Spotlight

May 2026

HIGHLIGHTS

The View from Singapore: A TOTM Q&A with Alvin Koh

Our latest guest in Truth on the Market’s “Global Voices Forum” series is Alvin Koh, chief executive of the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore . . .

Our latest guest in Truth on the Market’s “Global Voices Forum” series is Alvin Koh, chief executive of the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore (CCS). We discuss CCS’s enforcement priorities, recent antitrust developments, and its evolving approach to digital markets and artificial intelligence. We also explore Singapore’s regulatory strategy, views on the European Union’s Digital Markets Act, and the role of competition policy in supporting broader economic growth.

Acquihires and Antitrust: When Buying the Team Isn’t Buying the Company

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has trained its sights on one of Silicon Valley’s most familiar deal structures: the “acquihire.” In a Bloomberg podcast interview, . . .

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has trained its sights on one of Silicon Valley’s most familiar deal structures: the “acquihire.” In a Bloomberg podcast interview, FTC Chair Andrew Ferguson said the agency plans to scrutinize how acquihires are structured—looking for features that could bring them within merger law and trigger Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (HSR) reporting thresholds. The acting head of the U.S. Justice Department’s (DOJ) Antitrust Division, Omar Assefi, went further, calling acquihires a “red flag” designed to sidestep merger review.

Others share that concern. U.S. Sens. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) recently urged the antitrust agencies to investigate so-called “reverse acquihires,” which they argue evade scrutiny and “risk further consolidating the Big Tech industry.”

Skepticism about regulatory arbitrage makes sense. But in the case of acquihires—and related license-and-hire agreements, where firms license a target’s technology while hiring its staff—the concern looks misplaced. Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 1 of the Sherman Act target conduct with meaningful competitive effects. Acquihires rarely clear that bar. They center on talent transfers, which makes their structural impact too fleeting for Section 7 and their competitive harms too speculative for Section 1. As a result, most fall outside enforcement.

That gap reflects design, not defect. When agencies face novel conduct, uncertain harms, and resource-intensive enforcement, the better course often is restraint. Acquihires can serve legitimate ends: enabling entrepreneurial exit, preserving labor mobility, and protecting professional reputations in the tech ecosystem. Treating them as presumptively suspect risks destroying real economic value. It also invites agencies to spend scarce resources on cases that current law is unlikely to support.

This piece proceeds from that premise. Acquihires differ from transactions typically policed by antitrust law because they involve the transfer of talent. That distinction carries important implications, especially in startup ecosystems where such deals play a central role. For now, there is little reason to rethink a doctrine that largely treats them as benign.

Read the full piece here.

ICLE Comments on California SB 1074

On behalf of the International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE), a nonprofit, nonpartisan research group focused on rigorous economic analysis of law and policy, . . .

On behalf of the International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE), a nonprofit, nonpartisan research group focused on rigorous economic analysis of law and policy, we write to express concerns about SB 1074.

SB 1074 rests on a fundamental analytic error: it conflates harm to specific competitors with harm to consumers and the competitive process. The bill adopts a regulatory approach that risks privileging less efficient firms through rent-seeking—using regulation to secure advantages unavailable through market performance—rather than promoting consumer welfare.

Protecting Competition, Not Competitors

Antitrust law protects competition and consumers—not individual competitors. SB 1074 would prohibit certain platform operators from engaging in “self-preferencing,” a broad category that includes many forms of vertical integration that may advantage a firm’s own products or services.

Supporters of the bill argue that such restrictions will help startups and small businesses compete.[1] The economic literature does not support that claim.

When platforms integrate features—such as displaying maps in search results or highlighting fulfillment options—they may displace standalone competitors. This dynamic resembles a retailer allocating shelf space to its own private-label goods. Some rivals lose prominence as a result.

That outcome reflects competition, not necessarily exclusionary conduct.[2] Integrated features often reduce search costs, lower transaction risks, and improve user experience. Removing these features may benefit certain competitors, but only by eliminating options consumers prefer.

The Evidence on Vertical Integration

SB 1074 rests on the premise that self-preferencing and vertical integration are inherently anticompetitive. The empirical literature does not support that premise.

A comprehensive meta-analysis by Francine Lafontaine and Margaret Slade finds that profit-maximizing vertical-integration decisions are generally efficient and benefit consumers.[3] More broadly, economic analysis distinguishes between exclusionary conduct—which requires durable market power, meaningful foreclosure, and evidence of consumer harm—and legitimate business practices that improve products.

Common forms of vertical integration eliminate double marginalization, strengthen quality control, reduce search costs, and enhance ecosystem security.[4] The literature consistently emphasizes that the competitive effects of self-preferencing depend on context:

“self-preferencing by dual-role platforms is not necessarily detrimental…, [and t]he effectiveness of policy interventions… depends largely on the type of self-preferencing and the specific environment of the market in question.”[5]

“While none of the studies has documented harmful effects on platform users, there is mixed evidence on whether platform?owner entry is harmful for complementors.”[6]

“there does not seem to be a single prescription that policymakers can follow in regulating platform?owner entry.”[7]

Empirical studies of digital platforms reinforce these findings. Zhuoxin Li and Ashish Agarwal find that Facebook’s integration of Instagram increased demand across photography applications.[8] Jens Foerderer, Thomas Kude, Sunil Mithas, and Armin Heinzl find that Google’s entry into Android photography apps increased user attention, benefiting independent developers.[9]

Evidence from e-commerce points in the same direction. In a field experiment, Chiara Farronato, Andrey Fradkin, and Alexander MacKay simulate the removal of Amazon private-label products.[10] Consumer surplus falls by 5.5%, driven largely by reduced product variety. Efforts to adjust rankings or visibility produce no offsetting gains.

Theoretical work aligns with these results. Yusuke Zennyo finds that restrictions on platform integration can discourage marketplace expansion, increase commissions, and raise prices for both consumers and third-party sellers.[11]

Taken together, this evidence does not support a categorical presumption against self-preferencing. It instead underscores the need for context-specific analysis.

A Presumption Against Integration Risks Overenforcement

SB 1074 adopts a blanket presumption that covered conduct is unlawful unless a platform can prove otherwise. It requires firms to show that challenged conduct is “narrowly tailored, nonpretextual, and reasonably necessary” to achieve a procompetitive objective.

This burden-shifting framework increases the risk of overenforcement. Even conduct that enhances welfare may be deterred if firms face uncertain and costly litigation. The presumption of illegality also creates incentives for opportunistic claims by competitors.

The result is not just legal uncertainty, but predictable changes in firm behavior.

Incentives to Reduce Product Quality and Innovation

Faced with elevated litigation risk, firms will adjust their conduct. Platforms are likely to avoid integrating features, scale back quality-assurance mechanisms, and limit closed-ecosystem security controls to reduce exposure.

Over time, curated and reliable systems may give way to more open—but less managed—environments. Yet consumers often prefer platforms that reduce the risks of interacting with unknown third parties.

By discouraging integration and product improvement, SB 1074 risks degrading service quality and reducing consumer welfare.

Arbitrary Thresholds and Departure from Neutral Principles

SB 1074 applies only to firms that meet specific thresholds, including $1 trillion in market capitalization and 100 million U.S. monthly active users. These criteria target a small number of firms without grounding in neutral legal principles.

This approach subjects identical conduct to different legal standards based solely on firm size and invites strategic behavior.

The California Law Revision Commission reached a different conclusion after a multi-year review. It found that exclusionary conduct can arise in any industry and advised that any reform should apply across sectors.[12] It also declined to recommend abuse-of-dominance provisions, citing concerns about vague and arbitrary thresholds.[13]

SB 1074 departs from that guidance and adopts the type of industry-specific approach the Commission rejected.

Data-Portability Mandates and Risks to Privacy and Security

SB 1074 would require expanded data portability and limit platforms’ ability to restrict third-party access. Although framed as promoting competition, these provisions introduce significant tradeoffs.

Data-sharing and interoperability mandates increase technical complexity, require costly redesign, and create new security vulnerabilities.[14] In multi-sided platform environments, firms design systems to balance functionality, trust, and safety. Forced data sharing can disrupt those systems.

These requirements may push platforms toward more open architectures. But curated ecosystems often exist to screen participants, prevent abuse, and enforce quality standards. Mandated access can weaken those safeguards by requiring interaction with third parties whose reliability cannot be assured.

These risks are not theoretical. The Cambridge Analytica incident arose from broad third-party access to platform data—an arrangement similar to what these provisions would require.[15]

More broadly, these rules reflect a regulatory mismatch. Policies designed for simpler markets do not map cleanly onto complex digital ecosystems, where data, security, and product design are tightly integrated.

By requiring platforms to expose internal systems and data, SB 1074 risks reducing product quality, increasing security vulnerabilities, and weakening consumer trust.

[1] Press Release, Sen. Scott Wiener, Senator Wiener Announces Landmark Legislation to Crack Down on Big Tech’s Anticompetitive Behavior (Mar. 18, 2026), https://sd11.senate.ca.gov/news/senator-wiener-announces-landmark-legislation-crack-down-big-techs-anticompetitive-behavior.

[2] See The Case for Self-Preferencing, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. (last updated Apr. 25, 2024), https://laweconcenter.org/spotlights/self-preferencing.

[3] Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence, 45 J. Econ. Literature 629 (2007) (“[O]verall a fairly clear empirical picture emerges. The data appear to be telling us that efficiency considerations overwhelm anticompetitive motives in most contexts. Furthermore, even when we limit attention to natural monopolies or tight oligopolies, the evidence of anticompetitive harm is not strong.”); see also Geoffrey A. Manne, Kristian Stout & Eric Fruits, The Fatal Economic Flaws of the Contemporary Campaign Against Vertical Integration, 68 Kan. L. Rev. 923 (2020).

[4] See, e.g., Michael Salinger, Self-Preferencing, in The Global Antitrust Institute Report on the Digital Economy 329, 333 (Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg eds., 2020), https://gaidigitalreport.com/2020/08/25/self-preferencing; Geoffrey A. Manne, Against the Vertical Discrimination Presumption, Concurrences, No. 2 (May 2020).

[5] Yuta Kittaka, Susumu Sato & Yusuke Zennyo, Self-Preferencing by Platforms: A Literature Review, 66 Japan & the World Econ. 101191, 8 (2023).

[6] Feng Zhu, Friends or Foes? Examining Platform Owners’ Entry into Complementors’ Spaces, 28 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strat. 23, 27 (2019).

[7] Id.

[8] Zhuoxin Li & Ashish Agarwal, Platform Integration and Demand Spillovers in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Facebook’s Integration of Instagram, 63 Mgmt. Sci. 3438 (2017).

[9] Jens Foerderer, Thomas Kude, Sunil Mithas & Armin Heinzl, Does Platform Owner’s Entry Crowd Out Innovation? Evidence from Google Photos, 29 Info. Sys. Res. 444 (2018).

[10] Chiara Farronato, Andrey Fradkin & Alexander MacKay, Vertical Integration and Consumer Choice: Evidence from a Field Experiment (Working Paper, Mar. 2026), https://alexandermackay.org/files/Vertical%20Integration%20and%20Consumer%20Choice%20-%20Evidence%20from%20a%20Field%20Experiment.pdf.

[11] Yusuke Zennyo, Platform Encroachment and Own-Content Bias, 70 J. Indus. Econ. 684, 705 (2022).

[12] Cal. L. Revision Comm’n, Antitrust Law: Single Firm Conduct, Tentative Recommendation No. B-750 (Dec. 2025), https://clrc.ca.gov/pub/Misc-Report/TR-B750.pdf (“The Commission concluded that exclusionary practices by dominant companies in every industry have the capacity to harm competition, so any new law should not single out individual sectors but apply to all.”).

[13] Id. (“The Commission received numerous public comments opposing adoption of an abuse-of-dominance provision in California law. The Commission declined to craft separate rules for dominant firms, citing concerns about vague and potentially arbitrary thresholds for substantial market power, the use of differing conduct standards, and prior unsuccessful efforts in the United States to adopt this approach.”).

[14] See, e.g., Miko?aj Barczentewicz, GDPR Reform: What Should It Achieve, EU Tech Reg (Apr. 1, 2025), https://eutechreg.com/p/gdpr-reform-what-should-it-achieve (noting that the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in Europe and various state privacy laws in the United States create obligations that may conflict with mandated data-sharing or access requirements).

[15] See, e.g., Kristian Stout & Ben Sperry, Comments of the International Center for Law & Economics re: Proposed Rule 15 CSR 60-19.020 Prohibition on Restricting Choice of Content Moderator, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. (July 14, 2025), https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/ICLE-MO-Moderator-Choice-Rule.pdf (noting that Missouri’s proposed rule would “create systematic privacy and security vulnerabilities by mandating an architecture functionally identical to systems that enabled major data breaches, including Cambridge Analytica. The requirement for broad API access to third-party moderators multiplies attack surfaces, ignores the ‘other people’s data’ problem—where individual user choices expose nonconsenting network connections to unknown third parties—and fragments responsibility for protecting vulnerable populations across an ecosystem of unvetted entities”).

Digital Overreach: A Premature Turn to Ex Ante Regulation in Brazil

A Portuguese language version of this white paper is available here.  Executive Summary On September 18, 2025, the Brazilian government submitted Bill 4,675/2025 to the . . .

A Portuguese language version of this white paper is available here

Executive Summary

On September 18, 2025, the Brazilian government submitted Bill 4,675/2025 to the House of Representatives as part of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s “Digital Brazil Agenda.” The bill would amend Brazil’s Competition Law (Lei No. 12,529/2011) to create a new Digital Markets Superintendency (SMD) within the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE), empower it to designate firms of “systemic relevance in digital markets” for up to 10 years, and impose “special obligations” drawn from a non-exhaustive statutory menu. These include prohibitions on self-preferencing, interoperability mandates, data portability requirements, mandatory merger notification regardless of existing thresholds, and broad business-user data access rights.

This paper argues that the bill is neither necessary under the current framework of Brazilian Competition Law (BCL) nor supported by compelling evidence from the antitrust literature. If enacted, it would require substantial modification to reduce its legal, economic, and institutional risks.

A.       Overarching Findings

Three findings anchor this conclusion.

  1. Existing competition law already achieves the bill’s stated objectives. CADE’s December 2025 settlements with Apple and Google demonstrate that case-by-case enforcement through traditional Termos de Compromisso de Cessação (TCCs) already produces the outcomes the bill seeks to impose through ex ante These settlements were tailored to specific market conditions and allowed security-sensitive balancing that rigid rules cannot replicate. Despite CADE’s active oversight of digital markets, there remains no adjudicated finding of infringement under the BCL concerning the types of conduct the bill would regulate, weakening the evidentiary case for a sweeping new regime.
  2. European evidence counsels caution. Emerging empirical evidence from the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) suggests that regulatory obligations have harmed consumers, failed to shift market dynamics, and chilled innovation without delivering on contestability promises. Studies document measurable welfare losses. DMA-mandated changes to Google Maps increased search queries by 21% without increasing traffic to competing services. Chiara Farronato, Andrey Fradkin, and Alexander MacKay find that removing Amazon’s private-label products would reduce consumer surplus by 5.5%. Other evidence shows that Amazon’s post-DMA search results display fewer products (an 18% decline) and fewer sellers per product (a 7% decline). Consumer surveys report increased friction in routine online tasks, while 80% of respondents had no awareness of the DMA. Innovation costs are also significant. Apple, Meta, and Google have delayed European product launches due to compliance requirements, creating an “innovation tax” on consumers in regulated jurisdictions. At the macro level, Mario Draghi’s 2024 report finds that Europe’s productivity gap with the United States is largely explained by the technology sector and identifies excessive regulation as a key contributing factor.
  1. Brazil’s institutional constraints amplify the risks. Brazil ranks 78th of 143 countries on the Rule of Law Index and 124th on ease of doing business, increasing the risks associated with broad regulatory discretion. The country already faces the “Brazil Cost,” estimated at approximately R$1.7 trillion annually (roughly 19.5% of GDP), and ranks among the most restrictive jurisdictions in OECD product-market regulation indicators. The bill also carries geopolitical risk. As the United States increasingly frames foreign digital regulation as discriminatory toward U.S. firms, adopting a DMA-style regime may expose Brazil to policy responses that lawmakers have not fully considered.

B.        Summary of Recommendations

The paper offers three tiers of recommendations, together with targeted revisions to the bill’s most problematic provisions.

1.       Tier 1: Forgo Ex Ante Regulation; Strengthen Existing Enforcement

The preferred approach is to forgo ex ante regulation and instead strengthen CADE’s existing enforcement toolkit through additional resources, streamlined procedures, and targeted market studies and sector inquiries. Brazil should allow more evidence to accumulate from jurisdictions that moved first before imposing untested regulatory burdens.

Alternative models demonstrate that broad regulation is not the only option. Japan’s Mobile Software Competition Act, effective December 2025, adopts a narrower approach focused on smartphone software ecosystems, incorporates objective-justification defenses tied to cybersecurity and system stability, does not require web-based sideloading, and explicitly protects device security and user information. A targeted model of this kind is more likely to achieve policy objectives without the collateral costs of a comprehensive regime.

2.       Tier 2: If Ex Ante Regulation Proceeds, Impose Substantial Guardrails

The bill raises five principal concerns. The following modifications would mitigate its most significant risks:

a)         Objectives and Limiting Principles (Art. 47-B)

The bill’s objectives—reducing entry barriers, protecting the competitive process, and promoting freedom of choice—lack a consumer-welfare anchor and risk justifying intervention that protects competitors rather than consumers.

Recommendations:

  • Enshrine consumer welfare as the regime’s explicit limiting principle.
  • Retain the three objectives only as indicators of potential harm, not as independent bases for enforcement.
b)         Designation Test (Art. 47-C; Art. 87-A)

The designation framework conflates market reach with market power and relies on structural proxies that risk capturing firms whose size reflects competitive success.

Recommendations:

  • Require demonstrated, durable market power as a prerequisite for designation.
  • Replace “systemic relevance” with “substantial market power” or “competitive significance.”
  • Apply designation to specific services, not entire corporate groups.
  • Shorten the designation period to three to five years, with mandatory periodic review.
  • Remove counterproductive factors, such as “multiple digital products or services.”
  • Incorporate indicators of actual competitive constraints, including potential competition and technological disruption.
c)         Institutional Design (Arts. 14-A, 14-B)

The creation of a second superintendency risks fragmentation, overlap, and inconsistent enforcement.

Recommendations:

  • House the digital-markets function within the existing General Superintendence.
  • Introduce complaint-screening mechanisms to deter strategic filings.
  • Clarify regulatory responsibilities through statutory provisions.
  • Address resource constraints explicitly.
d)         Prohibited and Mandated Practices (Art. 47-E)

The bill’s per se prohibitions and mandates risk condemning procompetitive conduct and creating tensions with security, privacy, and investment incentives.

Recommendations:

  • Recognize that self-preferencing, vertical integration, and related practices can be procompetitive.
  • Replace vague categories such as “predatory or abusive strategies” with effects-based standards.
  • Introduce structured defenses based on security, privacy, fraud prevention, and trade-secret protection.
  • Require proportionality assessments and mandatory CADE-ANPD coordination.
  • Remove the blanket merger-notification requirement or replace it with a targeted call-in mechanism.
e)         Defenses (Art. 47-E, §2; Art. 87-B, §1; Art. 87-G)

The absence of an efficiencies defense creates a fundamental inconsistency with the BCL.

Recommendations:

  • Adopt a meaningful efficiencies defense aligned with Articles 36, § 1 and 88, § 6 of the BCL.
  • Replace “may consider” with “shall consider.”
  • Define “economic justification” as requiring proportionality, net consumer benefit, and least-restrictive means, and make it judicially reviewable.
  • Require reasoned economic analysis in Tribunal decisions..

3.       Tier 3: At a Minimum, Require a Regulatory Impact Assessment

At a minimum, the bill should undergo a rigorous Regulatory Impact Assessment prior to enactment. Brazil’s Economic Freedom Act (Lei No. 13,874/2019) already imposes such requirements on regulatory agencies, and Congress should apply the same standard to legislation of this magnitude. The European Commission conducted such an assessment before adopting the DMA; no equivalent preceded Bill 4,675/2025.

C.       Final Observation

Brazil has the opportunity to learn from, rather than replicate, the experience of jurisdictions that moved first. The available evidence suggests that the costs of ex ante digital regulation are real and measurable, while its benefits remain uncertain. Strengthening existing competition-law tools, investing in institutional capacity, and maintaining regulatory humility offer a more promising path for promoting consumer welfare and innovation.

I.          Introduction

On September 18, 2025, the Brazilian government submitted Bill 4,675/2025 to the House of Representatives as part of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s “Digital Brazil Agenda.”[1] The bill would amend Brazil’s Competition Law (BCL)[2] to create a new Digital Markets Superintendency (Superintendência de Mercados Digitais, or SMD) within the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE). It would empower the SMD to designate firms of “systemic relevance in digital markets” (relevância sistêmica em mercados digitais) for up to 10 years and impose “special obligations.” These obligations may include prohibitions on self-preferencing, interoperability mandates, data-portability requirements, mandatory merger notification regardless of existing thresholds, and broad business-user data-access rights.[3]

This paper argues that the bill is neither necessary under the current BCL framework nor supported by compelling, undisputed evidence from the antitrust literature.[4] Three findings anchor this conclusion.

First, CADE’s December 2025 settlement with Apple shows that existing Brazilian competition law already can achieve the outcomes the bill seeks to mandate. Through case-by-case enforcement, CADE secured tailored, security-sensitive remedies—including the allowance of third-party app stores, alternative payment systems, and the removal of anti-steering restrictions—without resorting to ex ante regulation.[5]

Second, a growing body of empirical evidence, particularly from the European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA), suggests that at least some digital regulatory obligations have harmed consumers, failed to shift market dynamics, and chilled innovation, without delivering on promised gains in contestability.

Third, Brazil’s institutional constraints heighten the risks of broad regulatory discretion. Brazil ranks 78th of 143 countries on rule of law[6] and 124th on ease of doing business.[7] These conditions make expansive, discretionary regulation more likely to generate error costs than in the jurisdictions the bill seeks to emulate.[8]

The paper proceeds in two parts. Section II situates the bill in its Brazilian and international context and presents the affirmative case that ex ante regulation is unnecessary—or, at minimum, untested and premature. Section III offers a systematic critique of the bill’s core provisions, including its institutional design, prohibitions, and mandates.

The paper concludes with tiered recommendations. First, it proposes strengthening CADE’s existing enforcement toolkit. Second, it outlines guardrails to mitigate risks if ex ante regulation proceeds. Third, it recommends a minimum requirement of a rigorous regulatory-impact assessment.

II.      The Case Against Ex Ante Regulation in Brazil

The case for Bill 4,675/2025 rests on two implicit premises: first, that digital markets in Brazil exhibit competition problems that existing law cannot adequately address; and second, that the ex ante regulatory model developed abroad has proven sufficiently effective to justify adoption in Brazil. Neither premise withstands scrutiny.

This section evaluates those assumptions from four complementary angles.

Section II.A situates the bill within the broader global shift toward ex ante digital-market regulation. It shows that, despite frequent claims to the contrary, there is no settled international consensus on either the necessity or the design of such regimes.

Section II.B turns to Brazil’s own experience. It examines CADE’s recent enforcement actions—particularly the Apple and Google settlements—and shows that existing Brazilian competition law already can deliver the same types of outcomes the bill seeks to mandate, without imposing additional regulatory burdens.

Section II.C then assesses the growing empirical record from the European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA). The available evidence suggests that ex ante obligations have, in some cases, increased consumer costs, failed to shift competitive dynamics, and introduced frictions without delivering measurable gains in contestability.

Section II.D explains why these risks are amplified in Brazil. The country’s institutional constraints, existing regulatory burdens, opportunity costs, and geopolitical exposure make the adoption of a discretionary, design-based regulatory regime particularly hazardous.

Taken together, these considerations undermine the bill’s core justification. They show not only that Brazil lacks a demonstrated need for ex ante intervention, but also that the model it seeks to emulate carries significant and well-documented risks.

A.       The Rise of Ex Ante Digital Regulation—and Its Limits

Over the past decade, a series of influential policy reports argued that traditional antitrust enforcement struggles to address fast-moving digital markets. The most prominent—the European Commission’s Competition Policy for the Digital Era (the “Cremer Report”), the United Kingdom’s Unlocking Digital Competition (the “Furman Report”), and the Stigler Center’s study of digital platforms—converged on a shared diagnosis. They contended that network effects, data advantages, and tipping dynamics create structural barriers that ex post enforcement cannot remedy in a timely manner.[9] Filippo Lancieri and Patricia Sakowski later synthesized these reports, documenting the extent to which they rely on a common intellectual framework that treats digital markets as structurally prone to entrenchment.[10]

This intellectual convergence helped catalyze a wave of legislative initiatives, including Germany’s Section 19a of the GWB (2021), the European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) (2022), and the United Kingdom’s Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act (DMCC) (2024).[11]

Supporters often portray this shift as reflecting a broad international consensus. That claim overstates the degree of agreement. As Lazar Radic explains in his analysis of the “imaginary antitrust consensus,” no consensus exists on three foundational premises: whether digital markets are inherently more prone to anticompetitive conduct, whether ex ante rules are necessary to address any such risks, or—among proponents—what an optimal regulatory framework should look like.[12] Outside the European Union, adoption of DMA-style regimes remains limited, particularly in the United States.[13]

Herbert Hovenkamp offers a related critique. He argues that antitrust’s firm-specific approach remains better suited to digital markets precisely because platforms differ in inputs, products, customer relationships, and third-party interactions. Broad ex ante rules, by contrast, risk misfiring in heterogeneous markets.[14]

To the extent a common purpose emerges from these regimes, it may not center on consumer protection. Critics argue that measures like the DMA instead aim to “level down” large firms and redistribute rents to politically favored rivals, rather than address demonstrable structural harms.[15]

Brazil’s engagement with this debate has followed a winding path. Its first major proposal, Bill 2,768/2022, combined the DMA’s rigid regulatory structure with the rhetoric of the U.S. “New Brandeis” movement, citing both the European model and the work of Lina Khan and Tim Wu.[16] That bill stalled in committee.

In January 2024, the Ministry of Finance’s Secretariat of Economic Reforms launched a public consultation on digital platform regulation, receiving 298 submissions from 72 participants.[17] The Ministry’s post-consultation report, published in October 2024, rejected the DMA’s blanket prohibitions.[18] Instead, it proposed a flexible “hybrid” model that would allow CADE to designate systemically relevant platforms and impose tailored obligations following a detailed, case-specific investigation of each firm’s business model.

That report underpins Bill 4,675/2025. Even so, it rests on questionable premises—particularly the assumption that digital markets tend toward “winner-take-all” outcomes.[19] Empirical evidence shows that tipping and entrenchment are not universal features of platform markets.[20] They must be demonstrated, not presumed.

Against a backdrop of unrelated concerns about children’s online safety, the executive branch unveiled its “Digital Brazil Agenda” on September 17, 2025, and submitted Bill 4,675/2025 the following day.[21] As noted above, the bill would amend Brazil’s Competition Law to create a digital-markets regulatory apparatus within CADE. It would establish a Superintendência de Mercados Digitais (SMD) empowered to designate firms of “systemic relevance” and impose “special obligations” drawn from a non-exhaustive statutory menu.

Mimicking foreign regimes, even if that is the goal, does not establish the existence of market failures in Brazil’s digital economy. The Ministry’s consultation record reveals sharply divided stakeholder views. Some observers—including the Coalition for App Fairness, Mercado Livre, and Match Group—argued that existing enforcement is insufficient. Others—including Amazon Brazil, Google, CCIA, camara-e.net, academic groups, and think tanks such as the Legal Grounds Institute, the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), the Global Antitrust Institute (GAI), and TechFreedom—countered that current antitrust tools are flexible enough to address digital markets without incurring the innovation costs of ex ante regulation.[22]

The bill also reflects broader global tensions surrounding these regimes. Its Explanatory Memorandum (Exposição de Motivos Interministerial, or EMI) claims the proposal is tailored to Brazilian conditions.[23] At the same time, it asserts that the law would place Brazil “at the vanguard” (na vanguarda) of digital-platform regulation alongside Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom.[24] This aspiration to regulatory leadership sits uneasily with the claim that the bill reflects a cautious, evidence-based response to domestic conditions.

Ultimately, the burden rests on proponents to demonstrate a Brazil-specific problem that only an ex ante regime can solve. As the next section shows, the available evidence points in the opposite direction.

B.        Existing Brazilian Competition Law Is Sufficient

The strongest argument against Bill 4,675/2025 is empirical, not theoretical. Brazil’s existing competition-law framework has already demonstrated its ability to achieve the bill’s stated objectives.

In December 2025, CADE reached a landmark settlement with Apple through a Termo de Compromisso de Cessação (TCC). The agreement requires Apple to permit third-party app stores on iOS, enable alternative payment processors, remove anti-steering restrictions that prevented developers from informing users about lower-priced alternatives, and adopt neutral language in its communications about these changes.[25] Apple was required implement these measures within 105 days under a three-year agreement.

CADE secured a parallel outcome in the Android ecosystem. That same month, it finalized another sweeping TCC with Google.[26] The agreement prohibits Google from conditioning Google Play Store licensing on the preinstallation or preferential placement of proprietary apps such as Google Search and Google Chrome. It also bars Google from tying revenue-sharing payments to device manufacturers and network operators to the exclusion of rival search services. Google had to notify its partners of these changes and renounce incompatible exclusivity provisions within 45 days, also under a three-year agreement.

These settlements deliver the same types of outcomes that Bill 4,675/2025 would impose through its menu of “special obligations.” CADE achieved them through existing law, with several advantages over an ex ante regime.

First, the remedies were tailored to the specific facts and competitive dynamics of each case. In the Apple matter, for example, the company resisted a direct sideloading mandate on legitimate security and privacy grounds, yet still implemented substantial ecosystem changes. Case-by-case enforcement thus permits the kind of nuanced, security-sensitive balancing that rigid ex ante rules may not replicate.[27]

Second, the settlements produced concrete, enforceable commitments with clear timelines. By contrast, ex ante regimes often generate open-ended obligations that evolve through ongoing negotiation. As Europe’s experience with the DMA illustrates, such frameworks can devolve into moving targets and perpetual compliance disputes, where “conflicts of interest will be deemed resolved only when competitors are satisfied”—an inherently unstable equilibrium disconnected from consumer welfare.[28]

Given their sweeping effects, ex ante digital-market rules should be adopted only after a clear, market-wide showing that Brazil faces systemic failures that ex post enforcement cannot adequately address. In legal terms, that showing would ordinarily rest on a sufficiently developed body of case law justifying such far-reaching intervention. That condition has not been met.[29]

To be sure, the Apple and Google cases demonstrate that CADE is actively engaged in digital markets. They show sustained attention and an ability to deliver meaningful outcomes.[30] But those outcomes were achieved through negotiated settlements, not adjudicated decisions on the merits. As a result, no infringement findings exist under Brazilian competition law in digital markets for the types of conduct that an ex ante regime would regulate.

That distinction matters. Settlements may replicate the practical effects of liability findings, but they do not establish legal precedent. The absence of adjudicated violations weakens the case for expanding Brazilian competition law into a rigid ex ante framework.

Brazil thus lacks a sufficiently developed domestic evidentiary record to justify such a regime. The recent settlements reinforce this point: they show not that current law is inadequate, but that it is capable of addressing alleged concerns through targeted enforcement. An ex ante framework would become more plausible only if experience under existing law produced a robust record demonstrating persistent enforcement failures.

