Executive Summary

In 2020, the Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica passed Legislative Decree 9831, which granted the Central Bank of Costa Rica (BCCR) authority to regulate payment-card fees. BCCR subsequently developed a regulation that set maximum fees for acquiring and issuing banks, which came into force Nov. 24, 2020. In BCCR’s November 2021 ordinary review of those price controls, the central bank set out a framework to limit further the fees charged on domestic cards and to introduce limits on fees charged on foreign cards.

This brief considers the international experience with interchange and acquisition fees, reviewing both theoretical and empirical evidence. It finds that international best practices require that payment networks be considered dynamic two-sided markets, and therefore, that assessments account for the effects of regulation on both sides of the market: merchants and consumers. In contrast, BCCR’s analysis focuses primarily on static costs that affect merchants, with little attention to the effects on consumers, let alone the dynamic effects. Consequently, BCCR’s proposed maximum interchange and acquisition fees would interfere with the efficient operation of the payment-card market in ways that are likely to harm consumers. Specifically, losses by issuing and acquiring banks are likely to be passed on to consumers in the form of higher banking and card fees, and less investment in improvements. Less wealthy consumers are likely to be hit hardest.

Based on the evidence available, international best practices entail:

• As far as possible, allowing the market to determine interchange fees and acquisition fees;
• Acknowledging that payment networks are two-sided markets in which one side (usually merchants) typically subsidizes the other side, thereby increasing system effectiveness;
• Not benchmarking fees, especially against countries that have price controls in place; and
• Not imposing price controls on fees on foreign cards.

Read the full issue brief here.

Executive Summary

Our response to the National Telecommunications and Information Administration’s (“NTIA”) request for comments (“RFC”) is broken into two parts. The first part raises concerns regarding what we see as the NTIA’s uncritical acceptance of certain contentious assumptions, as well as the RFC’s pre-commitment to a particular political viewpoint. The second part responds to several of the most pressing and problematic substantive questions raised in the RFC.

The RFC appears intended to invite comments that conform to a pre-established commitment to interventionist policy. The heuristics and assumptions on which it relies anticipate the desired policy outcome, rather than setting a baseline for genuine input and debate. Unfortunately, these biases also appear to carry over to the substantive questions. These comments offer four substantive observations:

First, that interoperability is not a panacea for mobile-apps ecosystems. There are risks and benefits that attend interoperability and these risks and benefits manifest differently for different groups of end-users and distributors. Specifically, some users may prefer “closed” platforms that offer a more curated experience with enhanced security features.

Second, considerations of security are intrinsic to determining whether interoperability is feasible or desirable. Centralized app distribution is what allows platforms like the App Store to filter harmful content through a two-tiered process of both human and automated app review. Such control over the ecosystem’s content would necessarily be relinquished if third-party app distribution and payment systems were allowed on “closed” platforms.

Third, determinations of “user benefit” in the mobile-app ecosystem must account for both end-users and developers. Where the interests of the two sides of the market conflict, total output—rather than price—should be the relevant benchmark.

Fourth, there is no objective “correct balance” between security and access. Some end-users and developers prefer more curated and ostensibly safer ecosystems, while others are most concerned with the sheer quantity of options. The NTIA should not substitute its own preferences for the revealed preferences of millions of users and distributors.

Read the full comments here.

Abstract

Two-dimensional Hotelling models predict that firms choose to maximally differentiate on one dominant characteristic and minimally differentiate on the other dominated characteristic. When consumers have more choices, firms tend to improve all dimensions. This study uses lodging tax data from the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts to examine the joint choices of geographic location and product positioning (or brand) by multi-unit hotel operators at different market boundary levels. First, our findings suggest that greater distance between own hotels is associated with less product differentiation, which implies a max-min equilibrium. Second, considering the coexistence of horizontal and vertical differentiation, we obtain a higher likelihood a hotel will be of the same quality tier as its nearest neighbor the nearer the neighbor; while a farther distance to nearest neighbor increases the degree of quality differentiation in the scenario of vertical differentiation. This implies both min-max and max-max equilibria are obtained. Third, owners with properties at different levels of quality are more likely to add new properties that are higher quality, while more geographically differentiated portfolios add lower quality properties at the margin. We obtain a max-min equilibrium. Therefore, our findings provide insights into the strategic motivations of multi-unit owners and, within their decisions, the relevant dominance of place versus market position.

