Our TOTM colleague Dan Crane has written a few posts here over the past year or so about attempts by the automobile dealers lobby (and General Motors itself) to restrict the ability of Tesla Motors to sell its vehicles directly to consumers (see here, here and here). Following New Jersey’s adoption of an anti-Tesla direct distribution ban, more than 70 lawyers and economists–including yours truly and several here at TOTM–submitted an open letter to Gov. Chris Christie explaining why the ban is bad policy.

Now it seems my own state of Missouri is getting caught up in the auto dealers’ ploy to thwart pro-consumer innovation and competition. Legislation (HB1124) that was intended to simply update statutes governing the definition, licensing and use of off-road and utility vehicles got co-opted at the last minute in the state Senate. Language was inserted to redefine the term “franchisor” to include any automobile manufacturer, regardless whether they have any franchise agreements–in direct contradiction to the definition used throughout the rest of the surrounding statues. The bill defines a “franchisor” as:

“any manufacturer of new motor vehicles which establishes any business location or facility within the state of Missouri, when such facilities are used by the manufacturer to inform, entice, or otherwise market to potential customers, or where customer orders for the manufacturer’s new motor vehicles are placed, received, or processed, whether or not any sales of such vehicles are finally consummated, and whether or not any such vehicles are actually delivered to the retail customer, at such business location or facility.”

In other words, it defines a franchisor as a company that chooses to open it’s own facility and not franchise. The bill then goes on to define any facility or business location meeting the above criteria as a “new motor vehicle dealership,” even though no sales or even distribution may actually take place there. Since “franchisors” are already forbidden from owning a “new motor vehicle dealership” in Missouri (a dubious restriction in itself), these perverted definitions effectively ban a company like Tesla from selling directly to consumers.

The bill still needs to go back to the Missouri House of Representatives, where it started out as addressing “laws regarding ‘all-terrain vehicles,’ ‘recreational off-highway vehicles,’ and ‘utility vehicles’.”

This is classic rent-seeking regulation at its finest, using contrived and contorted legislation–not to mention last-minute, underhanded legislative tactics–to prevent competition and innovation that, as General Motors itself pointed out, is based on a more economically efficient model of distribution that benefits consumers. Hopefully the State House…or the Governor…won’t be asleep at the wheel as this legislation speeds through the final days of the session.

Filed under: barriers to entry, competition advocacy, politics, regulation, Sykuta Tagged: direct distribution ban, entry barriers, Missouri legislature, regulation, rent seeking, Tesla

Excerpt

Remember way back (you know, like four years ago) when Netflix was primarily a mail-order DVD company? Things have changed a lot since then.

Now Netflix–which has become a key player in online video–wants to kill the Comcast/Time Warner Cable merger. Its announcement comes, not coincidentally, on the heels of a letter Senator Al Franken sent asking Netflix to help him stop the deal. His stated aim: to prevent Comcast from becoming (in the scare words of internet scolds everywhere) “the gatekeeper of the internet.”

But far from imperiling consumers’ access to video content from both online distributors and independent cable channels alike, the deal is likely to improve it.

Yesterday the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing on the merger, and Netflix (and the interconnection issues raised by big content companies like it) was a hot topic. Of particular concern to several of the Committee’s members was the recent interconnection agreement between Comcast and Netflix and what it might suggest about Comcast’s ability to keep competitors from mounting a real challenge to Comcast’s video service. They really needn’t fret so much.

Continue reading on WIRED

 

If you happen to own a computer, television or other streaming device, you’ve probably heard that Netflix recently reached an agreement with Comcast to streamline the delivery of Netflix’s videos to Comcast customers.

You’ve probably also heard that the chairman of the Federal Communications Commission has circulated new “net neutrality” rules to govern how traffic moves across the so-called “last mile” connection between an internet service provider and your home.

What do these have to do with each other? The short answer is “nothing,” but you wouldn’t know that from listening to Netflix’s CEO.