CADE’s own market study underscores this gap. The Cadernos do Cade: Mercados de Plataformas Digitais reflects both the agency’s technical sophistication and the limits of its enforcement record.[31] On one hand, the study documents CADE’s growing expertise across platform markets. On the other, it confirms that past investigations have resulted in settlements or dismissals, not infringement findings.[32]

This absence of convictions does not signal institutional weakness. To the contrary, CADE remains one of the world’s most respected competition authorities. The OECD’s 2019 peer review described Brazil’s regime as “largely a success” and praised CADE’s “technical capabilities.”[33] The agency continues to demonstrate proactive enforcement. In 2024, for example, it opened investigations into acquisitions of AI startups by large technology firms below standard merger-notification thresholds, using existing tools to address emerging concerns.[34]

Proponents of the bill raise two principal counterarguments. First, some note that CADE’s Google Shopping case ended in a tie vote, resolved by the president’s casting vote, and that digital investigations can take five to seven years.[35] These concerns are real. But they do not justify creating an entirely new regulatory apparatus. The Apple and Google settlements show that CADE’s toolkit has bite.[36] If enforcement speed is the issue, the appropriate response is to allocate more resources and streamline procedures—not to build a parallel regulatory regime with its own institutional costs. Europe’s DMA experience has produced the very problems it sought to avoid: lengthy proceedings, protracted compliance negotiations, and parallel antitrust investigations.[37]

Second, supporters point out that CADE itself has endorsed the idea of ex ante regulation. In its submission to the Ministry of Finance’s consultation,[38] the agency supported a complementary framework to address “dysfunctions in digital ecosystems, such as functional and distributive failures.”[39] At the same time, CADE emphasized the need to better understand the heterogeneity of digital markets[40] and highlighted the importance of a rigorous regulatory-impact analysis. Such an analysis preceded the DMA in Europe.[41] No comparable assessment preceded Bill 4,675/2025.

CADE’s institutional views merit serious consideration. But they must be weighed against the agency’s own enforcement record. An authority that has secured DMA-like outcomes through existing tools has shown, in practice, that it does not require an entirely new regulatory layer to achieve those results. Moreover, support for ex ante regulation in principle does not validate the specific design choices embedded in Bill 4,675/2025.

Those design choices raise additional concerns. The bill would create a new superintendency, introduce a non-exhaustive list of remedies, rely on unclear economic standards, and omit an efficiency defense. These features carry significant risks for Brazil’s digital economy. Evidence from other jurisdictions underscores those risks.

C.       Evidence from the DMA: Limited Benefits and Emerging Costs

Bill 4,675/2025 does not emerge in an international vacuum. The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) has been fully applicable since May 2023,[42] giving policymakers the benefit of observed outcomes, rather than theoretical projections. The emerging evidence is not encouraging.

The most granular evidence comes from Louis-Daniel Pape and Michelangelo Rossi, who examined the DMA’s restrictions on self-preferencing in the relationship between Google Search and Google Maps.[43] In January 2024, Google removed the Maps tab and clickable links from map previews on EU search pages to comply with Article 6(5) of the DMA. Using a difference-in-differences design comparing EU and non-EU countries, the authors find that mapping-related search queries in the EU increased by more than 21%. Despite this increase, overall visits to Google Maps did not change, and competing mapping services did not gain traffic. The regulation forced users to take additional steps to reach the same destination, increasing search costs without delivering meaningful competitive benefits. As the authors concluded, “these findings indicate that the DMA had weak competitive effects, highlighting Google Maps’ dominance in a market where alternatives remain limited.”[44]

Similar patterns appeared in e-commerce. Chiara Farronato, Andrey Fradkin, and Alexander MacKay conducted a field experiment on Amazon’s private-label products.[45] They found that prohibiting Amazon from offering its own brands would reduce consumer surplus by 5.5% due to lost variety. They concluded that “[c]ontrary to concerns about self-preferencing, demoting Amazon brands in search results does not increase welfare….”[46] Moreover, “[t]he consumer benefits from Amazon brands are driven both by cost advantages and by the product variety they generate… [with] value approximately 80 percent higher than the value of random products appearing in the same searches.”[47]

Additional evidence points in the same direction. Christian Peukert et al. presented preliminary findings on “Amazon’s Shrinking Shelf.”[48] Using a difference-in-differences framework, they documented an 18% decline in the number of products displayed in search results and a 7% decline in the number of sellers per product in the EU following DMA and Digital Services Act (DSA) changes.[49] These results suggest a narrowing of consumer choice.

Consumer surveys corroborated these findings. A study by the European Center for International Political Economy (ECIPE) and the European Public Policy Partnership (EPPP), based on 3,500 respondents across seven Central and Eastern European countries, found that 39% of users reported more cumbersome online tasks after the DMA, about one-third described their experience as “less seamless and more confusing,” and 80% had little or no awareness of the DMA.[50] The study found no evidence of lower prices, improved privacy, or increased contestability. Consumer behavior remained largely unchanged: more than 70% of respondents still relied on Google Search multiple times daily, and dependence on incumbent platforms remained “as strong as ever.”[51]

A separate survey by Nextrade Group of 5,000 EU consumers reported similar results. Among heavy search-engine users, 60% said routine searches took up to 50% longer, and 42% of frequent travelers reported less useful flight and hotel results.[52] These consumer costs coincided with broader economic impacts. Carmelo Cennamo, Tobias Kretschmer, Ioanna Constantiou, and Eliana Garcés estimated that DMA provisions could reduce EU service-sector revenues by up to €114 billion annually—approximately 0.64% of total sector turnover[53]—equivalent to losses of up to €1,122 per worker, depending on digital intensity.[54]

The DMA’s enforcement trajectory reinforces these concerns. In March 2025, the European Commission issued preliminary noncompliance findings against Alphabet,[55] with sanctions likely to follow.[56] In April 2025, it imposed fines of €500 million on Apple and €200 million on Meta.[57] Both companies have appealed.[58] In January 2026, the Commission opened two sets of specification proceedings against Google, covering Android and its AI services, including Gemini.[59] These developments suggest a pattern: when initial compliance proves insufficient, regulators move from setting obligations to prescribing technical implementation.[60] Enforcement thus becomes a continuous administrative process, requiring sustained oversight and significant institutional resources.

While ex ante regulation may accelerate intervention, it also increases the risk of false positives. Such regimes can impose remedies that generate “negative consequences in terms of innovation.”[61] Because the DMA relies on “detailed and absolute obligations… that do not admit of proof to the contrary,” and applied them across platforms regardless of business-model differences, it effectively “dispens[es] with the investigation itself… in a manner that is close to summary justice,” potentially penalizing conduct that benefits competition.[62]

Beyond immediate consumer effects, ex ante regulation appears to chill innovation. Apple delayed the European rollout of several features—including AirPods live translation, iPhone mirroring, and Apple Maps enhancements—citing risks to security, privacy, and user experience.[63] Meta postponed the EU launch of Threads due to uncertainty about data-integration rules.[64] Google reported that compliance with overlapping frameworks—including the DMA, Digital Services Act, and AI Act—has delayed product launches by up to a year,[65] particularly for AI-integrated services.[66] These delays function as an “innovation tax” on consumers in regulated jurisdictions—with costs that are real but diffuse, and unlikely to generate political backlash.[67]

Evidence from earlier European digital regulation reinforced these concerns. Mert Demirer, Diego Jiménez Hernández, Dean Li, and Sida Peng found that the GDPR reduced data storage by 25.7% and data processing by 15.4% among EU firms relative to U.S. counterparts, consistent with a 22.4% increase in data costs.[68] Smaller firms bore disproportionately higher burdens. The GDPR thus operates less as a neutral governance tool than as a tax on data-intensive activity.

Jian Jia, Ginger Zhe Jin, and Liad Wagman found that venture-capital investment in European technology startups declined by 26.1% in the year following the GDPR’s implementation.[69] Subsequent work found these effects persisted for at least 2.5 years.[70] The GDPR thus appears to have dampened startup financing and growth prospects.

Layering the DMA’s behavioral obligations onto this framework was bound to compound these effects. As prior research noted, “the GDPR experience demonstrates how sweeping regulation may create barriers to entry or encourage market exit among small tech firms.”[71]

The broader macroeconomic context underscores these concerns. In a widely cited 2024 report, former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi identified the technology sector as the primary driver of the growing productivity gap between the European Union and the United States.[72] He concluded that Europe lagged in the very technologies that will shape future growth.[73]

Draghi attributed this gap, in significant part, to regulatory constraints:

The problem is not that Europe lacks ideas or ambition. We have many talented researchers and entrepreneurs filing patents. But innovation is blocked at the next stage: we are failing to translate innovation into commercialisation, and innovative companies that want to scale up in Europe are hindered at every stage by inconsistent and restrictive regulations.[74]

Europe’s innovation gap is stark. Only four of the world’s 50 largest technology companies are European.[75] The region lacks counterparts to firms such as Google, Apple, Amazon, Meta, OpenAI, and Anthropic. These structural weaknesses may deepen if the DMA reduces startup exit opportunities[76] or weakens core revenue models, such as digital advertising.[77]

Causation is complex. But the correlation between Europe’s regulatory posture and its innovation deficit is difficult to ignore. Jurisdictions considering similar frameworks should weigh these tradeoffs carefully.

D.       Elevated Risks in the Brazilian Context

The foregoing evidence from Europe is concerning on its own terms. The risks of importing this model are even greater in Brazil. Institutional capacity constraints, existing regulatory burdens, opportunity costs, and geopolitical exposure all amplify the potential downsides of ex ante regulation.

Institutional capacity presents the most immediate concern. Brazil ranks 78th of 143 countries on the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index[78] and 124th on ease of doing business.[79] These rankings suggest that broad regulatory discretion is a particularly risky policy tool for Brazil. Digital antitrust regulation is especially vulnerable to capture because “the extremely high stakes will increase the incentives for incumbent digital firms to use regulation to protect the economic status quo.”[80] It also creates risks of politically motivated enforcement, reduced foreign investment, and slower long-term growth.[81] These concerns carry added weight in Brazil, which ranks 107th of 181 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.[82]

Even well-resourced regulators face capacity constraints. The European Commission—despite its institutional advantages—has filled only 19 of 80 planned DMA positions, a 76% shortfall, as Director-General for Competition Olivier Guersent has acknowledged.[83] CADE is likely to face even greater challenges, particularly because Bill 4,675/2025 does not provide for additional resources.[84]

The Ministry of Finance has stated that the proposed Digital Markets Superintendency (SMD) would be created through internal reorganization, without additional funding.[85] That claim implies one of two outcomes. Either the new regime will be under-resourced, increasing the risk of low-quality decisions, or it will divert scarce personnel from CADE’s core antitrust functions. Neither outcome is desirable. Ex ante regimes require specialized expertise that goes beyond traditional competition law and economics. Monitoring and enforcing design-based obligations demands capabilities in data science, engineering, and digital product development. A simple reallocation of existing staff is unlikely to meet these demands.

Brazil’s broader regulatory environment compounds these concerns. The country has long struggled with the “Custo Brasil,” which reflects structural inefficiencies that raise the cost of doing business, deter investment, and suppress entrepreneurship. [86] A 2019 study by Movimento Brasil Competitivo, conducted with the Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade, and Services, estimated that these inefficiencies imposed an annual burden of roughly R$1.7 trillion (about $330 billion), or 19.5% of GDP in 2022. “This means that producing and operating in Brazil costs R$1.7 trillion more per year than in countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).”[87] These costs stem not only from regulatory distortions, but also from tax complexity, infrastructure gaps, bureaucracy, and legal uncertainty.[88]

International benchmarks reinforce this diagnosis. OECD Product Market Regulation indicators for 2023–24 rank Brazil as the fifth-worst of 51 countries in economy-wide regulatory burden.[89] The OECD highlights the need to simplify administrative requirements, reduce retail price controls, and strengthen mechanisms to assess the competitive impact of regulation.[90] These priorities point toward regulatory simplification—not expansion.

A 2022 OECD review reached a similar conclusion: Brazil’s regulatory challenges reflect structural weaknesses in the design, coordination, and evaluation of policy.[91] The report emphasized persistent gaps in regulatory-impact assessment, stakeholder consultation, and ex post evaluation. These findings suggest that Brazil should rationalize its regulatory framework before adding new layers. At a minimum, any new regulation should meet a high evidentiary threshold and demonstrate clear net benefits for consumers.

Opportunity costs further weaken the case for ex ante intervention. As Mario Zúñiga argues, competition concerns are not the most pressing policy priority in Latin America. Greater gains would come from reforms that reduce entry barriers, expand telecommunications infrastructure, and improve public goods such as education and legal certainty.[92]

A January 2026 ITIF report makes a related point: countries should calibrate regulatory stringency to their level of economic development. For emerging economies, flexible and interoperable frameworks are preferable to rigid EU-style rules.[93] Brazil’s priority should be attracting investment, not imposing compliance-heavy regimes that may deter entry.[94]

Geopolitical considerations add another layer of risk. Digital-platform regulation tends to fall disproportionately on U.S.-based firms. Critics have characterized the DMA as a “non-tariff attack”[95] on U.S. technology companies.[96] Of the seven DMA-designated gatekeepers, five are U.S. firms: Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta, and Microsoft.[97] Regardless of intent, ex ante regimes de facto concentrate regulatory burdens on American companies.

The geopolitical environment has shifted significantly. Since 2025, the United States has treated foreign digital regulation as a matter of trade policy. The Trump administration has characterized such measures as “unfair taxes” or “overseas extortion.” In February 2025, President Donald Trump directed the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to consider tariffs and other responses to foreign regulatory actions deemed discriminatory.[98]

Senior officials have reinforced this position. Vice President J.D. Vance criticized the DMA, the DSA, and the GDPR as barriers to innovation.[99] In December 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio imposed visa restrictions on European officials linked to digital regulation, signaling a willingness to escalate beyond trade measures.[100]

Brazilian officials have downplayed these risks. Finance Minister Dario Durigan has argued that U.S. antitrust enforcement against digital platforms suggests Brazil need not fear retaliation. That comparison is incomplete.[101] Traditional ex post enforcement differs fundamentally from a standing, designation-based regime of ongoing obligations. The United States may not treat these approaches as equivalent.

Durigan also emphasized the bill’s formal neutrality.[102] But formal neutrality does not eliminate geopolitical exposure. Even country-neutral rules may disproportionately affect U.S. firms and be perceived accordingly.

The assertion that EU tech regulation is discriminatory is not merely a complaint from American boardrooms; it is supported by the design and application of the laws themselves. While European officials vehemently deny protectionist intent, claiming that the rules apply to all, the empirical reality tells a different story of targeted enforcement and “gerrymandered” criteria.[103]

Brazil retains full sovereignty over its regulatory choices. But given the current geopolitical environment, ignoring these risks would be imprudent.

A final observation on the bill’s claimed “flexibility” is warranted. As noted, the Brazilian approach is presented as more flexible and adaptive than the DMA and therefore less susceptible to its rigidity.[104] In the Ministry of Finance’s post-consultation report, the DMA serves as an important reference point, but the Ministry acknowledges that many submissions criticized the DMA model as overly rigid.[105] It therefore considers alternative approaches and ultimately recommends a “new hybrid regulatory system” that is “more flexible and adaptable,”[106] based on designating systemically relevant platforms and tailoring obligations on a case-by-case basis.[107]

That framing, however, does not resolve the underlying concerns. The bill, as submitted, still includes a non-exhaustive menu of obligations, granting CADE broad discretion to impose remedies on designated firms. Even when company-specific obligations are described as more tailored, they can, “over time,” “become a powerful force for locking in incumbents and erecting barriers to new entrants, paradoxically harming competition.”[108]

As Mario Zúñiga argues, the complexity of proving abuse-of-dominance claims serves an important function. It acts as a filter that helps agencies distinguish harmful conduct from potentially beneficial practices. This is a feature, not a bug, of case-by-case enforcement—one that an ex ante regime risks displacing.[109]

Recent experience in other jurisdictions reinforces this concern. Even where authorities formally rely on ex post enforcement, regulators have increasingly adopted sweeping remedies without establishing concrete consumer harm. South Africa’s Competition Commission has recommended that e-commerce firms separate retail and marketplace operations. Mexico’s COFECE has proposed that Amazon and Mercado Libre unbundle streaming services. The UK CMA has preliminarily advanced broad, DMA-like remedies based solely on strategic market status.[110]

In this context, “flexibility” is not necessarily a safeguard. When combined with broad discretion and weak limiting principles, it becomes a vehicle for expansive and unpredictable intervention—one that, at a minimum, undermines legal certainty and increases the risk of error.

III.     Substantive and Institutional Defects in Bill 4,675/2025

Even if one were to accept that existing Brazilian competition law is insufficient for digital markets—a premise that, as we have argued, is contradicted by CADE’s enforcement record and unsupported by empirical evidence from jurisdictions that moved first—the bill’s specific provisions would still raise serious concerns. This section therefore turns to the design and substance of Bill 4,675/2025.

The analysis does not attempt to catalog every provision. Instead, it focuses on those elements that are most consequential and that, if adopted, would require modification to better serve Brazilian consumers and the broader economy.

Five concerns stand out.

First, the bill’s guiding objectives—reduction of barriers to entry, protection of the competitive process, and promotion of freedom of choice—lack the consumer-welfare anchor that constrains enforcement under the BCL. This risks granting regulators broad discretion without a clear benchmark for evaluating outcomes.

Second, the designation criteria conflate market reach with market power, relying on structural proxies that risk capturing firms whose size reflects competitive success rather than durable dominance.

Third, the bill’s institutional design introduces governance gaps, including risks of fragmentation, resource constraints, and strategic use of the regime by private actors.

Fourth, the bill’s per se prohibitions and affirmative mandates risk condemning conduct that is often procompetitive, while creating unresolved tensions with security, privacy, and investment incentives.

Fifth, the absence of a meaningful efficiencies defense further distances the regime from the BCL and increases the likelihood of costly enforcement errors.

The subsections that follow examine each of these concerns in turn.

A.       Objectives and Limiting Principles

1.       The Consumer Welfare Standard and Brazilian Competition Law

The Brazilian government chose to frame Bill 4,675/2025 as an amendment to Brazil’s Competition Law (BCL)—similar to the UK’s DMCC and Germany’s Section 19a of the GWB—rather than as a standalone regulatory regime like the EU’s DMA. The bill thus embeds new digital-market powers within Brazil’s existing antitrust framework.

That design choice carries important implications. It situates ex ante digital regulation within the institutional and doctrinal boundaries of the BCL, importing both its strengths and its constraints. Any assessment of the bill must therefore consider its consistency with the underlying logic of Brazilian competition law.

Although the BCL does not include an explicit statement of purpose, its provisions—read systematically—reveal a coherent set of guiding principles. Article 1 establishes the law’s constitutional foundations:

This Law structures the Brazilian Competition Defense System (SBDC) and provides for the prevention (merger control) and repression of violations against the economic order, guided by the constitutional principles of freedom of initiative, free competition, the social function of property, consumer protection, and the repression of the abuse of economic power.[111]

These principles, drawn from Article 170 of the Brazilian Federal Constitution, do not provide an operational test for enforcement. They function instead as constitutional anchors that must be translated into practice through CADE’s case law and administrative decisions. The sole paragraph of Article 1 further clarifies that “the collectivity (society) is the holder of the legal rights protected by this Law.”[112]

Articles 4 and 6 reinforce the institutional structure. They define CADE as a “judicial entity… constituted as a federal autonomous agency”[113] and an “adjudicating body.”[114] This structure distinguishes Brazil from the United States. CADE acts as an administrative adjudicator, not as a prosecutorial authority that must seek judicial approval in an adversarial system.

Article 36 provides greater analytical clarity. Its § 1 introduces a central limiting principle:

Achieving dominance in a market by natural process and by being the most efficient economic agent in relation to competitors does not characterize the violation set forth in item II [“to control the relevant market for goods and services”] of the head provision of this article.[115]

This provision anchors Brazilian competition policy. Dominance is not unlawful per se. Market power—whether large or monopolistic—is permissible if it results from efficiency, innovation, or superior performance. In such cases, competitive success reflects consumer preference, not harm.

That logic implies a further requirement: enforcement must demonstrate harm to consumers. CADE must show that conduct leads to higher prices, reduced output, lower quality, or diminished innovation before it can intervene.

This framework aligns closely with the consumer-welfare standard.[116] While formulations differ in the literature, the standard consistently rejects the idea that market power achieved through superior performance constitutes a violation of antitrust law. Intervention is justified only when conduct harms consumers, not competitors.

The consumer-welfare principle is even clearer in merger control. Article 88 prohibits mergers that eliminate competition or create or reinforce dominance, [117] but it allows approval subject to a key limitation:

The mergers referred to in § 5 of this article may be authorized, provided that the limits strictly necessary to achieve the following objectives are observed:

I — cumulatively or alternatively:

  1. a) to increase productivity or competitiveness;
  2. b) improve the quality of goods or services; or
  3. c) promote efficiency and technological or economic development; and

II — that a significant portion of the resulting benefits are passed on to consumers.[118]

Thus, even mergers that raise competitive concerns may proceed if efficiencies outweigh harms and consumers receive a “significant portion” of the benefits. As in United States v. Baker Hughes,[119] this structure implicitly shifts the burden of proof: once CADE establishes a prima facie concern, merging parties may rebut it by demonstrating verifiable efficiencies.

In practice, the BCL evaluates conduct through its effects on consumers—closer to Herbert Hovenkamp’s interpretation of the standard[120] than to Robert Bork’s total-welfare approach.[121]

CADE’s 2016 Horizontal Merger Guidelines confirm this reading. They adopt a “non-negative net effect” standard:[122] mergers must be approved if they do not harm consumer welfare and blocked if they do.

CADE’s case law reinforces the same conclusion. As Eric Hadmann Jasper observes:

An analysis of Brazilian competition law and CADE’s regulations and documents indicates, at least at this stage of the research, a diffusion of national antitrust principles/purposes (i.e., freedom of initiative, free competition, social function of property, consumer protection/consumer welfare, repression of abuse of economic power, efficiency, and protection of the competitive process) and a slight primacy of consumer welfare, at least with regard to the analysis of mergers. Finally, an examination of CADE precedents reveals a diffuse list of purposes, with emphasis on “consumer welfare” (6 mentions, including the expression “maximization of economic value to the consumer”), protection of competition (3 mentions), protection of markets (3 mentions), efficiency (2 mentions), economic welfare (2 mentions), and social effects (2 mentions).[123]

Gustavo Manicardi Schneider and Rodrigo Fialho Borges reach a similar conclusion:

Among these documents (those that defined consumer welfare), two directly adhered to Hovenkamp’s standard of consumer welfare, one directly mentioned Bork but emphasized allocative efficiency, and 12 adopted the definition of consumer welfare contained in CADE’s H Guidelines.[124]

Consumer welfare is therefore not an abstract concept in Brazilian law. It is the operative standard embedded in Articles 36 and 88, CADE’s guidelines, and its administrative practice. Enforcement focuses on consumer outcomes—not on protecting individual competitors.

2.       Article 47-B’s Departure from Consumer Welfare

Against this backdrop, Bill 4,675/2025 introduces a potential conflict. Article 47-B identifies three objectives for digital regulation: (i) reducing barriers to entry; (ii) protecting the competitive process; and (iii) promoting freedom of choice.[125]

These goals may appear unobjectionable. But they lack limiting principles tied to measurable welfare outcomes. As a result, they risk expanding enforcement beyond economically grounded standards and increasing false positives.

a)         Reduction of barriers to entry

Entry barriers play an important role in traditional antitrust analysis. CADE evaluates them in merger review[126] and unilateral conduct cases[127] as part of a broader effects analysis. High barriers may enable firms to raise prices, reduce output, or suppress innovation.[128]

The bill changes that role. It transforms barriers to entry from an analytical factor into a regulatory objective.

That shift is consequential. Under current law, CADE evaluates barriers as one element among many. It does not seek to eliminate them as an end in itself. The bill’s approach departs from this framework.

Economic theory supports caution. While potential entry can discipline firms,[129] artificially increasing contestability does not necessarily improve outcomes. In markets characterized by network effects and scale economies, intervention may simply redistribute rents without benefiting consumers:

[W]here network effects or scale economies predominate (as is always the case with digital platforms), enhanced contestability by policy is most likely to redistribute rents but not necessarily to serve consumers or create competition. ‘[I]f the market cannot profitably accommodate another entrant, due to scale economies and the nature of the oligopoly interaction, entry will be followed by some firm’s exit and another period of high prices.’ If all increased contestability does is to replace one gatekeeper with another, it can hardly be said to improve competitive outcomes.[130]

Moreover, this same economic theory suggests that artificially expanding contestability—by removing barriers to entry—in an effort to increase the number of competitors beyond an existing oligopoly (or even duopoly) “may have little effect on outcomes because such markets already behave as if they are competitive.”[131] To the extent that an explicit objective of entry-barrier reduction rests on the assumption that markets are inherently more competitive when they have more entrants, that assumption lacks clear economic justification.

While facilitating entry may improve outcomes in cases of pure monopoly—where no meaningful prospect of entry exists—the same does not hold in the typical “gatekeeper” market. In such markets, a dominant platform may hold a large and durable market share, yet still face—and at times successfully repel—the threat of entry. In those settings, artificially enhanced entry may do little to promote competition. Incumbency advantages often stem from the firm’s ability to deliver the benefits of scale or scope to consumers, rather than from constraints imposed on rivals. In such cases, policies aimed at lowering entry barriers risk supporting competitors rather than competition or consumer welfare.[132]

In sum, barriers to entry may reflect genuine market failures, but they may also arise from economies of scale, quality investments, network effects that benefit consumers, or the natural advantages of a superior product.[133] A regime that treats barrier reduction as an end in itself—without requiring that such reductions improve consumer welfare—risks mandating access, unbundling, or interoperability in contexts where the very barrier at issue underpins the product’s value.

As the foundational error-cost literature emphasizes, reducing barriers that result from efficient conduct can impose costs that are difficult to reverse, particularly in technology markets.[134]

Elevating barriers to entry from a diagnostic variable to an explicit regulatory objective therefore represents a conceptual overreach. There is no clear economic or legal justification for treating their suppression as an end in itself.

b)         Protection of the competitive process

The second objective—“protection of the competitive process”—is conceptually vague and analytically weak. Brazilian law does not define the term, and comparative experience offers little guidance.

As Nicolas Petit and Lazar Radic observe:

The “protection of the competitive process” is similarly redundant. All acts of bad conduct spelled out in antitrust statute epitomize “distortions of the competitive process”. Collusion removes independence from competitors and monopolization eliminates rivalry. Both standards add nothing to text law and are thus circular, with Herbert Hovenkamp calling them “slogans.”[135]

Conceptually appealing though it may be, “protection of the competitive process” suffers from the same measurability problem that plagues the DMA’s fairness objective.[136] Without clear limiting principles or a defined analytical methodology, the concept risks being interpreted in almost limitless ways.

This indeterminacy creates broad discretion for decision-makers. It encourages competitors to bring self-aggrandizing complaints, undermines legal predictability for businesses, and increases the likelihood of arbitrary enforcement—including enforcement that shields less efficient competitors from market exit.

Such open-endedness is particularly problematic in an administrative-adjudication setting, where clarity and foreseeability are essential to the rule of law and to effective business compliance.[137]

c)         Promotion of freedom of choice

The third objective—“freedom of choice”—is similarly problematic. It lacks a clear connection to measurable welfare outcomes and may conflict with consumer-welfare analysis:

The fatal flaw in the consumer choice standard is that it simply, indeed simplistically, rejects economic analysis of consumer preferences as the fundamental guiding principle of antitrust analysis, including the preferences consumers express in making unavoidable tradeoffs between price and nonprice values. The consumer choice standard rejects even the view that the role of antitrust is to protect the competitive process as one that produces desirable outputs (i.e., consumer welfare) in favor of an antitrust regime that analyzes nonprice competition as a standalone and inviolable virtue.[138]

While product variety and consumer choice may, in certain contexts, correlate with competitive intensity, they are not reliable proxies for consumer welfare. As a practical matter, the promotion of choice over consumer welfare is rooted in structural presumptions that assume a causal relationship between the number of firms or brands in a market and consumer welfare. But “[t]hese presumptions have no basis in modern economic theory, are not supported by empirical evidence, and are likely to provide misleading answers to the very questions concerning nonprice competition and innovation that the choice standard was designed to address.”[139]

Moreover, a market offering a wide array of products does not necessarily generate greater consumer benefit if most options are inferior or overpriced. Conversely, markets dominated by a smaller number of high-quality, efficient products may yield higher welfare, even where choice is more limited. Consumer preferences—not the sheer number of options—ultimately determine the connection between products and consumers’ needs. Competition can therefore narrow choice when consumers gravitate toward superior products, and this natural process should not be mistaken for harm.[140]

Empirical analysis of CADE’s practice supports this interpretation. Borges and Schneider find that “freedom of choice,” along with “information made available to consumers,” appears only once as a proxy for consumer welfare in CADE’s decisions, whereas “price” appears 94 times—by far the most common indicator. [141] Price, quality, quantity, and innovation remain the key measurable variables through which CADE operationalizes the consumer-welfare standard. “Freedom of choice,” by contrast, is conceptually diffuse and analytically weak.

d)         Remedying these issues

Taken together, Article 47-B’s objectives depart from the consumer-welfare framework embedded in the BCL. Even when they align in particular cases, they substitute clear, economically grounded analysis with vague and potentially misleading proxies.

Two conclusions follow. First, the objectives lack measurable standards capable of guiding decision-making. In practice, enforcers will likely revert—explicitly or implicitly—to consumer-welfare analysis. Second, because the bill amends the BCL rather than creating a separate regime, the consumer-welfare standard remains the governing benchmark.

Consumer welfare, in other words, must prevail over the bill’s alternative objectives.

The remedy is straightforward. The bill should require that any obligation imposed under the digital-markets regime demonstrably advance consumer welfare. This would preserve flexibility while ensuring that interventions target harm to consumers—not merely harm to competitors. It would also align the new framework with the core principles of Brazilian competition law and limit the risk of rent-seeking and overenforcement.[142]

B.        Designation Criteria and the Risk of Regulating Size Rather Than Harm

The bill’s designation mechanism, set out in Article 47-C, operates through two tiers: qualitative criteria and revenue thresholds.[143] The qualitative criteria include multi-sidedness, network effects, vertical integration into adjacent markets, a strategic intermediary position for third-party business users, access to significant personal or commercial data, a large base of business and end users, and a portfolio of multiple digital products or services[144]

Paragraph 2 establishes revenue thresholds of R$50 billion in global annual gross revenue or R$5 billion in Brazil, with authority granted to the ministers of finance and justice to adjust these thresholds by joint act.[145] Designation applies to the entire economic group and lasts up to 10 years, renewable through a new proceeding.[146]

1.       Regulating Size Rather Than Demonstrable Market Power

The central problem with this framework is that it targets characteristics that are not only common, but often efficiency-enhancing and procompetitive.

Multi-sidedness is the defining economic structure of platform businesses; it is a feature, not a pathology.[147] Vertical integration produces well-documented efficiencies, including the elimination of double marginalization.[148] Broad product portfolios may reflect economies of scope or dynamic capabilities that generate consumer benefits across services. Access to data often reflects product quality and consumer demand, not exclusionary conduct.[149]

By treating these features as triggers for a decade-long regulatory designation, the bill risks converting business success into a regulatory offense.

At the same time, the framework omits key indicators of actual competitive constraint. A designation regime grounded in competition economics would instead assess factors such as the presence of potential competition, the degree of substitutability, exposure to technological disruption (including AI-driven entry), constraints from offline competitors, and countervailing power from users or suppliers. These factors better capture whether a firm can exercise market power.

The bill’s terminology reinforces this misalignment. The concept of “systemic relevance” points to size and economic importance rather than competitive dynamics. This framing suggests that firms are targeted because they are large or central to the digital economy—not because they can harm competition. A more appropriate standard would require “substantial market power” or “competitive significance,” anchoring designation in established antitrust principles.

