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TOTM What to make of the decision by the European Commission alleging that Google has engaged in anticompetitive behavior? In this post, Julian Morris contrasts the European Commission’s (EC) approach to competition policy with US antitrust, briefly explores the history of smartphones and discusses the ruling.
What to make of Wednesday’s decision by the European Commission alleging that Google has engaged in anticompetitive behavior? In this post, I contrast the European Commission’s (EC) approach to competition policy with US antitrust, briefly explore the history of smartphones and then discuss the ruling.
Read the full piece here.
TOTM The European Commission’s decision in Google Android cuts a fine line between punishing a company for its success and punishing a company for falling afoul of the rules of the game. Which side of the line it actually falls on cannot be fully understood until the Commission publishes its full decision.
The European Commission’s decision in Google Android cuts a fine line between punishing a company for its success and punishing a company for falling afoul of the rules of the game. Which side of the line it actually falls on cannot be fully understood until the Commission publishes its full decision. Much depends on the intricate facts of the case. As the full decision may take months to come, this post offers merely the author’s initial thoughts on the decision on the basis of the publicly available information.
TOTM Today’s Google Android decision could severely harm competition and innovation in the digital economy. It ignores the powerful rivalry that exists between Android devices and Apple’s iPhone. To compete against Apple, Google opted for an open-source project which entails a complex governance structure. By meddling with these rules, the Commission’s decision threatens the viability of the Android platform. Consumers will be the biggest losers.
Our story begins on the morning of January 9, 2007. Few people knew it at the time, but the world of wireless communications was about to change forever. Steve Jobs walked on stage wearing his usual turtleneck, and proceeded to reveal the iPhone. The rest, as they say, is history. The iPhone moved the wireless communications industry towards a new paradigm. No more physical keyboards, clamshell bodies, and protruding antennae. All of these were replaced by a beautiful black design, a huge touchscreen (3.5” was big for that time), a rear-facing camera, and (a little bit later) a revolutionary new way to consume applications: the App Store. Sales soared and Apple’s stock started an upward trajectory that would see it become one of the world’s most valuable companies.
TOTM It is sometimes said that the most important question in all of economics is “compared to what?” UCLA economist Harold Demsetz — one of the most important regulatory economists of the past century — coined the term “nirvana fallacy” to critique would-be regulators’ tendency to compare messy, real-world economic circumstances to idealized alternatives, and to justify policies on the basis of the discrepancy between them. Wishful thinking, in other words.
Today the European Commission launched its latest salvo against Google, issuing a decision in its three-year antitrust investigation into the company’s agreements for distribution of the Android mobile operating system. The massive fine levied by the Commission will dominate the headlines, but the underlying legal theory and proposed remedies are just as notable — and just as problematic.
ICLE Issue Brief This article introduces an empirical study conducted over the period 2004 to 2018 (Android included) on all the fines imposed by the European Commission on the basis of Article 102 TFEU. We show that the European Commission’s decisions may have the effect of slowing down R&D for numerous sanctioned companies.
On July 18, 2018, the European Commission fined Alphabet (Google) 4.34 billion euros. This decision confirms the Commission’s willingness to deter companies from engaging in anticompetitive practices. It also confirms that the European competition authority is missing the big picture by imposing disproportionate fines with regard to the specifics of the digital economy.
According to Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003, the fines imposed by competition authorities cannot exceed 10% of the overall annual turnover of the concerned company. This limit is intended to avoid disproportionate sanctions that would jeopardize the company’s future. In fact, however, while this turnover threshold is useful, it is insufficient. The digital economy requires companies to compete by innovating. R&D investments have become the lifeblood of the digital economy and the very essence of competition. The specific competitive dynamics of the industry should also be taken into account in considering the extent to which fines imposed by competition authorities can disrupt the investment capacity of companies.
This article introduces an empirical study conducted over the period 2004 to 2018 (Android included) on all the fines imposed by the European Commission on the basis of Article 102 TFEU. We show that the European Commission’s decisions may have the effect of slowing down R&D for numerous sanctioned companies. For this reason, an innovation protection mechanism should be incorporated into the calculation of the fine. We propose doing so by introducing a new limit that caps Article 102 fines at a certain percentage of companies’ investment in R&D.
Click here to read the full article.
Scholarship This paper seeks to ascertain whether Google’s Android licensing terms, which are currently under scrutiny from the European Commission, could be excused under an innovation defense framework. The paper starts by analyzing Google’s business model with regard to its Android OS.
This paper seeks to ascertain whether Google’s Android licensing terms, which are currently under scrutiny from the European Commission, could be excused under an innovation defense framework. The paper starts by analyzing Google’s business model with regard to its Android OS. It then identifies the Commission’s main concerns. It argues that Google is simply pursuing a sensible appropriation strategy. Finally, it puts forward a framework which hinges on the concept of “appropriability”, and tentatively applies it to Google’s behavior.
Read the entire piece here
Scholarship In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in high-tech markets. The existing body of research on the topic suggests that such markets lead to reinterpret antitrust law key concepts – which should be done.
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in high-tech markets. The existing body of research on the topic suggests that such markets lead to reinterpret antitrust law key concepts – which should be done. There is little published literature, however, on the subject of the new anti-competitive strategies nestle in these markets, which this paper addressed.
The process of competition generally encourages companies to lower their prices, which benefits the consumer. And yet, in certain specific cases, antitrust rules intend to sanction predatory prices because they eliminate the competitive process itself. A similar situation applies to innovation. Innovation is one of the main bases for competition between companies and it is beneficial to consumers who may enjoy new products which are also better suited to their needs. But certain “innovative” behaviors are considered as being predatory and are punished accordingly, despite the fact that no legal concept specifically addresses this issue.