Introduction

On behalf of the International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE), we thank the Commission for the opportunity to comment on this Notice of Inquiry in the Matter of Implementing the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act: Prevention and Elimination of Digital Discrimination (“NOI”). The NOI states that “one of the Commission’s foremost goals is to ensure that every person in the United States has equal access to high-quality, affordable broadband internet access service… Every person across our Nation deserves—and must have—equal access to this crucial technology in the increasingly digital world; a person’s zip code should not determine their destiny.”[1]

Despite this high-minded rhetoric, the NOI does not focus on extending broadband deployment to those who are actually unserved—i.e., to those who lack any broadband Internet options at all.[2] In fact, the word “unserved” does not appear in the NOI at all. The notice instead focuses on eliminating “digital discrimination of access based on income level, race, color, religion, or national origin.”[3] This group is deemed to be the “underserved,” a designation the NOI defines not by reference to their relative inability to access broadband Internet service, but by their membership in categories that “have been historically underserved, marginalized, or adversely affected by persistent poverty or inequality.”[4] Thus, the NOI includes in the ranks of the “underserved” individuals who do have the ability to access broadband service, although potentially at slower speeds than some of their neighbors.

Getting faster Internet to those who live where broadband service already exists—or assisting them in paying for access to that service which already exists—is a fundamentally different problem than that faced by Americans who lack Internet access because they live in geographic areas without broadband infrastructure. We thus caution the Commission that this rulemaking may distract from the pressing need, demonstrated by the FCC’s own broadband-deployment data, to build out broadband networks in those hardest-to-reach areas.

The Commission asks whether broadband-deployment decisions are being made based on impermissible “income discrimination.” But as we explain in greater detail below, differences in the levels of broadband service available to the richest and poorest census blocks are insignificant relative to the differences in availability between lowest population-density census blocks and even the next- lowest population-density census blocks.[5] Indeed, the issues raised in NOI largely do not speak to the need to alleviate the significant deficit of broadband infrastructure in the most rural areas of this country. While the NOI presumes that discrimination is to blame for differences in the availability of higher-speed tiers of broadband service, the data and the underlying economics tell a different tale.

Underpinning the stark differences in broadband availability between urban and rural areas is the underlying cost of deployment. Population density serves as a supply-side constraint on buildout decisions because it is cost-prohibitive to build a network to serve only a very few potential subscribers. Similarly, those differences that can be observed in the deployment of the highest-speed tiers in urban centers—which are far less pronounced, in comparison to the urban-rural divide—are similarly the result of providers’ judgment about the likelihood to recoup their investments, not willful decisions to discriminate on the basis of income or protected racial or religious characteristics.

It is undoubtedly important to examine patterns of deployment to discover how best to connect underserved communities. But if we are to overcome those obstacles that have impeded reaching every potential broadband consumer, it is essential that the FCC carefully consider how and why investment decisions are made in broadband markets. ICLE has researched these questions extensively and we offer, in addition to these comments, that commissioners and FCC staff may wish to read the more fulsome analysis offered in our 2021 paper, “A Dynamic Analysis of Broadband Competition: What Concentration Numbers Fail to Capture.”[6]

In short, we question the NOI’s framing of broadband-connectivity issues as a matter of “discrimination.” We would assert that the project to eliminate “digital discrimination of access based on income level”[7] does not usefully forward efforts to connect the underserved. While there remains much work to be done to connect the underserved, the FCC is already well aware of the technical, economic, regulatory, and geographical issues that can impede deployment and has for years been doing important work on these issues. The Commission should continue this important work and should avoid the unhelpful framing of “discrimination.”