Revenue thresholds compound the problem. As William Landes and Richard Posner showed, firm size and market share are poor proxies for market power. Market power depends on demand elasticity and supply-side constraints, including the ability of rivals and potential entrants to respond.[150] Harold Demsetz likewise demonstrated that large firm size often reflects efficiency, particularly in innovation-driven sectors where scale enables sustained investment.[151]

The government estimates that five to 10 firms—overwhelmingly U.S.-based technology companies—would meet the designation criteria.[152] This underscores that the regime targets a narrow set of global firms based on size thresholds,[153] rather than demonstrated competitive harm in Brazil.[154]

The problem is further compounded by the bill’s application to the entire economic group (todo o grupo econômico), rather than to specific services where competitive concerns arise.[155] This risks regulating activities unrelated to any identified harm, imposing costs disconnected from any coherent theory of competition.

These features raise serious error-cost concerns. As Frank Easterbrook emphasized, false positives—erroneously condemning or deterring procompetitive conduct—are especially costly in dynamic markets.[156] Geoffrey Manne extends this analysis to digital platforms, where integration and coordination often generate consumer benefits, and where regulatory error can chill innovation.[157]

A more coherent approach would require a demonstration that a firm possesses “lasting market power that cannot be disciplined by actual or potential competition within a reasonable period of time.” Relevant indicia would include substantial entry barriers, evidence of consumer harm, limited competitive pressure from rivals, and weak responsiveness of market participants.

Comparative frameworks highlight these shortcomings. The UK’s DMCC requires a finding of “substantial and entrenched market power” and “strategic significance.”[158] Germany’s Section 19a GWB requires a formal determination that a firm holds a dominant position before obligations attach.[159]

The inclusion of “multiple digital products or services” as a designation factor is particularly counterproductive. It risks deterring one of the most important sources of competition—entry by large firms into adjacent markets. Cross-market competition often represents the most meaningful constraint on incumbents. Treating such expansion as evidence of regulatory concern contradicts the bill’s stated objective of reducing entry barriers.[160]

The 10-year designation period raises additional concerns. Digital markets evolve rapidly. David Evans documents substantial churn in platform leadership over periods shorter than a decade.[161] A designation lasting until 2037 could outlive the competitive conditions that justified it.

While Article 87-B, § 3 allows review of specific obligations, it does not provide for periodic reassessment of the designation itself. This rigidity contrasts with other regimes. The DMA requires review at least every three years, the DMCC sets a five-year designation period, and Germany’s regime also limits designation to five years.

Brazil’s framework is therefore broader and less constrained: it combines open-ended qualitative criteria, adjustable thresholds, and a long designation period.

Introducing stronger limiting principles would materially improve the regime. The bill should require a finding of durable market power, limit designation to specific services rather than entire corporate groups, and mandate periodic review at shorter intervals—such as three to five years.

C.       Institutional Design and Governance Risks

1.       The New Superintendency and Its Oversight Gaps

The bill creates a new Digital Markets Superintendency (SMD) within CADE, led by a superintendent nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate, serving a two-year term renewable once.[162] The SMD’s remit is expansive. It will monitor digital markets, request information, initiate and investigate designation proceedings, impose and oversee compliance with special obligations, pursue noncompliance proceedings, and publish an annual priorities agenda subject to approval by CADE’s Tribunal and in consultation with the Ministry of Justice.[163] In practice, the SMD would serve as the administrative engine of the ex ante regime.

A closer examination of the SMD’s architecture raises broader governance concerns. These include how jurisdiction will be allocated, who may trigger proceedings, whether CADE will have sufficient resources to administer the regime, and how the new body will interact with existing sectoral regulators. The issue is not whether CADE should develop specialized expertise in digital markets—which may well be justified—but whether the bill does so in a manner consistent with CADE’s institutional design, coherent in its allocation of powers, and sufficiently constrained to avoid duplication, strategic use by private actors, and institutional uncertainty.

Four concerns arise.

a)         Institutional fragmentation

First, the creation of a second superintendency within CADE risks institutional fragmentation and mission duplication. Understanding this concern requires situating the SMD within CADE’s existing structure.

CADE is composed of three bodies: the Administrative Tribunal, the General Superintendence (SG), and the Department of Economic Studies (DEE). The SG is the agency’s operational core. It investigates mergers, cartels, and unilateral conduct, issuing decisions and recommendations that may be final in straightforward cases or referred to the Tribunal for adjudication. The SG is headed by a single General Superintendent, appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate for a two-year term, renewable once. The Tribunal, composed of six commissioners and a president serving four-year nonrenewable terms, adjudicates complex matters, including condemnations, merger remedies, and transaction prohibitions. The DEE provides economic analysis to support both the SG and the Tribunal.

The separation between the SG and the Tribunal reflects a clear institutional logic. The SG serves as the investigative arm, while the Tribunal provides collegiate adjudication. Creating an additional investigative authority that would likewise refer cases to the same Tribunal duplicates this structure. A more coherent alternative would be to establish a specialized digital-markets unit within the existing SG.

This concern is not merely theoretical. The SG already investigates anticompetitive conduct in digital markets, as demonstrated by the Google and Apple cases. A parallel superintendency creates risks of jurisdictional overlap, inconsistent enforcement standards, and competition for resources and institutional prominence.

Comparative experience reinforces this point. The EU administers the DMA within the European Commission through coordination between DG COMP and DG CONNECT.[164] The UK houses its digital-markets regime within the CMA through the Digital Markets Unit (DMU) and a board-level committee.[165] Germany enforces Section 19a within the Bundeskartellamt through existing divisions supported by a specialized digital unit.[166] The common pattern is specialization within existing structures, not duplication alongside them.

Article 14-B, § 1 attempts to address jurisdictional overlap by transferring unilateral-conduct cases involving designated firms from the SG to the SMD. This provision seeks to ensure coherence between special obligations and conduct investigations. It does not, however, resolve the broader inconsistency between cases involving designated firms (handled by the SMD) and those involving non-designated firms (handled by the SG). That asymmetry would not arise if digital-market expertise were integrated within the SG. A unitary structure would be more coherent, more efficient, and less prone to jurisdictional friction.

b)         Vulnerability to rent-seeking

Second, the bill’s standing provisions create significant vulnerability to rent-seeking. Proceedings for designation or the imposition of special obligations may be initiated by “any interested party,”[167] by CADE’s Tribunal or SG,[168] or by certain public bodies that trigger immediate initiation.[169]

In a regime where designation carries decade-long obligations and substantial penalties, this open-ended standing creates a powerful incentive for strategic complaints. Commercial rivals, trade associations, or politically connected entities may use the process to impose costs on competitors.

This risk is not hypothetical. The consultation process already revealed that some proponents of ex ante regulation are themselves market participants with interests adverse to likely designated firms. Match Group, for example, advocated an interventionist regime targeting app-store gatekeepers, particularly Apple. Regardless of the merits of its arguments, the alignment is predictable. Firms that are large but below the designation threshold have strong incentives to support rules that impose asymmetric burdens on larger rivals.

The statutory framework should account for this dynamic. Without tighter guardrails, the regime risks becoming a vehicle for competitor-driven regulatory pressure, rather than a tool targeted at demonstrated harm to competition and consumers.[170]

c)         Resource constraints

Third, the resource question remains unresolved. The Ministry of Finance has asserted that the SMD can be funded through internal reallocations, without additional appropriations.[171] That claim is difficult to reconcile with the bill’s scope.

Administering the regime will require managing simultaneous designation proceedings, obligation-setting, compliance monitoring, and enforcement actions across multiple global firms. These tasks involve complex technical questions, including interoperability, data governance, security architecture, and algorithmic design. They require specialized expertise that goes well beyond traditional competition law and economics.

Even the European Commission, with significantly greater resources, has acknowledged capacity constraints in implementing the DMA.[172] An under-resourced regime will either produce superficial analysis or lead to prolonged proceedings—undermining the claimed advantage of ex ante regulation as a faster alternative to ex post enforcement.

d)         Unclear allocation of regulatory responsibilities

Finally, the bill’s provisions on coordination with sectoral regulators remain vague. Article 47-F calls for cooperation but does not clearly allocate responsibilities.[173]

Memoranda of understanding could partially address this ambiguity, but relying on future agreements introduces uncertainty. Greater clarity should be embedded in the statute itself. Clear lines of authority are essential to avoid duplication, conflict, and gaps in enforcement, particularly in complex digital markets where multiple regulators may claim jurisdiction.

D.       Prohibited and Mandated Practices

1.       The Perils of Per Se Rules in Complex Markets

Article 47-E(IV) creates a non-exhaustive list of prohibitions that CADE may impose on designated firms. These include self-preferencing (favoring own offers or services), tying, restrictions on third-party access, anti-steering provisions, and “predatory or abusive strategies.”[174] This subsection focuses on the three most consequential categories, with particular attention to self-preferencing, which illustrates the broader shortcomings of ex ante obligations.

a)         Self-preferencing

The economic literature does not support treating self-preferencing as a per se offense. “The notion that platform entry into competition with edge providers is harmful to innovation is entirely speculative… there is certainly no basis for a presumption of harm.”[175]

A categorical prohibition would invert the well-established principle that vertical arrangements are generally efficient.[176] Indeed,

in vertically integrated structures, some form of self-preferencing is not only natural, but is often a manifestation of efficiency. By internalizing transactions and eliminating double markups, vertical integration reduces costs, which can translate into lower prices and improved outcomes for consumers. As a result, in this context, self-preferencing tends to be the rule, rather than the exception, and its baseline economic effect is typically procompetitive.[177]

In digital markets, such a prohibition would constrain platforms’ ability to refine user interfaces and integrate services, potentially foreclosing conduct that generates substantial consumer value while increasing the risk of overenforcement—a textbook Type I error.

A proper analysis must distinguish between exclusionary self-preferencing and legitimate business conduct. The former requires durable market power, substantial foreclosure, and demonstrable consumer harm. The latter includes efficiency-enhancing practices such as eliminating double marginalization, enforcing quality control, reducing search costs, and maintaining ecosystem security.[178] As the literature emphasizes, “self-preferencing by dual-role platforms is not necessarily detrimental… [and] the effectiveness of policy interventions… depends largely on the type of self-preferencing and the specific environment.”[179]

Empirical evidence reinforces this conclusion. Studies show that platform integration can expand demand and stimulate complementor activity. Empirical evidence reinforces this conclusion. Studies show that platform integration can expand demand and stimulate complementor activity. Zhuoxin Li and Ashish Agarwal find that Facebook’s integration of Instagram increased demand for photography applications more broadly, benefiting third-party developers.[180] Jens Foerderer and his coauthors similarly show that Google’s introduction of Google Photos increased user attention and demand in the photography category, leading to greater complementor innovation and entry.[181] Evidence from video-game ecosystems likewise suggests that strong first-party offerings expand installed bases and enlarge opportunities for third-party developers.[182]

Restrictions on self-preferencing can generate welfare losses. Chiara Farronato, Andrey Fradkin, and Alexander MacKay show that removing Amazon’s private-label products leads to a 5.5% decline in consumer surplus, driven largely by reduced variety.[183] Efforts to demote private labels do not generate welfare gains. Yusuke Zennyo’s theoretical work similarly finds that “a ban on one’s own content biases” may raise commissions and prices, harming both consumers and sellers.[184] Early evidence from the DMA also suggests that limiting self-preferencing increases user friction without improving contestability.[185]

Brazil’s own enforcement record points in the same direction. A 2025 report by the Legal Grounds Institute finds that CADE’s conviction rate for self-preferencing is only 27% over the past decade.[186] More importantly, there is no history of convictions for self-preferencing in digital markets.[187] As the report notes:

As the analysis of CADE’s case law shows, the impact of self-preferencing conduct is far from being inherently anticompetitive. Indeed, even in convictions of a particular practice of self-preferencing, there is usually divergence among commissioners, including in so-called digital markets, [which] shows a lack of certainty that is uncongenial to a per se regulation.[188]

The study concludes that making self-preferencing ex ante forbidden would be a “radical move” that inverts a practice often associated with efficiencies and consumer benefits.[189]

Self-preferencing thus illustrates the core problem with ex ante prohibitions: they risk condemning conduct that neither theory nor evidence supports treating as inherently harmful. Where effects are context-dependent and contested, categorical bans are ill-suited. Reclassifying a frequently efficiency-enhancing practice as presumptively unlawful risks eliminating benefits that CADE’s effects-based approach has historically recognized. The absence of convictions in Brazil reflects not underenforcement, but an evidence-based approach that requires demonstrated harm.

b)         Steering

Anti-steering prohibitions raise distinct concerns rooted in two-sided market economics. If platforms cannot prevent free-riding on their investments in discovery, trust, payments, and user experience, they may respond by raising prices on other margins or reducing investment.[190]

The CADE-Apple settlement illustrates the complexity of these tradeoffs. It imposed anti-steering remedies while accommodating Apple’s security and privacy concerns. That calibrated, case-specific approach is difficult to replicate through rigid ex ante prohibitions.

c)         ‘Predatory or abusive strategies’

The residual category of “predatory or abusive strategies” is exceptionally open-ended. Combined with a 10-year designation period and significant sanctions, this vagueness risks chilling legitimate innovation. Firms face moving compliance targets without clear benchmarks, creating an environment in which success can never be conclusively demonstrated while rivals can continually demand further intervention.[191]

The bill should replace this per se prohibition with an effects-based standard requiring a showing of concrete consumer harm, consistent with CADE’s existing practice. At minimum, the statute should explicitly recognize that vertical integration, self-preferencing, and related practices can be procompetitive.

2.       Interoperability, Data Portability, and ‘Free’ Access Mandates

Article 47-E(V) establishes a set of positive obligations, including data-transfer tools, “free and effective” interoperability, third-party app access, business-user data access, default-setting flexibility, complaint mechanisms, and non-discriminatory terms.[192] While CADE may “consider” information-security and legal obligations, this is a permissive standard—not a structured defense.[193] These obligations raise several concerns.

a)         Security tradeoffs

Mandating interoperability and open ecosystems increases attack surfaces and undermines secure-by-design architectures. The DMA experience already reveals increased risks related to fraud, malware, data-sharing, and weakened platform security protections.[194]

The CADE-Apple settlement again illustrates the superiority of case-by-case analysis. Apple was able to resist certain mandates on security grounds while still implementing meaningful changes—an outcome unlikely under rigid statutory rules.[195]

b)         Privacy and LGPD interaction

The interaction with Brazil’s LGPD raises additional risks. While the LGPD provides for data portability, it conditions that right on regulatory oversight and the protection of trade secrets.[196] Broad competition-law mandates for data access risk conflicting with privacy and confidentiality protections or creating inconsistent obligations between CADE and the ANPD.

The DMA illustrates this tension. Its data-sharing provisions may undermine GDPR objectives, creating tradeoffs between compliance regimes.[197] Brazil risks importing similar conflicts unless privacy and security considerations are made mandatory, not discretionary.

c)         Interoperability

The academic literature counsels caution. Marc Bourreau, Jan Krämer, and Miriam Buiten conclude that mandated interoperability may entrench incumbents, reduce incentives to innovate, and require ongoing regulatory oversight.[198] It may also reduce incentives to multi-home, undermining a key source of competitive discipline.[199]

The UK’s Ofcom similarly warns that interoperability mandates can weaken innovation incentives and enable free-riding.[200] As it notes, “a more closed approach may be necessary… to protect a fair return on investment.”[201]

d)         Data portability

Data portability mandates have shown limited effectiveness. Inge Graef, Martin Husovec, and Jeroen van den Boom show that GDPR portability remains subject to legal and practical uncertainty.[202] Peter Swire and Yianni Lagos argue that portability applies even absent market power[203] and effectively creates a per se rule where competition law would apply a case-by-case analysis.[204]

The OECD warns that portability may increase security risks and disproportionately burden smaller firms.[205] Universal mandates may also prevent certain business models from emerging, imposing unseen costs.[206]

e)         Remedying these issues

The bill should include explicit defenses based on security, privacy, fraud prevention, quality assurance, and trade secrets. Interoperability and data-access obligations should be subject to proportionality analysis, and coordination with the ANPD should be mandatory.

More broadly, “free” access mandates resemble compelled dealing. By forcing firms to share infrastructure, data, and services without compensation, they risk undermining investment incentives.[207] If firms cannot capture returns on ecosystem investments, they will reduce those investments—degrading consumer value.

3.       Mandatory Merger Notification for Designated Firms

Article 47-E(I) allows CADE to require designated firms to notify all mergers, regardless of thresholds.[208] While concerns about “killer acquisitions” are legitimate, this approach is disproportionate.

A blanket reporting requirement would strain agency resources and capture transactions with no competitive risk. It may also weaken startup exit opportunities, which are critical to venture capital investment. As Geoffrey Manne, Sam Bowman, and Dirk Auer explain, acquisitions play a central role in startup financing and innovation incentives.[209]

Increasing regulatory friction risks discouraging investment and entrepreneurship. As Gordon Phillips and Alexei Zhdanov show, acquisitions provide a key exit pathway that sustains venture capital activity.[210]

By increasing the friction and uncertainty associated with every acquisition by a designated firm, the bill may inadvertently deter the very acquisition activity that channels capital and talent into the startup ecosystem. “Put simply, acquisitions may offer an exit to early investors in cases where IPOs are not a realistic prospect, thus increasing the incentive to invest in startups in the first place; barriers to market exit have been known to slow investments.”[211]

Ex ante regulations on potential acquirers risk a “regulate the acquirers, harm the targets” dynamic: by constraining incumbent acquisitions, it may eliminate a crucial exit pathway for startups, dampen investor interest, and weaken the broader innovation ecosystem.[212]

Brazilian law already provides a solution. Article 88, § 7 allows CADE to review below-threshold transactions within one year. CADE has demonstrated its willingness to use this authority, including in recent AI-related investigations.[213] CADE’s 2024 probes into below-threshold Big Tech acquisitions of AI startups demonstrate that the authority is both willing and able to scrutinize transactions that fall outside the standard notification framework.[214]

The proposed provision therefore duplicates existing tools while imposing additional costs. A targeted “call-in” mechanism—triggered by specific risk factors and supported by published guidance—would achieve the same objectives with fewer negative effects.

E.        Defenses and the Absence of an Efficiencies Standard

1.       The Missing Efficiencies Defense

Article 47-E, § 2 provides that, when imposing special obligations on firms designated as having systemic relevance in digital markets, CADE “may consider” three limiting or justificatory factors: (i) information-security features, (ii) the firm’s existing legal and regulatory compliance duties, and (iii) product or service features that enhance the functionality of the firm’s ecosystem.[215] Two points follow.

First, the permissive “may consider” formulation offers little meaningful constraint on CADE’s discretion and provides limited legal certainty; replacing it with a mandatory “shall consider” requirement would serve as a more effective safeguard. Second, regarding the list of considerations, the provision omits the most fundamental defense in competition policy: an explicit efficiency justification.

Ideally, this requirement should also give rise to a substantive right. Designated firms should be entitled to challenge obligations before the Tribunal on the ground that the economic justification is insufficient, disproportionate, or fails to demonstrate net consumer benefit. Without such a right, the requirement risks functioning as a procedural formality rather than a meaningful constraint on regulatory discretion.

As discussed above,[216] the absence of an efficiencies defense conflicts with a foundational principle of Brazilian competition law.[217] Article 36, § 1 of the BCL provides that dominance achieved through the “natural process” of superior efficiency does not constitute an infringement. An ex ante regime embedded within the same statutory framework that denies firms the ability to invoke efficiency would create a doctrinal inconsistency. The same conduct could be lawful under general competition law but prohibited under the bill’s digital-markets provisions—an inconsistency that would generate uncertainty and invite strategic litigation.

To the extent the bill seeks alignment with the UK’s DMCC rather than the EU’s DMA, it adopts the less defensible approach. The DMA contains no general efficiencies defense. Recital 23 explicitly excludes economic-justification arguments from the designation inquiry and provides only narrow, non-economic mechanisms for suspension or exemption.[218] The DMCC includes a limited analogue in its “countervailing benefits exemption,”[219] but the five-part test is onerous. It requires firms to show that (i) the conduct generates user benefits, (ii) those benefits outweigh competitive harm, (iii) they could not be achieved without the conduct, (iv) the conduct is proportionate, and (v) it does not eliminate effective competition.[220] In practice, these conditions are so restrictive that the provision is “likely to be of little—and possibly no—practical value.”[221]

Brazil should, at minimum, adopt a provision analogous to the DMCC’s, but the better approach is to incorporate a clear efficiencies defense aligned with traditional competition law.

The absence of such a defense is not incidental. It reflects the underlying objectives of many ex ante regimes, which “prioritize fairness and a distorted notion of contestability over efficiency and consumer welfare,” protecting competitors rather than competition.[222] Indeed, excluding efficiencies defenses is often a deliberate design choice: allowing firms to justify their conduct on efficiency grounds would undermine a framework aimed at redistributing rents rather than promoting consumer welfare.[223]

If Brazil intends to remain consistent with the BCL, it should avoid replicating this design. A meaningful efficiencies defense should:

  1. allow firms to demonstrate that their conduct generates efficiencies that outweigh potential harms;
  2. align with Articles 36, § 1 and 88, § 6 of the BCL;
  3. explicitly recognize privacy, security, and innovation as legitimate countervailing benefits; and
  4. apply a proportionality standard rather than an indispensability test, ensuring the defense functions as a real safeguard rather than a theoretical right.

A related procedural gap appears in Article 87-G, which governs the Tribunal’s decisions. For designation proceedings, Article 87-G(I) requires only “the specification of the facts” supporting designation.[224] For obligations, Article 87-G(II) requires a description of the obligations and applicable fines, but not an explanation of why those obligations are warranted, proportionate, or beneficial to consumers.

This omission is significant. A decision that merely recites facts without explaining how those facts support the legal conclusion—or without addressing the economic consequences of the remedy—fails to provide the reasoned analysis necessary for judicial review or for an effective defense. At minimum, Article 87-G should require that the Tribunal articulate a reasoned economic analysis demonstrating that the designation or obligation is proportionate, that its expected benefits outweigh its costs, and that the chosen measures are the least restrictive means of achieving the bill’s objectives.

IV.     Conclusion and Recommendations

Bill 4,675/2025 is well intentioned and, in several respects, more carefully designed than the DMA. It remains premature, however, to adopt an ex ante regulatory regime for digital markets in Brazil. The bill’s foundational premise—that existing Brazilian competition law is inadequate—is contradicted by CADE’s recent enforcement record, most notably the Google and Apple settlements, which achieved outcomes similar to those contemplated by the bill through case-by-case enforcement. At the same time, emerging empirical evidence from the EU’s DMA suggests that this regulatory model has, at least in some instances, harmed consumers, chilled innovation, and failed to deliver on its promises of increased contestability. Brazil’s institutional constraints further amplify these risks, making broad regulatory discretion more hazardous than in the jurisdictions the bill seeks to emulate.

We offer three tiers of recommendations.

First, Brazil should forgo ex ante regulation and instead strengthen CADE’s existing enforcement toolkit. The Google and Apple settlements demonstrate that the current framework is capable of addressing digital-market concerns. If speed is a concern, the appropriate response is to invest in CADE’s resources, streamline procedures, and expand the use of targeted market studies and sector inquiries. Brazil should also allow more evidence to accumulate from jurisdictions that have already adopted ex ante regimes before imposing untested regulatory burdens on its own economy.

Alternative models underscore that broad, economy-wide regulation is not the only option. Japan’s Mobile Software Competition Act, which took effect in December 2025, adopts a narrower, more targeted approach[225] It applies specifically to smartphone software ecosystems, incorporates objective-justification defenses tied to cybersecurity and system stability, does not require web-based sideloading, and explicitly protects device security and user information. If Brazil ultimately determines that intervention is warranted, a more focused model of this kind is more likely to achieve its objectives without the collateral costs of a comprehensive ex ante regime.

Second, if ex ante regulation proceeds nonetheless, the bill requires substantial guardrails. Consumer welfare should be enshrined as the regime’s explicit limiting principle. The designation test should require demonstrated market power, not merely size, and the designation period should be shortened with mandatory periodic review. A meaningful efficiencies defense—aligned with Articles 36, § 1 and 88, § 6 of the BCL and calibrated to a proportionality standard—should allow firms to demonstrate that their conduct generates benefits that outweigh potential harms. The blanket merger-notification requirement should be removed, given the existing mechanism in Article 88, § 7, or replaced with a targeted call-in power. Designation should apply to specific services rather than entire corporate groups. The bill’s standing provisions should incorporate screening mechanisms to filter out strategic or frivolous complaints. Finally, the SMD should be integrated within the existing General Superintendence, rather than established as a parallel authority with separate leadership.

Third, and at a minimum, the bill should be subjected to a rigorous Regulatory Impact Assessment prior to enactment. Brazil’s Economic Freedom Act already imposes such requirements on regulatory agencies,[226] and Congress should treat this standard as a baseline for novel legislative interventions. The bill should not advance on the basis of political momentum tied to unrelated digital-policy initiatives. The stakes—for consumers, innovation, and Brazil’s position in the global digital economy—are too high to proceed without evidence-based deliberation.

Brazil has the opportunity to learn from, rather than replicate, the experience of jurisdictions that moved first. The available evidence suggests that the costs of ex ante digital regulation are real and measurable, while its benefits remain uncertain. A country that ranks 78th on the rule-of-law index and 124th on ease of doing business cannot afford to adopt regulatory models whose costs fall disproportionately on consumers, firms, and the broader innovation ecosystem. The more productive path is to strengthen the competition-law tools that have already demonstrated their effectiveness, invest in institutional capacity, and preserve the regulatory humility that sound law & economics demands.

[1] Projeto de Lei No. 4.675, de 2025, Câmara dos Deputados [hereinafter Bill 4,675/2025 or the Bill]. The bill forms part of Agenda Brasil Digital, a six-initiative package aimed at creating a safer, more competitive, and more innovative digital environment. Its centerpiece is the enactment of the Digital Child and Teenager Act (Lei No. 15.211/2025).

[2] Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de novembro de 2011, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.] de 1.12.2011 (Braz.) [hereinafter the BCL].

[3] A Bill 4,675/2025, art. 47-E. The provision sets out a non-exhaustive list of “special obligations” that CADE may impose on firms designated as “systemically relevant.” Because the list is expressly non-exclusive, CADE may impose virtually any remedy it considers appropriate. This broad discretion expands the agency’s authority and heightens the need for clear statutory limits, procedural safeguards, and meaningful constraints on its remedial powers.

[4] The paper also identifies the key modifications needed, if the bill is enacted, to reduce its legal, economic, and institutional risks.

[5] Dario Oliveira Neto & Mario Zúñiga, Apple in Brazil: Ex Post Antitrust Meets Ex Ante Ambitions, Truth on the Mkt. (Feb. 4, 2026), https://truthonthemarket.com/2026/02/04/apple-in-brazil-ex-post-antitrust-meets-ex-ante-ambitions.

[6] See World Justice Project, WJP Rule of Law Index 2025: Brazil (2025), https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2025/Brazil.

[7] See World Bank Group, Doing Business 2020: Comparing Business Regulation in 190 Economies (2020), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/75ea67f9-4bcb-5766-ada6-6963a992d64c/content. Brazil ranked 124th out of 190 economies. The World Bank discontinued the Doing Business project in 2020 after a methodological overhaul and replaced it with the Business Ready (B-READY) initiative. Brazil has not been surveyed in either B-READY edition to date. See also World Bank Group, Business Ready (2025), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/a35eb0e7-328a-46a3-8713-ce8ef8a7c9e3.

[8] See Mario Zúñiga, Parsing Brazil’s ‘More Flexible’ Approach to Digital Markets, Truth on the Mkt. (Feb. 5, 2025), https://truthonthemarket.com/2025/02/05/parsing-brazils-more-flexible-approach-to-digital-markets (noting Brazil’s low ranking on the Rule of Law Index).

[9] Jacques Crémer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye & Heike Schweitzer, Competition Policy for the Digital Era, Eur. Comm’n (2019), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf; Jason Furman, Unlocking Digital Competition: Report of the Digital Competition Expert Panel, HM Treasury (2019), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5c88150ee5274a230219c35f/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf; Stigler Ctr. for the Study of the Econ. & the State, Final Report of the Stigler Committee on Digital Platforms (2019), https://www.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/research/stigler/pdfs/digital-platforms—committee-report—stigler-center.pdf.

[10] See Filippo Lancieri & Patricia Sakowski, Competition in Digital Markets: A Review of Expert Reports, 26 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 65 (2023) (synthesizing the common analytical framework across leading digital competition policy reports).

[11] Regulation 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on Contestable and Fair Markets in the Digital Sector and Amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act), 2022 O.J. (L 265) 1 [hereinafter DMA], https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32022R1925; Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, c. 13 (U.K.) [hereinafter DMCC], https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2024/13/contents; Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [GWB] [Act Against Restraints of Competition] § 19a (Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gwb/englisch_gwb.html.

[12] Lazar Radic, The Imaginary Antitrust Consensus, 9 Eur. Competition & Regul. L. Rev. 22 (2025).

[13] Id.

[14] See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, 130 Yale L.J. 1952, 1955 (2021) (arguing for firm-specific antitrust enforcement over broad ex ante regulation).

[15] See Geoffrey A. Manne, Lazar Radic & Dirk Auer, Regulate for What? A Closer Look at the Rationale and Goals of Digital Competition Regulations, 22 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 201 (2025).

[16] See Projeto de Lei nº 2.768, de 2022, Câmara dos Deputados, https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=2337417 (citing Tim Wu’s scholarship, the U.S. House Judiciary Committee’s report Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets, and the DMA in the bill’s justification section (“Justificação”)).

[17] See Tomada de Subsídios: Aspectos Econômicos e Concorrenciais de Plataformas Digitais, Ministério da Fazenda, Secretaria de Reformas Econômicas (2024), https://www.gov.br/participamaisbrasil/concorrencia-plataformas-digitais. See also Dario da Silva Oliveira Neto, Some Remarks on the Comments Submitted to the Brazilian Public Consultation on Economic and Competitive Aspects of Digital Platforms Held by the Ministry of Finance, Kluwer Competition L. Blog (June 4, 2024), https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/competition-blog/some-remarks-on-the-comments-submitted-to-the-brazilian-public-consultation-on-economic-and-competitive-aspects-of-digital-platforms-held-by-the-ministry-of-finance.

[18] See Brazilian Secretariat of Economic Reforms (Ministry of Finance), Digital Platforms: Competition Aspects and Regulatory Recommendations for Brazil (Dec. 16, 2024), https://www.gov.br/fazenda/pt-br/central-de-conteudo/publicacoes/relatorios/sre/digital-platforms-competition-regulatory-recommendations-brazil-en.pdf.

[19] See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, supra note 14, at 1970 (“Notwithstanding overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the market for digital platforms is often said to be winner-take-all. But this is rarely true.”).

[20] See Jonathan M. Barnett, Illusions of Dominance: Revisiting the Market-Power Assumption in Platform Ecosystems, 86 Antitrust L.J. 1 (2024); Christopher Yoo, Network Effects in Action, in The Global Antitrust Institute Report on the Digital Economy (Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg eds., 2020), https://gaidigitalreport.com/2020/08/25/network-effects-in-action.

[21] Agenda Brasil Digital was unveiled at a political ceremony on Sept. 17, 2025. See also Dario Oliveira Neto & Lazar Radic, Brazil’s Digital Markets Bill: A DMA Through the Back Door?, Truth on the Mkt. (Sept. 24, 2025), https://truthonthemarket.com/2025/09/24/brazils-digital-markets-bill-a-dma-through-the-back-door.

[22] See Brasil, Relatório de Sistematização das Contribuições à Tomada de Subsídios nº 1/2024, Ministério da Fazenda, Secretaria de Reformas Econômicas (2024), https://www.gov.br/fazenda/pt-br/central-de-conteudo/publicacoes/relatorios/sre/relatorio-sre-tomada-de-subsidios.pdf/view.

