been idealized, taking them for granted goes too far.

The absence of creators from the critique of copyright is one of many reasons I doubt the political (and moral) appeal of much of the case for copyright reform we have heard from a few libertarians and conservatives. At the risk of dredging up tiresome memories from the recent presidential election, the argument over “you didn’t build that” was very familiar to me as a scholar of copyright. In both instances, there is a divide between those who value (or, even, romanticize) individual achievement and those who emphasize how much that achievement depends on a social context.

This follows Mark’s earlier and equally excellent essay, Copyright Reform through Private Ordering, in which he identifies how defining and securing copyright as a property right is consistent with and advances the private-ordering regimes embraced by advocates of the free market.  Again, here’s a small taste:

Like other forms of property, copyright thus represents an invitation to a transaction and an opportunity to bargain. This opportunity for parties to transact and bargain is one of the key differences between property and regulation. A regulator has a duty to enforce the law—and if a regulator chooses not to enforce, then a court may order him to do so. Copyright owners need not enforce their rights, of course. Moreover, it is perfectly legitimate to offer a property owner money to forgo their right to enforce their copyrights; such commercial transactions are really the whole point of copyright. Make the same offer to a regulator, and you go to jail.

Read these essays in their entirety—both of them are here and here—as Mark is doing a great job in what is very brief and limited blogging space in providing both the important data and the principled arguments for how copyright is fundamentally consistent with and advances the aspirations of the free market and limited government.  This follows on his earlier, excellent blog posting at the Copyright Alliance that touched on similar themes, Copyright, Economic Freedom, and the RSC Policy Brief.

DISCLOSURE: Mark and I are both on the Academic Advisory Board of the Copyright Alliance.

Filed under: blogging, copyright, intellectual property, law and economics, technology

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Intellectual Property & Licensing