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Showing 9 of 169 Results in Exclusionary Conduct
TOTM While the antitrust nerds of the world (including yours truly) have been all atwitter over Leegin’s renunciation of Dr. Miles, another antitrust decision from October . . .
While the antitrust nerds of the world (including yours truly) have been all atwitter over Leegin’s renunciation of Dr. Miles, another antitrust decision from October Term 2006 may turn out to be more significant in the long run. I’m speaking of Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., in which the Supreme Court considered whether predatory bidding plaintiffs must make the same two-part showing as predatory pricing plaintiffs (i.e., that the conduct at issue resulted in a below-cost price for the defendant’s products and that there was a dangerous probability that the defendant could recoup its short-term losses by exercising market power once rivals were vanquished). In answering that seemingly narrow question in the affirmative, the Court appears to have taken sides in antitrust’s greatest debate: how to define “exclusionary conduct” under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Read the full piece here.
TOTM In a California Bar Journal, Professor Chemerinsky documents what he describes as the Supreme Court’s “sharp turn to the right.” Ted Frank describes Chemerinsky’s review . . .
In a California Bar Journal, Professor Chemerinsky documents what he describes as the Supreme Court’s “sharp turn to the right.” Ted Frank describes Chemerinsky’s review of the term as “not especially honest” and discusses a few cases there. So what does Chemerinsky make of the recent antitrust decisions?
TOTM In my last post I claimed that there is a no “free market economics orthodoxy” amongst antitrust economists or those working in the field of . . .
In my last post I claimed that there is a no “free market economics orthodoxy” amongst antitrust economists or those working in the field of law and economics. In response to the post, an anonymous TOTM reader emails the following related, and probably more interesting, questions: “is there a free market orthodoxy amongst (1) legal commentators and (2) the Supreme Court?”
TOTM Thom’s excellent post covers most of the important points in Leegin and offers a fairly comprehensive critique of what I deemed to be a surprisingly . . .
Thom’s excellent post covers most of the important points in Leegin and offers a fairly comprehensive critique of what I deemed to be a surprisingly weak dissent from Justice Breyer. As we’ve noted over and over here at TOTM, the death of Dr. Miles is clearly the right outcome judged based upon the underlying antitrust fundamentals. As Thom and I have pointed out in various posts on RPM here at TOTM, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that anticompetitive RPM is much talked about but rarely observed or documented. Given that the bulk of the contemporary evidence on RPM suggests that it is largely pro-competitive, I must admit that I was surprised by Tyler Cowen’s “casual guess” in a post at the VC that >50% of RPM are associated with attempts to collude.
Popular Media Ben Klein’s new paper, “The Economic Lessons of Fisher Body – General Motors,” appears in the February 2007 issue of the International Journal of the Economics of Business. He . . .
Ben Klein’s new paper, “The Economic Lessons of Fisher Body – General Motors,” appears in the February 2007 issue of the International Journal of the Economics of Business. He is not about to give Ronald Coase the last word. Indeed, Klein writes, the newest evidence on the history of the relationship between Fisher and GM confirms his earlier claim that GM’s acquisition of Fisher in 1926 was a response to opportunistic behavior by Fisher. This evidence…
TOTM One of the more interesting parts of the November 29 DOJ/FTC hearing on loyalty discounts (where I presented these remarks) was the panelists’ discussion of . . .
One of the more interesting parts of the November 29 DOJ/FTC hearing on loyalty discounts (where I presented these remarks) was the panelists’ discussion of a number of “propositions” advanced, for purposes of discussion only, by the agencies. Unfortunately, we didn’t have time to discuss all the propositions. I’ve reproduced them below the fold, along with my own thoughts on whether they’re sound. (Please note the agencies’ insistence that “[t]hese propositions are solely for the purpose of discussion and do not necessarily represent the agencies’ views.”)
TOTM Dan Crane and Thom (who has promised more remarks!) have now both posted their prepared remarks for the Section 2 hearings panel on bundled discounts. . . .
Dan Crane and Thom (who has promised more remarks!) have now both posted their prepared remarks for the Section 2 hearings panel on bundled discounts. Both call for bright-line, administrable liability rules for all forms of unilateral exclusionary conduct, and have important things to say about designing antitrust rules for bundled discounts. Both are worth reading in their entirety. Administrable rules that sensibly balance Type I and II errors are certainly an indisputably admirable goal for antitrust analysis and bundled discounts have proven to be a particularly tricky form of conduct for Section 2 analysis. Despite all of the agreement around here between Thom, Dan and I on the design of antitrust rules in a world of costly Type I errors, I think I have found a topic upon which I can at least offer a mild dissent (or at least a different perspective) regarding the usefulness of the analogy of various anticompetitive theories of bundled discounting practices to exclusive dealing.
TOTM As promised, I am posting here my powerpoint slides for my testimony on exclusive dealing at the FTC/DOJ Section 2 Hearings, as well as the . . .
As promised, I am posting here my powerpoint slides for my testimony on exclusive dealing at the FTC/DOJ Section 2 Hearings, as well as the two papers upon which my analysis is based…
TOTM The FTC/ DOJ Section 2 Hearings (aka Hearings on Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Single Firm Conduct as Related to Competition) continued earlier this . . .
The FTC/ DOJ Section 2 Hearings (aka Hearings on Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Single Firm Conduct as Related to Competition) continued earlier this week with a session on tying Wednesday featuring David Evans, Robin Cooper Feldman, Mark Popofsky, Donald Russell, Michael Waldman, and Robert Willig.