[23] Exposição de Motivos Interministerial nº 00099/2025 MJSP AGU MF MGI, https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/prop_mostrarintegra?codteor=3003060&filename=PL%204675/2025.

[24] Id. at 3 (“This proposal introduces new measures that place Brazil at the vanguard of competition protection on digital platforms, alongside legal systems such as Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom.”).

[25] See Ebazar.com.br Ltda. & Mercado Pago Instituição de Pagamento Ltda. v. Apple Inc. & Apple Services LATAM LLC, Processo Administrativo No. 08700.009531/2022-04, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica [CADE] (Braz.); In re Apple Inc. & Apple Services LATAM LLC, Requerimento de TCC No. 08700.006953/2025-62, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica [CADE] (Braz.). See also Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica [CADE], CADE Signs a Cease and Desist Agreement with Apple (Jan. 5, 2026), https://www.gov.br/cade/en/matters/news/cade-signs-a-cease-and-desist-agreement-with-apple; Public Version of Apple TCC, https://sei.cade.gov.br/sei/modulos/pesquisa/md_pesq_documento_consulta_externa.php?HJ7F4wnIPj2Y8B7Bj80h1lskjh7ohC8yMfhLoDBLddagMC0PGtHHNJ5OLjWmXqqKoNDHq57WbWDJKa4eAKK0enGmrJphBHiCJbWXKXvI8K_s-573DMQSRm2YO5d-Z. See also Oliveira Neto & Zúñiga, supra note 5.

[26] See CADE ex officio v. Google Inc. & Google Brasil Internet Ltda., Inquérito Administrativo No. 08700.002940/2019-76, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica [CADE] (Braz.); In re Google LLC & Google Brasil Internet Ltda., Requerimento de TCC No. 08700.007062/2025-23, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica [CADE] (Braz.). See also Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica [CADE], CADE Signs Cease and Desist Agreement with Google (Dec. 22, 2025), https://www.gov.br/cade/en/matters/news/cade-signs-cease-and-desist-agreement-with-google; Public Version of Google TCC, https://sei.cade.gov.br/sei/modulos/pesquisa/md_pesq_documento_consulta_externa.php?HJ7F4wnIPj2Y8B7Bj80h1lskjh7ohC8yMfhLoDBLddbIYnvUI1X8bWwIhToKTn1x5R0mu6h3LUb759k5CTmSg4i6bYBGxz4PFNami4VYRNZ3Y2xQJfx6E2IFcAjrYNqQ.

[27] See Oliveira Neto & Zúñiga, supra note 5.

[28] See Geoffrey A. Manne, Dirk Auer, Lazar Radic, Selçukhan Ünekbas & Mario A. Zúñiga, ICLE Response to First Review of the Digital Markets Act, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. (Sept. 24, 2025), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/icle-response-to-first-review-of-the-digital-markets-act/ (finding that DMA enforcement has produced “lengthy proceedings, protracted compliance discussions, and frequent recourse to parallel competition-law investigations”) [hereinafter ICLE DMA Review Response].

[29] See Abbott B. Lipsky, Douglas H. Ginsburg, Alexander Raskovich & Dario da Silva Oliveira Neto, Comment of the Global Antitrust Institute on the Brazilian Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Reform Request for Contributions: Economic and Competitive Aspects of Digital Platforms 24 (Geo. Mason Univ. L. & Econ. Rsch. Paper No. 24-11, May 2024), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4815130. The authors note that EU case law under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU aligns with DMA obligations, while Brazil lacks a comparable body of precedent. They report that, of seven Brazilian antitrust cases involving digital platforms, only three reached a decision—and all were dismissed—while four remain under investigation. No infringement has yet been found in Brazilian digital markets.

[30] See supra notes 25-26.

[31] Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica [CADE], Mercados de Plataformas Digitais, Cadernos do CADE (rev. ed. 2023) (Braz.), https://cdn.cade.gov.br/Portal/centrais-de-conteudo/publicacoes/estudos-economicos/cadernos-do-cade/Caderno_Plataformas-Digitais_Atualizado_29.08.pdf.

[32] Id. at 162 (“Between 1995 and Apr. 30, 2023, 23 investigations were initiated regarding the markets examined [digital markets] in this report. Of these, 9 remained under investigation, 11 were dismissed, and 3 were closed through Termos de Cessação de Conduta (TCC). The conduct primarily involved exclusivity agreements and abuse of dominance.”). This data is likely outdated, but CADE still has not issued a fully adjudicated conviction in digital-market cases.

[33] Org. for Econ. Co-op. & Dev. (OECD), OECD Peer Reviews of Competition Law and Policy: Brazil (2019), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/oecd-peer-reviews-of-competition-law-and-policy-brazil-2019.htm. See also Geoffrey A. Manne, Dirk Auer & Mario Zúñiga, ICLE Comments to Brazil’s CADE on Competition in Digital Ecosystems of Mobile Devices, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. (Feb. 11, 2025), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/icle-comments-to-brazils-cade-on-competition-in-digital-ecosystems-of-mobile-devices (citing the OECD’s finding that CADE “is considered one of the most efficient public agencies in Brazil” as evidence of its capacity to address digital-market challenges).

[34] See Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica [CADE], The General Superintendence Is Investigating the Acquisitions of Artificial Intelligence Startups by Big Tech Companies (Aug. 26, 2024), https://www.gov.br/cade/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/superintendencia-geral-apura-aquisicoes-de-startups-de-inteligencia-artificial-por-big-techs. In merger control, CADE may review consummated transactions below the notification threshold for up to one year under Article 88(7) of the Brazilian Competition Law. See infra Section III.D.3.

[35] See Beatriz Kira, Brazil’s Fair Digital Competition Bill Offers an Alternative to Regulating Big Tech, ProMarket (Nov. 7, 2025), https://www.promarket.org/2025/11/07/brazils-fair-digital-competition-bill-offers-an-alternative-to-regulating-big-tech; Victor Oliveira Fernandes, Brazil’s Calibrated Revolution in Digital Competition, ProMarket (Nov. 12, 2025), https://www.promarket.org/2025/11/12/brazils-calibrated-revolution-in-digital-competition. For a comprehensive analysis of the Brazilian Google Shopping case, see Dario da Silva Oliveira Neto, Otávio Augusto de Oliveira Cruz Filho & Alexandre Cordeiro Macedo, The Rule of Reason and the Fundamentals Against More Presumption-Based Illegality Legal Standards: Highlights on CADE’s Decisions on Digital Economy Issues, 12 J. Antitrust Enforcement 570 (2024).

[36] See Oliveira Neto & Zúñiga, supra note 5.

[37] Manne, Auer, Radic, Ünekbas & Zúñiga, supra note 28, at 9.

[38] See Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica [CADE], CADE’s Contribution to the Ministry of Finance’s Public Consultation for Regulation of Digital Platforms 4 (Apr. 2024), https://cdn.cade.gov.br/Portal/centrais-de-conteudo/publicacoes/contribuicoes-do-cade/contribuicoes-cade-ministerio%20fazenda-ingl%C3%AAs.pdf.

[39] Id at 4.

[40] Id. at 19–20. CADE emphasizes the need for a comprehensive, technically grounded Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) before imposing new obligations on digital platforms. It notes that such a study should assess market characteristics—including concentration, entry barriers, innovation, and user behavior (e.g., single- and multi-homing)—as well as potential anticompetitive effects from vertical and conglomerate integration. A rigorous RIA, CADE explains, is essential to ensure effective and responsible sector-specific regulation.

[41] Id. at 20 (“This process was exemplified by the European Commission (EC) when introducing the DMA, where three approaches to regulation were examined.”).

[42] The Digital Markets Act entered into force on Nov. 1, 2022, and became applicable on May 2, 2023. In practice, however, enforcement of its core obligations began in March 2024, when the first designated gatekeepers were required to comply. This reflects the European Commission’s initial gatekeeper designations in September 2023, followed by the six-month compliance period provided under the regulation.

[43] Louis-Daniel Pape & Michelangelo Rossi, Is Competition Only One Click Away? The Digital Markets Act’s Impact on Google Maps, Mktg. Sci. (forthcoming 2026), https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2025.0159.

[44] Id. at 1.

[45] Chiara Farronato, Andrey Fradkin & Alexander MacKay, Vertical Integration and Consumer Choice: Evidence from a Field Experiment, Working Paper (Mar. 2026), https://alexandermackay.org/files/Vertical%20Integration%20and%20Consumer%20Choice%20-%20Evidence%20from%20a%20Field%20Experiment.pdf.

[46] Id. at 1.

[47] Id. at 35.

[48] Christian Peukert et al., Shrinking Shelf: The Effects of Digital Regulation on Amazon, Presentation at the Workshop on the Economics of the DMA (Sept. 22, 2025), https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/conf/2025/4._longtail_ec_0925.pdf.

[49] Id. at 14, 18.

[50] European Ctr. for Int’l Political Econ. & European Pub. Pol’y P’ship, What About Us? Consumer Response to the Digital Markets Act, ECIPE Occasional Paper No. 10/2025, at 14 (2025), https://ecipe.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/ECI_OccasionalPaper_10-2025_LY05.pdf [hereinafter ECIPE, What About Us?].

[51] Id. at 24 (“Reliance on Google, Meta, Apple, and other incumbents remains as strong as ever…”).

[52] Nextrade Group, Impact of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) on Consumers Across the European Union: Results from a Survey with 5,000 Consumers (Sept. 2025), https://www.nextradegroupllc.com/_files/ugd/478c1a_9d7c98475ce8404188d2f8dbb1c9d2ff.pdf.

[53] Carmelo Cennamo, Tobias Kretschmer, Ioanna Constantiou & Eliana Garcés, Economic Impact of the Digital Markets Act on European Businesses and the European Economy, LAMA Econ. Rsch. 45–46 (June 2025), https://www.dmcforum.net/publications/economic-impact-of-the-digital-markets-act-on-european-businesses-and-the-european-economy.

[54] Id. at 46.

[55] Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Commission Sends Preliminary Findings to Alphabet Under the Digital Markets Act (Mar. 19, 2025), https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/commission-sends-preliminary-findings-alphabet-under-digital-markets-act-2025-03-19_en.

[56] Foo Yun Chee, Exclusive: Google Faces EU Fine Next Year for Favouring Own Services, Sources Say, Reuters (Dec. 11, 2025), https://www.reuters.com/world/google-faces-eu-fine-next-year-favouring-own-services-sources-say-2025-12-11.

[57] Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Commission Finds Apple and Meta in Breach of the Digital Markets Act (Apr. 22, 2025), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1085.

[58] Action brought on July 4, 2025—Meta Platforms v. Comm’n (Case T-435/25), 2025 O.J. (C 5214), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AC_202505214. See also Foo Yun Chee, Apple Takes Fight Against $587 Million EU Antitrust Fine to Court, Reuters (July 7, 2025), https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/apple-takes-fight-against-587-million-eu-antitrust-fine-court-2025-07-07.

[59] Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Commission Opens Proceedings to Assist Google in Complying with Interoperability and Online Search Data Sharing Obligations Under the Digital Markets Act (Jan. 27, 2026), https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/commission-opens-proceedings-assist-google-complying-interoperability-and-online-search-data-sharing-2026-01-27_en.

[60] Onyeka Aralu & Dirk Auer, From Cure to Care: The DMA’s Chronic Regulation Problem, Truth on the Mkt. (Feb. 12, 2026), https://truthonthemarket.com/2026/02/12/from-cure-to-care-the-dmas-chronic-regulation-problem.

[61] Carlo Stagnaro & Christian N?sulea eds., Digital Revival? How Regulation Prevents the Rise of European Tech Leaders 38 (EPICENTER Feb. 2025), https://www.epicenternetwork.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Digital-Revival_revised_web.pdf (“The scope of remedies can shape product design, services, business models, and even firm structure. These interventions raise complex, often highly technical issues and may carry negative implications for innovation.”).

[62] Id. at 37.

[63] Apple Inc., The Digital Markets Act’s Impacts on EU Users (Sept. 24, 2025), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2025/09/the-digital-markets-acts-impacts-on-eu-users. Apple also delayed the rollout of Apple Intelligence in June 2024, citing concerns that the DMA’s interoperability mandates could compromise device security. See Akshaya Asokan, Apple to Delay AI Rollout in Europe: Smartphone Giant Fingers Regulation Meant to Restrain Big Tech, Bank Info Security (June 21, 2024), https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/apple-to-delay-ai-rollout-in-europe-a-25598.

[64] See, e.g., Dan Milmo, Meta Delays EU Launch of Twitter Rival Threads Amid Uncertainty Over Personal Data Use, The Guardian (July 5, 2023), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2023/jul/05/meta-delays-eu-launch-of-twitter-rival-threads-amid-uncertainty-over-personal-data-use.

[65] See Egle Markeviciute, Consumer Waiting Game: Why Do Tech Products Launch Later in Europe?, Euronews (Sept. 26, 2025), https://www.euronews.com/next/2025/09/26/consumer-waiting-game-why-do-tech-products-launch-later-in-europe.

[66] See Cynthia Kroet, Google’s AI Feature on Hold in Most EU Member States Due to ‘Strict Rules’, Euronews (Apr. 1, 2025), https://www.euronews.com/next/2025/04/01/googles-ai-feature-on-hold-in-most-eu-member-states-due-to-strict-rules.

[67] See Anti-American Antitrust: How Foreign Governments Target U.S. Businesses: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Admin. State, Reg. Reform, and Antitrust of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 119th Cong. 17 (Dec. 16, 2025) (statement of Dirk Auer), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU05/20251216/118753/HHRG-119-JU05-Wstate-AuerD-20251216-U2.pdf. Auer explains that regulatory costs are spread across millions of consumers: when users receive “a less useful list of links” instead of integrated tools, they “lose time and convenience” but often attribute the decline to the product itself, rather than regulation. This “rational ignorance” shields regulators from accountability. He adds that while aggregate welfare losses may be significant, the per-user harm is too small to generate backlash, and foreign firms’ objections are easily dismissed as the “whining of monopolists.”

[68] Mert Demirer, Diego J. Jiménez Hernández, Dean Li & Sida Peng, Data, Privacy Laws and Firm Production: Evidence from the GDPR 42 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 32146, Feb. 2026), https://www.diegojimenezh.com/assets/pdf/Demirer_et_al2023_Privacy.pdf.

[69] Jian Jia, Ginger Z. Jin & Liad Wagman, The Short-Run Effects of GDPR on Technology Venture Investment, 40 Mktg. Sci. 661 (2021).

[70] Jian Jia, Ginger Zhe Jin & Liad Wagman, The Persisting Effects of the EU General Data Protection Regulation on Technology Venture Investment, Antitrust Source 1, 6 (June 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust-magazine-online/2021/june-2021/jun2021-jia.pdf.

[71] Lazar Radic & Dirk Auer, A Europe Fit for the Age of Startups: Rhetoric and Reality in the EU’s Digital Package, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. 17 (Aug. 1, 2025), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/a-europe-fit-for-the-age-of-startups-rhetoric-and-reality-in-the-eus-digital-package.

[72] Mario Draghi, The Future of European Competitiveness: Part A: A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe, Eur. Comm’n (Sept. 2024), https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en.

[73] Id. at 24 (“The key driver of the rising productivity gap between the EU and the US has been digital technology … and Europe currently looks set to fall further behind. The main reason EU productivity diverged from the US in the mid-1990s was Europe’s failure to capitalize on the first digital revolution … both in generating new tech companies and diffusing digital technology across the economy. Excluding the tech sector, EU productivity growth over the past twenty years would be broadly at par with the US. Europe is lagging in the breakthrough digital technologies that will drive future growth.”).

[74] Id. at 6 (emphasis added).

[75] See id. at 14 (“Only four of the world’s top 50 tech companies are European, and the EU’s global position in tech is deteriorating: from 2013 to 2023, its share of global tech revenues fell from 22% to 18%, while the U.S. share rose from 30% to 38%.”).

[76] See infra Section III.D.3.

[77] See Radic & Auer, supra note 71, at 42 (“To the extent the Digital Package imposes burdens on large firms and, through compliance costs and reduced exit opportunities, raises barriers for startups to scale, it may undermine the goal of fostering competitive European firms and reclaiming technological leadership.”).

[78] See World Justice Project, supra note 6.

[79] See World Bank Group, supra note 7.

[80] Joseph V. Coniglio, Lilla Nóra Kiss, Giorgio Castiglia & Hadi Houalla, A Policymaker’s Guide to Digital Antitrust Regulation, Info. Tech. & Innovation Found. (Mar. 31, 2025), https://itif.org/publications/2025/03/31/a-policymakers-guide-to-digital-antitrust-regulation.

[81] Matthias Bauer, Dyuti Pandya & Vanika Sharma, EU Export of Regulatory Overreach: The Case of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) 2 (Eur. Ctr. for Int’l Political Econ., Policy Brief No. 08/2025, 2025), https://ecipe.org/publications/eu-export-of-regulatory-overreach-dma.

[82] Corruption Perceptions Index 2025, Transparency Int’l (Feb. 10, 2026), https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2025.

[83] Jean Comte, ‘Grossly Understaffed’ EU Competition Enforcers Must Prioritize, Guersent Says, MLex (Apr. 8, 2025), https://www.mlex.com/mlex/articles/2322385.

[84] See infra Section III.C.

[85] See Edoardo Ghirotto, Fazenda Diz que Cade Terá Realocação de Equipes se PL 4675/25 for Aprovado, JOTA (Nov. 28, 2025), https://www.jota.info/executivo/fazenda-diz-que-cade-tera-realocacao-de-equipes-se-pl-4675-25-for-aprovado.

[86] See, e.g., Confederação Nacional da Indústria, Custo Brasil: O Vilão Invisível que Não Anda Só (2025), https://cni.portaldaindustria.com.br/custo-brasil.

[87] Observatório do Custo Brasil, Observatório do Custo Brasil: Ferramenta para Monitorar Políticas Públicas Estratégicas com Potencial na Redução do Custo Brasil e Melhoria da Competitividade, https://custobrasil.org.br.

[88] Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria, Comércio e Serviços [MDIC], Agenda de Redução do Custo-Brasil, Secretaria de Competitividade e Política Regulatória, Melhoria do Ambiente de Negócios 5 (June 2025), https://static.portaldaindustria.com.br/portaldaindustria/noticias/media/filer_public/0b/79/0b7935cb-c61c-48f6-98d9-a5fd323b95b7/relatriocustobrasil012025.pdf (“O Custo Brasil é um dos principais obstáculos ao crescimento sustentável e à competitividade da economia nacional, refletindo ineficiências como excesso de burocracia, infraestrutura deficiente, insegurança jurídica e distorções regulatórias.”).

[89] Org. for Econ. Co-op. & Dev. (OECD), Key Takeaways from the 2023–2024 Update of the OECD Product Market Regulation Indicators (2024), https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/product-market-regulation.html.

[90] Org. for Econ. Co-op. & Dev. (OECD), OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) Indicators: How Does Brazil Compare? (2024), https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-sub-issues/product-market-regulation/Brazil_PMR%20country%20note.pdf.

[91] Org. for Econ. Co-op. & Dev. (OECD), Regulatory Reform in Brazil, OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform (2022), https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/06/regulatory-reform-in-brazil_da75f3f8/d81c15d7-en.pdf.

[92] See Mario A. Zúñiga, Regulatory Reconquista: Ex-Ante Regulation of Digital Platforms in Latin America, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. (Mar. 17, 2025), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/regulatory-reconquista-ex-ante-regulation-of-digital-platforms-in-latin-america.

[93] Ayesha Bhatti, How the Brussels Effect Hinders Innovation in the Global South, Ctr. for Data Innovation (Jan. 26, 2026), https://itif.org/publications/2026/01/26/how-brussels-effect-hinders-innovation-in-global-south.

[94] See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Manne & Dirk Auer, Brussels Effect or Brussels Defect: Digital Regulation in Emerging Markets, Truth on the Mkt. (Dec. 20, 2022), https://truthonthemarket.com/2022/12/20/brussels-effect-or-brussels-defect-digital-regulation-in-emerging-markets (“The most pressing challenge is to attract investment from international tech firms in the first place, not how to regulate their conduct.”).

[95] Robert D. Atkinson, Letter to the Trump Administration Regarding Non-Tariff Attacks on U.S. Tech Firms and Industries, Info. Tech. & Innovation Found. (July 2, 2025), https://itif.org/publications/2025/07/02/letter-regarding-non-tariff-attacks-on-ustech-firms-and-industries.

[96] Miko?aj Barczentewicz, The Digital Markets Act as an EU Digital Tax: When Compliance Costs Dwarf Regulatory Estimates, Truth on the Mkt. (July 8, 2025), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/the-digital-markets-act-as-an-eu-digital-tax-whencompliance-costs-dwarf-regulatory-estimates.

[97] Gatekeepers, Eur. Comm’n (last visited Mar. 12, 2026), https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/gatekeepers_en.

[98] See The White House, Defending American Companies and Innovators from Overseas Extortion and Unfair Fines and Penalties, Presidential Actions (Feb. 21, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/defending-american-companies-and-innovators-from-overseas-extortion-and-unfair-fines-and-penalties.

[99] See Siladitya Ray, JD Vance Knocks EU’s Regulation of U.S. Tech Giants: “America Cannot Accept That”, Forbes (Feb. 11, 2025), https://www.forbes.com/sites/siladityaray/2025/02/11/jd-vance-knocks-eus-regulation-of-us-tech-giants-america-cannot-accept-that.

[100] See Kim Marcrael, U.S. Sanctions Former EU Official Over Digital-Content Law, Wall St. J. (Dec. 24, 2025), https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/u-s-sanctions-former-eu-official-over-digital-content-law-c41f574c.

[101] See Patricia Campos Mello, Governo Quer Urgência no Novo Antitruste Digital e Não Teme Reação dos EUA, Diz Dario Durigan, Folha de S. Paulo (Nov. 2, 2025), https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2025/11/governo-quer-urgencia-no-novo-antitruste-digital-e-nao-teme-reacao-dos-eua-diz-dario-durigan.shtml.

[102] Id.

[103] Auer, supra note 67, at 18.

[104] See Zúñiga, supra note 8.

[105] See Digital Platforms, supra note 18, § 3.1.

[106] Id. at § 4.1.

[107] Id. at § 4.1.1, Proposal 1.

[108] Giorgio Castiglia, Brazil Should Avoid Rushing Into DMA-Style Regulation, Info. Tech. & Innovation Found. (Feb. 20, 2026), https://itif.org/publications/2026/02/20/brazil-should-avoid-rushing-into-dma-style-regulation.

[109] See Zúñiga, supra note 8.

[110] Id.

[111] BCL, art. 1.

[112] Id.

[113] Id. art. 4.

[114] Id. art. 6.

[115] Id. art. 36, § 1.

[116] Org. for Econ. Co-op. & Dev. (OECD), The Consumer Welfare Standard: Advantages and Disadvantages Compared to Alternative Standards (2023), https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2023/05/consumer-welfare-standards-advantages-and-disadvantages-compared-to-alternative-standards_4de3277e/3d174fdf-en.pdf (noting that the consumer welfare standard admits “a range of alternative definitions” and “many nuanced takes,” and extends beyond price to include quality, variety, service, and innovation).

[117] See BCL, art. 88, § 5.

[118] Id. art. 88, § 6.

[119] United States v. Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

[120] See Herbert Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled?, 45 J. Corp. L. 101 (2019), https://jcl.law.uiowa.edu/sites/jcl.law.uiowa.edu/files/2021-08/Hovenkamp_Final_Web.pdf.

[121] See generally Kenneth Heyer, Consumer Welfare and the Legacy of Robert Bork, 57 J.L. & Econ. 19 (2014), https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/676463. Legally, this means that even if a merger increases total welfare through efficiencies, CADE must reject it unless the parties show that a significant share of those gains will accrue to consumers.

[122] Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica [CADE], Guia para Análise de Atos de Concentração Horizontal (July 2016) (Braz.), https://cdn.cade.gov.br/Portal/centrais-de-conteudo/publicacoes/guias-do-cade/guia-para-analise-de-atos-de-concentracao-horizontal.pdf.

[123] Eric Hadmann Jasper, Paradoxo Tropical: A Finalidade do Direito da Concorrência no Brasil, 7 Rev. de Defesa da Concorrência 171, 186–87 (2019).

[124] Gustavo Manicardi Schneider & Rodrigo Fialho Borges, Qual Bem-Estar do Consumidor? Um Objetivo sem Significado, 188 Rev. Dir. Mercantil, Indus., Econ. & Fin. 65, 89 (2025).

[125] Bill 4,675/2025, supra note 1, art. 47-B, §§ I–III.

[126] For an explanation of why scale alone does not constitute antitrust harm, see Brian Albrecht, Scale and Antitrust: Where Is the Harm?, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. (Nov. 22, 2023), https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/tldr-Scale.pdf.

[127] CADE has not issued formal guidelines on unilateral conduct but is expected to do so in 2026 or 2027 following an internal initiative and the hiring of an external consultant. In practice, CADE defines the relevant market and assesses dominance before evaluating conduct. Consistent with this approach, proposed guidelines by the Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos de Concorrência, Consumo e Comércio Internacional (IBRAC) include a preliminary step to assess dominance based on market definition and market-power analysis. See Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos de Concorrência, Consumo e Comércio Internacional [IBRAC], Guia de Condutas Unilaterais (2020), https://ibrac.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/IBRAC_-_Guia_de_Condutas_Unilaterais.pdf.

[128] See CADE, Guia para Análise de Atos de Concentração Horizontal, supra note 122, § 2.5.1.

[129] Marius Schwartz, The Nature and Scope of Contestability Theory, 38 Oxford Econ. Papers (New Series), Supplement: Strategic Behaviour and Industrial Competition 37, 38–39 (1986). See generally William J. Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 1 (1982); William J. Baumol, John Panzar & Robert D. Willig, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure (rev. ed. 1988).

[130] Manne, Auer & Radic, Regulate for What?, supra note 15, at 236 (quoting Schwartz, id. at 38).

[131] Id. at 236–37.

[132] See, e.g., Maureen K. Ohlhausen & John M. Taladay, Are Competition Officials Abandoning Competition Principles?, 13 J. Competition L. & Prac. 463, 465 (2022) (“Some recent legislative and regulatory proposals appear to depart from this basic premise. Rather than protecting competition itself, they impose requirements on certain firms to benefit rivals, including those that lagged in investment, innovation, or product development. While such measures may constrain gatekeepers and assist competitors, it remains unclear how they benefit consumers, as opposed to competitors.”).

[133] See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 47, 56 (1982) (“The challenge in crafting policy on entry barriers lies in distinguishing socially desirable from undesirable costs. A narrow focus on production costs overlooks investments in reputation, innovation risk, and efficient scale, while ignoring how current policy shapes future incentives.”). See also Brian Albrecht, What Is a Barrier to Entry?, Truth on the Mkt. (July 7, 2023), https://truthonthemarket.com/2023/07/07/what-is-a-barrier-to-entry (“The problem with Bain’s framework is not his definition but its failure to distinguish cause from effect and endogenous from exogenous factors. Many so-called barriers—such as product differentiation and scale—reflect firm choices and dynamic competition, rather than fixed structural constraints.”).

[134] See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1984); Geoffrey A. Manne, Error Costs in Digital Markets, in The Global Antitrust Institute Report on the Digital Economy 33 (Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright eds., 2020), https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/SSRN-id3733662.pdf.

[135] Lazar Radic & Nicolas Petit, The Superiority of the Consumer Welfare Standard, EUI Dep’t of L. Working Paper No. 2024/20 (Dec. 15, 2024), https://ssrn.com/abstract=5065469.

[136] See Manne, Radic & Auer, Regulate for What?, supra note 15, at XX (observing that digital competition regimes grounded in vague goals such as “fairness” and “contestability,” untethered to consumer welfare, lack clear benchmarks and risk protecting competitors rather than competition).

[137] This concern is not unique to Brazil. Ex ante regimes globally tend to reshape competition-law concepts in subtle but significant ways, subordinating consumer welfare to broader and more abstract goals and, in doing so, transforming competition regimes into mechanisms for rent redistribution among firms. See Manne, Radic & Auer, Regulate for What?, supra note 15, at 217–28 (analyzing how ex ante regimes subvert traditional competition-law principles); id. at 228–34 (documenting rent redistribution as a common objective).

[138] Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps Choice, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2405, 2409 (2013).

[139] Id. at 2416–17.

[140] If harmful, standard competition analysis already accounts for it. See, e.g., id. at 2422 (“While incorporating product variety, quality, and innovation into welfare analysis is desirable when done correctly…, modern antitrust analysis comfortably incorporates the tradeoffs between price and quality that consumers face.”).

[141] See Schneider & Borges, supra note 124, at 88.

[142] See Thom Lambert, Rent-Seeking and Public Choice in Digital Markets, in The Global Antitrust Institute Report on the Digital Economy (Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg eds., 2020), https://gaidigitalreport.com/2020/08/25/rent-seeking-and-public-choice-in-digital-markets; Manne, Auer & Radic, Regulate for What?, supra note 15, at 254.

[143] See Bill 4,675/2025, supra note 1, art. 47-C.

[144] Id. at §§ I-VI.

[145] See id.

[146] See id.

[147] See, e.g., Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. Eur. Econ. Ass’n 990 (2003).

[148] See, e.g., Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence, 45 J. Econ. Lit. 629, 633–37 (2007).

[149] See Geoffrey A. Manne & Dirk Auer, Antitrust Dystopia and Antitrust Nostalgia: Alarmist Theories of Harm in Digital Markets and Their Origins, 28 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1281 (2021).

[150] William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 937 (1981).

[151] See Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1973). See also Chad Syverson, Macroeconomics and Market Power: Context, Implications, and Open Questions, 33 J. Econ. Persp. 23, 26 (2019) (“[C]oncentration is worse than just a noisy barometer of market power. Instead, we cannot even generally know which way the barometer is oriented.”); Steven Berry, Martin Gaynor & Fiona Scott Morton, Do Increasing Markups Matter? Lessons from Empirical Industrial Organization, 33 J. Econ. Persp. 44, 46 (2019) (“Within the field of industrial organization, the structure-conduct-performance approach has been discredited for a long time.”); id. at 48 (“In short, there is no well-defined ‘causal effect of concentration on price,’ but rather a set of hypotheses that can explain observed correlations….”).

[152] See Ministério da Fazenda, Governo Federal Envia à Câmara dos Deputados Projeto para Regulação Concorrencial das Big Techs (Sept. 17, 2025), https://www.gov.br/fazenda/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2025/setembro/governo-federal-envia-a-camara-dos-deputados-projeto-para-regulacao-concorrencial-das-big-techs (“It is estimated that five to ten platforms operating in Brazil will be designated.”).

[153] See Manne, Radic & Auer, supra note 15, at 229–33 (documenting how ex ante regimes across jurisdictions aim to redistribute rents from large, predominantly U.S.-based, technology firms to domestic competitors and business users).

[154] See Oliveira Neto & Radic, Brazil’s Digital Markets Bill: A DMA Through the Back Door?, supra note 21.

[155] See Bill 4,675/2025, supra note 1, art. 87-A, § 2.

[156] See Easterbrook, supra note 134.

[157] See Manne, Error Costs in Digital Markets, supra note 134.

[158] DMCC, ch. 1, §§ 2–5.

[159] Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [GWB] [Competition Act], as amended by Gesetz, Oct. 25, 2023, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I] 294 (Ger.), § 19a(1)(1).

[160] See supra Section III.A.2.a.

[161] David S. Evans, Attention Rivalry Among Online Platforms, 9 J. Competition L. & Econ. 313 (2013).

[162] See Bill 4,675/2025, supra note 1, art. 14-A, § 2.

[163] See id., art. 14-B.

