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Showing 9 of 129 Publications in Consumer Welfare Standard
Scholarship This article assesses the FCC’s current policies and rules regarding transaction reviews, concluding that the Commission’s current spectrum transfer review process harms consumer welfare.
This article assesses the FCC’s current policies and rules regarding transaction reviews, concluding that the Commission’s current spectrum transfer review process harms consumer welfare. In particular, the FCC’s spectrum screen as currently structured, its standard of review for spectrum transfers, its use of conditions, as well as the scope of its transaction reviews exceed legal limits, impede efficient markets for spectrum, and deter welfare-increasing transactions and investment.
First we explain the FCC’s current policies and decisions regarding transaction reviews and assess their appropriateness with respect to the Commission’s authorizing legislation, regulations and case law. With respect to the scope of its transaction reviews and its use of conditions in particular, we find that the FCC’s practices exceed their permissible limits.
Next we address the economics of the FCC’s policies and decisions, explaining and assessing the animating economic logic behind the FCC’s actions. We demonstrate that the FCC’s current spectrum screen and transaction review standards rest on the premise that spectrum concentration in markets inherently leads to anticompetitive behavior. Further, we explain the flaws in this premise.
In demonstrating and assessing the basis of the FCC’s transaction reviews, we discuss the particulars of the FCC’s spectrum screen in detail, focusing on its use of concentration metrics and claims that its full analysis (beyond the initial screen) investigates competitive conditions more broadly. As we discuss, the Commission uses HHIs and spectrum concentration measures improperly as de facto triggers for per se illegality, rather than triggers for further investigation. Further, none of the full analyses described by the Commission investigates an aspect of competition other than market or spectrum concentration; instead, they simply restate in more detail the structural analysis implied by the HHI test and spectrum screen.
Addressing the economics underlying the FCC’s actions, we demonstrate that both economic theory and evidence indicate that the presence of more competitors in telecommunications markets does not necessarily result in lower prices and better service for consumers. Particularly in industries (like wireless) that are characterized by rapid technological change, non-horizontal competitive constraints and shifting consumer demand, the threat of entry and the need for repeated contracts with input providers with market power operate to constrain strategic behavior, even in heavily concentrated markets.
The welfare effects of spectrum concentration are at worst ambiguous, and, as we demonstrate, as the market has grown more concentrated, investment, coverage and product diversity have increased while prices for consumers have decreased. These results are consistent with a more robust model of firm behavior in the industry that takes account of entry threats and technological change.
Next we undertake a detailed critique of the FCC staff’s analysis of the AT&T/T-Mobile merger, demonstrating that it exhibits the same flaws as the agency’s more cursory transaction reviews.
We conclude with a discussion of the policy implications and suggestions for reform.
TOTM In the past two weeks, Members of Congress from both parties have penned scathing letters to the FTC warning of the consequences (both to consumers and the agency . . .
In the past two weeks, Members of Congress from both parties have penned scathing letters to the FTC warning of the consequences (both to consumers and the agency itself) if the Commission sues Google not under traditional antitrust law, but instead by alleging unfair competition under Section 5 of the FTC Act. The FTC is rumored to be considering such a suit, and FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz and Republican Commissioner Tom Rosch have expressed a desire to litigate such a so-called “pure” Section 5 antitrust case — one not adjoining a cause of action under the Sherman Act. Unfortunately for the Commissioners, no appellate court has upheld such an action since the 1960s.
Read the full piece here.
Regulatory Comments It has been said that sometimes the best way to know the weather, is to step outside. For the FCC, it is time to take that first step outside into the reality of competition in the mobile marketplace.
It has been said that sometimes the best way to know the weather, is to step outside. For the FCC, it is time to take that first step outside into the reality of competition in the mobile marketplace. The mobile market stands as one of the few bright spots in the economy, limited primarily by severe constraints on its chief asset: spectrum. Verizon has decided to undertake what any prudent business would do—obtain those inputs necessary for its continued growth.
Critics of the proposed transaction lament the concentration of more spectrum in the hands of one of the industry’s biggest players. But this implicit equation of concentration with harm to consumers is unsupported and misplaced. Concentration of resources in the hands of the largest wireless providers has not slowed the growth of the market; the problem is that growth in demand has dramatically outpaced capacity. Meanwhile, whatever the claimed merits may be of other, smaller companies holding this spectrum (as the deal’s opponents seem to want), that theoretical deal is not before the Agency, and the Commission is precluded from evaluating this deal in light of that hypothetical alternative.
While the FCC undeniably has authority to review the license transfers under the Federal Communications Act, its purview to review transactions is intentionally limited in substantive scope, and the Commercial Agreements that the deal’s opponents want to bootstrap into the FCC’s review are outside of it. Whether those agreements have anticompetitive effect is properly the province of the Department of Justice and their effect on competition is best measured under the antitrust laws, not by the FCC under its vague “public interest” standard. Indeed, if the FCC can assert jurisdiction over the Commercial Agreements as part of its public interest review, its authority over license transfers will become a license to regulate all aspects of business—duplicating merger review by the DOJ, but under a standard of review that lacks any clear limiting principles and analytical rigor. This is a recipe for certain mischief.
In the final analysis, the mobile wireless telecommunications services market is not concentrated to the extent that anticompetitive effects would result from this transaction. At the same time, the need for all competitors, including Verizon, to obtain sufficient spectrum to meet increasing demand is so large that the transfer this deal contemplates of unused spectrum from companies with no means to deploy it to a company that has demonstrated itself to be one of the most significant in the industry is plainly in the public interest and should be approved.
