The Federal Communications Commission has voted on yet another round of net neutrality rules. Its vote Thursday reprises the 2015 rules, which resuscitated the 1934 Communications Act for modern, high-speed broadband networks. The agency decided, by a partisan split of 3-2, to end the “abdication of authority over broadband in 2017” and the ensuing years of “no federal oversight.”

Read the full piece here.

ICLE Academic Affiliate Thomas Hazlett was a guest on CNBC’s Squawk Box to discuss his recent Wall Street Journal op-ed arguing that mergers often have consumer benefits. Video of the clip is embedded below.

Abstract

Mergers in mobile markets are of keen interest to policy makers and scholars. Because carrier networks are subject to pronounced economies of scale and scope and given that communications regulators create substantial barriers to entry by limiting spectrum allocations for mobile services, wireless services generally exhibit relatively high levels of industrial concentration. Hence, antitrust authorities often struggle with the tradeoff between enhanced scale economies and enhanced market power. Between 2012 to 2016, for instance, four E.U. nations (Austria, Ireland, Germany, and Italy) consummated “4-to-3” mobile mergers while two such combinations were blocked (in Denmark and the U.K.). In the U.S., 4-to-3 transactions were blocked by regulators in 2011 and again in 2014, but a recent merger — between the No. 3 (T-Mobile) and No. 4 (Sprint) carriers was approved in February 2020. This combination remains a subject of intense debate. We examine post-merger evidence of retail mobile subscription prices, network investment, service quality, market shares, and industry profits in the U.S. mobile communications industry. We conclude that the data are consistent with the thesis that the T-Mobile/Sprint merger produced consumer gains. This outcome is particularly interesting given that the government remedy imposed to mitigate potential anti-competitive merger effects, the creation of a new fourth network (DISH), has produced no plausible pro-competitive impact.

The government has become increasingly suspicious of major mergers over the past decade, under both political parties. The Justice Department under Donald Trump sued to prevent AT&T from buying Time Warner. The Federal Trade Commission under President Biden is continuing a case the Trump administration initiated against Meta, parent of Facebook, to force the firm to cough up Instagram and WhatsApp, which it swallowed during the Obama years. In January, JetBlue Airways’ plans to merge with Spirit Airlines and Amazon’s plans to acquire iRobot were deterred under regulatory pressure.

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Abstract

As an industry, communications satellites have traced a wobbly trajectory. Envisioned to bring revolutionary advances to telecommunications services in the U.S. Communications Satellite Act of 1962, the marketplace did open via Comsat, a public-private partnership. But the sluggish pace was revealed a decade later when progress increased substantially with the Open Skies policy. Free entry collapsed costs for wide area distribution of broadcasting services, launching the U.S. cable television industry (disrupting the TV broadcasting triopoly) in the 1980s and then direct-to-subscriber satellite TV (challenging the new incumbent cable operators) in the 1990s. In ensuing decades, however, fortunes reversed. Satellite phone and broadband service providers—Iridium, Teledesic, Motient, Intelsat and many others—financially crashed and burned. Yet another reversal may now be in evidence, however: satellites in service have increased more than three-fold in the past decade. Spasms of technological progress, including gains in small device electronics, are driving market change: “While some [satellites] are the size of a bus and weighing over 6,000 pounds, they can also be as small as a lunchbox,” noted a 2018 Aspen Institute report. “Constellations can now be composed of hundreds or even thousands of satellites.” The new mega-constellations are creating a crowded sky. With demand for orbital slots and complementary radio bands dramatically intensifying, new policy formulations are being floated. We outline possible innovations in spectrum property rights.

In July 2001, a dozen Google techies pondered their mission mantra. In essence, they aimed “to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful.” However, their ambition was celestial. They grasped for a moniker.

The network of networks was expanding exponentially in every direction, with websites stacking up data everywhere. The informational jumble was messier than a teenager’s bedroom floor.

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Abstract

In 2015, the FCC established the Citizens Broadband Radio Service (CBRS) for sharing the 3.5 GHz Band (3550-3700 MHz) among federal and non-federal users in the United States. This rulemaking created an experiment in a novel three-tier rights structure: strong protections for incumbents, including government radar systems; Priority Access Licenses (PALs) granting exclusive rights to high bidders in an FCC auction, in part of the band and subject to avoiding interference with incumbents; and Generalized Authorized Access (GAA) for unlicensed users, subject to avoiding interference with both PALs and incumbents. The first commercial deployments in this band were approved in 2019 for GAA devices, and an auction of PALs completed in 2020 generated $4.5 billion in revenues.

It is now timely to evaluate this experiment and glean lessons for applications to other spectrum bands, such as the neighboring 3.1-3.45 GHz band or portions of the upper mid-band spectrum 7-24 GHz. In fact, a number of perspectives on CBRS have been recently published. In this paper we review these developments and suggest related policy questions that should be considered when evaluating the use of CBRS-style allocation rules in future bands.

