In yet another example of interagency cheerleading from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Chair Lina Khan recently touted the work of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) on payments networks:

New @CFPB research reveals that large banks are offering worse credit card terms & interest rates than small banks and credit unions, regardless of credit risk. For an average cardholder, the difference can amount to $400-$500 in additional interest/year.https://t.co/gsliqy1ohn

— Lina Khan (@linakhanFTC) February 20, 2024

Read the full piece here.

Just days before the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) was set to enter into force, the European Commission hit Apple—one of the six designated “gatekeepers” to which the new law will apply—with a hefty €1.8 billion fine for the kinds of anti-steering provisions that will be banned by the DMA, which enters into force on 6 March. 

The timing of the fine, and its seemingly arbitrary amount, are both curious. Announced as being the result of a four-year investigation, the decision amounts to an exclusionary-abuse turned exploitative-conduct case, and is underpinned by a flimsy theory of harm in a market that has seen exponential growth over the past decade. The fact that the Commission fined Apple for conduct that would be banned per se just two days later raises questions as to why the DMA was necessary and whether the Commission has faith in the new law’s effectiveness.

Read the full piece here.

Once upon a time (July 9, 2021, to be precise), President Joe Biden issued an executive order on “Promoting Competition in the American Economy,” which declared that “a whole-of-government approach is necessary to address overconcentration, monopolization, and unfair competition in the American economy.”

Read the full piece here.

Abstract

Antitrust law and policy rely on a hypothetical average consumer. But no one is average. With this basic observation in mind, we show how agent-based modeling (“ABM”) allows enforcers and policymakers to bypass imaginary averages by observing interactions between unique agents. We argue that agent-based regulatory and enforcement policies have a greater potential than average-based public policies because they are more realistic. As we show, the realism brought by ABM enables antitrust agencies and policymakers to better anticipate the effects of their actions and, perhaps more importantly, to time their interventions better.

Read at SSRN.

The press is abuzz with news about the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Feb. 26 announcement that it would challenge the proposed Kroger/Albertsons mega-supermarket merger, which had been in the works since the fall of 2022. If the FTC succeeds in obtaining a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in Oregon federal district court (a big if), it plans to review the transaction in an administrative hearing beginning in late July.

Read the full piece here.

La implementación de la Ley de Mercados Digitales (LMD) en Europa nos puede dar algunas lecciones regulatorias a los países que, desde este lado del Atlántico, queremos emular al viejo continente (ya hay una iniciativa en Brazil; y la Comunidad Andina y México han indicado su intención de estudiar el tema).

Read the full piece (in Spanish) here.

ICLE research on the proposed merger of supermarkets Kroger and Albertsons was cited on an episode of the Econception podcast. The full episode is embedded below. Discussion of the ICLE white paper begins at around the 20:43 mark.

Abstract

The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Ohio v. American Express (“Amex”) remains central to the enforcement of antitrust laws involving digital markets. Specifically, the decision established a framework to assess business conduct involving transactional, multisided platforms from both an economic and legal perspective. At its crux, the Court in Amex integrated both the relevant market and competitive effects analysis across the two distinct groups who interact on the Amex platform, that is, cardholders and merchants. This unified, integrated approach has been controversial, however. The primary debate is whether the Court’s ruling places an undue burden on plaintiffs under the rule of reason paradigm to meet its burden of production to establish harm to competition. Enter Epic v. Apple (“Epic”): a case involving the legality of various Apple policies governing its iOS App Store, which, like Amex, is a transactional, multisided platform. While both the district court and the Ninth Circuit largely ruled in favor of Apple over Epic, these decisions are of broader interest for their fidelity to Amex. A careful review of the decisions reveals that the Epic courts operationalized Amex in a practical, sensible way. The courts did not engage in extensive balancing across developers and users as some critics of Amex contended would be required. Ultimately, the courts in Epic (a) considered evidence of effects across both groups on the platform and (b) gave equal weight to both the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects evidence, which, this Article contends, are the essential elements of the Amex precedent. Relatedly, the Epic decisions illustrate that the burden of production on plaintiffs in multisided platform cases is not higher than in cases involving regular, single-sided markets. Additionally, both parties, whether litigating single-sided or multi-sided markets, are fully incentivized to bring evidence to bear on all aspects of the case. Finally, this Article details how the integrated Amex approach deftly avoids potential issues involving the out-of-market effects doctrine in antitrust, which limits what type of effects courts can consider in assessing conduct.

Read at SSRN.

Abstract

This paper is on the new Merger Guidelines. It makes several arguments. First, that the Guidelines should be understood as existing in a political equilibrium. Second, that the new structural presumption of the Merger Guidelines (HHI = 1,800) is too strict, and that an economically reasonable revision in the structural presumption would have increased rather than decreased the threshold. Whereas the new Guidelines lowers the threshold to HHI 1,800 from HHI 2,500, an economically reasonable revision would have increased the threshold to HHI 3,200. I justify this argument using a bare-bones model of Cournot competition. Third, it seems unlikely, as an empirical matter, that merger enforcement under the existing Guidelines is socially desirable. Fourth, that federal merger enforcement raises serious constitutional issues, originally discussed in 1904, and that it may be time now, in view of the new Guidelines, to return to these foundational constitutional questions.

Read at SSRN.