In Part II, we detail some of the important factors that guide broadband providers’ investment decisions and that drive competition in specific markets. There is no reasonable model (nor data) that would suggest broadband companies have engaged in discrimination against racial, ethnic, or religious minorities—or even against lower-income consumers—as that would imply that they have systematically sacrificed profits due to animus.

In Part III, we offer an approach to implement Section 60506 of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act that applies insights from the law & economics of broadband buildout. It is not accurate to categorize the process firms undertake to evaluate the likelihood of recoupment as “discrimination” on the basis of “income level, race, ethnicity, color, religion, or national origin.”[8]

Thus, rules to proscribe “digital discrimination” ought to focus on cases where explicit and demonstrable discriminatory intent played a role in broadband providers’ investment decisions.

In Part IV, we counsel the FCC that it is economically infeasible to require equivalent broadband infrastructure across all territories irrespective of the likelihood that providers will be able to recoup their investment. Mandates that providers make unprofitable deployment decisions in some areas would necessarily require either that they raise prices in other areas or that they be subsidized directly by the government. The former (i.e., cross-subsidization) is generally infeasible, as higher-income territories tend to have more competitive markets. Thus, we recommend that the FCC and the federal government consider user subsidies (e.g., connectivity vouchers) to encourage more options for lower-income consumers.

Read the full comments here.

[1] Notice of Inquiry, In the Matter of Implementing the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act: Prevention and Elimination of Digital Discrimination, GN Docket No. 22-69 (Feb. 23, 2022), at para. 1 [hereinafter “NOI”].

[2] Currently defined by the FCC as 25/3 Mbps for terrestrial fixed broadband and 10/1 for mobile broadband. See Fourteenth Broadband Deployment Report, In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, GN Docket No. 20-269 (Jan. 19, 2021), at para. 12 (defining terrestrial fixed broadband), para. 15 (defining mobile broadband) [hereinafter “Fourteenth Broadband Deployment Report”].

[3] NOI, supra note 1, at para. 2 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 1754(b)(1).

[4] Id. at para. 3, n.5; para. 40 (both quoting Executive Order 13985).

[5] See Part II.B below.

[6] Geoffrey A. Manne, Kristian Stout, & Ben Sperry, A Dynamic Analysis of Broadband Competition: What Concentration Numbers Fail to Capture (ICLE White Paper, Jun. 2021), available at https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/A- Dynamic-Analysis-of-Broadband-Competition.pdf [hereinafter “ICLE Broadband Competition Paper”].

[7] NOI, supra note 1, at para. 2

[8] 47 U.S.C. § 1754.

 

Sen. Mike Lee of Utah is poised to introduce legislation that would forbid Google and other tech giants that build and operate digital advertising exchanges from owning the tools that help buyers and sellers of online advertising. Not only is this bad policy, but it is based on the faulty premise that advertising markets are analogous to securities markets.

Read the full piece here.

Abstract

There is a raging debate within antitrust to determine how to best assess the conduct of digital platforms and tailor the enforcement of antitrust laws to the modern economy. The distinguishing features of digital platforms can make their analysis quite different from conventional, single-sided markets. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Ohio v. American Express (“Amex”) was the first decision to explicitly incorporate features of multisided platforms into antitrust analyses. However, the decision has divided academics and practitioners as to whether the Court properly incorporated platform features into antitrust’s rule of reason framework, which seeks to divide the burden of production between plaintiffs and defendants. Adding fuel to the fire are the lower courts’ interpretation of Amex, including in U.S. v. Sabre, where the district court ruled that only “transactional” platforms compete with other transactional platforms, which effectively short-circuited the competitive analysis. This Article argues that antitrust has forgotten the lessons from Ronald Coase’s work on the nature of the firm. Specifically, categorizing business organizations as “platforms” is insufficient to properly inform the actual competitive effects analysis. Firms organize in various ways to ultimately turn inputs into outputs. Precisely how this process is achieved is relevant to understand a firm’s conduct and incentives, but firm organization alone should not lead to competitive effects conclusions. In light of Coase, this Article reexamines the Court’s Amex decision to put suitable bounds on its precedential value. Additionally, this Article examines several key antitrust cases before and after Amex to assess their fidelity to a Coasian interpretation of platforms.

