Rep. Carter and the Members of NCOIL,

Thank you for inviting me. My name is R.J. Lehmann, and I am the editor-in-chief and a senior fellow with the International Center for Law & Economics. ICLE is a think tank based in Portland, Oregon, dedicated to promoting the law & economics approach to legal analysis, and to issues of public policy more generally.

Some of you may know me from my prior work at the R Street Institute, which I co-founded in 2012. Among the hats I wore at R Street was running the institute’s insurance policy project, and I was the author of the first nine editions of R Street’s annual report card evaluating insurance regulation in the 50 states.

It was actually early in our days at R Street that I first encountered the topic before us today. After the tragic shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary in December 2012, there was a pressing call for new and creative thinking about ways to address the scourge of firearms violence. Being a research center that was, at that point, devoted almost exclusively to insurance issues, we explored whether mandatory insurance could be part of the solution to promote firearms safety, just as mandatory auto insurance has served to promote driving safety and mandatory workers compensation insurance has served to promote workplace safety. So, while I’m about to tell you why I think these mandates are a bad idea, I want to note at the top that I do understand the intuition.

What we concluded, after batting around various iterations of what a mandate might look like, is that it was fundamentally unworkable. That insurance could not possibly respond in the overwhelming number of cases that were of public concern and that in the limited set where it could respond – which is, basically, true accidents that befall third parties – coverage already exists, either through a homeowners policy or a renters policy.

The two central problems that limit the applicability of any firearms-insurance mandate are that intentional acts are uninsurable and that it is the nature of liability insurance that only harms to third parties are covered.

Taking those one at a time, the claim that intentional acts are uninsurable begs two other obvious questions, each of which, unfortunately, can take us down some rather unproductive detours. What does it mean for an act to be intentional and what does it mean for an event to be insurable?

On intentionality, there’s a whole rabbit hole one can head down on free will and determinism and whether all actions are intentional or whether no actions are intentional. This is not a philosophy class, so I’d like to rescue us from that particular rabbit hole.

The question of insurability returns me to a theme I found myself echoing a lot in another recent public policy discussion—which is whether business interruption for pandemics is insurable. What I said then and will say here is that insurability is a spectrum. Things may be more or less insurable, meaning, in a nutshell, that the willingness of capital to participate in risk-transfer solutions for any particular class of event will vary.

The framing that I think is most helpful for these purposes is to say the sorts of events that are most insurable are those that are fortuitious—which is to say, they happen by chance, rather than by design—and where there is a broad alignment between the goals of the insurer and the insured. When I step into my car, I would like to avoid getting into an accident. My insurer would also like me to avoid getting into an accident. If I do nonetheless get into an accident, it’s a fortuitous event. That event is insurable. If, rather than an accident, I willfully try to run someone down on the road, then we’re not aligned. That’s not insurable and claims for vehicular homicide are excluded—even though, in some places and some cases, the insurer may still be required by a judge or jury to pay a claim.

Applying that logic to the example of firearms incidents offers some context for just how many potential claims are excluded the realm of insurability simply from the fact that insurers are not willing to extend coverage to intentional acts. According to the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention, more than 70% of firearms injuries are the result of assaults, while less than 20% are unintentional. Among firearms-related deaths, the National Safety Council finds that 54% are suicides, 43% are homicides, and only about 1% are accidental.

We therefore start with proposition that only about one-fifth of firearms injuries, and only about 1 in 100 firearms deaths, are even potentially insurable. That universe of potentially insurable claims shrinks even further—although the data on this is harder to find—when you consider that it is the nature of liability policies that they only cover injuries to third parties. If a contractor slips and falls on your property, that might be covered under your homeowners insurance policy. If you slip and fall, it will not be. If your dog bites your neighbor, it might be covered. If your dog bites you, it will not be covered.

So, similarly, if there’s a firearms accident in your home and a third party is injured, that might be covered. Indeed, even if the accident is outside your home—say, you’re the vice president of the United States and you accidentally shoot your hunting partner in the face—your homeowners policy very well might cover that.

But the insured in a homeowners policy is the household, not an individual. If one member of your household accidentally shoots another member of your household—even in the very tragic incidents we hear about involving children—that’s not going to be an insured claim.

Another factor that likely shrinks the universe of claims even further is the language of the HO-3 policy itself. The policy has always excluded injuries or property damage that the insured “expected or intended.” But in 2000, the Insurance Services Office actually broadened that exclusion quite a bit, and the standard policy now states that coverage is excluded for an action that is “of a different kind, quality or degree than initially expected or intended” or “is sustained by a different person, entity, real or personal property, than initially expected or intended.” That’s a pretty broad exclusion and courts have tended to read it as covering even negligently careless actions that result in unintentional injuries.

