Research Programs
More
What are you looking for?
Showing 9 of 1644 Publications in Antitrust
TOTM Shubha Ghosh, of the Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog, is predicting that the Supreme Court will not overrule the 1911 Dr. Miles decision, which holds . . .
Shubha Ghosh, of the Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog, is predicting that the Supreme Court will not overrule the 1911 Dr. Miles decision, which holds that “vertical minimum resale price maintenance” (i.e., a manufacturer’s imposition of minimum resale price for his goods) is per se illegal.
Read the full piece here.
TOTM Elizabeth Warren (Credit Slips) points to an interesting empirical study by Agarwal, Liu, Souleses, and Chomsisengphet (“ALSC”) which examines consumer credit card selection in a . . .
Elizabeth Warren (Credit Slips) points to an interesting empirical study by Agarwal, Liu, Souleses, and Chomsisengphet (“ALSC”) which examines consumer credit card selection in a natural experiment setting in which a card company offers two cards to consumers: (1) a high interest rate, no annual fee card and (2) a low rate card with an annual fee.
TOTM One of the more interesting parts of the November 29 DOJ/FTC hearing on loyalty discounts (where I presented these remarks) was the panelists’ discussion of . . .
One of the more interesting parts of the November 29 DOJ/FTC hearing on loyalty discounts (where I presented these remarks) was the panelists’ discussion of a number of “propositions” advanced, for purposes of discussion only, by the agencies. Unfortunately, we didn’t have time to discuss all the propositions. I’ve reproduced them below the fold, along with my own thoughts on whether they’re sound. (Please note the agencies’ insistence that “[t]hese propositions are solely for the purpose of discussion and do not necessarily represent the agencies’ views.”)
TOTM Huh? This statement appears in this article by Professor Anthony D’Amato (Northwestern) on the failure of interdisciplinary scholarship in the legal academy. HT: Brian Leiter. . . .
Huh? This statement appears in this article by Professor Anthony D’Amato (Northwestern) on the failure of interdisciplinary scholarship in the legal academy. HT: Brian Leiter. Quite frankly, I was very surprised to see a claim like this in a paper written after 1970 or so. Even in corners of the academy hostile to economic analysis, antitrust is conventionally distinguished as a special case where economics is useful, typically along with some statement about the uniqueness of antitrust. D’Amato reserves no such special treatment for antitrust, criticizing that field in the context of a more general critique of what he describes as the “interdisciplinary turn” in the legal academy on three grounds…
TOTM So it looks like Dr. Miles is going down. That’s a good thing. For non-antitrusters, Dr. Miles is a 1911 Supreme Court decision holding that . . .
So it looks like Dr. Miles is going down. That’s a good thing.
For non-antitrusters, Dr. Miles is a 1911 Supreme Court decision holding that “minimum vertical resale price maintenance” is per se illegal — that is, automatically illegal without inquiry into the practice’s actual effect on competition. Minimum vertical resale price maintenance (or “RPM”) occurs when a manufacturer requires dealers who sell its product to charge no less than a set price for that product. For example, Ford might require its dealers to charge at least $30,000 for an Explorer.
TOTM Dan Crane and Thom (who has promised more remarks!) have now both posted their prepared remarks for the Section 2 hearings panel on bundled discounts. . . .
Dan Crane and Thom (who has promised more remarks!) have now both posted their prepared remarks for the Section 2 hearings panel on bundled discounts. Both call for bright-line, administrable liability rules for all forms of unilateral exclusionary conduct, and have important things to say about designing antitrust rules for bundled discounts. Both are worth reading in their entirety. Administrable rules that sensibly balance Type I and II errors are certainly an indisputably admirable goal for antitrust analysis and bundled discounts have proven to be a particularly tricky form of conduct for Section 2 analysis. Despite all of the agreement around here between Thom, Dan and I on the design of antitrust rules in a world of costly Type I errors, I think I have found a topic upon which I can at least offer a mild dissent (or at least a different perspective) regarding the usefulness of the analogy of various anticompetitive theories of bundled discounting practices to exclusive dealing.
TOTM In response to Josh’s gentle nudge, here are my remarks from Wednesday’s DOJ/FTC hearing on loyalty discounts. I focus entirely on bundled discounts (as opposed . . .
In response to Josh’s gentle nudge, here are my remarks from Wednesday’s DOJ/FTC hearing on loyalty discounts. I focus entirely on bundled discounts (as opposed to single-product loyalty discounts, like volume or market-share discounts). Bundled discounts are discounts (or rebates) that are conditioned upon purchasing separate products from disparate product markets — e.g., “we’ll give you a 25% discount on all your A and B purchases if you buy 70% of your A requirements and 80% of your B requirements from us.”
TOTM Dan Crane (Antitrust Review, Cardozo) has graciously posted his testimony for Wednesday’s FTC/ DOJ Section 2 Hearings on Loyalty Discounts. Readers familiar with Crane’s scholarship . . .
TOTM Dennis Carlton and Randy Picker have posted Antitrust and Regulation on SSRN. It looks like a very interesting paper on the relationship between antitrust and . . .
Dennis Carlton and Randy Picker have posted Antitrust and Regulation on SSRN. It looks like a very interesting paper on the relationship between antitrust and regulation to control competition. Here’s the abstract…