The CBRS policy involves several different innovations, seeking to accomplish multiple objectives. One can evaluate this approach from a technical point of view, as an experiment to show that dynamic sharing can provide multiple tiers of commercial access to a band of spectrum while protecting incumbent users. The approach involves coordinated access via a cloud-based Spectrum Access System (SAS) and an Environmental Sensing Capability (ESC) to monitor incumbent users of the band, with requirements standardized through the Wireless Innovation Forum (WInnForum) and implementations certified by the FCC. From an economic and policy point of view, this type of dynamic sharing is asserted to reduce the costs and delays involved in making additional spectrum available for commercial use, as it seeks to avoid relocating incumbents. Of course, costs and benefits should be observed, not simply assumed, and the process undertaken should be compared to those associated with the relevant policy alternatives.

CBRS adopted the PAL and GAA tiers for commercial access in an attempt to provide spectrum that could not only support deployments by traditional wireless providers, but also enable new uses of the spectrum by non-traditional entities. How well the spectrum can support these uses, and whether this type of approach leads to an economically efficient mix of uses, provides another economic and policy lens through which this system can be evaluated. This paper explores the technical implementation of the CBRS spectrum sharing approach, and then attempts to appraise the economic welfare results of the novel allocation policy.

Abstract

The battle over rules governing 5.9 GHz airwaves offers important lessons in both the creation of property rights and applied public choice. Set aside in 1999, the 75 MHz “Car Band” band was designated by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to support emerging vehicle telematics and computerized driving. Transportation regulators and automakers, including General Motors, Ford, and BMW, claimed this would efficiently promote road safety, fuel savings, and collision avoidance, as dedicated bandwidth would operate under a “spectrum commons” regime designed to favor such applications. While anticipated services gradually developed, the 5.9 GHz band did not. Spectrum inputs outside the “Car Band” accommodated driving applications, while the general development of wireless networks shifted social priorities. Eventually, Internet services companies such as Comcast, Google and Microsoft claimed the 75 MHz allocation was wastefully large and that switching access rules to favor WiFi would generate net benefits. Suggested for possible reallocation by the U.S. Department of Commerce since 2012, the FCC issued an order in 2020 to split the baby: 45 MHz of the band would be shifted to Wi-Fi, with 30 MHz remaining dedicated for Intelligent Transportation Systems. The FCC’s 2020 “Cost Benefit Analysis” purports to quantify the trade-offs involved, but upon scrutiny fails to plausibly value Wi-Fi services or to even consider the relevant opportunity costs. The costly, delay-intensive and ad hoc policy process (whose costs are additionally ignored by the FCC) begs for further development of auction mechanisms to rationalize alternative rights assignments.

United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit

STATE OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
FACEBOOK, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
No. 1:20-cv-03589-JEB (Hon. James E. Boasberg)

BRIEF OF INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR
LAW AND ECONOMICS AND SCHOLARS OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE FACEBOOK, INC. AND AFFIRMANCE

STATEMENT OF THE AMICUS CURIAE

Amici are leading scholars of economics, telecommunications, and/or antitrust. Their scholarship reflects years of experience and publications in these fields.

Amici’s expertise and academic perspectives will aid the Court in deciding whether to affirm in three respects. First, amici provide an explanation of key economic concepts underpinning how economists understand the welfare effects of a monopolist’s refusal to deal voluntarily with a competitor and why that supports affirmance here. Second, amici offer their perspective on the limited circumstances that might justify penalizing a monopolist’s unilateral refusal to deal—and why this case is not one of them. Third, amici explain why the District Court’s legal framework was correct and why a clear standard is necessary when analyzing alleged refusals to deal.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This brief addresses the broad consensus in the academic literature disfavoring a theory underlying plaintiff’s case—“unilateral refusal to deal” doctrine. The States allege that Facebook restricted access to an input (Facebook’s Platform) in order to prevent third parties from using that access to export Facebook data to competitors or compete directly with Facebook. But a unilateral refusal to deal involves more than an allegation that a monopolist refuses to enter into a business relationship with a rival.

Mainstream economists and competition law scholars are skeptical of imposing liability, even on a monopolist, based solely on its choice of business partners. The freedom of firms to choose their business partners is a fundamental tenet of the free market economy, and the mechanism by which markets produce the greatest welfare gains. Thus, cases compelling business dealings should be confined to particularly delineated circumstances.

In Part I below, amici describe why it is generally inefficient for courts to compel economic actors to deal with one another. Such “solutions” are generally unsound in theory and unworkable in practice, in that they ask judges to operate as regulators over the defendant’s business.

In Part II, amici explain why Aspen Skiing—the Supreme Court’s most prominent precedent permitting liability for a monopolist’s unilateral refusal to deal—went too far and should not be expanded as the States’ and some of their amici propose.

In Part III, amici explain that the District Court correctly held that the conduct at issue here does not constitute a refusal to deal under Aspen Skiing. A unilateral refusal to deal should trigger antitrust liability only where a monopolist turns down more profitable dealings with a competitor in an effort to drive that competitor’s exit or to disable its ability to compete, thereby allowing the monopolist to recoup its losses by increasing prices in the future. But the States’ allegations do not describe that scenario.

In Part IV, amici address that the District Court properly considered and dismissed the States’ “conditional dealing” argument. The States’ allegations are correctly addressed under the rubric of a refusal to deal—not exclusive dealing or otherwise. The States’ desire to mold their allegations into different legal theories highlights why courts should use a strict, clear standard to analyze refusals to deal.

Read the full brief here.