Nonetheless, despite these manifest limitations on what an insurance mandate could possibly cover, we have watched such proposals perennially introduced in various states in the decade since Sandy Hook, with New York and Connecticut being two of the most frequent states where legislation was considered. Until this past year, when the City of San Jose and the State of New Jersey both adopted differing versions of a mandate, they never went anywhere.

But interestingly, in 2018, we saw regulatory action that, rather than mandate liability insurance for gun owners, actually would appear to forbid it, and this contradiction is important and underappreciated in the current discussion.

For a recap, back in 2018, New York State Financial Services Superintendent Maria T. Vullo brought complaints against the broker Lockton, the underwriter Chubb, and the National Rifle Association over their respective roles in administering the Carry Guard insurance program for NRA members. Some of the charges concerned alleged violations of the declinations requirements to place policies in the surplus-lines market and that the NRA was marketing policies as an unlicensed producer. Those violations aren’t of much interest here. But the core charge was that, because Carry Guard would pay legal defense costs for insureds who face civil or criminal charges related to the use of firearms (that is, where the insured pleads innocent, claims self-defense, or asserts that they are not liable in a civil proceeding) the coverage itself was fundamentally contrary to public policy establishing that criminal acts cannot be insured.

Now, as many insurance lawyers in this room could testify, it’s not always quite as simple as that. It is not unusual at all for an insurer in, say, the directors and officers, or errors and omissions, or environmental-liability lines to find themselves on the hook for the defense costs of an insured accused of a criminal act. And where they are adjudicated guilty, the insurer may try to claw back those costs. But until that point, there are fiduciary duties an insurer owes to its policyholders, and refusing to pay defense costs on a liability policy is usually a quick ticket to a bad faith lawsuit.

But more fundamentally, paying defense costs is a if not the fundamental purpose of liability insurance. So, if the Carry Guard program was contrary to public policy, that’s another way to say that liability insurance for firearms is illegal. And the primary reason I think that has to be considered in this discussion is that one of the states that filed follow-on actions in the Carry Guard case was New Jersey. Which suggests the absurd scenario that New Jersey is now requiring a form of insurance that is illegal to sell in New Jersey.

I am not a constitutional lawyer—or any kind of lawyer for that matter—so I’m going to refrain from saying too much about how these mandates would be treated under the rubric the Supreme Court promulgated in last year’s Bruen decision, although I reserve for myself the right to chime in with my amateur opinion if the subject comes up in the Q&A, which I imagine it will. I would recommend a paper by Adam Schniderman of the University of Michigan Law School that I believe is the first to look at the question, and he makes what I think is a compelling case that neither the New Jersey statute nor the San Jose ordinance would survive under Bruen analysis.

But more generally, I think it’s clear that what these proposals seek is a kind of end-run around the Second Amendment; i.e., that you can outsource to the insurance industry, through its underwriting and rate-setting processes, vetting of firearms owners that existing Second Amendment jurisprudence would appear to deny to state and local governments.

There are various problems with this, but one that I think is most important is that it’s grounded on a theory of what insurers would do to manage firearms risk that appears to be fundamentally untrue. In other words, as mentioned, we already have coverage for firearms accidents in homeowners policies. But insurers don’t charge different rates to different homeowners based on their risk of firearms accidents. Based on my understanding, there aren’t even any insurers who ask whether a policy applicant owns a firearm, so it doesn’t even appear in the underwriting side of the equation.

Now, maybe this is because liability is a relatively small part of the risk underwritten in a homeowners policy, and as mentioned, firearms incidents are an even smaller proportion of liability claims. But it should be noted that, even the NRA’s Carry Guard policy—which was a standalone policy for firearms liability—didn’t charge variable rates. It charged a flat fee.

Bespoke, targeted risk-based underwriting is such a ubiquitous part of our modern insurance markets that we sometimes take for granted just how new and novel it is. In auto insurance, it really only dates back to George Joseph’s Mercury General in the 1960s. There have always been underwriting criteria, such as Benjamin Franklin’s Philadelphia Contributionship refusing to insure homes with trees because they were likely to spread fire. But the assumption that, for any given risk, insurers will automatically have and know how to use the relevant data sets to segregate high risk from low risk, is naïve. The use of this data is actually a historical aberration.