In short, the Netflix-Comcast agreement deals with something known as interconnection – how big content providers transmit their huge files over the internet’s backbone in order to get to Comcast (and other ISP) last mile facilities in the first place.  Net neutrality deals with how traffic is handled once it arrives at the last-mile, and whether it makes sense for certain traffic to receive priority treatment once it gets there.

Let’s take the issue of interconnection first.

Big content providers have always had to pay someone to manage delivery of their shows, movies and services. Typically these companies use specialized services called “content delivery networks” (CDNs) to manage this traffic as it travels from the provider to the ISP, which then moves it over its “last miles” to individual customers and screens. CDNs often build significant infrastructure of their own to improve speeds, and content providers (including Netflix) have always paid for this.

A company like Netflix can also connect to ISPs directly to cut out the middleman. Companies like Google, Microsoft, Amazon and others do just this, paying for network “ports” that enable them to manage their own traffic and offload their massive data streams directly, instead of paying a third party to handle it.

Netflix’s much-loved videos take up as much as 30 percent of all internet bandwidth in the U.S, creating longstanding traffic management problems for the company that have been costly to address.  Netflix had used a number of CDN middlemen to deliver its traffic, but ran into problems when it overloaded one CDN, Cogent, which didn’t want to pay for the extra infrastructure needed to offload the additional content.
So Netflix chose to interconnect directly with Comcast, which had already invested heavily in the infrastructure to handle large volumes of content.  Although Netflix pays Comcast for interconnection, it has reportedly saved a ton of cash in cutting out the middleman— and increased its speeds by 65 percent.

Net neutrality, on the other hand, addresses the issue of discrimination on the last-mile networks owned by Comcast and other ISPs. In essence, it seeks to prohibit unfair treatment of unaffiliated content traveling within an ISP’s network. Under the new proposed rules, according to reports, if an ISP decides to provide premium speeds to Netflix over its last mile facility, it can’t deny that same quality of service to Netflix’s competitors.

So if the issues of interconnection and net neutrality are entirely different, why did Netflix CEO Reed Hastings take to the airwaves to complain that the interconnection deal with Comcast – one that he initiated and over which he stands to save money – amounts to an unfair “toll” on Netflix that threatens net neutrality?

Apparently, Mr. Hastings figured he could confuse longstanding, widely accepted interconnection practices with the debate over net neutrality, hoping politicians and regulators who favor net neutrality might help him get a free pass on interconnection costs.

But free to whom? Someone has to pay for the infrastructure needed to handle Netflix’s traffic. If Netflix (or Cogent) doesn’t pay, everyone using the network would have to, whether they were Netflix customers or not.

In reality, Hastings was looking for a government handout – either in the new net neutrality rules or via “conditions” attached to approval of the Comcast/Time Warner Cable deal. Given that Sen. Al Franken recently asked Netflix to help him kill the transaction using similar “gatekeeper” metaphors, Hastings’ ploy may well be effective. But that doesn’t make it logical or fair.

There is simply no justification for offering Netflix any special treatment in its interconnection arrangements. Online content providers have countless ways to connect with broadband networks. Competition has forced prices for these interconnection services down by a remarkable 99 percent in recent years. ISPs can do nothing to thwart interconnection, and, in fact, Comcast has every incentive to keep the online video spigot wide open.

There is a reason every iteration of the FCC’s net neutrality rules, including the latest, have explicitly not applied to backbone interconnection agreements: Interconnection over the backbone has always been open and competitive, and it simply doesn’t give rise to the kind of discrimination concerns net neutrality is meant to address.

That Netflix would prefer not to pay for delivery of its content isn’t surprising. But net neutrality regulations don’t — and shouldn’t — have anything to do with it.

Cross-posted from the Oregonian

Summary

The FTC oversees nearly every company in America. It polices competition by enforcing the antitrust laws. It tries to protect consumers by punishing deception and practices it deems “unfair.” It’s the general enforcer of corporate promises made in privacy policies and codes of conduct generated by industry and multi-stakeholder processes. It’s the de facto regulator of the media, from traditional advertising to internet search and social networks. It handles novel problems of privacy, data security, online child protection, and patents, among others.