[164] See DMA, Eur. Comm’n (last visited Mar. 26, 2026), https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/index_en (“The European Commission is the sole enforcer of the DMA. A joint team in the Directorates-General for Competition (DG COMP) and Communications Networks, Content and Technology (DG CONNECT) is responsible for its implementation and enforcement.”).

[165] Working in Digital at the CMA, Competition & Markets Auth. (last visited Mar. 26, 2026), https://www.civil-service-careers.gov.uk/cma-working-in-digital-at-the-cma.

[166] Bundeskartellamt, The Bundeskartellamt: Organisation, Tasks and Activities (2022), https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Broschueren/Brochure_About_%20Bundeskartellamt.pdf.

[167] See Bill 4,675/2025, supra note 1, arts. 87-A–87-B.

[168] See id. at arts. 87-A, § 5 & 87-B, § 5.

[169] See id. at arts. 87-A, § 6 & 87-B, § 6.

[170] For a comprehensive analysis of the risks and consequences of regulatory extortion, see Fred S. McChesney, Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion (1997).

[171] See Ghirotto, supra note 85.

[172] See Comte, supra note 83.

[173] See Oliveira Neto & Radic, supra note 21.

[174] See Bill 4,675/2025, supra note 1, art. 47-E, § IV(b)–(h).

[175] Geoffrey A. Manne, Against the Vertical Discrimination Presumption, Concurrences, No. 2, at 1 (May 2020).

[176] See generally Geoffrey A. Manne, Kristian Stout & Eric Fruits, The Fatal Economic Flaws of the Contemporary Campaign Against Vertical Integration, 68 Kan. L. Rev. 923 (2020).

[177] Dario Oliveira Neto, Self-Preferencing in Brazil: Should We Regulate Before We Understand?, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. 4 (2025), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/self-preferencing-in-brazil-should-we-regulate-before-we-understand.

[178] See, e.g., Michael Salinger, Self-Preferencing, in The Global Antitrust Institute Report on the Digital Economy 329, 333 (Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg eds., 2020), https://gaidigitalreport.com/2020/08/25/self-preferencing; Manne, supra note 175.

[179] Yuta Kittaka, Susumu Sato & Yusuke Zennyo, Self-Preferencing by Platforms: A Literature Review, 66 Japan & the World Econ. 101191, 8 (2023). See also Feng Zhu, Friends or Foes? Examining Platform Owners’ Entry into Complementors’ Spaces, 28 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 23, 27 (2019).

[180] See Zhuoxin Li & Ashish Agarwal, Platform Integration and Demand Spillovers in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Facebook’s Integration of Instagram, 63 Mgmt. Sci. 3438 (2017).

[181] See Jens Foerderer et al., Does Platform Owner’s Entry Crowd Out Innovation? Evidence from Google Photos, 29 Info. Sys. Res. 444 (2018).

[182] See Carmelo Cennamo, Yuan Gu & Feng Zhu, Value Co-Creation and Capture in the Creative Industry: The U.S. Home Video Game Market, Working Paper (2016), http://questromworld.bu.edu/platformstrategy/files/2017/06/PlatStrat_2017_paper_21.pdf.

[183] See Farronato et al., supra note 45.

[184] Yusuke Zennyo, Platform Encroachment and Own-Content Bias, 70 J. Indus. Econ. 684, 705 (2022).

[185] See Pape & Rossi, supra note 43; Nextrade Grp., supra note 52, at 2; ECIPE, What About Us?, supra note 50, at 14.

[186] See Legal Grounds Institute, Legal Grounds’ Report on the Impact of Bill 2768 on Legal Certainty: Summary of the Findings (2025), https://legalgroundsinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/FindingsReportSelf-Preferencingfinal.pdf.

[187] Id. at 10.

[188] Id.

[189] Id.

[190] See Rochet & Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, supra note 147 (analyzing two-sided platform economics and the welfare effects of limits on cross-subsidization and steering).

[191] See Manne et al., ICLE DMA Review Response, supra note 28, at 14.

[192] See Bill 4,675/2025, supra note 1, art. 47-E(V)(a)–(h).

[193] See id. art. 47-E, § 2 (providing that CADE “may consider” information-security factors).

[194] See Kati Suominen, New Costs and Cybersecurity Challenges Flagged as DMA Compliance Starts, Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Stud. (Mar. 22, 2024), https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-costs-and-cybersecurity-challenges-flagged-dma-compliance-starts.

[195] See Oliveira Neto & Zúñiga, supra note 5.

[196] See Brasil, Lei nº 13.709, de 14 de agosto de 2018, art. 18(V) (Braz.) [hereinafter LGPD].

[197] See Matthew Kilcoyne & Joseph V. Coniglio, Comments to European Commission, In the Matter of: Consultation on Joint Guidelines on the Interplay Between DMA and GDPR, Info. Tech. & Innovation Found. (Dec. 4, 2025), https://itif.org/publications/2025/12/04/comments-european-commission-joint-guidelines-on-interplay-between-dma-and-gdpr.

[198] Marc Bourreau, Jan Krämer & Miriam Buiten, Interoperability in Digital Markets, Ctr. on Regul. in Eur. [CERRE] (Mar. 2022), https://cerre.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/220321_CERRE_Report_Interoperability-in-Digital-Markets_FINAL.pdf.

[199] See Brian Albrecht, Network Effects and Interoperability, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. (May 5, 2023), https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Interoperability-TLDR.pdf.

[200] Ofcom, Mandated Interoperability in Digital Markets 18–19 (Econ. Discussion Paper Series, Issue 8, Nov. 2, 2023), https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/research-and-data/economic-discussion-papers-/discussion-paper-mandated-interoperability-in-digital-markets?v=330343 (“There is a fundamental interaction between innovation and interoperability….”).

[201] Id. at 8.

[202] See Inge Graef, Martin Husovec & Jeroen van den Boom, Spill-Overs in Data Governance: Uncovering the Uneasy Relationship Between the GDPR’s Right to Data Portability and EU Sector-Specific Data Access Regimes, 9 J. Eur. Consumer & Mkt. L. 3 (2020).

[203] Peter Swire & Yianni Lagos, Why the Right to Data Portability Likely Reduces Consumer Welfare: Antitrust and Privacy Critique, 72 Md. L. Rev. 335, 339 (2013).

[204] Id. at 352.

[205] Christian Reimsbach-Kounatze & Andras Molnar, The Impact of Data Portability on User Empowerment, Innovation, and Competition 5 (OECD Going Digital Toolkit Note No. 25, June 2024), https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/06/the-impact-of-data-portability-on-user-empowerment-innovation-and-competition_ee329380/319f420f-en.pdf.

[206] Geoffrey A. Manne & Sam Bowman, Data Portability and Interoperability: The Promise and Perils of Data Portability Mandates as a Competition Tool, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. (Sept. 10, 2020), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/issue-brief-data-portability-and-interoperability-the-promise-and-perils-of-data-portability-mandates-as-a-competition-tool.

[207] See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407–08 (2004) (warning that compelling firms to share the source of their advantage may weaken incentives for both incumbents and rivals to invest in beneficial facilities).

[208] See Bill 4,675/2025, supra note 1, art. 47-E(I).

[209] See generally Geoffrey A. Manne, Samuel Bowman & Dirk Auer, Technology Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 86 Mo. L. Rev. 1047 (2022).

[210] Gordon M. Phillips & Alexei Zhdanov, Venture Capital Investments, Merger Activity, and Competition Laws Around the World, 13 Rev. Corp. Fin. Stud. 303, 307 (2024).

[211] Manne, Bowman & Auer, supra note 211, at 1113–14.

[212] See generally Radic & Auer, A Europe Fit for the Age of Startups, supra note 71.

[213] See BCL, art. 88.

[214] Oliveira Neto & Zúñiga, supra note 5.

[215] See Bill 4,675/2025, supra note 1, art. 47-E § 2.

[216] See supra Section III.A.1.

[217] See BCL, art. 36.

[218] See DMA recital 23 (“Any justification on economic grounds seeking to enter into market definition or to demonstrate efficiencies deriving from a specific type of behaviour by the undertaking providing core platform services should be discarded, as it is not relevant to the designation as a gatekeeper.”).

[219] See DMCC, pt. 1, ch. 3, § 29 (Countervailing Benefits Exemption).

[220] See id. § 29(2)(a)–(h).

[221] Dirk Auer, Matthew Lesh & Lazar Radic, Digital Overload: How the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill’s Sweeping New Powers Threaten Britain’s Economy, Inst. of Econ. Affs. (Sept. 19, 2023), https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Perspectives_4_Digital-overload_web-1.pdf.

[222] See Manne, Radic & Auer, Regulate for What?, supra note 15, at 201.

[223] See id. at 249–54 (arguing that ex ante regimes treat consumer-welfare losses as acceptable tradeoffs for competitor benefits and for supply-chain wealth transfers deemed “fair” by regulators).

[224] Bill 4,675/2025, supra note 1, art. 87-G(I).

[225] Fredrik Erixon, Andrea Dugo & Dyuti Pandya, Reviewing the Digital Markets Act: Inspirations from Japan, Eur. Ctr. for Int’l Political Econ. [ECIPE] (Feb. 2026), https://ecipe.org/insights/dma-review-inspirations-from-japan.

[226] Lei No. 13.874, de 20 de setembro de 2019, Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.] de 20.09.2019 (Braz.), art. 5.

Ben Sperry on the Future of Section 230

ICLE Senior Scholar Ben Sperry appeared as a guest on the Mobile Dev Memo podcast to discuss recent jury verdicts in California and New Mexico . . .

ICLE Senior Scholar Ben Sperry appeared as a guest on the Mobile Dev Memo podcast to discuss recent jury verdicts in California and New Mexico holding Meta and Google liable for harms allegedly caused by social media design features, including addictive elements and failures to protect minors. Sperry emphasized that these cases could significantly weaken Section 230 protections and raise serious First Amendment concerns by encouraging widespread litigation and increased censorship across online platforms. Audio of the full episode is embedded below.

RECENT EVENTS

AMICUS BRIEFS

ICLE Brief to the Third Circuit in Reading Hospital v Hill-Rom Holdings

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE[1] The International Center for Law & Economics (“ICLE”) is a nonprofit, non-partisan global research and policy center aimed at building the . . .

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE[1]

The International Center for Law & Economics (“ICLE”) is a nonprofit, non-partisan global research and policy center aimed at building the intellectual foundations for sensible, economically grounded policy. ICLE promotes using law and economics methodologies and economic learning to inform policy and has expertise evaluating antitrust law and policy.

ICLE has an interest in ensuring that antitrust law promotes the public interest by remaining grounded in rules informed by sound economic analysis.

Professor Thomas A. Lambert is the Wall Chair in Corporate Law and Governance at the University of Missouri, School of Law, a recognized antitrust scholar, and an academic affiliate of ICLE.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The First Amended Class Action Complaint (“FAC”) by named plaintiff Reading Hospital (“Reading”) against defendant Hill-Rom Holdings, et. al. (“Hill-Rom”) is remarkably unspecific. Reading complains about “corporate enterprise agreements” (“CEAs”) between Hill-Rom and various “integrated delivery networks” (“IDNs”), which are health systems that own or manage multiple hospitals. The IDN with which Reading is affiliated, Tower Health, is a party to one of those CEAs, so Reading surely knows what the agreements entail.

Despite that fact, Reading alleges little about the specific content of the CEAs it is challenging. The FAC avers that the challenged agreements required or encouraged IDN members to buy all or most of their requirements of three types of hospital beds (standard, ICU, and birthing beds) from Hill-Rom rather than from its two leading competitors, Stryker and Linet, both of which produce all three types of beds and compete to secure their own multi-product supply agreements with IDNs. But the FAC alleges nothing about the precise nature of the CEAs’ requirements or incentives, instead referring vaguely to “exclusive dealing” provisions, rebates conditioned on hitting purchase targets (“loyalty rebates”), and discounts for buying multiple separate products from Hill-Rom (“bundled discounts”).

Regardless of whether the FAC is challenging exclusive dealing arrangements, loyalty rebates, bundled discounts, or some combination of the three, it is legally deficient. Because all three practices are often procompetitive—with loyalty rebates and bundled discounts providing an immediate benefit to consumers in the form of lower prices—courts condemn them only when the factual prerequisites to anticompetitive harm are satisfied. For exclusive dealing, the challenged arrangements must foreclose rivals from a large enough proportion of available sales opportunities to hold them below “minimum efficient scale” (“MES”)—i.e., the output level at which all economies of scale (i.e., per-unit cost-savings that result simply from producing more units) are exhausted. Absent such “substantial foreclosure,” an exclusive dealing contract may disadvantage a competitor (by causing it to lose business) but does not injure competition itself (by rendering rivals less efficient and thus less formidable). Loyalty rebates harm competition only if they result in a below-cost price that could drive an equally efficient, but less deep-pocketed, rival from the market. Bundled discounts can cause competitive harm only if they result in a below-cost price for the bundle or include products that the discounter’s rivals do not produce so that they could not match the entire dollar amount of the bundled discount on their own bundles.

Because the FAC does not allege substantial foreclosure that would hold Hill-Rom’s rivals below MES, below-cost pricing on any of Hill-Rom’s products, or a lack of product diversification on the part of Hill-Rom’s rivals so that they could not offer competitive bundled discounts, it does not plead any harm to competition itself. To prevent the Third Circuit from becoming a mecca for antitrust strike suits, this Court should reject plaintiffs’ attempt to saddle defendants with burdensome discovery obligations on the basis of threadbare allegations that do not aver competitive harm. It should affirm the district court’s order dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice.

ARGUMENT

I.          Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged Anticompetitive Exclusive Dealing

a.    Exclusive Dealing Is Usually Procompetitive and Injures Market Competition Only In a Narrow Set of Circumstances.

“Exclusive dealing” refers to an arrangement under which two parties agree to do business exclusively with one another for a period of time. Such contracts are often “of economic advantage to buyers as well as to sellers, and thus indirectly of advantage to the consuming public.” Standard Oil Co v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949). They are ubiquitous, and prohibited only if “competition has been foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected.” Id. at 314. Standard Oil held that the government could challenge exclusive contracts if their effect “may be to substantially lessen competition.” Id. at 302. But the Court later held that private parties must do more. They must be able to show that “the contract will foreclose competition in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected” based on “facts peculiar to the case.” Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961).

This test reflects the prevalence of exclusive dealing in highly competitive markets where such arrangements strengthen competition and increase output. One way they do so is by eliminating “interbrand free riding.” To win sales, producers seek to make their offerings more attractive, often by investing in their distributors. A gasoline manufacturer, for example, may boost sales by providing retailers with attractive signage, good lighting, and free customer items (e.g., roadmaps). If those retailers also carried gasoline from a rival that made no comparable investments (and thus faced lower costs and could charge lower wholesale prices), some of the investing producer’s gains would accrue to that rival. By ensuring that distributor investments do not benefit competitors, exclusive dealing can encourage output-enhancing, consumer-friendly investments. See generally Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J. L. & Econ. 1, 6–11 (1982); Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice 440 (3d ed. 2005).

Exclusive dealing may also benefit consumers by intensifying competition for distribution. To secure exclusivity and the resulting increase in sales, producers often reduce wholesale prices. Retail competition then tends to pass those savings on to consumers as lower retail prices, which can outweigh any loss from reduced product variety and produce net consumer benefits. See generally Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Exclusive Dealing Intensifies Competition for Distribution, 75 Antitrust L. J. 433 (2008).

Even early enforcement decisions like Standard Oil recognized that exclusive dealing can further enhance output by “assur[ing] supply, afford[ing] protection against rises in price, enabl[ing] long-term planning… and obviat[ing] the expense and risk of storage.” Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 306. A gasoline retailer, for instance, may want adequate inventory for peak summer demand. Committing in advance to a fixed quantity risks either surplus or shortage. A requirements contract—under which the retailer agrees to buy all its needs from one supplier in exchange for guaranteed supply—may minimize those risks. See id.

On the producer side, exclusive dealing reduces uncertainty by securing a more “predictable market.” Id. at 306-07.  By improving demand forecasts, such arrangements can encourage producers to expand capacity. See generally Hovenkamp, supra, at 440.

Because of these benefits, exclusive dealing can be anticompetitive only when they substantially foreclose competition on metrics relevant to the line of commerce and facts of a particular industry. Tampa, 365 U.S. at 327. Most industries exhibit economies of scale, meaning that average costs decline as output rises—up to a point. Beyond that point, diminishing returns cause average costs to increase. The lowest output level at which scale economies are exhausted is the industry’s MES. See Robert S. Pindyck & Daniel S. Rubinfeld, Microeconomics 237 (6th ed. 2008); Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Economics 428 (1987). To compete most effectively, firms must reach that level of output.

In certain cases exclusive dealing by a dominant rival can prevent them from doing so. Because expansion requires access to buyers, a dominant firm can restrict rivals’ growth by locking up distribution outlets. If foreclosure is sufficiently substantial, rivals may be unable to reach MES. See generally Joshua D. Wright, Moving Beyond Naïve Foreclosure Analysis, 19 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1163, 1166–71 (2012).The economic results—reduced output and higher prices—can injure competition, not just competitors, where three conditions are present.

First, foreclosure must be substantial enough to push rivals below MES. Id. at 1166. Second, rivals must lack practical alternatives, such as competing for their own exclusive or direct distribution contracts. Third, barriers to entry into the producer’s market must be so significant that new firms cannot enter in response to supracompetitive pricing.

Given the many procompetitive benefits of exclusive dealing it is unsurprising that empirical studies generally find that these conditions are rarely satisfied, and that exclusive dealing enhances rather than reduces competition. See Jan B. Heide et. al., Exclusive Dealing and Business Efficiency, 41 J. L. & Econ. 387 (1998) (finding that “firms are more likely to use exclusive dealing when there is a potential that other manufacturers can free ride on the services they provide” and that “when manufacturers are concerned about the costs that exclusive dealing imposes on end customers, such arrangements are less likely”); Tim R. Sass, The Competitive Effects of Exclusive Dealing, 23 Int’l J. Indus. Org. 203 (2005) (concluding that exclusive dealing in the beer market increases market output); James C. Cooper et. al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23 Int’l J. Indus. Org. 639, 658 (2005) (observing that although “some studies find evidence consistent with both pro- and anticompetitive effects . . . virtually no studies claim to have identified instances where vertical practices were likely to have harmed competition”); Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints, in Handbook of Antitrust Economics 391, 409 (2008) (“[I]t appears that when manufacturers choose to impose restraints, not only do they make themselves better off but they also typically allow consumers to benefit from higher quality products and better service provision”); Daniel O’Brien, The Antitrust Treatment of Vertical Restraints, in The Pros and Cons of Vertical Restraints 40, 76 (2008) (observing that “with few exceptions, the literature does not support the view that [vertical restraints] are used for anticompetitive reasons”).

b.    Reflecting Economic Learning, Supreme Court Precedent Requires Substantial Foreclosure as a Necessary, Though Insufficient, Condition for Exclusive Dealing Liability.

Because (1) procompetitive uses of exclusive dealing are quite common, (2) anticompetitive harm from exclusive dealing can occur only under rare conditions, and (3) most instances of exclusive dealing enhance market output, courts impose a “qualitative foreclosure” test for assessing the legality of such arrangements. They typically start by assessing the percentage of sales opportunities in the relevant geographic and product market the challenged deal has foreclosed to the defendant’s rivals. Tampa, 365 U.S. at 327-29. But the analysis is not merely quantitative. See Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, “Foreclosure,” and Consumer Harm, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 322 (2002) (explaining why governing standard is qualitative foreclosure). As Tampa explains:

“To determine substantiality [of market foreclosure] in a given case, it is necessary to weigh the probable effect of the contract on the relevant area of effective competition, taking into account the relative strength of the parties, the proportionate volume of commerce involved in relation to the total volume of commerce in the relevant market area, and the probable immediate and future effects which preemption of that share of the market might have on effective competition therein.”

Tampa Electric, 365 U.S. at 329 (emphasis added).[2]

Tampa’s effects-based, qualitative foreclosure approach properly reflects economic insights about exclusive dealing’s ability to enhance market output even when it forecloses some sales opportunities for a defendant’s rivals. The Court’s emphasis on the competitive effects of foreclosure requires an assessment of whether the challenged arrangement occasioned an actual change in market output—i.e., a significant change in the total number of units sold, their quality, or the prices charged. If the evidence on that question is indeterminate, courts should then consider:

  • what is minimum efficient scale in the industry at issue, and whether the foreclosure occasioned by the arrangement threatens to drive or hold a rival below that level of output;
  • the likelihood that the challenged arrangement creates procompetitive benefits by reducing interbrand free-riding, intensifying competition for distribution, or cutting costs or otherwise enhancing output by guaranteeing demand for producers or supply for distributors; and
  • barriers to entering the relevant markets.

To state a claim for anticompetitive exclusive dealing, a plaintiff must plead the above or other facts that, taken as true, show that the challenged arrangements actually caused market foreclosure substantial enough to hold the defendants’ rivals below MES or otherwise prevent them from continuing to supply output to the relevant markets.

c.     Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged the Factual Prerequisites to Anticompetitive Harm from Exclusive Dealing.

Given that economically informed pleading requirement, plaintiffs’ FAC is deficient. A well pled exclusive dealing complaint should allege that the challenged agreements would result in a degree of market foreclosure sufficient to hold the defendants’ rivals below MES and that they have consequently been forced out of the market for the output consumers want (here, hospital beds). Yet the FAC says nothing about MES. It provides a conclusory allegation that competitors were deprived of scale but does not allege that the challenged agreements have driven those competitors below MES, much less in ways that have substantially foreclosed them from continuing to offer competitive output. Instead, it admits that these competitors have continued to supply beds in the decade since the challenged agreements were first used.

For this and other reasons the district court noted, the “Plaintiff does not plead facts regarding the necessary degree of foreclosure.” Mem. Op. at 16. Plaintiff says the allegedly exclusive contracts (CEAs) substantially foreclose competition, but “Plaintiff does not attach, quote, or otherwise reference anything from the CEA” to support this conclusion. Id. at 19. That is particularly true because the FAC “is noticeably absent of any allegation that Plaintiff itself has entered into a CEA with Defendants.” Id. at n.2. This point alone makes this case fundamentally different from Tampa and Standard Oil. And the FAC’s failure to allege how CEAs deprived other hospitals of the opportunity to choose among competing suppliers for each contract cycle makes this case fundamentally different from LePage’s and all the other well-pled exclusive dealing cases Plaintiff cites. Indeed, the FAC here admits that hospitals continue to have the same choice of suppliers they have always had, and that those suppliers compete for exclusive contract cycles because they are efficient for hospitals given the installation and training costs associated with the line of commerce (smart beds). These allegations confirm that this case does not allege the actual economic and anticompetitive effects the law requires to state an antitrust claim for exclusive dealing.

The district court correctly found these and other pleading defects fatal to this case. “The share of the market that has allegedly been foreclosed is a major component of a finding of substantial foreclosure.” Mem. Op. at 16. And even where substantial foreclosure is adequately pled, a plaintiff must relate it to consumer harm in the form of reduced output or higher prices caused by the allegedly unlawful terms of the exclusive arrangement. The FAC does neither. It alleges that the deals caused price inflation, but it does not cite any contract or market prices at all, much less tie them to any exclusivity provisions. Instead, plaintiff admits it was not forced to sign any exclusive deal and admits that the other hospitals it purports to represent still have the same choice of bed suppliers they had before the exclusive dealing began over a decade ago. The FAC thus fails to plead any of the economic facts required to challenge exclusive deals under the Supreme Court cases above.

d.    Plaintiffs’ Allegations Suggest Procompetitive Rationales for the Alleged Exclusive Dealing.

The pleading failures above are not surprising, because the FAC describes economic reasons for the allegedly exclusive CEAs that would make them procompetitive for the line of commerce and industry at issue. As discussed above, it is widely recognized that exclusive dealing agreements can provide for supply stability and can mitigate the costs of uncertainty across market fluctuations, to the extent that the agreements increase a seller’s incentive to meet a customer’s requirements fully, and on a reliable basis. See Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, supra, at 359. The FAC itself describes such conditions that would benefit from exclusive agreements. For example, it cites high, rising, and volatile input costs: “To manufacture hospital beds, new entrants need to purchase commodities such as aluminum and steel that are subject to significant volatility. Similarly, hospital bed manufacturing increasingly requires chips and sensors, which have been subject to shortages that have led to rising prices throughout the country.” FAC at 20-21. The FAC characterizes these uncertainties as entry barriers, but uncertainty about the price and availability of key production inputs is a challenge—and a cost—for any incumbent manufacturer of the relevant hospital beds. And “episodic rather than smooth demand” for hospital beds, FAC ¶ 30, confounds planning for the consumers of hospital beds—hospitals, hospital systems, and other health care providers—as well as producers. Both upstream and downstream exclusive dealing agreements can mitigate these costs in ways beneficial to the manufacturers and the IDNs, GPOs, and health care providers with whom they contract. That is a straightforward—and legitimate—business rationale for both parties to an exclusive dealing contract regarding the supply of hospital beds.

Such inconsistencies on both the supply side and the demand side can exacerbate stock inconsistencies as well; and it is understood that exclusive dealing arrangements can reduce stock inconsistencies associated with multiple product lines and myriad SKUs. That is, streamlined stocks and supply chains may be a significant advantage to hospitals, even as a wide range of product choices may be desirable at the time of contracting. See id. at 357 (citing Joyce Beverages, Inc. v. Royal Crown Cola Co., 555 F. Supp. 271, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)). Moreover, the FAC acknowledges that IDNs, such as Tower Health, “naturally prefer to standardize,” their agreements, and that the “promise of future low prices” encourages IDNs (not manufacturers) “to force its individual hospitals to stick to the agreement.” Appx94-95, 118, 120 ¶¶ 70, 178, 181. Again, these are demand-side pressures on manufacturers, such as Hil-Rom, to enter into exclusive arrangements with IDNs. They do not suggest that such agreements result from anticompetitive exploitation of manufacturer market power rather than efficient, procompetitive arrangements.

The FAC also alleges that the importance of product support in hospital bed markets should be seen as a barrier to entry. For example, “U.S. hospital customers demand that suppliers have a local sales and service organization in order to provide dedicated sales support, as well as in-service training, education, and clinical support specific to the U.S. health care industry.” FAC at ¶ 24. Perhaps, but the demand for such services is a demand-side pressures on manufacturers, such as Hil-Rom, Stryker, and Linet, as is the risk that competitors might free-ride on a manufacturer’s investments in such support services, Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, supra, at 312. Exclusive dealing agreements can mitigate the risk of inter-brand free riding and thus enhance incentives for the investments required to meet such demands. Id.

II.          Plaintiffs Have Not Stated a Claim Based on Hill-Rom’s Agreements to Provide Discounts for Meeting Purchase Targets.

While plaintiffs focus primarily on Hill-Rom’s alleged exclusive dealing agreements (without identifying the agreements’ precise terms), they also suggest that Hill-Rom has used conditional price cuts to exclude its rivals, impairing market competition. The Complaint alleges that Hill-Rom’s CEAs “ensur[e] that an IDN cannot achieve its maximum rebate unless the hospitals in the system purchase effectively all of their requirements for the Relevant Products from Hill-Rom.” Cmplt. ¶ 172 (emphasis added). It also refers to purchase thresholds of 80-90% of a hospital’s requirements. Id. at ¶ 160. The Complaint thus suggests (again, with no specificity) that Hill-Rom is using “loyalty rebates”—price cuts conditioned upon meeting purchase targets on individual products—to foreclose its rivals from sales opportunities. Elsewhere, the Complaint alleges that Hill-Rom offers IDNs “bundled discounts”—discounts conditioned on buying a package of different products—to exclude less diversified rivals.[3]

Although both loyalty rebates and bundled discounts may be anticompetitive in certain circumstances, they are not inevitably so. And they always entail immediate consumer benefit in the form of lower prices. To ensure that antitrust law does not chill consumer-friendly discounting without justification, courts wisely limit antitrust liability based on loyalty rebates and bundled discounts to situations in which the factual prerequisites to anticompetitive harm exist. Because plaintiffs have not alleged such factual prerequisites here, they have failed to state an antitrust claim on the basis of either loyalty rebates or bundled discounts.

a.    Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged the Below-Cost Pricing Required to Establish Actionable Loyalty Rebates.

For single-product loyalty rebates—e.g., “we will provide a 20% rebate on all your purchases of standard hospital beds if you purchase at least 80% of your standard bed requirements from us”—there can be no harm to competition unless the discounted price is below the discounter’s cost. A loyalty rebate resulting in a below-cost price may harm competition by winning business from, and perhaps driving from the market, a rival that is as efficient as the discounter but does not have the reserves required to endure losses from below-cost pricing. But if the loyalty rebate results in an above-cost price, any equally efficient rival could match it by cutting its profit margin while still charging a sustainable price. See Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 768 (3d ed. 2008) (“For single-item discounts, no matter how measured or aggregated, exclusion of an equally efficient rival seems implausible, provided that the fully discounted price remains above the seller’s cost.”). Any rival excluded by an above-cost loyalty rebate, then, would be either less efficient than the discounter or less willing to lower its price to a sustainable, though less profitable, level. Winning business from a less efficient or less aggressive rival by enhancing the benefits offered to consumers is hardly anticompetitive; it is the essence of price competition. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986) (“[C]utting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of competition.”).

The Supreme Court has thus limited antitrust liability for simple price cuts to those that result in below-cost prices that an equally efficient rival could not sustainably match. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 (1993) (“[A] plaintiff seeking to establish competitive injury resulting from a rival’s low prices must prove that the prices complained of are below an appropriate measure of its rival’s costs.”); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990) (“Low prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten competition.”). The Circuit Courts—including this Court—have extended that holding to rebates conditioned on meeting single-product purchase targets. ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 274 n. 11 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[W]e join our sister circuits in holding that the price-cost test applies to market share or volume rebates offered by suppliers in a single-product market.”) (citing NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 452 (6th Cir. 2007); Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1061 (8th Cir. 2000); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 236 (1st Cir. 1983)).

Although plaintiffs’ complaint does appear to allege some sort of loyalty rebate (albeit with no specificity), it never alleges that the post-rebate price on any product was below Hill-Rom’s cost. Accordingly, the complaint does not state an antitrust claim arising from loyalty rebates.

b.    Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged Actionable Bundled Discounts Because They Have Not Identified Less Diversified Rivals that Are Plausibly Excluded By Hill-Rom’s Discount Arrangements.

While below-cost pricing is not a prerequisite to anticompetitive harm from a bundled discount, no such harm can result when (1) the discounted bundle price is non-predatory in that it exceeds the aggregate cost of the items in the bundle (i.e., the discount is an “above-cost bundled discount”), and (2) the discounter’s rivals can offer all the products in the discounted bundle and can thus, if equally efficient, match the discounted price without pricing below cost. Because plaintiffs have not alleged either that Hill-Rom’s bundled discounts resulted in below-cost pricing or that its identified rivals could not replicate its bundle, plaintiffs have failed to state an antitrust claim based on Hill-Rom’s bundled discounts. Indeed, plaintiffs have not plead any facts about the product bundle that Hil-Rom is alleged to have offered or any other product bundle in the industry.

Admittedly, an above-cost bundled discount may exclude an equally efficient, aggressive rival in one line of commerce if the rival cannot offer a comparable bundle, and must therefore price its more limited offerings below cost to match the discount on the bundle. That is the situation the LePage’s plaintiff pled with supporting facts about the bundled items and prices at issue, but this case does not plead at all. Instead, the FAC admits the challenged bundles do not result in below cost pricing on the defendants’ beds (the relevant lines of commerce here). Nor does it plead any facts showing that the defendants’ bundles require rivals to price their beds below cost because they cannot offer comparable bundled discounts.