This absence of a legal category specifically dedicated to anti-competitive practices disguised as “innovation” leads judges to create numerous type I and II errors. The jurisprudence didn’t yet generalize the etiquette of “predatory innovation,” which nevertheless answers some of the modern problems encountered by antitrust law with high-tech markets development.
This article seeks to substantiate the value of this notion. Because many practices in high-tech markets are simultaneously occurring on several continents at once – the new version of software is generally available at the same moment around the world – we chose to carry out a comparative analysis between the United States and Europe. We are doing so because these two bodies of antitrust law may learn from each other – they have homologous roots – and also because the concerned countries have the highest GDP in the world.
The main objective of this paper, in the first instance, is to portray the practices that can and should be condemned as predatory innovation. And in fact, most predatory innovation practices are currently addressed under the label of “technological tying.” The creation of some legal rules dedicated to predatory innovation would lead to removing this legal concept and to create – instead – a more coherent legal regime – in both continents – that could be understood by business leaders.
Scholarship In its investigation into Google’s search practices, Google Search, the Commission alleges that Google abuses its dominant position on the web search market by giving systematic favourable treatment to its “comparison shopping product” (namely, “Google Shopping”) in its general search results pages.
In its investigation into Google’s search practices, Google Search, the Commission alleges that Google abuses its dominant position on the web search market by giving systematic favourable treatment to its “comparison shopping product” (namely, “Google Shopping”) in its general search results pages. This Article analyses whether the conduct in question in Google Search can be an abuse under Article 102TFEU (prohibiting the abuse of a dominant position in the EU) and, if so, under what conditions. This Article proceeds by first providing a positive assessment of the application of Article 102TFEU and the relevant case law to the issues involved in Google Search on the assumption that the Commission may seek to place the facts under an existing category of abuse. Three categories of abuse are analysed to this end: refusal to deal (including the essential facilities doctrine), discrimination, and tying. The article then proceeds to a normative assessment of the circumstances under which Article 102TFEU should be applied in Google Search under a principled conceptualisation of “abuse,” one which requires exploitation, exclusion, and a lack of an increase in efficiency. The Article finds that the facts in Google Search do not meet the requirements of the existing law to be found abusive unless the established frameworks for the types of abuse examined are unjustifiably disrupted. It also finds that under the principled conceptualisation of abuse adopted in this Article, the facts in Google Search do not represent the type of conduct that should be found abusive either.
Scholarship In a US Senate Hearing in 2011, Eric Schmidt, Google’s CEO, stated that ‘competition is only one click away’. On 27 June 2017, the European Commission fined Google €2.42 billion for allegedly ‘abusing dominance as search engine by giving illegal advantage to own comparison shopping service’. Ruthlessly, a fine is only one click away too.
In a US Senate Hearing in 2011, Eric Schmidt, Google’s CEO, stated that ‘competition is only one click away’. On 27 June 2017, the European Commission fined Google €2.42 billion for allegedly ‘abusing dominance as search engine by giving illegal advantage to own comparison shopping service’. Ruthlessly, a fine is only one click away too. Why did the European Commission impose such a record-breaking fine on Google? According to Competition Commissioner Margareth Vestager, ‘Google abused its market dominance as a search engine by promoting its own comparison shopping service in its search results, and demoting those of competitors’ (…) therefore denying ‘other companies the chance to compete on the merits and to innovate. And most importantly, it denied European consumers a genuine choice of services and the full benefits of innovation.’ The products referenced on Google Shopping have been promoted in the search results in comparisonwith other shopping platforms, the Commission considered. The legal arguments of the European Commission are the following: thanks to its complex algorithms, Google has allegedly manipulated the search results of products in order to promote its own platform, Google Shopping, at the expense of competitors. Since the artificial modification of the ranking of search results is tantamount to a price paid by economic actors, by the manipulation of its search results, Google has abused its dominance. It has infringed Article 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) because it i) ‘has systematically given prominent placement to its own comparison shopping service’ and ii) ‘has demoted rival comparison shopping services in its search results’. Although clear, both legal arguments from the only document yet available – namely the Press Release from t27 June 2017 by the European Commission – are nonetheless unsubstantiated and ungrounded as discussed below successively.
In a US Senate Hearing in 2011, Eric Schmidt, Google’s CEO, stated that ‘competition is only one click away’. On 27 June 2017, the European Commission fined Google €2.42 billion for allegedly ‘abusing dominance as search engine by giving illegal advantage to own comparison shopping service’. Ruthlessly, a fine is only one click away too.
Why did the European Commission impose such a record-breaking fine on Google? According to Competition Commissioner Margareth Vestager,
‘Google abused its market dominance as a search engine by promoting its own comparison shopping service in its search results, and demoting those of competitors’ (…) therefore denying ‘other companies the chance to compete on the merits and to innovate. And most importantly, it denied European consumers a genuine choice of services and the full benefits of innovation.’
The products referenced on Google Shopping have been promoted in the search results in comparisonwith other shopping platforms, the Commission considered.
The legal arguments of the European Commission are the following: thanks to its complex algorithms, Google has allegedly manipulated the search results of products in order to promote its own platform, Google Shopping, at the expense of competitors. Since the artificial modification of the ranking of search results is tantamount to a price paid by economic actors, by the manipulation of its search results, Google has abused its dominance. It has infringed Article 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) because it i) ‘has systematically given prominent placement to its own comparison shopping service’ and ii) ‘has demoted rival comparison shopping services in its search results’. Although clear, both legal arguments from the only document yet available – namely the Press Release from t27 June 2017 by the European Commission – are nonetheless unsubstantiated and ungrounded as discussed below successively.