But perhaps most importantly, the Federal Trade Commission has become, for better or worse, the Federal *Technology* Commission, and technology creates a special problem for regulators.

Inherent limitations on anyone’s knowledge about the future nature of technology, business, and social norms caution skepticism as regulators attempt to predict whether any given business conduct will, on net, improve or harm consumer welfare. In fact, a host of factors suggests that even the best-intentioned regulators may tend toward overconfidence and the erroneous condemnation of novel conduct that benefits consumers in ways that are difficult for regulators to understand.

One thing is certain: A top-down, administrative regulatory model of regulation is ill-suited for technology, and this technocratic model of regulation is inconsistent with the regulatory humility required in the face of fast-changing, unexpected—and immeasurably valuable—technological advance.

In assessing the FTC, three themes emerge as being crucial to the Agency’s continued success: humility, institutional structure, and economic rigor. Together these three elements serve the essential function of restraining this powerful Agency’s discretion.

This essay discusses how these constraints have operated (or failed to operate) in the past, and offers some suggestions for reform to improve their operation in the future.

 

Geoff Manne joined Sandra Aistars and Bartlett D. Cleland to discuss the Aereo case as part of World IP Day 2014.

2014 World IP Day: What’s at Stake in the Aereo Case?

Interested observers on all sides of the contentious debate over Aereo have focused a great deal on the implications for cloud computing if the Supreme Court rules against Aereo. The Court hears oral argument next week, and the cloud computing issue is sure to make an appearance.

Read the full piece here.

FTC Commissioner Josh Wright is on a roll. A couple of days before his excellent Ardagh/Saint Gobain dissent addressing merger efficiencies, Wright delivered a terrific speech on minimum resale price maintenance (RPM). The speech, delivered in London to the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, signaled that Wright will seek to correct the FTC’s early post-Leegin mistakes on RPM and will push for the sort of structured rule of reason that is most likely to benefit consumers.

Wright began by acknowledging that minimum RPM is, from a competitive standpoint, a mixed bag. Under certain (rarely existent) circumstances, RPM may occasion anticompetitive harm by facilitating dealer or manufacturer collusion or by acting as an exclusionary device for a dominant manufacturer or retailer. Under more commonly existing sets of circumstances, however, RPM may enhance interbrand competition by reducing dealer free-riding, facilitating the entry of new brands, or encouraging optimal production of output-enhancing dealer services that are not susceptible to free-riding.

Because instances of minimum RPM may be good or bad, liability rules may err in two directions. Overly lenient rules may fail to condemn output-reducing instances of RPM, but overly strict rules will prevent uses of RPM that would benefit consumers by enhancing distributional efficiency. Efforts to tailor a liability rule so that it makes fewer errors (i.e., produces fewer false acquittals or false convictions) will create complexity that makes the rule more difficult for business planners and courts to apply. An optimal liability rule, then, should minimize the sum of “error costs” (social losses from expected false acquittals and false convictions) and “decision costs” (costs of applying the rule).

Crafting such a rule requires judgments about (1) whether RPM is more likely to occasion harmful or beneficial effects, and (2) the magnitude of expected harms or benefits. If most instances of RPM are likely to be harmful, the harm resulting from an instance of RPM is likely to be great, and the foregone efficiencies from false convictions are likely to be minor, then the liability rule should tend toward condemnation – i.e., should be “plaintiff-friendly.” On the other hand, if most instances of RPM are likely to be beneficial, the magnitude of expected benefit is significant, and the social losses from false acquittals are likely small, then a “defendant-friendly” rule is more likely to minimize error costs.

