We appear to be reaching an end stage in negotiations between the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union on a plan to extend the EU’s financial-surveillance regime over the cryptocurrency industry. Alas, lawmakers were in such a rush that they appear not to have noticed that the hastily crafted legislative package violates fundamental tenets of the EU’s founding treaties.

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Abstract

American corporations have a long history of carelessness and Caremark has made it difficult for shareholders to recover against them for it. In 2018, for example, the world discovered that Donald Trump had wrongfully collected the personal data of up to 87 million Facebook users. Facebook’s failure to address the unchecked collection and use of users’ data cost the company more than $50 billion in market capitalization alone. Despite clear losses, shareholder litigation has thus far been unsuccessful. The normal governmental response to such corporate failures of oversight is to saddle corporations with more federal oversight, even though this purely reactive behavior has consistently failed to curb corporate misconduct. The consequence for regulated firms is thus an ever-increasing cost of compliance with no marked change in behavior. Meanwhile, shareholders are left with few options for recovery because, in the face of asymmetrical information, there is insufficient evidence to meet onerous pleading requirements found in state and federal laws such as Caremark.

This Article proposes a better solution—the use of federal administrative determinations as presumptive evidence of corporate mismanagement. It describes the existing limitations of both SEC and common law-based protections in the context of shareholder derivative litigation for lapses in oversight, explores the factual commonalties of those plaintiffs that have been successful in this area, and proposes that Delaware can preempt corporate misbehavior, while reducing the need for more federal oversight, by relying on federal administrative fact-finding combined with the Caremark standard to promote shareholder successes in derivative litigation. Corporate law scholarship rarely acknowledges its intersection with administrative law. Thus, scholars have not considered the possibility that shareholders can easily rely on the determinations of federal agencies to establish evidence of a director’s failure of oversight under Caremark.

Twitter has sued Elon Musk, seeking to compel him to buy the company for $54.20 a share. Many observers think the company will prevail, or that Mr. Musk is likely at least to pay the $1 billion breakup fee. They’re wrong. He is likely to walk away largely unscathed, a belief reflected in Twitter’s stock price. This case will be a good lesson on the limits of boilerplate merger agreements and the difference between a corporation and its shareholders.

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Abstract

We study the factors that predict medical malpractice (“med mal”) insurance premia, using national data from Medical Liability Monitor over 1990 to 2017. A number of core findings are not easily explained by standard economic theory. First, we estimate long run elasticities of premia to insurers’ direct cost (payouts plus defense costs), allowing for lags of up to four years, of only around +0.40, when one might expect elasticities near one. Second, state caps on malpractice damages predict a roughly 50% higher ratio of premia to direct costs even though, in competitive markets, a damages cap should affect premia primarily through effect on cost. A difference-in-differences analysis of the “new cap” states that adopted caps during the early 2000’s provides evidence supporting a causal link between cap adoption and the ratio of premium to direct cost. Third, the premium-to-cost ratio, which one might expect to be fairly constant over time, instead varies widely both across states at a given time and within states across time. Our results suggest that insurance companies do not fully adjust revenues to changes in direct costs even over long time periods. Insurers in new-cap states have been able to charge apparently supra-competitive prices for a sustained period.

Abstract

Using hazard analysis, we study whether various physician characteristics, including prior paid claim history, gender, specialty, years of experience, type of degree (M.D. versus D.O.), country of medical school attendance (U.S. versus non-U.S.), and gender) predict future paid medical malpractice (“med mal”) claims, using detailed data on all licensed physicians and all paid claims in Illinois over a 25-year period. This level of granularity is not available using national data. After controlling for other factors, physicians with a single prior paid claim have a four-fold higher risk of future claims than physicians with zero prior paid claims. Male gender, attending a non-U.S. medical school, and practicing in a high-malpractice-risk specialty all predict higher paid claim risk. Paid claim risk is also higher for physicians with 6-15 prior years of experience than for those who are either earlier or later in their careers. We find having an M.D. (rather than a D.O.) is associated with higher paid claim risk, but only in our multiple-failure models.

When campaigning for his progressive income tax, Illinois Gov. J.B. Pritzker argued it was needed to address “income inequality” and fund education and social services.

Although voters rejected the tax hike, Pritzker has succeeded in reducing income inequality without it. He did so by driving away the state’s wealthiest person.

Billionaire investor Ken Griffin and his family are moving to Florida.

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As Congress faces the possibility of a worldwide recession, historic inflation, pandemic recovery and supply chain issues – they should avoid increasing tariffs at all costs. Although tariffs might seem like a helpful tool – often they cause real damage by stifling trade and raising the prices of imports. Oregonians, like most Americans, are trying to find ways to make ends meet and the last thing they need is for costs to go up and that is exactly what Congress is considering right now.

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Abstract

The phenomenon of social-media-driven trading (SMD trading) entered the public consciousness earlier this year when GameStop’s stock price was driven up two orders of magnitude by a “hivemind” of individual investors coordinating their actions via social media. Some believe that GameStop’s price is artificially high and is destined to fall. Yet the stock prices of GameStop and other prominent SMD trading targets like AMC Entertainment continue to remain well above historical levels.

Much recent SMD trading is driven by profit motives. But a meaningful part of the rise has been a result of expressive trading—a subset of SMD trading—in which investors buy or sell for non-profit-seeking reasons like social or political activism, or for aesthetic reasons like a nostalgia play. To date, expressive trading has only benefited issuers by raising their stock prices. There is nothing, however, to prevent these traders from employing similar methods for driving a target’s stock price down (e.g., to influence or extort certain behaviors from issuers).

At least for now, stock prices raised by SMD trading have been sticky and appear at least moderately sustainable. The expressive aspect, which unites the traders under a common banner, is likely a reason that dramatic price increases resulting from profit-seeking SMD trading have persisted. Without a nonfinancial motivation to hold the group together, its members would be expected to defect and take profits.

Given that SMD trading appears to be more than a passing fad, issuers and their compliance departments ought to be prepared to respond when targeted by SMD trading. A question that might arise is whether and when SMD-trading-targeted issuers, and their insiders, may trade in their firms’ shares without running afoul of insider trading laws.

This Article proceeds as follows: Part I summarizes the current state of insider trading law, with special focus on the elements of materiality and publicity. Part II opens with a brief summary of the filing, disclosure, and other (non-insider-trading-related) requirements issuers and their insiders may face when trading in their own company’s shares under any circumstance. The remainder of this Part analyzes the insider trading-related legal implications of three different scenarios in which issuers and their insiders trade in their own company’s shares in response to SMD trading. The analysis reveals that although the issuer’s and insiders’ nonpublic internal information may be material (and therefore preclude their legal trading) prior to and just after the onset of third-party SMD trading in the company’s stock, subsequent SMD price changes (if sufficiently dramatic) may diminish the importance of the company’s nonpublic information, rendering it immaterial. If the issuer’s and insiders’ nonpublic information about the firm is immaterial, then they may trade while in possession of it without violating the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.

Regulation is justified when it serves the public interest, but it is frequently motivated by the economic self-interest of powerful groups. Economists call this the “bootleggers and Baptists” phenomenon—those likely to profit from trade in illicit alcohol push for regulation alongside the moralists hoping to protect the vulnerable.

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