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ICLE Issue Brief As has been rumored in the press for a few weeks, Comcast announced today that it is considering a renewed bid for a large chunk of Twenty-First Century Fox’s (Fox) assets. In December 2017, Fox’s board rejected a bid from Comcast that was some 16% higher than the one it ultimately accepted from Disney.
As has been rumored in the press for a few weeks, Comcast announced today that it is considering a renewed bid for a large chunk of Twenty-First Century Fox’s (Fox) assets. In December 2017, Fox’s board rejected a bid from Comcast that was some 16% higher than the one it ultimately accepted from Disney.
The board’s decision was based largely on its assessment that a merger with Comcast created unacceptable antitrust risk, where a merger with Disney did not.
In a brief analysis of the proposed deal, ICLE executive director and antitrust expert, Geoffrey Manne, posits that there is no basis for ascribing a greater antitrust risk to Comcast’s purchase of Fox’s assets than to Disney’s.
Among other things, Manne discusses why the DOJ’s AT&T/Time Warner merger challenge doesn’t increase the risk that the DOJ would challenge a Comcast/Fox deal. His analysis also touches on:
In sum, Manne finds that while a Comcast/Fox deal may pose some antitrust enforcement risk, it certainly doesn’t entail sufficient risk to deem the deal dead on arrival — and it seems to represent less regulatory risk than a Disney/Fox tie-up.
Continue reading the full paper
TOTM At this point, only the most masochistic and cynical among DC’s policy elite actually desire for the net neutrality conflict to continue. And yet, despite claims that . . .
At this point, only the most masochistic and cynical among DC’s policy elite actually desire for the net neutrality conflict to continue. And yet, despite claims that net neutrality principles are critical to protecting consumers, passage of the current Congressional Review Act (“CRA”) disapproval resolution in Congress would undermine consumer protection and promise only to drag out the fight even longer.
Read the full piece here.
TOTM Although not always front page news, International Trade Commission (“ITC”) decisions can have major impacts on trade policy and antitrust law. Scott Kieff, a former . . .
Although not always front page news, International Trade Commission (“ITC”) decisions can have major impacts on trade policy and antitrust law. Scott Kieff, a former ITC Commissioner, recently published a thoughtful analysis of Certain Carbon and Alloy Steel Products — a potentially important ITC investigation that implicates the intersection of these two policy areas. Scott was on the ITC when the investigation was initiated in 2016, but left in 2017 before the decision was finally issued in March of this year.
ICLE White Paper In 1973, Michigan Senator Philip A. Hart introduced Senate Bill 1167, the Industrial Reorganization Act, in order to address perceived problems arising from industrial concentration. The bill was rooted in the belief that industry concentration led inexorably to monopoly power.
In 1973, Michigan Senator Philip A. Hart introduced Senate Bill 1167, the Industrial Reorganization Act, in order to address perceived problems arising from industrial concentration. The bill was rooted in the belief that industry concentration led inexorably to monopoly power; that monopoly power, however obtained, posed an inexorable threat to freedom and prosperity; and that the antitrust laws (i.e., the Sherman and Clayton Acts) were insufficient to address the purported problems.
That sentiment — rooted in the reflexive application of the (largely-discredited) structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm — had become largely passe?, but has resurfaced today as the asserted justification for similar (although less onerous) antitrust reform legislation and the general approach to antitrust analysis commonly known as “hipster antitrust.”
The critiques leveled against the asserted economic underpinnings of efforts like the Industrial Reorganization Act are as relevant today as they were then.
The proposed bill itself was the subject of a series of hearings in both the Senate and the House, including one on April 9, 1974, at which Henry G. Manne (then professor of law and political science at the University of Rochester) testified (along with UCLA economist, Harold Demsetz) in opposition to the bill. His trenchant testimony, reprinted in full in Section 2, below, should be required reading for advocates of a return to antitrust law and policy rooted in the SCP paradigm.
As Henry Manne notes in his testimony:
To be successful in this stated aim [“getting the government out of the market”] the following dreams would have to come true: The members of both the special commission and the court established by the bill would have to be satisfied merely to complete their assigned task and then abdicate their tremendous power and authority; they would have to know how to satisfactorily define and identify the limits of the industries to be restructured; the Government’s regulation would not sacrifice significant efficiencies or economies of scale; and the incentive for new firms to enter an industry would not be diminished by the threat of a punitive response to success.