Introduction

The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) is grateful for the opportunity to submit these comments in support of FTX’s application to amend its DCO registration to allow it to clear margined products directly for retail participants.

The vast majority (some 96%[1]) of global crypto derivatives trading takes place outside the U.S., much of it on platforms operating non-intermediated retail models similar to that proposed in FTX’s application—but with one crucial difference: these offshore exchanges are largely unregulated. The reason for the disparity in domestic vs. foreign trading volumes is clear: regulatory constraints and costs in the U.S. make the operation of such platforms impossible or unviable. FTX’s proposal would pave the way to bring the technology and business models currently employed to facilitate virtually the entirety of the world’s crypto derivatives trading into the regulated structure of U.S. derivatives markets. The only thing standing in the way is the possible inflexibility of that regulatory structure in the face of disruptive competition.

The obvious market benefits of FTX’s proposal are that:

1. It would free capital that would otherwise be pledged as collateral, which could greatly expand liquidity in crypto markets or could be deployed elsewhere in the financial system;
2. It would introduce a competitive alternative to the current exchanges, thus providing investors savings on what they would otherwise pay in commissions, account origination fees, etc.; and
3. It would offer clear product differentiation: e.g., by introducing a new mechanism for counterparty risk mitigation and by offering direct access to retail investors (with inherently lower costs of participation, more and cheaper information, and technological enhancements like a direct-access mobile interface).

The latter two of these benefits (and to some extent even the first) go particularly to the enhancement of competition in U.S. derivatives markets.

Concerns that markets lack sufficient competition are at the forefront of current policy debates. Legislators are currently working on draft bills that seek to promote competition in digital markets, and President Biden recently issued an executive order advocating for a “whole of government” approach to competition.[2]

Unfortunately, the renewed focus on how governments may boost competition has a significant blindside when it comes to government-created barriers to competition. Rather than offering a solution, government regulations are all too often the cause of reduced competition. This is notably the case when regulation artificially narrows a market by preventing new and innovative firms from disrupting entrenched incumbents.

In other words, if the “whole-of-government” approach to promoting competition means anything, it means that regulatory agencies should work to remove state-created, artificial barriers to market entry that are not absolutely required to accomplish core regulatory functions. The CFTC has precisely that opportunity with FTX’s application.

The market for crypto (and many other) derivatives is currently a lucrative duopoly, dominated by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). Both firms have long been shielded from robust competition by a protective, if well-intentioned, moat of government regulation. The CFTC now has a unique opportunity to open this duopoly to disruptive competition.

FTX’s application would bring both technological and business-model innovation to the derivatives market, carrying with them the promise of increased competition, reduced risk, more efficient pricing, and lower costs for investors. There is always reluctance to embrace the new, particularly in areas that deal so intrinsically with risk. But a sensible measure of caution must not be allowed to morph into costly intransigence.

FTX’s application, while ambitious in its aims, is, in fact, quite modest in its mechanisms. It is respectful of the existing, overarching regulatory paradigm implemented to protect consumers, investors, and the financial system as a whole; it contemplates significant protections and backstops to shore up any increased risk it might introduce; and it ensures that ongoing oversight by the CFTC is readily facilitated.