Nor does the FAC plead the practical (non-price) foreclosure the Third Circuit addressed in rejecting a safe harbor for above-cost bundled discounts in LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir. 2003) (en banc). The plaintiff in that case, LePage’s, produced private label transparent tape. It complained of bundled discounts offered by 3M, which produced branded “Scotch” tape, private label transparent tape, and a number of other products. 3M offered retailers rebate programs conditioned upon meeting purchase targets across multiple 3M lines of commerce beyond transparent tape. Id. at 154. LePage’s alleged that 3M’s bundled discounts were anticompetitive because they induced retailers to eliminate LePage’s as a supplier so that they could meet 3M’s purchase target for private label tape and thereby qualify for rebates on purchases from a number of 3M product lines. Id. at 160-61. A jury found that LePage’s had established illegal monopolization, but a divided panel of this Court reversed on the ground that LePage’s “did not even attempt to show that it could not compete by calculating the discount that it would have had to provide in order to match the discounts offered by 3M through its bundled rebates.” LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 2002 WL 46961, at *9 (3rd Cir. Jan. 14, 2002). On rehearing en banc, this Court reinstated the jury verdict in favor of LePage’s on grounds the FAC does not plead here. LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 164-66.

The en banc Court first emphasized that the principal anticompetitive danger of bundled discounts is that they can disadvantage competitors that sell narrower product lines and therefore could only compete by offering discounts so deep they cannot stay in the marketplace. Id. at 155. Once LePage’s showed that the bundle 3M’s customers had to buy to secure the discounts included product lines that LePage’s could not offer and that this fact made it difficult for LePage’s to compete with 3M, the burden shifted to 3M to prove that its bundled discounts were “justified” by cost savings of some sort. Id. at 163-64. Because 3M failed to prove that selling its products in a bundled fashion reduced cost by an amount equal to or exceeding the discount, its bundled discounts were deemed unjustified and thus exclusionary. Id. at 164. LePage’s thus holds that (1) bundled discounts may be exclusionary if the discounter is bundling product lines its rivals do not produce and foreclosing those rivals from competing, but (2) the presumption may be rebutted if the discounter proves a “business reasons justification” for the bundled discounts, meaning that the bundling saves costs in excess of the total discount.

LePage’s has been limited to its facts in this circuit and generated a great deal of critical commentary in other circuits and among antitrust scholars. See, e.g., In re Epi Pen, 44 F.4th 959, 991-1000 (10th Cir. 2022); Collins Inkjet Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 781 F.3d 264, 273-74 (6th Cir. 2015); Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2009); FTC v. Church & Dwight Co., Inc., 665 F.3d 1312, 1316–17 (D.C. Cir. 2011);[4] Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 1688, 1722-26 (2005); Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 3M’s Bundled Rebates: An Economic Perspective, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 243, 254–56, 262–64 (2005); Daniel A. Crane, Multiproduct Discounting: A Myth of Non-Price Predation, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 27 (2005); Gary P. Zanfagna, LePage’s v. 3M: A Reality Check, Antitrust Source 1 (Nov. 2004) (“The Third Circuit en banc decision in LePage’s is a giant step backwards in Section 2 jurisprudence.”). A primary criticism is that, by eschewing consideration of the relative efficiency of a complaining rival and focusing solely on product line breadth, it can enable inefficient but less diversified competitors to block consumer-friendly discounts or even recover treble damages based upon them thus punishing suppliers who offer customers the best prices and most varied or innovative products. Indeed, one of the expert economists hired by LePage’s admitted that LePage’s—which walked away with more than $68 million in damages—was a less efficient producer of transparent tape than 3M. LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 177 (Greenberg, J., dissenting). Given that LePage’s may prop up less efficient rivals at the expense of consumers, other courts have declined to follow it. See, e.g., Cascade, 515 F.3d at 899-900 (9th Cir. 2008); see also EpiPen, Collins, and Church, supra.

Even under LePage’s, however, the plaintiffs here have not alleged actionable bundled discounts. The LePage’s Court emphasized that “[t]he principal anticompetitive effect of bundled rebates as offered by 3M is that when offered by a monopolist they may foreclose portions of the market to a potential competitor who does not manufacture an equally diverse group of products and who therefore cannot make a comparable offer.” Id. at 155 (emphasis added). If a bundled discount does not result in bundled price that is below the aggregate cost of the items in a bundle (a situation that might trigger liability for predatory pricing under Brooke Group), then it can harm competition only if it excludes a less diversified rival. A rival that produces all the bundled product lines or some comparable array of products could match any above-cost bundled discount if it were as efficient as the discounter, and antitrust law should not intervene to protect less efficient rivals or those that are equally efficient but unwilling to reduce their profit margin to win business from discounters. For this reason, this Court has restricted liability under LePage’s to above-cost bundled discounts that exclude less diversified rivals where plaintiffs plead (and ultimately prove) that they are substantially foreclosed from competition by exclusivity terms with offsetting efficiencies. ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 274 n. 11 (“The reasoning of LePage’s is limited to cases in which a single-product producer is excluded through a bundled rebate program offered by a producer of multiple products, which conditions the rebates on purchases across multiple different product lines.”). Where, as here, the defendant’s rivals produce all of the relevant lines of commerce, see Cmplt. ¶¶ 36, 52, 68 (alleging that defendant Hill-Rom’s chief rivals produce the standard, ICU, and birthing beds at issue in this case), there can be no liability for bundled discounting absent facts that show the defendant has bundled the relevant product lines with other lines for which rivals have no comparable offerings and thus can only compete by offering unsustainable below-cost prices on the relevant products. The FAC does not allege any such facts here. It alleges no prices or bundle components at all. It also alleges no facts about what bundles or discounts Hill-Rom offers and how they compare to rival bundles and discounts. Nor does it allege any facts showing that Hill-Rom’s bundles involve discounts that rival bed makers can match only by pricing their beds below-cost. Instead, the FAC admits that rivals continue to offer all relevant bed product lines to customers now, and that these rivals include Stryker—one of the largest medical suppliers in the world with product lines far beyond what Hill-Rom offers. See Stryker Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Feb. 11, 2026). The district court was therefore correct in concluding that “this set of facts does not fit into the limited scope of the [Court’s] opinion in LePage’s.” Mem. Op. at 18.

Amici supporting the plaintiffs contend otherwise. They read ZF Meritor as instructing that an exclusionary effect on a less diversified rival is a sufficient, not a necessary, condition for liability under LePage’s. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Antitrust Institute in Support of Appellant (“AAI Brief”) at 9 n. 4 (“ZF Meritor may have been suggesting that a single-product rival is sufficient to impose liability under LePage’s, but it was not suggesting that it is necessary.”). They also maintain that an excluded rival need not be a single-product producer in order to impose liability for above-cost bundled discounting because LePage’s itself produced multiple products, as did the plaintiff in SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056 (3rd Cir. 1978), another Third Circuit decision condemning bundled discounts. AAI Brief at 9, n. 4; Brief of Committee to Support the Antitrust Laws as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant at 20-21. Amici thus imply that this Court should allow the imposition of liability for above-cost bundled discounts even when the discounter’s rivals are equally diversified and could, if equally efficient, match the bundled discounts at issue.

Amici are unpersuasive. The relevant language of ZF Meritor—“The reasoning of LePage’s is limited to cases in which a single-product producer is excluded through a bundled rebate program offered by a producer of multiple products, which conditions the rebates on purchases across multiple different product lines,” ZF Meritor, 696 F.3d at 274 n. 11 (emphasis added)—is plainly stating a necessary, not sufficient, condition for liability under LePage’s. Moreover, the LePage’s Court itself was clear that the anticompetitive effect of an above-cost bundled discount is its potential to exclude less diversified rivals that cannot, even if they are as efficient as the discounter in producing the products they make, match the total dollar value of the discount on their narrower product line. LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 141 (“The principal anticompetitive effect of bundled rebates … is that when offered by a monopolist they may foreclose portions of the market to a potential competitor who does not manufacture an equally diverse group of products and who therefore cannot make a comparable offer.”) (emphasis added). Critically, both the LePage’s and SmithKline plaintiffs were far less-diversified than their bundled discounting rival, see id. at 144, 157; SmithKline, 575 F.2d at 1059, and would thus have had to match the entire dollar volume of its discount on their narrower line of products.[5] Hill-Rom’s rivals, by contrast, produce the same types of hospital beds as Hill-Rom—standard, ICU, and birthing—and thus could, if equally efficient, match any above-cost discount on bundles of beds. The district court was therefore correct to conclude that LePage’s is inapposite.[6]

Amici’s apparent position—that a plaintiff complaining of a bundled discount may state an antitrust claim without identifying a less diversified rival and explaining why it cannot match the discount at issue—would empower antitrust plaintiffs to subject defendants to burdensome discovery obligations by simply stating that the defendant had offered a bundled discount. After all, there will almost always be some rival out there that produces some, but not all, items in the bundle. This Court should decline plaintiffs’ and their amici’s invitation to transform the already pro-plaintiff LePage’s decision into an open invitation to file strike suits.

CONCLUSION

The District Court’s judgment should be affirmed.

[1] No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part. Apart from amici curiae, no person contributed money intended to fund the brief’s preparation and submission. The parties consented to the filing of this brief.

[2] This language from Tampa Electric, which assessed liability under Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14, undermines the bizarre claim of amicus Open Markets Institute that “the Tampa Electric decision is not an invitation to lower courts to apply the rule of reason.” Brief of Open Markets Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintffs-Appellants at 15. In directing courts to assess “the probable effect” of a challenged exclusive dealing agreement in light of a number of context-specific factors, Tampa Electric explicitly prescribed a rule of reason analysis.

[3] See Cmplt. ¶ 139 (“The CEAs were therefore designed to bundle and link together all of the purchasing decisions by hospitals in numerous distinct product markets … into a single overarching agreement with a collective rebate.”); id. at ¶ 173 (“The CEAs thus ensure that it is impossible for any competitor in the Relevant Markets which does not manufacture a similarly broad line of products to demonstrate how offered savings could offset the rebate potential on other products with Hill-Rom.”).

[4] Even in Church, which was a government enforcement case, the D.C. Circuit stressed that LePage’s “has been roundly criticized.” Church, 665 F.3d at 1316–17 (citing Antitrust Modernization Comm’n, Report and Recommendations 94 (2007) (“The lack of clear standards regarding bundling, as reflected in LePage’s v. 3M, may discourage conduct that is procompetitive or competitively neutral and thus may actually harm consumer welfare”); Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing, in Antitrust Law and Economics 116, 148 (Keith N. Hylton ed., 2009) (“The potential for liability will result in [firms with sufficient market power and multiple product lines] being deterred from using bundling that would have led to reduced prices for consumers and higher welfare”); Richard A. Epstein, Monopoly Dominance or Level Playing Field? The New Antitrust Paradox, 72 U. Chi. L.Rev. 49, 71 (2005) (“highly unlikely that 3M would tailor practices that cover six of its departments solely because of the effects that it would have on” the one product market in which it competed with LePage’s).

[5] The ZF Meritor Court’s reference to a “single-product producer” in its limitation of LePage’s, see ZF Meritor, 696 F.3d at 274 n. 11, is just case-specific shorthand for the actual “reasoning of LePage’s,” which facially applies only to less diversified (if not single-product) rivals.

[6] To the extent plaintiffs complain of bundled discounts involving products besides hospital beds, their complaint is deficient because it does not identify what the products are and thus why equally efficient competitors could not match the discounts across them.

COMMENTS & STATEMENTS

ICLE Comments to the FCC on Lifeline Modernization

I.               Introduction and Overview The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) submits these comments in response to the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) public notice . . .

I.               Introduction and Overview

The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) submits these comments in response to the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) public notice on reforms to the Lifeline program.[1] ICLE is a nonprofit, nonpartisan research center that applies law & economics methodologies to public policy. Its work promotes sound economic analysis and consumer welfare, particularly in dynamic, technology-driven markets such as telecommunications.

The Universal Service Fund (USF) has expanded access to voice and data services, but it has long faced persistent waste, fraud, and abuse.[2] The program relies on mandatory contributions passed through to consumers as line-item charges on phone bills.[3] Improper payments therefore raise the cost of connectivity and undermine the program’s purpose. The Commission is right to prioritize program integrity and limit excess costs.

The FCC has taken several steps over the past two decades to address these challenges.[4] The 2012 Lifeline reforms created the National Lifeline Accountability Database (NLAD), limited benefits to one per household, and established non-usage de-enrollment rules.[5] The 2016 reforms introduced the National Verifier to centralize eligibility determinations.[6] In 2019, the Commission added further safeguards, including restrictions on enrollment-based compensation, enhanced registration requirements, and stricter documentation rules.[7] These reforms improved oversight but did not eliminate systemic vulnerabilities.

Recent evidence underscores those remaining gaps. The FCC Office of Inspector General (OIG) found that, in three opt-out states, providers received about $5 million to enroll more than 116,000 deceased individuals.[8] Nearly 40,000 of those enrollments may have occurred after death, indicating fraud beyond delays in death-record updates.[9] The report also identified duplicate claims across multiple states.[10] These findings highlight structural weaknesses that require targeted reform.

The Commission should build on prior efforts with a disciplined, cost-benefit approach. Effective reforms must reduce waste, fraud, and abuse while preserving access for eligible households and maintaining provider participation. Measures such as eliminating the opt-out framework, adopting secondary consent verification, and improving data transparency offer targeted ways to strengthen integrity. At the same time, overly burdensome requirements—whether through rigid eligibility rules, excessive compliance obligations, or misaligned service standards—risk deterring participation and undermining the program’s goals.

Lifeline policy should reflect modern network realities and user needs. Minimum service standards should focus on the level of connectivity required for meaningful participation, not parity with average consumption. Prioritizing data-enabled service, streamlining reporting requirements, and aligning incentives with an all-IP communications environment would improve both efficiency and outcomes. The Commission should adopt reforms that deliver measurable integrity gains without sacrificing access, competition, or affordability.

II.             Reducing Fraud Must Not Undermine Participation or Access

The NPRM correctly targets waste, fraud, and abuse in the Lifeline program. The USF relies on a mandatory contribution assessed on telecommunications providers, which they pass directly to consumers as a line-item surcharge. The contribution factor now stands at 37%, making the surcharge one of the largest hidden taxes on telecommunications services.[11]

Improper payments directly harm the consumers the program intends to help. Funds paid to ineligible subscribers, deceased individuals, fraudulent enrollees, or providers that do not actually deliver service reduce the resources available to eligible households. The FCC owes ratepayers a clear duty to ensure these funds serve their intended purpose.

That said, eliminating waste, fraud, and abuse is only part of the Commission’s mandate. The agency must evaluate proposed reforms through a rigorous cost-benefit framework that accounts not only for improper payments, but also for the real costs that compliance burdens impose on eligible households and participating providers.[12] Section 254 of the Communications Act requires more than fraud reduction. It requires ensuring that low-income Americans can access quality services at affordable rates.[13]

Reforms that reduce fraud but also deter eligible households from enrolling or remaining in the program risk undermining that mandate. The same holds for reforms that increase provider costs to the point that participation declines, leaving eligible consumers with fewer or no service options.[14]

Provider participation is critical to the program’s competitive structure. Lifeline depends on a sufficient number of Eligible Telecommunications Carriers (ETCs) to ensure meaningful consumer choice and coverage across geographic areas and demographic groups. If new requirements significantly raise compliance costs—especially for smaller, non-facilities-based ETCs that serve most Lifeline subscribers on thin margins—providers may scale back service, exit high-cost markets, or leave the program entirely.

The Commission should evaluate each proposed reform with a clear-eyed assessment of who bears the costs and whether those costs are proportionate to the expected gains in program integrity.

III.           The Commission Should Eliminate the Opt-Out Framework

The NPRM identifies a central problem: waste, fraud, and abuse in states that opted out of NLAD and the National Verifier.[15] The Commission should eliminate the opt-out framework and require all remaining states to transition to the federal National Verifier for eligibility verification and duplicate checking on a clear, reasonable timeline.

The evidence supports this change. The OIG Report found that providers in opt-out states received nearly $5 million in reimbursements for more than 116,000 deceased individuals over five years.[16] About 40% of those payments went to individuals who had died, or may have died, before initial enrollment.[17] These failures reflect structural weaknesses in state-based systems.

The National Verifier addresses those weaknesses. It connects directly to federal and state databases for real-time or near-real-time eligibility checks. It conducts automated death checks using authoritative federal mortality data and applies uniform identity-verification standards nationwide.[18] These safeguards do not depend on state policy choices.

State deviations can undermine program integrity. California’s decision to eliminate the Social Security number requirement for Lifeline applicants weakened identity verification and made it harder to detect duplicate enrollments. The Commission lacked a proactive mechanism to prevent that change and had to rely on revocation after the fact.[19] No comparable vulnerability exists under the federal system, where the FCC controls verification standards and processes across all states.

The opt-out framework also creates inequities among ratepayers. A low-income household in Texas faces a different verification process, documentation burden, and duplicate-checking regime than an identical household in a neighboring state that uses the National Verifier. The integrity of a federally funded program should not vary based on geography. Yet evidence shows higher rates of improper payments in opt-out states than in states using the federal system.[20] The Commission’s experience with the Affordable Connectivity Program further demonstrates that a uniform federal verification framework is both feasible and more effective than a patchwork approach.

A unified system would also reduce administrative burdens. Providers operating across both NLAD and opt-out states must comply with multiple verification frameworks, each with different processes and requirements.[21] That fragmentation increases compliance costs and complexity. Requiring all states to use the National Verifier would replace that patchwork with a single, consistent system that providers can implement once and apply nationwide.

IV.          Secondary Verification Stops Unauthorized Enrollments

FCC OIG investigations show that many consumers were enrolled in Lifeline without their knowledge or consent and never received service.[22] These unauthorized enrollments benefit only providers and agents who claim reimbursement. A secondary consent-verification requirement—conditioning enrollment or transfer on an affirmative response to a confirmation text or email—targets this fraud at its source. It does not raise eligibility barriers, add documentation, or require consumers to navigate complex processes. It simply ensures that the person listed on the application confirms their intent to enroll.

This requirement directly disrupts how enrollment fraud occurs. Fraud typically involves submitting an application using a real person’s information without consent or fabricating contact information to create fictitious subscribers.[23] Both schemes depend on the absence of a verification step requiring a response from the actual individual. A confirmation request sent to the applicant’s contact information creates an immediate check. If the contact information is fabricated, no one can respond, and the enrollment fails. If real information is used without consent, the individual receives an unexpected notice and can reject it, triggering scrutiny instead of completing a fraudulent enrollment.

This approach reflects standard fraud-prevention practices. Financial institutions, health care providers, and government agencies routinely use out-of-band confirmation to verify that the person initiating a transaction controls the relevant account.[24] Applying this well-established method to Lifeline is not experimental. It adopts a proven safeguard that works at scale in analogous contexts.

The benefits are even greater for transfers. When an ETC initiates a benefit transfer in NLAD, the system moves the subscriber to a new provider based solely on the initiating provider’s certification of consent. There is no independent verification that the subscriber actually approved the transfer.[25] The OIG Report identifies unwanted transfers as a significant source of harm.[26] Consumers can be switched without notice, lose existing service relationships, and sometimes lose their phone numbers. These transfers benefit only the receiving provider and the agent.

A secondary verification requirement closes this gap. Subscribers who did not authorize a transfer would receive a notice before it occurs and could block it. That shifts detection from after-the-fact remediation to real-time prevention.

This reform would impose minimal burdens on legitimate users. Enrollment already requires applicants to complete certification forms, provide identifying information, and verify eligibility through the National Verifier. A confirmation step—tapping a link or replying to a message—adds only seconds. Most smartphone users already perform similar actions routinely. For willing, eligible applicants, the burden is de minimis. It is far less onerous than existing documentation, annual recertification, or certification requirements.

V.             Minimum Standards Should Reflect Basic Connectivity Needs

The NPRM asks whether the Commission should revise the Lifeline program’s minimum service standards.[27] As the Commission evaluates the record, it should focus on what recipients actually need to benefit from connectivity.[28] The goal of a low-income support program is to ensure access to a threshold level of service sufficient for meaningful participation in modern economic and social life. That goal differs from providing parity with average or median consumer usage. Conflating the two has contributed to the Commission’s difficulties with the mobile broadband data-allowance update mechanism.[29]

The relevant question is not how much data the average smartphone user consumes or what median speeds look like. It is what level of service enables Lifeline subscribers to access core applications: job searches, telehealth, education, government services, emergency communications, banking, and basic social connection. The law & economics literature on broadband adoption consistently finds that the largest gains come from moving households from no connectivity to basic connectivity, not from incremental increases beyond that baseline.[30]

The applications that generate these gains are not bandwidth-intensive by modern standards. A telehealth visit typically requires about 1–6 Mbps of sustained throughput.[31] Job portals, government websites, and educational resources require far less. These are the services that justify a low-income subsidy program, and they function reliably at modest bandwidth levels consistent with current minimum service standards.

Even limited connectivity can be transformative. A household with access to a basic data plan can apply for jobs, communicate with health care providers, access benefits, and support children’s education. Those benefits do not depend on 29 GB of monthly data or gigabit speeds. They depend on reliable access to a basic level of connectivity.

VI.          Voice-Only Subsidies No Longer Make Sense

Lifeline rules should maximize benefits to recipients while minimizing costs on consumers’ phone bills. Voice-only plans may meet some users’ needs, but adding basic data service imposes minimal additional cost on providers—especially if the Commission avoids overly burdensome minimum data-cap and bandwidth requirements. The benefits of including data, by contrast, are substantial.

On modern all-IP wireless networks, the marginal cost of providing basic broadband data alongside voice service is effectively zero. Voice over Long-Term Evolution (VoLTE) calls use only about 6.6 kbps to 23.85 kbps of bandwidth[32] and run over the same IP infrastructure and spectrum as data traffic. These networks were designed for data, with voice layered on top as a managed IP service, not as a separate circuit-switched function. As a result, the incremental cost of offering data access reflects the data allowance itself, not additional infrastructure. The Commission should recognize that the cost difference between a voice-only plan and a basic bundled broadband plan is far smaller than the current $4 reimbursement differential suggests.

The consumer benefits of data access are far greater. Broadband enables participation in the full range of modern economic and social activity. In 2026, essential services—employment, health care, education, government services, banking, and communication—primarily rely on IP-based applications. A subscriber limited to voice-only service cannot fully access these opportunities. Subsidizing voice without enabling meaningful participation risks wasting program resources.

The Commission’s broader policy goals reinforce this conclusion. The FCC has long encouraged the transition from legacy copper networks to all-IP infrastructure.[33] ICLE has consistently shown that this transition benefits both providers and consumers, while maintaining legacy networks imposes rising costs and diverts investment from next-generation services.[34] Existing rules can slow this transition by making migration more costly.

Continuing to subsidize a distinct voice-only Lifeline tier conflicts with these objectives. The Commission should not promote all-IP migration on one hand while preserving a subsidy structure that assumes voice remains a separate, standalone service. Aligning Lifeline with modern network realities requires prioritizing data-enabled service as the baseline.

VII.        A One-Per-Residence Rule Would Exclude Eligible Households

The NPRM proposes a one-per-residence rule to address multiple Lifeline subscribers at a single street address.[35] Although well intentioned, a broad rule of this kind would exclude many eligible households. Many Americans share a residential address while maintaining separate economic lives. Multigenerational households are a common example. Pew Research data shows that roughly 25% of Asian, Black, and Hispanic Americans live in such arrangements.[36] These households often include distinct family units that would otherwise qualify for Lifeline support.

Rising housing costs have also increased shared living arrangements. Many young adults now live with parents while remaining financially independent.[37] Other households share a single address while renting individual rooms. Transitional housing presents similar challenges. Families recovering from homelessness, domestic violence, substance abuse, or incarceration often share addresses while maintaining separate eligibility for benefits. A bright-line, one-per-residence rule would deny support to many households that need it most.

The Commission should still address potential abuse. Requiring NLAD to display the number of Lifeline discounts claimed at a given address across all ETCs is a more targeted solution. Greater visibility would allow ETCs to identify potential duplicate claims while preserving access for legitimately independent households.

VIII.      The Commission Should Consolidate Lifeline Reporting

The NPRM seeks ways to improve program efficiency while reducing reporting burdens on ETCs.[38] The Commission should consolidate FCC Form 481 and FCC Form 555 into a single annual filing with one deadline, one submission portal, and one distribution to all relevant regulators.[39]

The two forms cover overlapping aspects of the same program. They apply to largely the same ETCs, require similar officer certifications, and duplicate administrative work. ETCs must track separate deadlines, maintain parallel workflows, and submit overlapping organizational and identifying information multiple times. A unified filing would eliminate this redundancy.

A consolidated form could combine Form 481’s financial and operational data with Form 555’s recertification metrics into a single annual snapshot of each ETC’s Lifeline participation. ETCs would submit this filing once per year through a centralized portal accessible to the Commission, the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), state commissions, and relevant Tribal and territorial governments. The Commission should set a deadline that aligns with the most practical point in the program’s annual cycle.

Dual filings impose the greatest burden on small- and mid-sized, non-facilities-based ETCs, which serve most Lifeline subscribers. Maintaining separate compliance processes, preparing multiple officer certifications, and submitting duplicative filings diverts resources from serving customers. These costs are not trivial.

Reporting burdens can also affect market participation. Providers considering entry must weigh compliance costs against expected Lifeline revenues. In low-density markets with thin margins, duplicative reporting can deter participation. Reducing unnecessary compliance costs would improve efficiency and strengthen the competitive provider ecosystem that supports universal Lifeline access.

IX.          Balance Integrity and Access for Non-Facilities-Based ETCs

The NPRM raises concerns about non-facilities-based ETCs and their association with higher rates of fraud. Enforcement actions show that these providers have been disproportionately linked to serious program-integrity failures. The current compliance-plan framework has not reliably detected or deterred systemic fraud. Greater scrutiny is warranted, and the Commission is right to revisit the conditions attached to its forbearance grant in light of a decade of experience.

At the same time, the Commission must account for the role these providers play in ensuring universal access. Non-facilities-based ETCs are not just a regulatory artifact. They are often essential to serving low-income consumers, particularly in markets where facilities-based providers do not participate in Lifeline.

Any redesign of the forbearance framework should reflect these market realities. Proposed measures—such as enhanced compliance plans, letters of credit, expanded financial disclosures, mandatory annual audits, and more frequent resubmission requirements—impose real costs. The Commission should weigh those costs against expected fraud-reduction benefits using the same cost-benefit framework applied elsewhere in this NPRM.

X.            Conclusion

The NPRM presents several proposals to reduce waste, fraud, and abuse in the Lifeline program. Many of these reforms move in the right direction. The Commission should evaluate each proposal through a rigorous cost-benefit framework that accounts not only for program-integrity gains, but also for effects on participation, provider incentives, and consumer access.

Effective reform requires targeting fraud at its source while preserving access for eligible households. Measures such as eliminating the opt-out framework, requiring secondary consent verification, and improving data visibility within NLAD offer high-impact, low-burden ways to strengthen program integrity. At the same time, overly rigid rules—such as a one-per-residence limit or excessive compliance burdens on providers—risk excluding eligible households and reducing provider participation.

The Commission should also align Lifeline with modern network and consumer realities. Minimum service standards should reflect the level of connectivity needed for meaningful participation, not parity with average usage. Prioritizing data-enabled service over legacy voice-only offerings would better serve recipients and reflect the all-IP networks that now deliver communications services. Streamlining reporting requirements and reducing duplicative compliance obligations would further support a competitive provider ecosystem.

Lifeline succeeds when it connects eligible households to essential services at a reasonable cost to consumers who fund the program. Reforms should focus on that objective: target support to those who need it most, deliver services that meet real-world needs, and ensure that program rules strengthen—rather than undermine—access, participation, and efficiency.

[1] Lifeline and Link Up Reform and Modernization et al., WC Docket No. 11-42 et al., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 26-8 (rel. Feb. 23, 2026), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-26-8A1.pdf (hereinafter NPRM).

[2] Lifeline and Link Up Reform and Modernization et al., WC Docket No. 11-42 et al., Third Report and Order, Further Report and Order, and Order on Reconsideration, 31 FCC Rcd 3962, ¶ 46 (2016), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-16-38A1.pdf (hereinafter 2016 Order).

[3] Paroma Sanyal & Coleman Bazelon, The Economics of Universal Service Fund Reform, The Brattle Group 4–5 (2023), https://incompas.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/The-Economics-of-USF-Reform-Brattle_FINAL.pdf.

[4] TracFone Wireless, Inc., Petition for Designation as an Eligible Telecommunications Carrier in New York et al., Order, 23 FCC Rcd 6206 (2008), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-08-100A1.pdf.

[5] Lifeline and Link Up Reform and Modernization et al., Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 27 FCC Rcd 6656 (2012), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-12-11A1.pdf.

[6] 2016 Order, supra note 2.

[7] Bridging the Digital Divide for Low-Income Consumers et al., Fifth Report and Order et al., 34 FCC Rcd 10886 (2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-19-111A1.pdf.

[8] See FCC OIG, Advisory Regarding Deceased and Duplicate Lifeline Subscribers 4 (2026), https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/FCC%20OIG%20Advisory%20Regarding%20Deceased%20and%20Duplicate%20Lifeline%20Subscribers.pdf (hereinafter OIG Report).

[9] Id. at 5

[10] Id. at 6.

[11] Proposed Second Quarter 2026 Universal Service Contribution Factor, Public Notice, DA 26-218 (rel. Mar. 16, 2026), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-218A1.pdf.

[12] See Jerry Ellig, Why and How Independent Agencies Should Conduct Regulatory Impact Analysis, 28 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1 (2018), https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1489&context=cjlpp; see also Thomas Hazlett, Benefit–Cost Analysis in the 5.9 GHz Band, J. Benefit-Cost Analysis 1 (2025), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-benefit-cost-analysis/article/benefitcost-analysis-in-the-59-ghz-band/2788B60F3B5C9F87788F844742C7186A.

[13] 47 U.S.C. § 254(b).

[14] Comments of NCTA—The Internet & Television Association, WC Docket No. 11-42, at 4 (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/1041937652451/1.

[15] NPRM, supra note 1, ¶ 8.

[16] OIG Report, supra note 8, at 4.

[17] Id. at 5.

[18] U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-21-235, FCC Has Implemented the Lifeline National Verifier but Should Improve Consumer Awareness and Experience (2021), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-235.pdf.

[19] Lifeline and Link Up Reform and Modernization, Order, DA 25-965 (WCB Nov. 20, 2025), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-25-965A1.pdf.

[20] See OIG Report, supra note 8.

[21] Univ. Serv. Admin. Co., 2026 National Verifier Annual Report and Data (2026), https://www.usac.org/wp-content/uploads/lifeline/documents/Data/2026-National-Verifier-Annual-Report-and-Data.pdf.

[22] NPRM, supra note 1, ¶ 33.

[23] 2016 Order, supra note 2, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Ajit Pai (“Sales agents schemed with consumers—who no longer had skin in the game—to enroll them in Lifeline multiple times, even if the consumer never qualified in the first place.”).

[24] Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., U.S. Dep’t of Com., NIST Special Publication 800-63B, Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Lifecycle Management § 5 (2017), https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html#sec5.

[25] Univ. Serv. Admin. Co., Benefit Transfers, https://www.usac.org/lifeline/national-lifeline-accountability-database-nlad/benefit-transfers (last visited Apr. 29, 2026).

[26] OIG Report, supra note 8, at 5.

[27] NPRM, supra note 1, ¶¶ 43–56.

[28] Jeffrey Westling, Redefining Broadband Speeds to Reflect User Needs, Am. Action F. (June 15, 2023), https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/redefining-broadband-speeds-to-reflect-user-needs.

[29] NPRM, supra note 1, ¶ 46.