Even if insurers do find that data, the variables that provide actuarially credible projections may not be the ones that you assume or hope for. For instance, it may be that the thing that best predicts whether you’re going to have a firearms accident is your income. That sort of correlation is always problematic and controversial, but it should be particularly concerning if what it implicates is a constitutionally protected right.

I look forward to your questions.

 

Wildfire has hit Assemblymember Damon Connolly’s (D-San Rafael) Northern California district particularly hard in recent years, including the devastating Glass and LNU Lightning Complex fires in 2020, the Nuns and Tubbs fires in 2017, and the Valley fire in 2015.

Read the full piece here.

How it is that Illinois, a jurisdiction not typically associated with a strong commitment to free-market principles, came to be the first state in the nation to allow its insurance rates to be regulated entirely by open competition is something of an accident of history.

Read the full piece here.

ICLE Editor-in-Chief R.J. Lehmann joined The Reload podcast to discuss New Jersey’s new gun-carry insurance mandate and San Jose, California’s gun ownership insurance requirement. He said the requirements, which are the first of their kind, won’t accomplish the goal lawmakers have claimed. Namely, insurance companies can’t provide coverage for criminal acts. That basically leaves damage caused by accidental shootings as the only real option for coverage.

And even accidental coverage is more limited than most people realize. For instance, homeowners’ insurance–which San Jose now claims qualifies under its mandate–will cover accidental shootings, but only for damages done to third parties. That means any harm caused to the homeowner or family members living in the home wouldn’t be covered.

Lehmann said New Jersey’s requirement is even more problematic because it appears to be trying to require insurance against deliberate, and potentially criminal, acts. He said that’s not something any company offers nor is it a policy lawmakers could realistically force companies to offer. It also goes directly against the state’s complaints about “concealed carry insurance,” which are often not actual insurance policies but lawyer co-ops or group retainer plans.

Beyond the practical problems with the mandates, Lehmann said they also face an uphill battle in the courts. He explains why founding-era surety laws are a bad analogue for these modern requirements and why they are unlikely to survive the Bruen test in the long run.

Video of the appearance is embedded below.

ICLE Editor-in-Chief R.J. Lehmann joined On Point, a daily discussion program produced by WBUR radio in Boston, for a discussion of  the nation’s first gun-insurance mandate, which took effect this year in San Jose, California. Gun owners in the city are required to have liability insurance or they could be fined a minimum of $250. But can insurance actually help curb gun violence?

“Insurance in and of itself is never going to cover the kinds of violent events that people imagine it would because insurance can’t cover things that you do on purpose,” R.J. Lehmann says.

Guests

• Mayor Sam Liccardo, former mayor of San Jose, California. He championed the city’s first in the nation ordinance requiring gun owners to have gun liability insurance. The insurance mandate took effect Jan. 1st. (@sliccardo)
• Jennifer Mascia, senior news writer and a founding staffer at The Trace, which is a newsroom dedicated to covering gun violence. Read their article: Will Requiring Gun Owners to Buy Insurance Improve Firearm Safety? (@JenniferMascia)
• R.J. Lehmann, editor-in-chief and senior fellow of the International Center for Law and Economics. Read their article: Nation’s First Gun-Insurance Mandates Take Effect. Will They Hold up in Court? (@raylehmann)

Audio of the full episode is embedded below.

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)—named for its chief sponsors, former Sen. Paul Sarbanes (D–Md.) and former Rep. Mike Oxley (R–Ohio)—was intended to restore trust in the transparency of publicly traded companies after the collapses of WorldCom and Enron Corp. revealed that their auditors had certified financial reports that overstated the firms’ assets and massively understated their liabilities.

But, of course, “transparency” isn’t quite the same thing as prudential safety and soundness. In the insurance space, more specifically, transparency doesn’t necessarily equal solvency.

Read the full piece here.

As the calendar flips to 2023, among the scores of new laws taking effect are a pair of legislative mandates that would, for the first time anywhere in the country, require firearms owners to obtain and maintain liability insurance. What remains to be seen, however, is whether either measure will survive Second Amendment challenges, particularly given the standard handed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its June 2022 New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Bruen decision.

Read the full piece here.

California has a wildfire crisis. Arguably, the entire Western United States has a wildfire crisis, but California’s crisis is of an entirely different magnitude.

Read the full piece here.

Introduction

The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) is grateful for the opportunity to submit these comments in support of FTX’s application to amend its DCO registration to allow it to clear margined products directly for retail participants.

