DOJ’s top antitrust enforcer Christine Varney had hardly gotten settled in her office before she repudiated the existing DOJ guidelines on policing single-firm conduct. In the spirit of Rahm Emanuel’s famous “never let a serious crisis go to waste” directive, Ms. Varney invoked the current economic crisis as grounds for her decision to throw out the product of more than a year’s worth of hearings (from all sides).

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University of Chicago economist (and behavioralist doyen) Richard Thaler thinks “the question of whether a ‘public option’ should be part of the health care solution” is just “one big distraction.” In Sunday’s New York Times, Thaler argues that the debate over the public option is a “red herring” if, as President Obama insists, the public plan will have to break even and won’t be granted “the power to impose special deals with suppliers like hospitals and drug companies.” If those two conditions are satisfied, Thaler contends, the public plan is unlikely to have much success and certainly won’t drive out private insurers.

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As American antitrust regulators hurtle headlong toward a Europeanized (i.e., competitor-focused) antitrust, I do hope they will at least avoid the tack the EU has taken in evaluating Lufthansa’s proposed takeover of Austrian Airlines. The Wall Street Journal is reporting that EU Antitrust Chief Neelie Kroes has directed her subordinates to draft a “conditional clearance” that approves the merger subject to Lufthansa’s surrender of a number of routes. Lufthansa offered to give up those routes “in response to the concerns raised by competitors,” the Journal reports. It also reports that EU regulators enlisted the assistance of Lufthansa’s competitors in fashioning the conditions to merger approval…

Read the full piece here. 

As his Council of Economic Advisers made clear in its recent health care report, President Obama sees two primary goals for his health care reform efforts: to slow the growth of health care costs and to expand coverage of health insurance. It’s pretty clear, though, which of these goals is steering the ship. While the President’s proposals include a few modest measures ostensibly aimed at reducing costs (digitizing medical records, collecting and disseminating data on treatment-effectiveness, etc.), the primary focus is on increasing insurance coverage. That’s unfortunate, for relentless pursuit of coverage expansion is almost certain to undermine the goal of cost containment.

Read the full piece here. 

In his recent speech on the GM bankruptcy, President Obama reassured Americans that the government, which now holds 60% of GM’s stock, is not going to try to take over management of the company…

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Our own Josh Wright is quoted in the lead article in today’s Wall Street Journal. Josh opines that the European Union’s record $1.45 billion fine against Intel for lowering its prices on granting “exclusionary” rebates on microprocessors means that FTC action against Intel is “much more likely than it was two weeks ago.” And what about our reinvigorated DOJ, Josh? Aren’t they going to want a piece of this action, lest they look like pansies next to those muscular South Koreans, Europeans, and FTC folk?

Read the full piece here.

A bundled discount occurs when a seller offers to sell a collection of different goods for a lower price than the aggregate price for which it would sell the constituent products individually. Such discounts pose different competitive risks than single-product discounts because, as I explained in this post, they may have an exclusionary effect even if they result in a price that exceeds the cost of producing the bundle. In particular, even an “above-cost” bundled discount may have the effect of excluding rivals that (1) are more efficient at producing the products that compete with the discounter’s but (2) produce a less extensive product line than the discounter. In other words, bundled discounts may drive equally efficient but less diversified rivals from the market.

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There’s a fundamental problem with Section 2 of the Sherman Act: nobody really knows what it means. More specifically, we don’t have a very precise definition for “exclusionary conduct,” the second element of a Section 2 claim. The classic definition from the Supreme Court’s Grinnell decision — “the willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident” — provides little guidance. The same goes for vacuous statements that exclusionary conduct is something besides “competition on the merits.” Accordingly, a generalized test for exclusionary conduct has become a sort of Holy Grail for antitrust scholars and regulators.

Read the full piece here. 

A couple of weeks ago, Rep. Barney Frank sent a snippy letter to Northern Trust, a Chicago-based bank that caters to very wealthy clients. Mr. Frank and some other Platonic guardians on the House Financial Services Committee were incensed that Northern Trust, a recipient of TARP funds, had sponsored and hosted clients at a California golf tournament.

Read the full piece here.