The lessons of history, economic theory, and practical politics argue overwhelmingly against every one of these assumptions.
Manne’s trenchant testimony, reprinted in full in this white paper (with introductory material by Geoffrey Manne) should be required reading for advocates of a return to antitrust law and policy rooted in the SCP paradigm.
ICLE White Paper A pair of recent, long-form articles in the New York Times Magazine and Wired UK — the latest in a virtual journalistic cottage industry of such articles — chronicle the downfall of British price comparison site and stalwart Google provocateur, Foundem, and attribute its demise to anticompetitive behavior on the part of Google.
A pair of recent, long-form articles in the New York Times Magazine and Wired UK — the latest in a virtual journalistic cottage industry of such articles — chronicle the downfall of British price comparison site and stalwart Google provocateur, Foundem, and attribute its demise to anticompetitive behavior on the part of Google.
Unfortunately, the media’s hagiographies of Foundem and its founders, Shivaun and Adam Raff, approach the antitrust question as if it were imbued with the simple morality of a David vs. Goliath tale. The reality is far more complicated. In fact, these articles misunderstand and misstate the critical economic, business, and legal realities of Google Search, of Foundem’s claims of harm, and of the relationship between the two.
Was Foundem’s failure really the result of anticompetitive “gatekeeping” on Google’s part? Or could it simply be a pedestrian tale of yet another tech start-up that failed because its founders didn’t appreciate that a successful business is built on more than just a good idea?
While the import of the Foundem story has been misconstrued by journalists and EU regulators, it is useful in illuminating what may actually be the fundamental question regarding the antitrust fortunes of the platform economy:
What, if anything, does a successful platform “owe” to the companies that make themselves dependent upon it?
Continue reading the full paper.
ICLE White Paper Summary The relationship between classical liberalism and technology is surprisingly fraught. The common understanding is that technological advance is complementary to the principles of classical . . .
The relationship between classical liberalism and technology is surprisingly fraught. The common understanding is that technological advance is complementary to the principles of classical liberalism – especially in the case of contemporary, information-age technology. This is most clearly on display in Silicon Valley, with its oft-professed libertarian (classical liberalism’s kissing cousin) affinities. The analytical predicate for this complementarity is that classical liberalism values liberty-enhancing private ordering, and technological advance both is generally facially liberty-enhancing and facilitates private ordering.
This analysis, however, is incomplete. Classical liberalism recognizes that certain rules are necessary in a well-functioning polity. The classical liberal, for instance, recognizes the centrality of enforceable property rights, and the concomitant ability to seek recourse from a third party (the state) when those rights are compromised. Thus, contemporary technological advances may facilitate private transactions – but such transactions may not support private ordering if they also weaken either the property rights necessary to that ordering or the enforceability of those rights.
This chapter argues that technological advance can at times create (or, perhaps more accurately, highlight) a tension within principles of classical liberalism: It can simultaneously enhance liberty, while also undermining the legal rules and institutions necessary for the efficient and just private ordering of interactions in a liberal society. This is an important tension for classical liberals to understand – and one that needs to be, but too rarely is, acknowledged or struggled with. Related, the chapter also identifies and evaluates important fracture lines between prevalent branches of modern libertarianism: those that tend to embrace technological anarchism as maximally liberty-enhancing, on the one hand, and those that more cautiously protect the legal institutions (for example, property rights) upon which individual autonomy and private ordering are based, on the other.
This chapter proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces our understanding of classical liberalism’s core principles: an emphasis on individual liberty; the recognition of a limit to the exercise of liberty when it conflicts with the autonomy of others; and support for a minimal set of rules necessary to coordinate individuals’ exercise of their liberty in autonomy-respecting ways through a system of private ordering. Part II then offers an initial discussion of the relationship between technology and legal institutions and argues that technology is important to classical liberalism insofar as it affects the legal institutions upon which private ordering is based. Part III explores how libertarian philosophies have embraced contemporary technology, focusing on “extreme” and “moderate” views – views that correspond roughly to liberty maximalism and autonomy protectionism. This discussion sets the stage for Part IV, which considers the tensions that technological change – especially the rapid change that characterizes much of recent history – creates within the classical liberal philosophy. The central insight is that classical liberalism posits a set of relatively stable legal institutions as the basis for liberty-enhancing private ordering – institutions that are generally developed through public, not private ordering – but that technology, including otherwise liberty-enhancing technology, can disrupt these institutions in ways that threaten both individual autonomy and the private ordering built upon extant institutions.