The vast majority (some 96%[1]) of global crypto derivatives trading takes place outside the U.S., much of it on platforms operating non-intermediated retail models similar to that proposed in FTX’s application—but with one crucial difference: these offshore exchanges are largely unregulated. The reason for the disparity in domestic vs. foreign trading volumes is clear: regulatory constraints and costs in the U.S. make the operation of such platforms impossible or unviable. FTX’s proposal would pave the way to bring the technology and business models currently employed to facilitate virtually the entirety of the world’s crypto derivatives trading into the regulated structure of U.S. derivatives markets. The only thing standing in the way is the possible inflexibility of that regulatory structure in the face of disruptive competition.

The obvious market benefits of FTX’s proposal are that:

1. It would free capital that would otherwise be pledged as collateral, which could greatly expand liquidity in crypto markets or could be deployed elsewhere in the financial system;
2. It would introduce a competitive alternative to the current exchanges, thus providing investors savings on what they would otherwise pay in commissions, account origination fees, etc.; and
3. It would offer clear product differentiation: e.g., by introducing a new mechanism for counterparty risk mitigation and by offering direct access to retail investors (with inherently lower costs of participation, more and cheaper information, and technological enhancements like a direct-access mobile interface).

The latter two of these benefits (and to some extent even the first) go particularly to the enhancement of competition in U.S. derivatives markets.

Concerns that markets lack sufficient competition are at the forefront of current policy debates. Legislators are currently working on draft bills that seek to promote competition in digital markets, and President Biden recently issued an executive order advocating for a “whole of government” approach to competition.[2]

Unfortunately, the renewed focus on how governments may boost competition has a significant blindside when it comes to government-created barriers to competition. Rather than offering a solution, government regulations are all too often the cause of reduced competition. This is notably the case when regulation artificially narrows a market by preventing new and innovative firms from disrupting entrenched incumbents.

In other words, if the “whole-of-government” approach to promoting competition means anything, it means that regulatory agencies should work to remove state-created, artificial barriers to market entry that are not absolutely required to accomplish core regulatory functions. The CFTC has precisely that opportunity with FTX’s application.

The market for crypto (and many other) derivatives is currently a lucrative duopoly, dominated by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). Both firms have long been shielded from robust competition by a protective, if well-intentioned, moat of government regulation. The CFTC now has a unique opportunity to open this duopoly to disruptive competition.

FTX’s application would bring both technological and business-model innovation to the derivatives market, carrying with them the promise of increased competition, reduced risk, more efficient pricing, and lower costs for investors. There is always reluctance to embrace the new, particularly in areas that deal so intrinsically with risk. But a sensible measure of caution must not be allowed to morph into costly intransigence.

FTX’s application, while ambitious in its aims, is, in fact, quite modest in its mechanisms. It is respectful of the existing, overarching regulatory paradigm implemented to protect consumers, investors, and the financial system as a whole; it contemplates significant protections and backstops to shore up any increased risk it might introduce; and it ensures that ongoing oversight by the CFTC is readily facilitated.

Indeed, approval of FTX’s application would not entail the abandonment of the CFTC’s core principles, but merely a recognition that the specific implementation of those principles may not be optimal for certain novel business models and technology. As Chairman Benham recently remarked:

[T]he digital asset market would benefit from uniform imposition of requirements focused on ensuring certain core principles, including market integrity, customer protection, and market stability. At the CFTC, we have seen that a regulatory regime focused on core principles can be successful in overseeing a wide variety of markets, and have no reason to think those same principles cannot be applied to digital asset markets.[3]

In short, the CFTC should jump at this opportunity to introduce some well-regulated experimentation into the derivatives market: the likely social benefits of this effort significantly outweigh the potential harms.

Read the full comments here.

[1] See, e.g., Philip Stafford, Crypto industry makes push into regulated derivatives markets, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 21, 2022), https://www.ft.com/content/364dee59-fb51-400b-acd2-808d4ec41ab3.

[2] Executive Order 14036 on Promoting Competition in the American Economy, § 2(g) (Jul. 9, 2021) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/07/09/executive-order-on-promoting-competition- inthe-american-economy (“This order recognizes that a whole-of-government approach is necessary to address overconcentration, monopolization, and unfair competition in the American economy.”).

[3] CFTC Chairman Rostin Behnam, Letter to the U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and House Committee on Agriculture (Feb. 8, 2022) at 4, available at https://www.agriculture.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2022%2002%2008%20Ag%20committees%20digital%20asset%20res ponse%20letter.pdf.