[30] Wolfgang Briglauer, Jan Krämer & Nicole Palan, Socioeconomic Benefits of High-Speed Broadband Availability and Service Adoption: A Survey, 48 Telecomm. Pol’y 7 (2024), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2024.102808.

[31] FCC Consumer & Gov’t Affs. Bureau, Broadband Speed Guide, https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/broadband_speed_guide.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2026).

[32] Eur. Telecomm. Standards Inst. (ETSI), Speech Codec Speech Processing Functions; Adaptive Multi-Rate—Wideband (AMR-WB) Speech Codec; General Description, ETSI TS 126 171 V19.0.0 (3GPP TS 26.171 Ver. 19.0.0 Rel. 19), https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/126100_126199/126171/19.00.00_60/ts_126171v190000p.pdf.

[33] Reducing Barriers to Network Improvements and Service Changes; Accelerating Network Modernization, WC Docket Nos. 25-209 & 25-208, Report and Order, FCC 26-19 (rel. Mar. 27, 2026), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-26-19A1.pdf; Advancing IP Interconnection; Accelerating Network Modernization; Call Authentication Trust Anchor, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 25-73 (rel. Oct. 29, 2025), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-25-73A1.pdf.

[34] Comments of ICLE, Reducing Barriers to Network Improvements and Service Changes, WC Docket Nos. 25-209 & 25-208 (Aug. 22, 2025), https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/10822002748400/1; Comments of ICLE, Advancing IP Interconnection; Accelerating Network Modernization; Call Authentication Trust Anchor, WC Docket Nos. 25-304, 25-208, 17-97 (Jan. 20, 2026), https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/ICLE-Comments-on-Advancing-IP-Interconnection.pdf.

[35] NPRM, supra note 1, ¶ 63.

[36] D’Vera Cohn et al., Financial Issues Top the List of Reasons U.S. Adults Live in Multigenerational Homes, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Mar. 24, 2022), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2022/03/24/the-demographics-of-multigenerational-households (reporting that 24% of Asian, 26% of Black, and 26% of Hispanic Americans lived in multigenerational households in 2021, compared with 13% of White Americans).

[37] Id.

[38] NPRM, supra note 1, ¶ 71.

[39] Comments of USTelecom, in re Delete, Delete, Delete, GN Docket No. 25-133 (Apr. 11, 2025), https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/104110786700283/1; Comments of WTA—Advocates for Rural Broadband, in re Delete, Delete, Delete, GN Docket No. 25-133 (Apr. 14, 2025), https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/10411148117639/1.

ICLE Comments to the European Commission on Alphabet’s Article 6(11) DMA Obligations

I.         Introduction The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) appreciates the opportunity to respond to the European Commission’s consultation on proposed measures to specify . . .

I.         Introduction

The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) appreciates the opportunity to respond to the European Commission’s consultation on proposed measures to specify Alphabet’s obligations under Article 6(11) of the Digital Markets Act (DMA). Article 6(11) requires Alphabet to provide access to certain Google Search data to third-party providers of online search engines (OSEs) on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms.[1] ICLE is a non-profit, non-partisan global research and policy centre that advances evidence-based policy.

These comments address the Commission’s implementing choices under Article 8(2) DMA. They do not challenge Article 6(11) or Alphabet’s designation.[2] The central issue is how the Commission defines ‘effective compliance’. That definition will shape the scope of access, the design of anonymisation, the pricing framework, and the supervisory regime.

The Preliminary Measures risk shifting Article 6(11) from a data-access obligation to a tool for delivering competitor success. The provision does not support that shift. It requires access to specified data, anonymised, on FRAND terms. It does not guarantee that recipients will match Google’s quality, gain market share, or remain in the market. The specification should reflect that legislative choice.

Four themes guide these comments.

Effectiveness. Article 6(11) is an access obligation, not a rescue regime. Effectiveness should turn on whether third parties receive lawful, workable access on FRAND terms. It should not depend on uptake, market-share shifts, or beneficiary survival. Recital 32 confirms that the DMA’s concept of contestability is procedural and opportunity-based.

Data transferability. The premise that shared, anonymised data will generate comparable gains for recipients is uncertain. The literature shows diminishing returns to data and highlights the role of complementary inputs—crawler infrastructure, indexing, ranking systems, engineering capability, and experimentation. Anonymisation further reduces the value of shared data, especially by suppressing rare and tail queries. The Commission should require evidence that specific data fields will produce material improvements, rather than assume parity with Alphabet’s internal use.

Privacy and anonymisation. Search queries are highly sensitive. The Preliminary Measures’ layered design—technical anonymisation combined with extensive contractual restrictions—reflects the limits of anonymisation alone under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Privacy should operate as a binding constraint. Data minimisation should guide scope and retention, and staged access should mitigate risk as the recipient pool expands.

FRAND pricing. Search data is an information good characterised by high fixed costs and low marginal costs. The FRAND experience with standard-essential patents (SEPs) shows that pricing such assets is inherently indeterminate and yields a range of reasonable outcomes. The draft’s weighted-average-cost-of-capital (WACC) ceiling, exclusion of core investments from the cost base, and open-ended recipient class risk shifting pricing toward recipient ability to pay. Non-discrimination should instead prevent competitive disadvantage among similarly situated recipients, consistent with Unwired Planet v. Huawei. The regime should also allow for periodic ex post review, rather than rely on fixed terms that may not remain appropriate.

These themes reflect a common concern. The Commission’s specification should preserve the balance the DMA strikes—ensuring access while respecting privacy, proportionality, and investment incentives.

II.      ‘Effectiveness’ Means Access, Not Outcomes

The Commission asks whether the proposed measures will be effective in practice.[3] That question should track the legal obligation: effective access to anonymised data on FRAND terms. It should not turn on beneficiary uptake, traffic, market-share shifts, or the survival of particular recipients.

Article 6(11) grants third parties a right of access to specified data, anonymised, on FRAND terms. It does not grant a right to succeed. Conflating ‘effective’ with ‘sufficient to make beneficiaries viable’ would distort the provision. Under that reading, any disappointing competitive outcome—rival exit, lower-quality results, or limited market-share gains—would invite claims that the measures are ineffective and must be tightened. Compliance would become a moving target, defined by the least efficient beneficiaries, rather than by whether Alphabet has met its data-access obligations.

There are strong reasons to reject that approach.

First, beneficiary outcomes depend on many factors beyond data access. Product quality, ranking architecture, engineering capacity, marketing, distribution, brand, and business-model fit all matter. In United States v. Google LLC, Google expert Edward Fox’s analysis implied that user-side data explained only about 3 per cent of the measured Google–Bing search-quality gap. Fox testified that the remaining difference was ‘not from user interaction data’, pointing instead to factors such as ‘innovation’ and ‘better algorithms’.[4] If beneficiaries underperform despite receiving data on FRAND terms, that result may reflect ordinary competition, not non-compliance.

Second, the empirical record on remedies that aim to rebalance market shares through forced disclosure or default changes is mixed. Users often revert to preferred services after intervention. In a 2016 experiment, Mozilla switched Firefox’s default search engine to Bing; Bing retained about 42 per cent of search volume by day 12, with retention declining over time.[5] In Europe, where the Android choice screen has operated since 2020, Google’s share of search has barely shifted.[6]  The UK Competition and Markets Authority likewise recognised that, although click-and-query data may improve ranking quality, ‘the empirical evidence finds rapidly diminishing returns to scale’, with effects concentrated in rare queries.[7] These findings do not show that data sharing lacks value. They show that competitive outcomes reflect a broader set of forces. Market shares are therefore a poor proxy for compliance with the DMA’s data-access obligation.

Third, even proponents of data-access remedies warn against using them to override competitive selection. The Crémer–de Montjoye–Schweitzer report acknowledges that ‘the sharing or pooling of data can discourage competitors from differentiating and improving their own data collection and analytics pipelines’.[8] The Furman Report similarly cautions that such interventions carry trade-offs:

Requiring the opening up of a part of a business’s legitimately obtained data holding would be a significant intervention. Platforms would reasonably be concerned about the impact upon their business model, the legitimacy of requiring access to a significant asset, and the impact on incentives for investment in future data collection and management.[9]

These concerns weigh against reading Article 6(11) to require parity with Google.

Some may argue that the DMA’s ‘contestability’ objective permits an outcome-based test of effectiveness. The text does not support that view. Recital 32 defines contestability in procedural terms: the ability of undertakings to overcome barriers to entry and expansion and to challenge the gatekeeper on the merits.[10] The relevant question is whether the measures materially reduce the data-access barriers identified in Recital 61, on FRAND terms and subject to anonymisation, so that eligible third-party search engines can improve and optimise their services. It is not whether those firms achieve a particular market share, user base, query volume, or advertising-revenue shift. Those outcomes depend on factors outside Article 6(11), including product quality, brand, distribution, user preferences, innovation, privacy choices, and the scale and network characteristics of search.

Tying effectiveness to recipient outcomes would also create a predictable ratchet. Beneficiaries that find anonymised data less useful than expected will press for additional data fields. Beneficiaries that find FRAND prices too high will press for lower prices, potentially calibrated to their own constraints. Each step will be framed as necessary to make the measures ‘effective’. Each step will also erode the statutory constraints—privacy, proportionality, and dynamic incentives—that the DMA preserves.

III.    Data Sharing Does Not Guarantee Transferable Value

A second, related concern is the implicit causal premise of the Preliminary Measures: that the same data Google uses internally to optimise its search service will, once anonymised and shared, produce comparable improvements for recipients. The literature does not support that assumption, and the empirical record is mixed. The Commission should treat this as a working hypothesis, not as a basis for broad scope or parity defaults.

The economic literature on data as an input is more cautious than the specification suggests. Anja Lambrecht and Catherine Tucker find that big data rarely satisfies the conditions for a sustained competitive advantage, and that ‘the simple act of amassing big data does not confer a long-term competitive advantage’.[11] Tucker summarises the evidence as showing ‘concave returns to data’—initial gains, followed by rapidly diminishing marginal benefits.[12] Hal Varian likewise notes that data scale faces statistical limits: because measurement accuracy increases with the square root of sample size, ‘you have to have four times as big a sample to get twice as good an estimate’.[13] Empirical work on internet search reaches a similar conclusion. Additional data can improve results, but its marginal value depends on context, including user-history depth, algorithmic quality, and system design.[14]

These findings align with how firms actually create value from data. Data is not a stand-alone input. It complements crawler infrastructure, indexing, ranking systems, machine-learning expertise, experimentation capabilities, and product design. The same dataset will produce different outcomes in different hands.[15]  ICLE scholars describe this as ‘data immobility’: the value of data depends on the system that generates and uses it, and disclosure cannot transfer that value in the absence of complementary capabilities.[16]

The search-specific evidence points in the same direction. The United States v. Google LLC record includes expert testimony attributing only about 3 per cent of the Google–Bing quality gap to user-side data.[17] Other evidence suggests that Bing can perform comparably to Google in some contexts, despite Google’s larger data scale. That result is difficult to square with a theory that treats data as the single binding constraint. The court itself observed that Bing’s ‘search quality on Desktop measures up to Google’s’.[18]

The Commission’s anonymisation regime further limits transferability. The Preliminary Measures recognise that anonymisation suppresses long, rare, and tail queries—the queries where marginal returns to additional data are highest.[19] The U.S. data-sharing remedy in United States v. Google LLC similarly acknowledges that DMA-style anonymisation can remove the vast majority of queries before sharing.[20] The dataset proposed for disclosure is therefore, by design, stripped of much of the information that would drive marginal improvements.

These points do not undermine Article 6(11). They do, however, support two changes to the specification. First, the Commission should require evidence—not assumption—that the data fields included in the search dataset will deliver material improvements after anonymisation and under contractual limits. Second, the Commission should resist scope expansions based on unsupported claims of necessity. The idea of ‘parity with Alphabet’s own use’[21] may reflect a statutory aspiration, but it does not establish proportionality for every data field, recipient, or use case.

IV.    Privacy Is a Binding Constraint, Not a Design Variable

The Preliminary Measures rest on a strong premise: that technical and contractual anonymisation can produce data that is both useful for search optimisation and sufficiently anonymised to satisfy the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Recital 61 of the DMA recognises the tension by requiring anonymisation that does not ‘substantially degrade’ usefulness.[22] The literature on search-query anonymisation, and the Commission’s own framework, show that this trade-off is real. The Commission should treat privacy as a binding constraint on the regime’s design, not as a parameter to relax in pursuit of beneficiary success.

Search queries can reveal highly sensitive information—health, finances, sexuality, location, politics, and ideology—often in granular, longitudinal detail. The 2006 AOL data release illustrates the risk. AOL disclosed 20 million search queries from 658,000 users, replacing identities with numeric pseudonyms. Within days, a New York Times reporter identified user #4417749 as Thelma Arnold of Lilburn, Georgia, based on her queries.[23] Search histories are uniquely revealing. They can expose a user’s health concerns, political interests, religious beliefs, financial anxieties, sexual orientation, and family issues. As privacy advocates have observed, access to search queries can be ‘akin to reading someone’s most complete and intimate diary’.[24]

The technical literature confirms that this risk is not limited to crude anonymisation. Latanya Sweeney showed that 87 per cent of the U.S. population can be uniquely identified using date of birth, gender, and postal code alone.[25] Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye and co-authors found that four spatio-temporal data points can identify 95 per cent of individuals in a large mobility dataset, even when the data is coarse.[26] Cynthia Dwork’s differential-privacy framework formalises the underlying trade-off. Under the ‘Fundamental Law of Information Recovery’, sufficiently accurate answers to enough queries will erode privacy.[27] Differential privacy does not eliminate this constraint; it manages cumulative privacy loss.

The Preliminary Measures themselves recognise these limits. Section 3.1 specifies technical safeguards—removal of identifiers, suppression of long and rare queries, generalisation of metadata, and k=50 / r=50 thresholding—to reduce re-identification risk to a ‘residual level’.[28] Section 3.2 then adds extensive contractual restrictions: prohibitions on attempts to determine which records relate to the same users, prohibitions on linking with auxiliary datasets, limits on augmentation that could weaken safeguards, and audit rights.[29] The Commission describes these contractual measures as necessary to reduce risk to an ‘insignificant level’.[30]

This layered design reflects an important reality. Technical measures alone do not satisfy the GDPR’s anonymisation standard, which requires that re-identification be impossible ‘taking account of all the means reasonably likely to be used’.[31] ICLE’s prior work on the DMA–GDPR interface makes the same point: anonymisation leaves residual risk, and gatekeepers remain the first line of defence.[32] The Commission’s reliance on contractual controls confirms that anonymisation here operates as a governance regime, not a binary switch. Weakening those controls would reintroduce the very risks the regime seeks to manage.

Privacy risk also depends on who receives the data. Risk is not a property of the dataset alone, but of the dataset and the recipient set. Data that poses limited risk in the hands of a single, well-governed recipient may pose far greater risk when shared with a broad and heterogeneous group. The Preliminary Measures extend access to any third-party undertaking offering an online search engine (OSE) in the European Economic Area (EEA), ‘including AI chatbots with OSE functionalities… even if the OSE is provided as part of a broader service’.[33] Expanding eligibility expands the adversary class. It may include recipients with sophisticated inference capabilities not fully addressed in the anonymisation literature.[34]

Against this backdrop, three principles should guide the specification.

First, treat privacy as a binding constraint. If shared data proves less useful than expected, the solution is not to weaken anonymisation, expand permissible uses, or reduce safeguards. The solution is to recognise that the regime delivers what Article 6(11) requires—lawful access on FRAND terms—and that beneficiaries must compete within those limits.

Second, apply data minimisation as the controlling principle for fields, recipients, and retention. The combination of a broad search dataset and a five-year retention period[35] sits at the more permissive end of what proportionality under Recital 61 can support.

Third, consider staged access. Provide synthetic or filtered datasets first, with fuller access contingent on audit, security review, and demonstrated compliance. Staged access aligns with comparable disclosure regimes and reduces the cost of correcting recipient-side failures.

V.      FRAND Pricing Should Reflect Costs, Not Subsidise Competitors

The Preliminary Measures’ FRAND specification risks converting a data-access obligation into a competitor-subsidy regime. Search data, like standard-essential patents (SEPs) and app-store services, is a classic information good. It involves high fixed and sunk costs—collection, indexing, ranking, and quality maintenance—and near-zero marginal costs of replication.

As Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian explain, ‘Information is costly to produce but cheap to reproduce… cost-based pricing does not work’.[36] The two-decade SEP/FRAND experience confirms the point. Accepted methodologies yield a range of defensible outcomes, not a single price.[37] In Microsoft v. Motorola, the court took years to determine a FRAND rate, with a range spanning roughly thirty-fold. Unwired Planet v. Huawei accepted that FRAND yields a range of acceptable royalties, and Optis v. Apple increased the rate sevenfold on appeal.[38] The DMA has already generated a similar dispute in the Apple App Store proceedings, where the Commission has yet to converge on a stable outcome despite years of effort and a €500 million fine.[39]

The Preliminary Measures amplify these structural difficulties through three design choices.

First, paragraph 71 caps Alphabet’s return on capital employed at its weighted average cost of capital, effectively eliminating economic profit. Paragraph 72(i) relaxes that cap only where Alphabet shows it cannot recover costs from its own use of the data.[40] This approach ties pricing to Alphabet’s profitability, not to economic cost.[41] It operates as a transfer rule, not a pricing rule, and risks the under-compensation problem identified by Daniel Spulber and Christopher Yoo in regulated information industries.[42]

Second, paragraph 78 excludes ‘overhead, sunk costs, or investments in data collection, processing and storage not attributable to making the data available’.[43] Those investments create the data’s value. Pricing based only on the marginal cost of disclosure misprices the asset.

Third, paragraph 79(b) requires Alphabet to forecast ‘the expected number of eligible access recipients’.[44] That denominator is inherently unstable. The regime covers all OSE providers in the EEA, including AI chatbots with OSE functionalities. As eligibility expands, cost allocation becomes less predictable. Paragraph 75 compounds the problem by locking in FRAND terms for five years, followed by renegotiation without a clear benchmark. This structure is likely to increase, not reduce, disputes.[45]

Taken together, these features calibrate prices to recipient size and ability to pay, rather than to economic cost. Paragraph 74 makes this explicit for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). It caps their charges at incremental cost and requires that other beneficiaries’ allocations be calculated as if all recipients faced that constraint. The result is cross-subsidisation. The burden of below-cost SME access shifts to other recipients.[46]

Article 6(11) does not support that outcome. It requires access on ‘fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory’ terms—not parity, and not pricing based on what recipients can afford. Properly understood, non-discrimination prevents competitive disadvantage among similarly situated licensees. It does not require identical terms for differently situated firms.[47] An access price designed to ensure viability for all would invert that principle. It would equalise outcomes by shifting the shortfall of less efficient recipients onto more efficient ones.

The incentive effects run in the same direction. Below-economic pricing weakens the gatekeeper’s incentives to invest in data quality, abuse detection, and privacy-preserving analytics. It also reduces recipients’ incentives to invest in independent crawl, ranking, and behavioural data. As noted above, even proponents of ex ante data-access duties warn that such regimes can dampen investment incentives.[48]

A more stable design would follow three principles.

First, the cost base should reflect the full economic cost of supplying the data. That includes compliance, audit, security, and monitoring costs, plus a return that reflects investment risk, not just ex post weighted average cost of capital (WACC).

Second, interpret non-discrimination in line with the SEP/FRAND tradition. The goal is to prevent competitive disadvantage among similarly situated recipients, not to impose identical terms across heterogeneous firms.

Third, build in review. The five-year lock-in, followed by renegotiation without a benchmark, trades short-term certainty for long-term instability. Periodic ex post review would better reflect the Commission’s practice and the dynamics of the market.

VI.    Conclusion

Article 6(11) is in force, and ICLE recognises the Commission’s authority to specify what effective compliance requires. The question is how that authority should be exercised. Three points follow.

First, effectiveness should track the legal obligation, not recipient outcomes. Article 6(11) guarantees access to anonymised data on FRAND terms; it does not guarantee competitive success. The DMA’s definition of contestability in Recital 32 is procedural and opportunity-based. It asks whether firms can overcome barriers and compete on the merits, not whether they achieve particular outcomes. The evidence reinforces this distinction. Competitive performance depends on multiple inputs—product quality, engineering, distribution, and business-model fit—not data access alone. A specification that equates effectiveness with competitor success will create a predictable ratchet: broader scope, lower prices, and weaker safeguards, with no principled stopping point.

Second, the Commission should address, not assume away, the core constraints identified above. Data is not a freely transferable input. Its value depends on complementary capabilities, and the empirical literature shows diminishing returns to scale. Anonymisation further limits transferability, especially where it removes tail queries that drive marginal improvements. At the same time, privacy is a binding constraint. The GDPR requires that re-identification be effectively impossible, and the Preliminary Measures’ layered technical-and-contractual regime reflects that reality. These constraints cannot be relaxed without undermining the legal framework.

The same is true for FRAND. Search data is an information good with high fixed costs and low marginal costs. The SEP/FRAND experience shows that pricing such assets yields a range of reasonable outcomes, not a single point. The current specification departs from that logic. The WACC ceiling, the exclusion of core investments from the cost base, and the open-ended recipient class together shift pricing toward recipient ability to pay rather than economic cost. That approach risks under-compensation, cross-subsidisation, and distorted incentives. It weakens investment by both the gatekeeper and recipients.

Third, the Commission should approach specification with discipline and restraint. The DMA aims to provide clarity through ex ante rules, but early experience shows that even narrow specifications can generate complex disputes and significant enforcement costs. Article 6(11) is broader and more operationally demanding than the provisions the Commission has addressed to date. That increases the risk of unintended effects on users, innovation, and privacy.

These themes point in the same direction. The Commission should anchor effectiveness in access, not outcomes; treat privacy and proportionality as binding constraints; recognise the limits of data transferability; and align FRAND with economic cost, rather than recipient viability. It should also build in mechanisms—such as staged access and periodic ex post review—that allow the regime to adjust without constant expansion.

The Commission has the authority to define what Alphabet must do. It should exercise that authority with care. Article 6(11) does not authorise a competitor-subsidy regime, and the specification should not evolve into one in the name of effectiveness.

[1] Eur. Comm’n, For Public Consultation in Case DMA.100209 — SP — Alphabet — Article 6(11): Preliminary Measures (16 Apr. 2026), https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/document/download/b3aed7f6-c45c-4bfa-b032-b8975a48bb06_en [hereinafter Preliminary Measures]; Eur. Comm’n, Case DMA.100209 — SP — Alphabet — Article 6(11) Google Search Data Sharing: Case Summary (16 Apr. 2026), https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/dma100209-consultation-proposed-measures-google-search-data-sharing_en [hereinafter Case Summary].

[2] Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 Sept. 2022 on Contestable and Fair Markets in the Digital Sector, art. 6(11), 2022 O.J. (L 265) 1 [hereinafter DMA]; Eur. Comm’n, Commission Designates Six Gatekeepers Under the Digital Markets Act (5 Sept. 2023), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_4328.

[3] Case Summary, supra note 1, at 1 (‘Interested third parties are now consulted on these measures, in particular their effectiveness, completeness, and implementation timelines’).

[4] See Rebuttal Testimony of Professor Douglas W. Oard, Trial Ex. UPXD105 at 7, 32, United States v. Google LLC, No. 1:20-cv-03010-APM (D.D.C. 15 Nov. 2023) (reporting a measured Bing–Google IS4@5 gap of 3.924 and a frozen-versus-retrained Google effect of 0.113, and quoting Edward Fox’s testimony that the remaining ‘97 percent’ was ‘not from user interaction data’).

[5] United States v. Google LLC, Memorandum Opinion, No. 20-cv-3010 (APM), at 117 (D.D.C. 5 Aug. 2024), https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/pr/2024/pr24-59-Google.pdf; see also Geoffrey A. Manne, A Critical Analysis of the Google Search Antitrust Decision 16–17, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. (14 Aug. 2024), https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Manne-Google-Search-Decision-Analysis-2024-08-14.pdf [hereinafter Manne, Critical Analysis].

[6] Id.

[7] Competition & Mkts. Auth., Online Platforms and Digital Advertising: Market Study, Appendix I: Search Quality and Economies of Scale ¶ 34 (2020), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5fe4957c8fa8f56aeff87c12/Appendix_I_-_search_quality_v.3_WEB_.pdf.

[8] Jacques Crémer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye & Heike Schweitzer, Competition Policy for the Digital Era 9, Eur. Comm’n (2019).

[9] Digital Competition Expert Panel, Unlocking Digital Competition ¶ 2.87 (2019) [hereinafter Furman Report].

[10] DMA, supra note 2, recital 32.

[11] Anja Lambrecht & Catherine E. Tucker, Can Big Data Protect a Firm from Competition?, Competition Pol’y Int’l Antitrust Chron. 8 (Jan. 2017).

[12] Catherine Tucker, Digital Data, Platforms and the Usual [Antitrust] Suspects: Network Effects, Switching Costs, Essential Facility, 54 Rev. Indus. Org. 683 (2019).

[13] Tom Krazit, Google’s Varian: Search Scale Is ‘Bogus’, CNET (14 Aug. 2009), https://www.cnet.com/culture/googles-varian-search-scale-is-bogus.

[14] Maximilian Schäfer, Geza Sapi & Szabolcs Lorincz, The Effect of Big Data on Recommendation Quality: The Example of Internet Search 1 (DIW Berlin Discussion Paper No. 1730; DICE Discussion Paper No. 284, 2018), https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.581628.de/dp1730.pdf; Maximilian Schäfer & Geza Sapi, Learning from Data and Network Effects: The Example of Internet Search 1 (DIW Berlin Discussion Paper No. 1894, 2020), https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.798442.de/dp1894.pdf.

[15] Geoffrey A. Manne & Dirk Auer, From Data Myths to Data Reality: What Generative AI Can Tell Us About Competition Policy, Competition Pol’y Int’l (Feb. 2024) (observing that AI rivals such as OpenAI, Anthropic, and Perplexity emerged without massive incumbent data).

[16] See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Manne & Dirk Auer, Antitrust Dystopia and Antitrust Nostalgia: Alarmist Theories of Harm in Digital Markets and Their Origins, 28 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1280 (2021).

[17] Fox testimony, in Oard, supra note 4.

[18] United States v. Google LLC, supra note 5, at 46.

[19] Preliminary Measures, supra note 1, ¶¶ 13–22 (describing technical anonymisation, including suppression of long queries and queries containing rare words and word combinations); Case Summary, supra note 1, at 3.

[20] Mikolaj Barczentewicz, Comparing the EU DMA to the Search-Query Data-Sharing Remedy in US v Google, Truth on the Mkt. (3 Sept. 2025), https://truthonthemarket.com/2025/09/03/comparing-the-eu-dma-to-the-search-query-data-sharing-remedy-in-us-v-google.

[21] Preliminary Measures, supra note 1, ¶ 3.

[22] DMA, supra note 2, recital 61.

[23] Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face Is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749, N.Y. Times (9 Aug. 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html.

[24] Chad Marlow & Jennifer Stisa Granick, Celebrating an Important Victory in the Ongoing Fight Against Reverse Warrants, ACLU (29 Jan. 2024), https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/fight-against-reverse-warrants-victory.

[25] Latanya Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely 16 (Carnegie Mellon Univ. Data Privacy Working Paper No. 3, 2000).

[26] Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, César A. Hidalgo, Michel Verleysen & Vincent D. Blondel, Unique in the Crowd: The Privacy Bounds of Human Mobility, 3 Sci. Rep. 1376 (2013); see also Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique in the Shopping Mall: On the Reidentifiability of Credit Card Metadata, 347 Science 536 (2015).

[27] Cynthia Dwork & Aaron Roth, The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy, 9 Found. & Trends Theoretical Comput. Sci. 211, 214 (2014) (‘the Fundamental Law of Information Recovery states that overly accurate answers to too many questions will destroy privacy in a spectacular way’); see also Cynthia Dwork, Differential Privacy, in Automata, Languages and Programming 1, 1–12 (Michele Bugliesi et al. eds., 2006), https://doi.org/10.1007/11787006_1.

[28] Preliminary Measures, supra note 1, ¶¶ 13–22; Case Summary, supra note 1, at 3 (technical measures reduce re-identification risk ‘to a residual level without unnecessarily degrading the quality or usefulness of the search data’).

[29] Preliminary Measures, supra note 1, ¶¶ 38–39 (prohibiting re-identification, sessionisation, linking, and augmentation), ¶¶ 40–48 (imposing purpose limitation), ¶¶ 36–37 (requiring auditor verification).

[30] Case Summary, supra note 1, at 3.

[31] Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR), recital 26.

[32] Miko?aj Barczentewicz, Comments of the International Center for Law & Economics on the Joint Guidelines on the Interplay Between the Digital Markets Act and the GDPR, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. (2025), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/icle-comments-on-the-interplay-between-dma-and-gdpr.

[33] Preliminary Measures, supra note 1, ¶ 2.

[34] See Barczentewicz, supra note 20 (observing that the privacy-utility trade-off depends on who receives the data and how many recipients there are).

[35] Preliminary Measures, supra note 1, ¶ 12 (requiring data to be made available for at least five years).

[36] Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy 3 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Press 1999); see also William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors, 11 Yale J. on Reg. 171 (1994).

[37] Anne Layne-Farrar, A. Jorge Padilla & Richard Schmalensee, Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments, 74 Antitrust L.J. 671 (2007); J. Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 9 J. Competition L. & Econ. 931 (2013).

[38] Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015); Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2020] UKSC 37; Optis Cellular Tech. LLC v. Apple Retail UK Ltd. [2025] EWCA Civ 552.

[39] Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Commission Finds Apple’s App Store Rules Breach Digital Markets Act (23 Apr. 2025), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1085.

[40] Eur. Comm’n, For Public Consultation in Case DMA.100209 — SP — Alphabet — Article 6(11): Preliminary Measures ¶¶ 71, 72(i) (16 Apr. 2026), https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/document/download/b3aed7f6-c45c-4bfa-b032-b8975a48bb06_en [hereinafter Preliminary Measures].

[41] Sidak, supra note 37.

[42] Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, On the Regulation of Networks as Complex Systems: A Graph Theory Approach, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1687, 1711–12 (2005).

[43] Preliminary Measures, supra note 1, ¶ 78.

[44] Id. ¶ 79(b).

[45] Id. ¶ 75.

[46] Id. ¶ 74.

[47] Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2020] UKSC 37, ¶¶ 112–14; Valéria Silva, FRAND-Licensing Litigation Across the Atlantic, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. (8 Apr. 2025), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/frand-licensing-litigation-across-the-atlantic-a-comparative-assessment-of-us-and-uk-jurisprudence-on-telecom-disputes.

[48] See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.

ICLE Comments to the CMA on Apple’s and Google’s App Store Rules

I. Introduction The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) appreciates the opportunity to respond to the Competition and Markets Authority’s (CMA) call for evidence . . .

I. Introduction

The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) appreciates the opportunity to respond to the Competition and Markets Authority’s (CMA) call for evidence on recent developments relating to Apple’s and Google’s app-store rules.[1] ICLE is a non-profit, non-partisan global research and policy centre that advances evidence-based policy. Its scholars have written extensively on digital competition.

The call for evidence raises three related questions: (i) whether fees on steered transactions represent ‘a fair and reasonable charge for the services provided’; (ii) how the design of steering mechanisms—including side-by-side presentation of billing options, interstitial disclosures, parental gates, and attribution windows—affects user uptake; and (iii) whether the privacy, security, and fraud risks identified by Apple and Google have materialised where steering has been introduced.[2] These comments address each issue in turn.

A preliminary point frames our analysis. The CMA’s roadmaps rest on the view that Apple and Google operate an ‘effective duopoly’ subject to ‘limited competitive constraint’. ICLE has addressed that claim in prior submissions and does not repeat those arguments here.[3] The premise remains contested. Competition between iOS and Android, alongside growing pressure from AI-native firms and device manufacturers such as Samsung, materially shapes the effects of any intervention. Where competition is robust, the marginal benefits of regulation diminish, while the risks of error increase. The CMA should account for the possibility that intervention could leave UK consumers and developers worse off overall.