Indeed, approval of FTX’s application would not entail the abandonment of the CFTC’s core principles, but merely a recognition that the specific implementation of those principles may not be optimal for certain novel business models and technology. As Chairman Benham recently remarked:

[T]he digital asset market would benefit from uniform imposition of requirements focused on ensuring certain core principles, including market integrity, customer protection, and market stability. At the CFTC, we have seen that a regulatory regime focused on core principles can be successful in overseeing a wide variety of markets, and have no reason to think those same principles cannot be applied to digital asset markets.[3]

In short, the CFTC should jump at this opportunity to introduce some well-regulated experimentation into the derivatives market: the likely social benefits of this effort significantly outweigh the potential harms.

Read the full comments here.

[1] See, e.g., Philip Stafford, Crypto industry makes push into regulated derivatives markets, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 21, 2022), https://www.ft.com/content/364dee59-fb51-400b-acd2-808d4ec41ab3.

[2] Executive Order 14036 on Promoting Competition in the American Economy, § 2(g) (Jul. 9, 2021) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/07/09/executive-order-on-promoting-competition- inthe-american-economy (“This order recognizes that a whole-of-government approach is necessary to address overconcentration, monopolization, and unfair competition in the American economy.”).

[3] CFTC Chairman Rostin Behnam, Letter to the U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry and House Committee on Agriculture (Feb. 8, 2022) at 4, available at https://www.agriculture.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2022%2002%2008%20Ag%20committees%20digital%20asset%20res ponse%20letter.pdf.

Introduction

We thank the European Commission for this opportunity to comment on its call for evidence concerning a new framework for standard-essential patents. The International Center for Law and Economics (ICLE) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan research center whose work promotes the use of law & economics methodologies to inform public-policy debates. We believe that intellectually rigorous, data-driven analysis will lead to efficient policy solutions that promote consumer welfare and global economic growth. ICLE’s scholars have written extensively on competition, intellectual property, and consumer-protection policy.

In this comment, we express concerns about the commission’s plan to update the legal framework that underpins standard-essential patent licensing in Europe.

For obvious reasons, the way intellectual property disputes are resolved has tremendous ramifications for firms that operate in standard-reliant industries. Not only do many of the firms in this space derive a large share of their revenue from patents but, perhaps more importantly, the prospect of litigation dictates how firms structure the transfer of intellectual property assets. In simple terms, ineffectual judicial remedies for IP infringements and uncertainty concerning the resolution of IP disputes discourage firms from concluding license agreements in the first place.

The key role that IP plays in these industries should impel policymakers to proceed with caution. By virtually all available metrics, the current system works. The development of innovative technologies through standards development organizations (SDOs) has led to the emergence of some of the most groundbreaking technologies that consumers use today;[1] and recent empirical evidence suggests that many of the alleged ills that have been associated with the overenforcement of intellectual property rights simply fail to materialize in industries that rely on standard-essential patents.[2]

At the same time, “there is no empirical evidence of structural and systematic problems of holdup and royalty stacking affecting standard-essential patent (“SEP”) licensing.”[3] Indeed, “[t]he notion that implementers in such innovation–driven industries are being suffocated by an insurmountable patent royalty stack has turned out to be nothing more than horror fiction.”[4] Yet, without a sound basis, the anti-injunctions approach increasingly espoused by policymakers unnecessarily “adds a layer of additional legal complexity and alters bargaining processes, unduly favoring implementers.”[5]

Licensing negotiations involving complex technologies are legally intricate. It is simply not helpful for a regulatory body to impose a particular vision of licensing negotiations if the goal is more innovation and greater ultimate returns to consumers. Instead, where possible, policy should prefer allowing parties to negotiate at arm’s length and to resolve disputes through courts. In addition to maintaining the sometimes-necessary remedy of injunctive relief against bad-faith implementers, this approach allows courts to explore when injunctive relief is appropriate on a case-by-case basis. Thus, over the course of examining actual cases, courts can refine the standards that determine when an injunctive remedy is inappropriate. Indeed, the very exercise of designing ex ante rules and guidelines to inform F/RAND licensing is antagonistic to optimal policymaking, as judges are far better situated and equipped to make the necessary marginal adjustments to the system.