Scholarship In recent months a veritable legal and policy frenzy has erupted around Google generally, and more specifically concerning how its search activities should be regulated by government authorities throughout the world in the name of ensuring “search neutrality.”
In recent months a veritable legal and policy frenzy has erupted around Google generally, and more specifically concerning how its search activities should be regulated by government authorities throughout the world in the name of ensuring “search neutrality.” Concerns with search engine bias have led to a menu of proposed regulatory reactions. Although the debate has focused upon possible remedies to the “problem” presented by a range of Google’s business decisions, it has largely missed the predicate question of whether search engine bias is the product of market failure or otherwise generates significant economic or social harms meriting regulatory intervention in the first place. “Search neutrality” by its very name presupposes that mandatory neutrality or some imposition of restrictions on search engine bias is desirable, but it is an open question whether advocates of search neutrality have demonstrated that there is a problem necessitating any of the various prescribed remedies. This paper attempts to answer that question, and we evaluate both the economic and non-economic costs and benefits of search bias, as well as the solutions proposed to remedy perceived costs. We demonstrate that search bias is the product of the competitive process and link the search bias debate to the economic and empirical literature on vertical integration and the generally-efficient and pro-competitive incentives for a vertically integrated firm to favor its own content. We conclude that neither an ex ante regulatory restriction on search engine bias nor the imposition of an antitrust duty to deal upon Google would benefit consumers. Moreover, in considering the proposed remedies, we find that by they substitute away from the traditional antitrust consumer welfare standard, and would impose costs exceeding any potential benefits.
Popular Media It is not exactly the application of the consumer welfare standard, nor a scientific survey, but nonetheless an interesting poll at the American Bar Association . . .
It is not exactly the application of the consumer welfare standard, nor a scientific survey, but nonetheless an interesting poll at the American Bar Association Antitrust & Intellectual Property Conference before and after presentations from lawyers representing each side. The results?
While this is an admittedly small sample size and may not be representative of antitrust lawyers on a more widespread basis, a poll taken at an American Bar Association event at Stanford University reveals that nearly 3/4 of the antitrust lawyers present didn’t feel that Google was hurting competition. The event was a debate and polling before the debate had attendees of the debate set at 61% not feeling that Google has hurt competition. Those on the other side of the debate? Before it got underway 19% felt that Google was hurting competition and that number lowered slightly to 17% following the exchange.
Interesting results for a group of antitrust lawyers hearing out some version of the arguments likely to be made in from of the antitrust lawyers at the Federal Trade Commission.
UPDATE: Here is Manne & Wright (2011) on the case against the case against Google in the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy.
Filed under: antitrust, federal trade commission, google
TOTM The “consumer choice” approach to antitrust is increasingly discussed in a variety of settings, and endorsed by regulators and in scholarship, especially but not exclusively . . .
The “consumer choice” approach to antitrust is increasingly discussed in a variety of settings, and endorsed by regulators and in scholarship, especially but not exclusively in the Section 5 context. The fundamental idea is that the “conventional” efficiency approach embedded in the total and/or consumer welfare standards is too cramped and does not measure the “right” things. The consumer choice is a standard focusing on the options available to consumers and is proposed as an alternative to efficiency-based standards. Preliminary, I do not think the approach as I understand it is an improvement for modern antitrust methods, nor do I think that its adoption would be a good development for the coherence of antitrust jurisprudence or consumers.
TOTM Yesterday, in my contribution to the Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog’s Section 5 symposium, I discussed the FTC’s use of Section 5 to evade the . . .
Yesterday, in my contribution to the Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog’s Section 5 symposium, I discussed the FTC’s use of Section 5 to evade the tough standards facing plaintiffs bringing Section 2 claims and how that evasion was likely to cost consumers by stripping out the error-cost protections embedded in modern monopolization law. I also argued that the Commission’s various justifications for bringing the case under Section 5 were both unpersuasive and unprincipled. Some of the justifications are to do with the general trend towards favoring Section 5 as a stand alone authority, others rely on the institutional expertise of the Commission relative to judges in federal district court, and still others on the nature of competition in the microprocessor market, e.g. Commissioner Rosch’s claim that the difficulty in distinguishing harm to competitors from harm to competition in this setting supports a Section 5 case.
TOTM 1. Do the Merger Guidelines Need Revision? Yes. Conceptually, the current Guidelines incorporate multiple strands of intellectual and legal history with respect to merger analysis . . .
1. Do the Merger Guidelines Need Revision?
Yes. Conceptually, the current Guidelines incorporate multiple strands of intellectual and legal history with respect to merger analysis that have been layered one upon the other over time, but never effectively integrated. This now encumbers the application of the Guidelines and may be inhibiting the government’s capacity to effectively and efficiently initiate merger challenges.
TOTM I was recently reading Dean Chemerinsky (Irvine Law) on the Roberts Court at Age 3. One of Chemerinsky’s standard takes when he talks about the . . .
I was recently reading Dean Chemerinsky (Irvine Law) on the Roberts Court at Age 3. One of Chemerinsky’s standard takes when he talks about the Roberts Court is that the Court’s pro-business stance is one of its defining characteristics. Readers of the blog will know that I’ve been critical of Chemerinsky for his superficial antitrust commentary. For example, in this California Bar Journal piece, under the heading “Favoring Businesses over Consumers and Employees,” Chemerinsky argues that the Roberts Court antitrust decisions favored businesses over consumers by overturning Dr. Miles, “make it more difficult to sue business for antitrust violations” in Credit Suisse, and, in Twombly, made it “harder for plaintiff to get into court.”