As Commissioner Wright observed, economic theory and empirical evidence about minimum RPM’s competitive effects, as well as intuitions about the magnitude of those various effects, suggest that minimum RPM ought to be subject to a defendant-friendly liability rule that puts the burden on plaintiffs to establish actual or likely competitive harm. With respect to economic theory, procompetitive benefit from RPM is more likely because the necessary conditions for RPM’s anticompetitive effects are rarely satisfied, while the prerequisites to procompetitive benefit often exist. Not surprisingly, then, most studies of minimum RPM have concluded that it is more frequently used to enhance rather than reduce market output. (As I have elsewhere observed and Commissioner Wright acknowledged, the one recent outlier study is methodologically flawed.) In terms of the magnitude of harms from wrongly condemning or wrongly approving instances of RPM, there are good reasons to believe greater harm will result from the former sort of error. The social harm from a false acquittal – enhanced market power – is self-correcting; market power invites entry. A false condemnation, by contrast, can be corrected only by a subsequent judicial, regulatory, or legislative overruling.  Moreover, an improper conviction thwarts not just the challenged instance of RPM but also instances contemplated by business planners who would seek to avoid antitrust liability. Taken together, these considerations about the probability and magnitude of various competitive effects argue in favor of a fairly lenient liability rule for minimum RPM – certainly not per se illegality or a “quick look” approach that deems RPM to be inherently suspect and places the burden on the defendant to rebut a presumption of anticompetitive harm.

Commissioner Wright’s call for a more probing rule of reason for minimum RPM represents a substantial improvement on the approach the FTC took in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2007 Leegin decision. Shortly after Leegin abrogated the rule of per se illegality for minimum RPM, women’s shoe manufacturer Nine West petitioned the Commission to modify a pre-Leegin consent decree constraining Nine West’s use of RPM arrangements. In agreeing to modify (but not eliminate) the restrictions, the Commission endorsed a liability rule that would deem RPM to be inherently suspect (and thus presumptively illegal) unless the defendant could establish an absence of the so-called “Leegin factors” – i.e., that there was no dealer or manufacturer market power, that RPM was not widely used in the relevant market, and that the RPM at issue was not dealer-initiated.

The FTC’s fairly pro-plaintiff approach was deficient in that it simply lifted a few words from Leegin without paying close attention to the economics of RPM. As Commissioner Wright explained,

[C]ritical to any decision to structure the rule of reason for minimum RPM is that the relevant analytical factors correctly match the economic evidence. For instance, some of the factors identified by the Leegin Court as relevant for identifying whether a particular minimum RPM agreement might be anticompetitive actually shed little light on competitive effects. For example, the Leegin Court noted that “the source of the constraint might also be an important consideration” and observed that retailer-initiated restraints are more likely to be anticompetitive than manufacturer-initiated restraints. But economic evidence recognizes that because retailers in effect sell promotional services to manufacturers and benefit from such contracts, it is equally as possible that retailers will initiate minimum RPM agreements as manufacturers. Imposing a structured rule of reason standard that treats retailer-initiated minimum RPM more restrictively would thus undermine the benefits of the rule of reason.

Commissioner Wright’s remarks give me hope that the FTC will eventually embrace an economically sensible liability rule for RPM. Now, if we could only get those pesky state policy makers to modernize their outdated RPM thinking.  As Commissioner Wright recently observed, policy advocacy “is a weapon the FTC has wielded effectively and consistently over time.” Perhaps the Commission, spurred by Wright, will exercise its policy advocacy prowess on the backward states that continue to demonize minimum RPM arrangements.

Filed under: antitrust, economics, error costs, federal trade commission, law and economics, markets, regulation, resale price maintenance

FTC Commissioner Josh Wright pens an incredibly important dissent in the FTC’s recent Ardagh/Saint-Gobain merger review.

At issue is how pro-competitive efficiencies should be considered by the agency under the Merger Guidelines.

Read the full piece here.

I have a new article on the Comcast/Time Warner Cable merger in the latest edition of the CPI Antitrust Chronicle, which includes several other articles on the merger, as well.

In a recent essay, Allen Grunes & Maurice Stucke (who also have an essay in the CPI issue) pose a thought experiment: If Comcast can acquire TWC, what’s to stop it acquiring all cable companies? The authors’ assertion is that the arguments being put forward to support the merger contain no “limiting principle,” and that the same arguments, if accepted here, would unjustifiably permit further consolidation. But there is a limiting principle: competitive harm. Size doesn’t matter, as courts and economists have repeatedly pointed out.

Read the full piece here.