Against this backdrop, our comments highlight several factors that should counsel the commission to preserve the rules that currently govern SEP-licensing agreements:

For a start, the SEP space is far more complex than many recognize. Critics often assume that collaborative standard development creates significant scope for opportunistic behavior—notably patent holdup. However, the tremendous growth of SEP-reliant industries and market participants’ strong preference for this form of technological development suggest these problems are nowhere near as widespread as many believe.

Second, weakening the protections afforded to SEP holders would have second-order effects that are widely ignored in contemporary policy debates. Weaker SEP protection would notably encourage firms to integrate vertically, rather than to specialize. It would reduce startup companies’ access to capital markets by making it harder to collateralize IP. Curbing existing IP protections would also erode the West’s technological leadership over economies that are heavily reliant on manufacturing and whose policymakers routinely undermine the intellectual property rights of foreign firms.

Finally, critics often overlook the important benefits conferred by existing IP protections. This includes the comparative advantage of injunctions over damages awards, as well as firms’ ability to decide at what level of the value chain royalties will be calculated.

Read the full comments here.

[1] See, e.g., Dirk Auer & Julian Morris, Governing the Patent Commons, 38 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 294 (2020).

[2] See, e.g., Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber & Ross Levine, An Empirical Examination of Patent Holdup, 11 J. COMPETITION & ECON. 549 (2015). This is in keeping with general observations about the dynamic nature of intellectual property protections. See, e.g., RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N. HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WORLD OF IDEAS 42-44 (2013).

[3] Oscar Borgogno & Giuseppe Colangelo, Disentangling the FRAND Conundrum, DEEP-IN Research Paper (Dec. 5, 2019) at 5, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3498995.

[4] Richard A. Epstein & Kayvan B. Noroozi, Why Incentives for “Patent Holdout” Threaten to Dismantle FRAND, and Why It Matters, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1381, 1411 (2017).

[5] Borgogno & Colangelo, supra note 3, at 5.

 

Abstract

For much of its existence, the academic and policy debate on standards essential patents (SEPs) in mobile telecommunications was driven by the theory of “hold up”— the ability of SEP owners to supposedly extract value well beyond the contribution of their technology to downstream products. This theory of hold up was never empirically validated, and even as a theory, took no account of the non-self-enforcing nature of patents, including SEPs. Injunctive relief for infringement is far from automatic, and litigation is costly and carries asymmetric risks for licensors. In reality, licensors are often able to collect payment only several years after infringement began, may sometimes end up agreeing to rates that are too low to incentivise future investment, and may often be unable to collect payment for all the period of infringement by the implementer. Thus “hold out” by licensees who wish to delay, avoid and reduce payment for their use of SEPs is a potentially greater danger than “hold up.”

If injunctions are difficult to obtain and the eventual remedy for infringement is to take a license and pay damages based on FRAND rates, there is little positive incentive for licensees to take licenses. Instead, it is attractive for licensees to delay and force licensors into litigation. The attractiveness and increasing pervasiveness of such behaviour risks disrupting the “balance” of incentives that is sought by standards development organisations such as the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), which has been responsible for shepherding the development of mobile telecommunications standards. The long-term consequences of disrupting this balance will likely be a diminished rate of future innovation, and the potential replacement of a remarkably successful model of “open innovation” by more closed models.

This paper suggests potential correctives to the holdout problem. The correctives involve the strengthening of injunctive relief regimes, and the recognition by Courts and policy-makers (especially antitrust or competition agencies) that achieving the “balance” sought out by ETSI may require limiting or withdrawing the unlimited availability of FRAND licenses for unwilling licensors. Courts and agencies should recognise that SEP holders are only obliged to be prepared to make FRAND licenses available, but also recognise that licensors are not compelled to conclude FRAND licenses with unwilling licensees. At the very least, Courts that are often asked to determine FRAND rates based on evaluating “comparable licenses” can still take measures that avoid putting unwilling licensees on the same footing as those who willingly negotiated “comparable” licenses.