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Popular Media Last week the European Commission slapped Intel Corporation with the largest antitrust fine in the Commission’s history, announcing that the sanctions were necessary to protect consumers from the egregious abuses of a “dominant firm.”
Last week the European Commission slapped Intel Corporation with the largest antitrust fine in the Commission’s history, announcing that the sanctions were necessary to protect consumers from the egregious abuses of a “dominant firm.” What did Intel do to merit this sanction? Whatever its intentions were, its actions leading up to the fine resulted inarguably in lower prices for consumers.
Read the full piece here.
TOTM Reacting to the EU fines imposed on Intel, Geoff raises a nice point about the difficulty of constructing the but-for world in antitrust cases generally, . . .
Reacting to the EU fines imposed on Intel, Geoff raises a nice point about the difficulty of constructing the but-for world in antitrust cases generally, but particularly in cases where prices are falling. This discussion reminded me of Thom’s excellent post responding to the NYT editorial and an AAI working paper and putting theoretical anticompetitive concerns to an empirical test and discussing evidence of falling prices for both Intel and AMD products and increased operating margins for AMD. So how are we to sensibly evaluate the EU decision?
TOTM Our own Josh Wright is quoted in the lead article in today’s Wall Street Journal. Josh opines that the European Union’s record $1.45 billion fine . . .
Our own Josh Wright is quoted in the lead article in today’s Wall Street Journal. Josh opines that the European Union’s record $1.45 billion fine against Intel for lowering its prices on granting “exclusionary” rebates on microprocessors means that FTC action against Intel is “much more likely than it was two weeks ago.” And what about our reinvigorated DOJ, Josh? Aren’t they going to want a piece of this action, lest they look like pansies next to those muscular South Koreans, Europeans, and FTC folk?
TOTM I am curious about something. AMD and Intel have been competing head to head for more than 15 years, at least since AMD released its . . .
I am curious about something. AMD and Intel have been competing head to head for more than 15 years, at least since AMD released its Intel 386 clone in the early 90s. In that time, inarguably, microprocessor prices have plumeted and processing power and other features have increased dramatically (I’m aware that we don’t know what the but-for world would look like, but these effects have been enormous).
TOTM A few quick reactions to the repudiation of the Section 2 Report, and more importantly, what it means for the future of monopolization enforcement… Read . . .
A few quick reactions to the repudiation of the Section 2 Report, and more importantly, what it means for the future of monopolization enforcement…
TOTM Dan Crane has an excellent essay (“Chicago, Post-Chicago and Neo-Chicago“) reviewing Bob Pitofsky’s Overshot the Mark volume. Here’s Dan’s brief abstract… Read the full piece . . .
Dan Crane has an excellent essay (“Chicago, Post-Chicago and Neo-Chicago“) reviewing Bob Pitofsky’s Overshot the Mark volume. Here’s Dan’s brief abstract…
TOTM Expanding on the themes in this post from the TOTM symposium book review of Professor Carrier’s new book on “Harnessing the Power of Intellectual Property . . .
Expanding on the themes in this post from the TOTM symposium book review of Professor Carrier’s new book on “Harnessing the Power of Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law” to encourage innovation, I’ve posted an essay co-authored with a very talented former student and research assistant, Aubrey Stuempfle. The essay expands on some of the themes we touched upon in reviewing Carrier’s analysis of standard setting issues, including the potential threat to innovation posed by invoking antitrust remedies to govern the SSO contracting process (whether under Section 2 of the Sherman Act of Section 5 of the FTC Act) in patent holdup cases. The review (along with the others from the symposium on Carrier’s book) will be published in the Alabama Law Review.
TOTM I guess it comes as little surprise that Christine Varney has withdrawn the Section 2 Report. The comments made in the statement withdrawing the Report . . .
I guess it comes as little surprise that Christine Varney has withdrawn the Section 2 Report. The comments made in the statement withdrawing the Report indicate . . . well, that Varney isn’t convinced by reading this blog, among other things. Coming on the heels of our Section 2 Symposium, the news is jarring, although not unexpected. Moreover, as predicted in Howard Marvel’s first post here, Varney is using “recent events” in the economy as a lever…
TOTM I’d like to propose a contest for the greatest intellectual embarrassment of antitrust. Let me name the first contestant—tying, which some of you know has . . .
I’d like to propose a contest for the greatest intellectual embarrassment of antitrust. Let me name the first contestant—tying, which some of you know has been one of my favorite for years. Here’s why. First, there is no persuasive theoretical or empirical evidence that tying is a business practice that is likely to harm consumers. (This is not the blog to deal with Professor Elhauge’s provocative paper except to say that it does not alter this view.) There is work that says it could be, under stringent conditions, and one can point to cases where maybe the practice has been used in a harmful way. Yet the courts have put tying in the same antitrust category as price fixing when done by a firm with some market power. Second, the courts, lacking any analytical framework for detecting bad behavior, have developed a mechanical test for tying that doesn’t have any connection whatsoever to any of the plausible theories of when and why tying might be bad. The test leads to false positives almost by design. Third, tying has led to one of the most ridiculous antitrust remedies of all time—namely the European Commission’s insistence that Microsoft expend effort creating and offering a product–a version of Windows that didn’t include Microsoft’s media player technology—that no one wants. Now, I understand that others will have their own candidates. But to beat mine your challenge is you must show a complete lack of theoretical or empirical support; a really bad legal test; and a remedy that better demonstrates the bankruptcy of the law. The challenge is on.
