Research Programs
More
What are you looking for?
Showing 9 of 180 Results in Vertical Restraints & Self-Preferencing
TOTM The Amazon vs. Macmillan controversy has been beaten to a pulp in the blogosphere. See Megan McArdle, John Scalzi, Joshua Gans, Virginia Postrel, Lynne Kiesling, . . .
The Amazon vs. Macmillan controversy has been beaten to a pulp in the blogosphere. See Megan McArdle, John Scalzi, Joshua Gans, Virginia Postrel, Lynne Kiesling, Lynne Kielsing and Lynne Kiesling, among others. Pulp or no (get it? It’s a book/e-book pun), I haven’t seen anyone hit squarely on what I think is the crux of the issue: control rights.
Read the full piece here.
TOTM A couple of days ago, Josh wrote to correct the record on Judge Posner’s antitrust views. AAG Varney had implied that Posner has changed his . . .
A couple of days ago, Josh wrote to correct the record on Judge Posner’s antitrust views. AAG Varney had implied that Posner has changed his views on antitrust and now favors a more interventionist antitrust policy. Josh helpfully pointed us to Posner’s own remarks, which do not support Ms. Varney’s “gloss.”
TOTM Economic theory is essential to antitrust law. It is economic analysis that constrains antitrust law and harnesses it so that it is used to protect . . .
Economic theory is essential to antitrust law. It is economic analysis that constrains antitrust law and harnesses it so that it is used to protect consumers rather than competitors. And the relationship between economics and antitrust is responsible for the successful evolution of antitrust from its economically incoherent origins to its present state. In my view, which I’ve expressed in greater detail elsewhere, the fundamental challenge for antitrust is one that is created by having “too many theories” without methodological commitments from regulators and courts on how to select between them. The proliferation of economic models that came along with the rise of Post-Chicago economics and integration of game theory into industrial organization has led to a state of affairs where a regulator or court has a broad spectrum of models to choose from when analyzing an antitrust issue.
TOTM One of the most important changes in the antitrust laws over the past 40 years has been the diminished reliance of rules of per se . . .
One of the most important changes in the antitrust laws over the past 40 years has been the diminished reliance of rules of per se illegality in favor of a rule of reason analysis. With the Court’s recent rulings in Leegin (eliminating per se rule for minimum RPM) and Independent Ink (eliminating the per se rule against intellectual property tying), the evolution of the antitrust laws has left only tying (under a “modified” per se rule) and horizontal price fixing under per se rules of illegality. This movement reflects advances in law and economics that recognize that vertical restraints, once condemned as per se illegal when used by firms with antitrust market power, can be procompetitive. It also reflects the judgment that declaring such practices pre se illegal produced high type I error costs (the false condemnation and deterrence of pro competitive practices).
TOTM Much has already been written about the strained relationship between the FTC and DOJ in antitrust matters. There is no more entertaining description of these . . .
Much has already been written about the strained relationship between the FTC and DOJ in antitrust matters. There is no more entertaining description of these strains than Chairman Kovacic’s description of the sister agencies as “an archipelago of policy makers with very inadequate ferry service between the islands” and “too many instances when you go to visit those islands the inhabitants come out with sticks and torches and try to chase you away.” It looks like the recent dust-up over the Section 2 Report is going to be the latest front in that matter. Here’s the DOJ Report, the Statement from Commissioners Rosch, Leibowitz and Harbour, and from Chairman Kovacic.
TOTM As regular readers of this blog will know, I was pretty stoked when the Supreme Court finally overruled its infamous Dr. Miles decision. The Leegin . . .
As regular readers of this blog will know, I was pretty stoked when the Supreme Court finally overruled its infamous Dr. Miles decision. The Leegin Court’s holding that minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) is not per se illegal constituted a major step toward an economically rational and theoretically coherent approach to vertical restraints. (And on a more personal note, Leegin‘s holding meant that I didn’t have to eat my hat, as I’d promised to do if the Court upheld the per se rule against vertical price-fixing.)
TOTM In a new article in the June 2008 issue of Antitrust Source, Howard Marvel discusses what the rule of reason could and should look like . . .
In a new article in the June 2008 issue of Antitrust Source, Howard Marvel discusses what the rule of reason could and should look like in the Post-Leegin world as well as the different proposals to a rule of reason approach articulated by the states and the FTC in the recent Nine West consent order modification. For interested readers, Marvel is much more generous to the FTC decision than co-blogger Thom who not to long ago posted a harsh (and in my view, fairly devastating on both legal and economic grounds) critique of the Commission’s approach.
TOTM I’ve mentioned previously that my colleague Lloyd Cohen and I are editing a volume for Edward Elgar Publishing on Pioneers in Law and Economics. Look . . .
I’ve mentioned previously that my colleague Lloyd Cohen and I are editing a volume for Edward Elgar Publishing on Pioneers in Law and Economics. Look for details in this space soon on a full list of contributing authors and subjects as well as where to buy the book! One of the perks of co-editing a volume like this was that I was able to assign myself the chapter on my dissertation advisor and co-author Benjamin Klein.
TOTM Danny Sokol points to Professor Einer Elhauge’s (Harvard) forthcoming paper in Competition Policy International where he argues that recent Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence reflects a . . .
Danny Sokol points to Professor Einer Elhauge’s (Harvard) forthcoming paper in Competition Policy International where he argues that recent Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence reflects a choice in favor of the Harvard School rather than the Chicago School of antitrust analysis. I recommend Professor Elhauge’s analysis to our readers for at least two reasons.
