I called it last week. Today’s NYT reports that Princeton has accepted Harvard’s invitation to join it in eliminating early admissions. In addition, the presidents of eleven elite liberal arts colleges (including Swarthmore, Williams, Barnard, and Amherst) have met to discuss, among other things, collectively eliminating their early admission programs and reducing merit-based aid.

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Yesterday I had the pleasure of participating in a panel discussion on standards for single firm conduct in the United States and the EU at the George Mason Antitrust Symposium, which focused on antitrust issues in the global marketplace (and I might add, was put together quite nicely by the GMU Law Review folks). The materials from many of the presentations are available at the GMU website.

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Harvard College is cutting its early admissions program. According to the New York Times, which is pleased with this move, Harvard’s purported reasons for cutting the program are as follows…

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Maybe. WSJ Law Blog reports that SCOTUS may revisit the nearly century old precedent applying the per se rule to minimum resale price maintenance (RPM). Dr. Miles may well be the last vestige of antitrust before consumer welfare’s promotion as the guiding principle of the Sherman Act, which is to say, before economics had a significant role in antitrust jurisprudence. As of today, SCOTUS has not granted cert in Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, but its agreement to stay a 5th Circuit judgment upholding Dr. Miles may well signal that cert is forthcoming. While there is still some disagreement between antitrust scholars on the issue (Georgetown’s Robert Pitofsky is Dr. Miles‘ most well known advocate), I would venture to guess — and it is not more than a guess — that the majority of antitrust scholars and economists believe that Dr. Miles is misguided.

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As reported here, Johnson & Johnson scored a major victory last week in a case challenging some of its discounting practices. The jury concluded that J&J had not engaged in monopolization of the market for “trocars,” which are sharp cylindrical devices used in endoscopic surgery. Plaintiff Applied Medical Resources Corp., which sells trocars that compete with J&J’s, had complained that J&J’s discounting practices excluded it from the trocars market. Specifically, Applied complained about J&J’s “bundled discounts,” which provided a discount on J&J’s sutures (surgical stitches) to those hospital purchasers that also bought a certain percentage of their trocars from J&J.

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Abstract

This paper investigates a dataset that codes key features of the competition laws of 102 countries. It first compares the scope of the laws overall, and of various subcomponents such as the law governing dominance, collusive conduct, and mergers. The second question examined in this paper is whether competition law has any effect on the intensity of competition within a nation. We find, in ordinary least squares regressions, that the scope of a country’s competition law is positively associated with the perceived intensity of competition in the country’s economy. However, we find no evidence that the scope of competition law is positively associated with an objective proxy of the intensity of competition. Moreover, instrumental variables regressions, though preliminary, do not indicate that the scope of competition law affects the perceived intensity of competition.

Like Thom, I also have spent the last few weeks reading Herbert Hovenkamp’s excellent new antitrust book, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principles and Execution. I am looking forward to Thom’s review in the Texas Law Review, and wholeheartedly agree with him that Hovenkamp’s book is an important and significant contribution to the antitrust literature (see also Randy Picker’s book review here describing “The Antitrust Enterprise as The Antitrust Paradox for a post-Chicago antitrust landscape”). I’m still digesting most of the book, and perhaps will share some more thoughts in this space later on, but thought I would chime in with some thoughts on two issues relevant to my own research on slotting contracts, discounts, and competition for product distribution.

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I’ve had the pleasure of spending the last few weeks curled up with Herbert Hovenkamp’s wonderful new book, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution, which I’m reviewing for the Texas Law Review. Hovenkamp is a sharp thinker and a wonderfully clear writer, and the book is a fantastic read for scholars and students alike. As a reviewer, though, I’m charged with pointing out the weak spots. Hovenkamp’s discussion of Illinois Brick‘s indirect purchaser rule is, I believe, one of those spots.

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The WSJ Law Blog reports (via this AP Report) that the French law allowing regulators to force Apple to make its iPod compatible with rival offerings went into effect Thursday. “Me too” regulatory movements are already underway in Britain, Norway, Sweden, Poland and Denmark. This, as Microsoft plans to introduce “Zune,” its entry into the media player market. First, it was Apple’s shiny packaging and exploitation of consumer irrationality that explained Apple’s success in the media player market. Now, the French law adopts a different theory: it’s iTunes.

Read the full piece here.