TOTM The urge to treat antitrust as a legal Swiss Army knife capable of correcting all manner of social and economic ills is apparently difficult for some to resist. Conflating size with market power, and market power with political power, many recent calls for regulation of industry — and the tech industry in particular — are framed in antitrust terms.
Following is the (slightly expanded and edited) text of my remarks from the panel, Antitrust and the Tech Industry: What Is at Stake?, hosted last Thursday by CCIA. Bruce Hoffman (keynote), Bill Kovacic, Nicolas Petit, and Christine Caffarra also spoke. If we’re lucky Bruce will post his remarks on the FTC website; they were very good.
Presentations & Interviews A U.S. Supreme Court case over the legitimacy of a credit card issuer’s terms of business with its merchant establishments is reverberating far and wide. . . .
A U.S. Supreme Court case over the legitimacy of a credit card issuer’s terms of business with its merchant establishments is reverberating far and wide. Among others, it is rattling technology companies — including Google, Facebook and Amazon — that have business models involving multiple customers.
The case prompting all those fears – Ohio v. American Express – which the Supreme Court heard on February 26, attempts to reverse a September 2016 ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that went in favor of American Express. At the core of the issue are so-called “anti-steering” restrictions that Amex imposes on merchant establishments, disallowing them to “steer” customers to using cards such as Visa, MasterCard or Discover that charge lower merchant fees than Amex. The merchants would typically do that by offering customers discounts on their purchases, or in essence, “sharing” what they would save in merchant fees if the customers use a lower-fee card such as a Visa or MasterCard.
Knowledge@Wharton discussed the larger implications of the case with Herbert Hovenkamp, a professor with a joint appointment at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and Wharton, and Geoffrey A. Manne, a founder and executive director of the International Center for Law and Economics (ICLE) in Portland, Ore. They shared their insights on the Knowledge@Wharton show on SiriusXM channel 111. (Listen to the podcast at the top of this page.)
The full episode is embedded below.
Written Testimonies & Filings Summary Chairman Marino, Ranking Member Cicilline, and Members of the Com- mittee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify before you today. The . . .
Chairman Marino, Ranking Member Cicilline, and Members of the Com- mittee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify before you today.
The overriding point of my testimony is that the proposed CVS Health/Aetna merger presents a creative effort by two of the most well-in- formed and successful industry participants to try something new to reform a troubled system. Absent overwhelming evidence that the merger would create an unacceptable risk of harm, the effort should be welcomed and en- couraged. And, as it happens, I have seen no evidence of even a small risk of harm.
It seems fair to say that the predominant characteristic of the CVS Health/Aetna merger is its prospect of developing, on a larger scale than ever before, innovative approaches to healthcare that could transform our healthcare system. As one analyst noted in an article titled, “Why CVS/Aetna Could Be a Game Changer”:
What CVS seeks to do with this deal is to dramatically accelerate that process, and change the nature of the neighborhood pharmacy. For example, we already know that getting a flu shot at the pharmacy is more convenient than making an appointment with a doctor.
What if an entire array of services was available at the pharmacy? Better yet, what if it would cost less to have those services performed at the pharmacy? The advantage to the provider is clear; send the patients to the pharmacy, and free up the doctors for more pressing needs.
Even this touches on only the tip of the potentially transformative iceberg. The proposed merger has the aim and the potential to demonstrate that it is feasible to provide integrated care with a focus both on both lowering costs for therapeutic treatments, such as prescription drugs, as well as enhancing the effectiveness of preventive care in order to reduce the need for therapeutic treatments in the first place.
In this light, I believe that it is important to view this merger not as a combination tending to concentrate economic power in the existing industry structure, but as a significant step toward a reorganization of the industry itself.