Our views are as follows.

On fees. The CMA asks whether steered-transaction fees are ‘fair and reasonable’. In practice, that inquiry risks sliding into cost-based rate-setting—a path with a poor track record. Pricing information goods presents well-known difficulties, as experience in the standard-essential patent (SEP) context shows. The analogy to FRAND pricing does not hold. FRAND commitments arise ex ante, before lock-in occurs. By contrast, Strategic Market Status (SMS) designation under the DMCC lacks any comparable anchor. Any cost-based approach would therefore operate ex post, inviting uncertainty and litigation. The European Commission’s ongoing dispute with Apple over alternative fee structures illustrates these risks. Even using a benchmarking approach, Apple’s and Google’s fees fall within the range charged by comparable online platforms. The CMA should avoid committing enforcement resources to rate-setting.

On design. Intervening in the design of steering mechanisms requires caution. Choice screens and mandated disclosures often fail to influence behaviour as regulators expect. Side-by-side displays, interstitial screens, parental gates, and attribution windows each serve identifiable informational, safety, or commercial functions. Removing or weakening these features to increase steering uptake risks displacing the preferences of users, developers, and platforms with those of the regulator.

On privacy, security, and fraud. The risks identified by platform operators are not hypothetical. Design mandates in curated ecosystems have, in other contexts, contributed to security failures—including the July 2024 Microsoft/CrowdStrike outage—and to unintended degradation of user experience. Steering moves transactions outside managed billing environments designed to detect fraud, resolve disputes, protect minors, and reduce exposure to social-engineering attacks. Limited evidence from jurisdictions where steering remains recent does not establish that these risks will not materialise.

A broader institutional point underlies these observations. The CMA indicates that it intends to introduce steering measures in the first half of 2026. Before doing so, it should assess experience elsewhere. Early evidence from the Digital Markets Act suggests rising compliance costs and protracted, adversarial enforcement, with limited demonstrable consumer benefit. The CMA is not obliged to replicate that approach.

II. The Limits of ‘Fair and Reasonable’ Fee Assessment

The call for evidence asks whether Apple’s and Google’s fees on steered transactions ‘reflect a fair and reasonable charge for the services provided’.[4] Framed this way, the inquiry invites a form of rate-setting, including benchmarking exercises of the kind endorsed by the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Epic Games v. Apple, which the CMA cites approvingly.[5] That path warrants caution.

Experience in analogous settings shows that rate-setting for information goods is difficult to administer and highly contestable. The underlying cost structures resist clean measurement, and attempts to derive a ‘correct’ price tend to devolve into discretionary judgments and protracted disputes. The CMA should consider that record before proceeding.

The analysis that follows makes three points. First, cost-based approaches cannot yield stable or non-arbitrary rates in this context. Second, analogies to FRAND rate-setting in the standard-essential patent space do not translate to the DMCC’s Strategic Market Status regime. Third, even on a conservative benchmarking approach, current fees fall within commercial norms, and the economic case for intervention is weak.

A. Cost-Based Rate-Setting for App Stores Is Indeterminate

App stores, like standard-essential patents (SEPs), are paradigmatic information goods. They involve high fixed costs of development and maintenance, near-zero marginal costs of distribution, and extensive shared inputs—security infrastructure, developer tools, payment processing, review and curation, anti-fraud systems, spam detection, accessibility APIs, and other platform-wide services. These inputs support thousands of downstream services and cannot be allocated cleanly across them.[6]

This cost structure defeats any attempt to identify a single ‘correct’ rate through cost-based analysis. Regulators face three options, none satisfactory. They can allocate shared fixed costs across services, but any allocation will be arbitrary. They can focus on narrowly defined marginal or incremental costs, but that approach systematically undercompensates investment in platform-wide goods. Or they can add a return on capital to a chosen cost base, which reintroduces discretion and judgment. None of these approaches yields a stable or principled result.

The same problem has long plagued FRAND rate-setting in the SEP context.[7] Courts and arbitrators have relied on a mix of heuristics—comparable-licence benchmarks, top-down and bottom-up methods, and hypothetical-negotiation frameworks. These approaches have not scaled well. In practice, disputes often collapse into competing expert valuations.

The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals’ suggestion in Epic that Apple could justify a steered-transaction commission based on ‘costs genuinely and reasonably necessary for its coordination of external links’[8] imports these difficulties into app-store regulation. The resulting administrative and litigation burdens are not speculative; they mirror the experience of SEP enforcement.

B. FRAND Analogies Do Not Translate to App-Store Regulation

The SEP experience may appear to offer a roadmap, but the analogy breaks down at a structural level. FRAND obligations arise as the price of inclusion in a technical standard. They reflect an ex ante commitment by a patent holder to a standard-setting organisation, made before lock-in, in exchange for the commercial benefits of standardisation. That commitment provides a conceptual baseline: a ‘fair and reasonable’ rate reflects the outcome of a hypothetical negotiation among willing parties before market power attaches.[9]

The DMCC SMS regime rests on a different foundation. Apple and Google did not seek SMS designation, nor did they make ex ante commitments to a regulatory framework. They did not voluntarily submit to any licensing regime. Instead, the CMA identified market characteristics it considered problematic and imposed conduct requirements unilaterally. There is no equivalent to the FRAND ‘hypothetical negotiation before lock-in’. The CMA would need to reconstruct, after the fact, a counterfactual rate that never existed.[10]

That difference matters. Any cost-based or benchmarking approach in this context operates ex post. It inherits the weaknesses of FRAND rate-setting—discretion, contestability, and reliance on expert judgment—without its central discipline: the ex ante anchor. Unsurprisingly, rate-setting exercises in similar contexts have proven persistently contentious.

The European Commission’s experience under the Digital Markets Act illustrates the point. After questioning Apple’s 30 per cent commission in its non-compliance findings,[11] the Commission turned to Apple’s revised fee structure, including the Core Technology Commission, the initial acquisition fee, and the tiered Store Services fee.[12] That process remains ongoing. It has absorbed significant enforcement resources without yielding a stable outcome for developers, consumers, or platforms. Instead, each revised fee structure has triggered further rounds of scrutiny and dispute.

C. Benchmarking and Evidence Do Not Support Fee Intervention

Even setting aside these threshold concerns, the case for intervening on fee levels is weaker than the call for evidence suggests. A proper benchmarking exercise indicates that current steered-transaction fees sit within—and often below—the range charged by comparable digital platforms. That undermines any inference that prevailing rates are unreasonably high. Developer dissatisfaction, standing alone, does not establish a competitive failure. Nor do claims about the benefits of lower fees rest on a sound economic foundation. They assume complete cost pass-through, which theory and evidence both reject, particularly in multi-sided markets where platforms adjust along non-price margins. Fee intervention therefore risks delivering concentrated gains to a narrow set of large developers while imposing diffuse costs across the UK app economy.

If the CMA proceeds to assess whether fees are ‘fair and reasonable’, the least-worst approach is benchmarking against comparable services. Applied conservatively, that exercise does not support intervention.

Comparable platforms typically charge commissions that overlap with, and often exceed, the 10–20 per cent range applied to steered transactions. Gaming console storefronts (PlayStation, Xbox, Nintendo eShop) charge 30 per cent. Steam charges 30 per cent, falling to 20–25 per cent at higher volumes. Amazon Marketplace referral fees range from 8 per cent to 45 per cent. Food-delivery and online-travel platforms routinely charge 15–30 per cent.[13]

By contrast, steered-transaction fees—15 per cent and 10 per cent in Japan, 10–20 per cent in Google’s global rollout, and the EU’s alternative-business-terms structure—are not outliers. In several cases, they are materially lower than comparable commissions.

Treating developer dissatisfaction as evidence of a ‘failure of competition’ conflates preference with market failure. Firms naturally prefer lower input costs. That preference does not show that prevailing rates depart from competitive benchmarks.

The call for evidence also asserts that lower fees would produce substantial benefits for UK users and developers, including ‘lower prices for digital content and services’ and ‘a wider choice of higher quality innovative goods and services’.[14] Those claims are overstated.

Cost pass-through is rarely complete. When input costs fall, firms share the resulting surplus among themselves, their customers, other complementors, and—in multi-sided markets—the other side of the platform. The outcome depends on demand elasticities, market structure, and competitive constraints, none of which the call for evidence models. In multi-sided markets with differentiated products, pass-through can be well below complete and may even be negative on one side as platforms rebalance pricing.

Empirical evidence supports this view. A 2020 study commissioned by the European Commission found that caps on payment-card interchange fees only partially translated into lower consumer prices.[15] More directly, a recent study of U.S. cities that capped delivery-platform commissions at 15 per cent found that platforms responded by reducing the visibility of independent restaurants and shifting promotion toward chain restaurants not subject to the caps. Consumers did not clearly benefit, and smaller restaurants—the intended beneficiaries—were worse off.[16]

These findings are directly relevant. Platforms respond to fee interventions through non-price adjustments, including ranking changes, advertising monetisation, service bundling, and quality reductions. Those responses can offset or reverse the intended benefits.

Fee interventions also tend to produce concentrated benefits and diffuse costs. Large developers—with scale, brand recognition, and in-house payment systems—are best positioned to exploit lower steering fees. Smaller developers, whom the CMA acknowledges ‘often do not pay the highest commission rates’,[17] gain little. They may instead face degraded distribution, new compliance costs, or reduced platform investment in shared services.

In short, the case for rate-setting is weak. Experience in the SEP context shows the difficulty of pricing information goods, and the FRAND analogy does not resolve those challenges. The European Commission’s ongoing engagement with Apple’s fee structure illustrates the institutional burden. Benchmarking does not indicate that current fees fall outside commercial norms. Pass-through assumptions lack empirical support. And the distributional effects of intervention favour a narrow group of large developers at the expense of smaller firms and consumers. The CMA should avoid drifting into rate-setting and direct its enforcement resources elsewhere.

III. Assessing Steering Design Interventions

The call for evidence identifies several design features that affect steering uptake: side-by-side presentation of native billing options, interstitial disclosures that payments occur off-platform, parental gates for users aged 13–18, attribution windows (such as the seven-day window in Japan), and scope carve-outs (such as Apple’s exclusion of apps in the ‘Kids’ category).[18] The CMA should approach any intervention in these features with caution.

These design elements fall into three broad categories. Some serve clear informational or safety functions and should be preserved, including disclosures and child-protection measures. Others reflect standard commercial terms, such as attribution windows, which do not lend themselves to regulatory calibration. Still others—such as choice architecture interventions—have an uncertain and often limited effect on user behaviour, while imposing real compliance and usability costs.

These design elements fall into three broad categories. Some serve clear informational or safety functions and should be preserved, including disclosures and child-protection measures. Others reflect standard commercial terms, such as attribution windows, which do not lend themselves to regulatory calibration. Still others—such as choice architecture interventions—have an uncertain and often limited effect on user behaviour, while imposing real compliance and usability costs.

A. Choice Screens and Disclosures Rarely Shift Behaviour

The empirical record on choice screens and mandated disclosures is not encouraging.[19] Browser and search-engine choice screens introduced on Android in Europe after the 2018 Google Android decision did not materially shift market shares over several years. As Geoffrey Manne observes in the context of the U.S. Google Search case:

In Europe, where Google has since 2020 implemented a search engine choice screen on Android following the EU’s 2018 antitrust decision against it, Google’s share of the search engine market has barely budged.[20]

Evidence from default-switching experiments points in the same direction. When Mozilla changed Firefox’s default search engine from Google to Bing in 2016, Bing retained only 42 per cent of search volume by day 12. That figure later fell to between 20 per cent and 35 per cent.[21] Users quickly revert to preferred options when defaults change.

These findings undermine the assumption that presenting alternatives at the point of purchase will meaningfully alter behaviour.[22] Similar design mandates in app-store purchase flows are likely to produce similar results. They will impose compliance costs, increase interface complexity, and risk user frustration with additional disclosures, while delivering at most modest behavioural change. The return on regulatory intervention is therefore uncertain at best.

B. Core Design Safeguards Are Legitimate

Requirements that steering links appear alongside Apple’s In-App Purchase and Google Play Billing, and that users see a disclosure explaining that the transaction is with the developer, are often framed as friction designed to deter steering. That characterisation is incomplete. These features also serve straightforward consumer-protection functions.

When users transact off-platform, they lose access to centralised billing, subscription management, refunds, and dispute-resolution mechanisms. They assume counterparty risk with developers they may not know. Many users will not realise that refunds, chargebacks, or family-sharing features no longer apply. Clear, point-of-decision disclosures enable informed choice. Removing them to increase steering uptake would prioritise developer interests over user protection.

Child-safety measures reinforce this point. Apple’s rules in Japan exclude apps in the ‘Kids’ category, prohibit steering for users under 13, and require parental gates for users aged 13–18.[23] These safeguards respond to well-established concerns about minors’ in-app purchases, exposure to fraud, and compliance with child-protection laws in the UK and elsewhere.[24]

Treating parental gates as anticompetitive—or as design friction to be removed—would invert the policy balance. The CMA should recognise that child-safety protections are core platform functions. Any intervention should preserve parental gates, age-based restrictions, and category carve-outs for services aimed at minors.

Attribution windows raise a similar issue. Apple’s seven-day window—under which reduced commissions apply only to transactions completed within seven days of a steering link—reflects a standard commercial practice.[25] It limits commission liability to transactions plausibly facilitated by the platform, while preventing arbitrage through a single steering event.

Time-limited attribution is common across affiliate marketing, referral agreements, advertising networks, and other commercial arrangements. There is no economic basis to treat a seven-day window, or any particular duration, as inherently unreasonable. The CMA should not treat attribution windows as design features requiring adjustment. Doing so would draw the authority into setting commercial terms, beyond the scope contemplated by the DMCC.

C. Design Mandates Risk Obsolescence and Harm

The CMA should approach design mandates with caution. Each feature identified for potential removal—side-by-side presentation, disclosure screens, parental gates, and attribution windows—serves legitimate user, safety, or commercial purposes. Mandated removal would likely produce modest behavioural change while imposing real costs on informed consent, child safety, and product development. Parental gates and related child-safety measures should remain outside the scope of any conduct requirements.

Design mandates also risk becoming obsolete as mobile ecosystems evolve. As ICLE has previously noted, rapid integration of artificial intelligence is reshaping how users discover and transact with apps.[26] Samsung’s AI-driven features, Apple’s on-device intelligence, Google’s Gemini integration, and the rise of third-party AI assistants are already shifting interaction models toward assistant-driven, recommendation-based, and voice-first interfaces. Mandates tied to current user-interface patterns may soon apply to design surfaces that no longer exist.

The call for evidence underestimates the risk that regulatory mandates will ossify platform design at a moment of rapid technological change. The CMA should build flexibility into any intervention it adopts—or, preferably, avoid prescriptive design mandates and allow platforms, developers, and users to iterate through standard product-development processes.

IV. Steering Introduces Real Privacy, Security, and Fraud Risks

The call for evidence asks for ‘the effect, or otherwise, of these developments on users’ privacy and security or prevalence of fraud’, and seeks ‘any examples or evidence relating to the extent to which any privacy, security or fraud risks have materialised as a result of the introduction of steered transactions’.[27] This framing is welcome. The CMA is right to insist on concrete evidence, rather than purely theoretical concerns. ICLE has likewise emphasised in prior comments that design-mandate interventions in curated digital ecosystems create concrete—not merely theoretical—risks.[28]

At the same time, the evidentiary record remains limited. In jurisdictions where steering has been introduced—Japan (since Dec. 2025), the EU (2024–2025), and the United States (since 2024)—the regimes are recent, and their effects on fraud, privacy, and security are still emerging. This makes systematic harm difficult to measure at this stage, even where the underlying risk mechanisms are well understood. The absence of large-scale, attributable failures in this short period does not establish that risks are absent. Many relevant harms—subscription traps, phishing at the point of redirect, post-transaction data exfiltration, fraudulent refund disputes, and exploitation of vulnerable users—are diffuse, underreported, and slow to surface.

App-store billing systems are not mere payment processors. They are integrated fraud-detection, subscription-management, and dispute-resolution infrastructures operating at scale. Apple reports blocking more than $9 billion in fraudulent transactions over five years, including $2 billion in 2024, terminating 146,000 developer accounts for fraud, and identifying 4.7 million stolen credit cards.[29] Google’s Play Protect performs a comparable function. Android-team analysis indicates that apps obtained outside curated stores are more than 50 times as likely to contain malware.[30] These figures illustrate the scope of the infrastructure that steering bypasses.

Steering moves transactions from this environment into developer-specific systems of widely varying quality. Most developers cannot replicate platform-scale protections. Centralised billing delivers at least three advantages. First, platform-scale fraud detection: Apple and Google rely on cross-platform signals—device anomalies, known-bad merchant identifiers, and transaction-velocity checks across millions of users—that smaller providers cannot match. Second, unified subscription management: users can manage and cancel subscriptions in one place, rather than tracking multiple external providers. Third, centralised dispute resolution: platforms offer standardised refund processes, while off-platform disputes depend on bilateral negotiations with developers. These differences matter for user protection.

Evidence from adjacent contexts underscores the risks. The July 2024 Microsoft/CrowdStrike outage—affecting airlines, hospitals, and banks—appears to have resulted, in part, from an interoperability mandate.[31] It imposed widespread disruption and economic harm far beyond its regulatory target.[32]

Closer to the present context, the Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets required Apple to permit alternative payments for dating apps.[33] Following that change, Dutch banks reported a sharp rise in dating-app fraud. More than 160 victims came forward in 2024—a nearly 25 per cent increase on the prior year—with average losses of €25,000.[34] While causation is not conclusive, the timing is notable, particularly as transactions shifted outside the systems designed to detect such fraud.

Early evidence under the Digital Markets Act points in a similar direction. A Netcraft analysis of apps distributed through grey-market iOS sideloading sites found that around 5 per cent of a 350-app sample appeared malicious—orders of magnitude above rates observed on the official App Store.[35] These outcomes follow from the logic of the intervention: opening curated ecosystems expands the attack surface.

From a security-engineering perspective, each redirect from a trusted environment to an external site introduces new vulnerabilities. Users who follow steering links assume legitimacy, making them more susceptible to phishing, typosquatting, and look-alike payment pages. Historical patterns reinforce this dynamic. The expansion of online banking coincided with increased phishing. The growth of mobile apps brought fake app stores. Subscription commerce has seen the spread of manipulative cancellation practices. These developments reflect predictable responses to new opportunities for exploitation. Research shows that SMS and phishing vectors account for roughly 70 per cent of mobile-payment fraud—the very channels that steering amplifies.[36]

Even sceptical scholarship recognises that some interoperability measures create genuine security challenges. Daji Landis, Elettra Bietti, and Sunoo Park distinguish among ‘security engineering concerns’, ‘security vetting concerns’, and ‘hybrid concerns’.[37] Their framework shows that some risks arise from system design, not strategic behaviour.[38] The CMA should adopt a similarly granular approach. It should neither dismiss platform concerns as pretextual nor accept them uncritically. The relevant question is whether the mechanisms through which steering weakens protections—centralised fraud detection, subscription management, and dispute resolution—are substantive. The evidence indicates that they are.

The promise of ex ante regulation was clarity and predictability. Early experience under the Digital Markets Act points in the opposite direction: increased complexity, prolonged disputes, and unintended consequences.[39] Measures that appeared narrow have, in practice, expanded attack surfaces, degraded user experience, and shifted fraud losses from platforms to users without clear offsetting benefits.[40] Steering mandates risk producing similar effects. The CMA should focus not on whether these harms are possible—they are—but on whether the benefits of intervention outweigh the predictable security and fraud costs. That assessment should rest on evidence, not assumption.

Security and competition also interact through product differentiation. Many users choose iOS—and many Android users remain within Google Play Billing—because of the security, privacy, and curation these systems provide. As Randal Picker observes, the contrast between Apple’s integrated model and Google’s more open architecture reflects competition between business models, not its absence.[41] Platform-economics scholarship reaches the same conclusion. David Evans and Richard Schmalensee explain:

The full gamut of bad behavior that we encounter in society, as citizens, consumers and merchants, can happen on multisided platforms. Participants engage on offensive behavior (…). There is fraud and misrepresentation (…). Interactions become risky when platforms participants aren’t trustworthy (…). Platforms can deal with this problem by preventing low-quality entrants from joining. Steve Jobs was worried that the iPhone would attract low-quality apps that would decrease the value of the platform. Apple solved this by imposing quality control on the apps it would make available on its AppStore. This sort of quality control requires platforms to invest significant efforts into investigating participants and kicking out bad ones.[42]

Interventions that weaken these controls in the name of increasing steering uptake risk undermining a dimension of competition that users value. In a differentiated ecosystem, the objective should be to preserve user choice, not to homogenise platform design.

The empirical record on whether harms have ‘materialised’ remains limited because the relevant regimes are new. The mechanisms that generate those harms are well understood. Evidence from adjacent interventions, early DMA experience, and the literature on fraud and consumer protection all point in the same direction. The CMA should require clear, quantifiable evidence that the benefits of any steering intervention exceed its privacy, security, and fraud costs. It should not invert that burden by treating the absence of fully realised harms as evidence that risks do not exist.

V. Conclusion

The CMA considers steering interventions at a critical juncture. Its roadmaps commit the authority to ‘taking action’ in the first half of 2026, and the call for evidence seeks to build the record for that step. That decision should reflect caution, not momentum.

Three points follow.

First, the CMA should avoid rate-setting. As Section II shows, pricing information goods resists principled, administrable solutions. The SEP/FRAND analogy does not translate to the DMCC context. Experience in the EU illustrates the institutional costs of sustained rate disputes, and benchmarking does not indicate that current fees fall outside commercial norms. Moving into rate-setting would commit the CMA to a resource-intensive exercise with no clear endpoint.

Second, the CMA should approach design mandates with restraint. Section III shows that choice screens and disclosure requirements rarely shift behaviour in meaningful ways. The design features under review—side-by-side presentation, disclosure screens, parental gates, and attribution windows—serve legitimate informational, safety, and commercial functions. Removing or weakening them risks degrading informed consent, undermining child safety, and constraining product development. Static mandates also risk rapid obsolescence as AI-driven interfaces reshape how users discover and transact with apps. At a minimum, parental gates and related child-safety measures should remain outside the scope of any conduct requirements.

Third, the CMA should require clear evidence that steering does not impose privacy, security, and fraud costs. Section IV shows that the relevant regimes are new, but the mechanisms of harm are well understood. Steering shifts transactions out of platform infrastructures that provide fraud detection, subscription management, and dispute resolution at scale. Evidence from adjacent interventions—from interoperability mandates to early Digital Markets Act experience—shows that well-intentioned design changes can expand attack surfaces and shift risk onto users. The burden should rest on proponents of intervention to show that the benefits outweigh these costs.

A broader theme runs through these points. Competition in mobile ecosystems reflects differentiation as well as rivalry. Apple’s integrated model and Google’s more open architecture offer distinct trade-offs that users actively choose between. Regulatory interventions that push toward uniformity risk weakening that dimension of competition.

The intensity of rivalry between iOS and Android—now joined by AI-driven entrants—further narrows the case for intervention. Where competitive constraints are strong, the marginal benefits of regulation fall, while the risks of error rise. The DMCC grants the CMA substantial authority, but it also requires disciplined use of that authority. Decisions should rest on evidence, reflect institutional limits, and account for both intended and unintended effects.

The CMA should proceed accordingly.

 

[1] Competition & Mkts. Auth., Views Sought: Recent Developments in Relation to Apple’s and Google’s App Store Rules (Mar. 2026), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69cce7e0eafd66b876458b25/Call_for_evidence_.pdf [hereinafter Call for Evidence].

[2] Id. ¶ 22(a).

[3] See Geoffrey A. Manne, Dirk Auer & Mario A. Zúñiga, ICLE Comments to UK CMA on Competition in Mobile Ecosystems, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. (12 Feb. 2025), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/icle-comments-to-uk-cma-on-competition-in-mobile-ecosystems; Geoffrey A. Manne, Dirk Auer & Mario A. Zúñiga, Comments of the International Center for Law & Economics on CMA’s Proposal to Designate Apple and Google with Strategic Market Status, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. (20 Aug. 2025), https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/ICLE-CMA-Apple-Google-Designation-comments.pdf.

[4] Call for Evidence, supra note 1, ¶ 22(a)(i).

[5] See Call for Evidence, supra note 1, ¶ 15; Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 23-16234 (9th Cir. 11 Dec. 2025), at 41 (discussing a cost-based measure for commissions).

[6] Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy 3 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Press 1999) (‘Information is costly to produce but cheap to reproduce … cost-based pricing does not work: a 10 or 20 per cent markup on unit cost makes no sense when unit cost is zero.’).

[7] See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray?, 32 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1313 (2017); Anne Layne-Farrar, Moving Past the SEP RAND Obsession: Some Thoughts on the Economic Implications of Unilateral Commitments and the Complexities of Patent Licensing, 21 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1093 (2014); Daniel F. Spulber, Patent Licensing and Bargaining with Innovative Complements and Substitutes, 70 Res. Econ. 693 (2016).

[8] Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 23-16234 (9th Cir. 11 Dec. 2025), at 41.

[9] Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol, Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of Market Power, 73 Antitrust L.J. 1 (2005).

[10] Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carl Shapiro & Theresa Sullivan, Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 Antitrust L.J. 603 (2007).

[11] Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Commission Finds Apple’s App Store Rules Breach Digital Markets Act (23 Apr. 2025), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1085.

[12] See Apple, Communication and Promotion of Offers on the App Store in the EU (last visited 21 Apr. 2026), https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=communication-and-promotion-of-offers-on-the-app-store-in-the-eu.

[13] See 1D3, Platform Fees in the Videogame Industry (13 Nov. 2024), https://1d3.com/platform-fees; see also Press Release, Steam, New Revenue Share Tiers and Other Updates to the Steam Distribution Agreement (30 Nov. 2018), https://steamcommunity.com/games/593110/announcements/detail/1697191267930157838 (30 per cent commission on gross revenue, falling to 25 per cent after $10 million and 20 per cent after $50 million per title); Amazon, Selling on Amazon Fee Schedule (last visited 21 Apr. 2026), https://sell.amazon.com/pricing (referral fees range from 8 per cent to 45 per cent, with most digital-adjacent categories at 15 per cent); Scott Sage, How Much Does Booking.com Charge Hosts?, AirDNA (4 Aug. 2024), https://www.airdna.co/blog/bookingcom-charges-for-owners (typical hotel commissions of 10 per cent to 25 per cent). These negotiated fee structures among sophisticated parties provide a conservative benchmark for assessing whether app-store commissions fall outside ordinary commercial norms.

[14] Call for Evidence, supra note 1, ¶¶ 5–7.

[15] Ernst & Young & Copenhagen Econ., Study on the Application of the Interchange Fee Regulation (2020), https://www.copenhageneconomics.com/dyn/resources/Publication/publicationPDF/9/559/1583763875/copenhagen-economics_march_ifr-report.pdf.

[16] Li Zhuoxin & Wang Gang, Regulating Powerful Platform: Evidence From Commission Cap Fees, 36 Info. Sys. Res. 126 (2025), https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/isre.2022.0191 (finding that, in regulated cities, consumers face higher delivery fees and longer wait times as platforms recoup lost commission revenue through other channels).

[17] Call for Evidence, supra note 1, ¶ 21 (acknowledging that ‘smaller developers, which often do not pay the highest commission rates, make up a large proportion of the UK developer base’).

[18] Call for Evidence, supra note 1, ¶¶ 13–18.

[19] See ICLE Mobile Ecosystems Comments, supra note 3, at 10–12 (documenting that browser and search-engine choice screens in the EU failed to shift user behaviour).

[20] Geoffrey A. Manne, A Critical Analysis of the Google Search Antitrust Decision, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. (14 Aug. 2024), at 16–17, https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Manne-Google-Search-Decision-Analysis-2024-08-14.pdf (references omitted).

[21] Id. at 16–17.

[22] Id. at 17.

[23] Call for Evidence, supra note 1, ¶ 13(a).

[24] See Online Safety Act 2023, c. 50 (UK); Information Comm’r’s Off., Age-Appropriate Design Code (2020); see also Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Children in the Digital Environment: Revised Typology of Risks (2021) (documenting harms from unsupervised digital transactions by minors).

[25] Call for Evidence, supra note 1, ¶ 13(b).

[26] See ICLE Designation Comments, supra note 3, at 13–15 (discussing AI integration and the risk that static regulatory mandates ossify platform design amid rapid technological change).

[27] Call for Evidence, supra note 1, ¶ 22(a)(iii).

[28] See, e.g., ICLE Mobile Ecosystems Comments, supra note 3; ICLE Designation Comments, supra note 3.

[29] See Apple, App Store Prevented More than $9 Billion in Fraudulent Transactions (May 2025), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2025/05/the-app-store-prevented-more-than-9-billion-usd-in-fraudulent-transactions (reporting $2 billion in blocked fraudulent transactions in 2024, termination of 146,000 developer accounts for fraud, and identification of 4.7 million stolen credit cards).

[30] Suzanne Frey, A New Layer of Security for Certified Android Devices, Android Devs. Blog (25 Aug. 2025), https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2025/08/elevating-android-security.html.

[31] Geoffrey A. Manne, Dirk Auer & Mario Zúñiga, Comments of ICLE to Commission Consultation on Proposed Measures for Interoperability Between Apple’s iOS Operating System and Connected Devices, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. (8 Jan. 2025), at 8, https://laweconcenter.org/resources/comments-of-icle-to-commission-consultation-on-proposed-measures-for-interoperability-between-apples-ios-operating-system-and-connected-devices-dma-100203 [hereinafter ICLE Interoperability Comments] (citing Josephine Wolff, Software Crash Exposes Tensions Between Security and Competition, Fin. Times (28 Jul. 2024), https://www.ft.com/content/60dde560-194a-40d1-8c98-1d96d6d019a0). Both measures—interoperability mandates and requirements to allow sideloading or steering—require platforms to share information or open systems, thereby reducing platform control over security and system integrity.

[32] Adam Satariano et al., Outage for Microsoft Users Knocks Out Systems for Airlines and Hospitals in Chaotic Day, N.Y. Times (19 Jul. 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/07/19/business/global-tech-outage.

[33] Auth. for Consumers & Mkts., ACM: Apple Changes Unfair Conditions, Allows Alternative Payment Methods in Dating Apps (11 Jun. 2022), https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/acm-apple-changes-unfair-conditions-allows-alternative-payments-methods-dating-apps.

[34] See NL Times, Dutch Banks Worried About Rise in Dating App Scams; Victims’ Average Loss €25,000 (25 Nov. 2024), https://nltimes.nl/2024/11/25/dutch-banks-worried-rise-dating-app-scams-victims-average-loss-eu25000 (reporting that, in 2024, more than 160 victims came forward—nearly a 25 per cent increase over 2023—with average losses of €25,000; noting also that, in Oct. 2025, authorities arrested two individuals in Utrecht for defrauding 26 victims of €550,000). The Dutch ACM’s alternative-payment mandate for dating apps preceded these developments; while causation is not established, the temporal correlation is notable.

[35] See Bilaal Rashid, What Apple Is Afraid of — Pre-DMA Alternative iOS App Stores Are Already Riddled with Malware, Netcraft (6 Mar. 2024), https://www.netcraft.com/blog/apple-dma-app-store-malware-review.

[36] See Umar Sayibu et al., Fraud Prediction and Prevention in Mobile Money Payment Systems: A Systematic Literature Review of Text-Based Detection Methods, Sec. & Commc’n Networks 1 (2025), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1155/sec/8913715 (finding that 70 per cent of mobile payment fraud follows SMS and phishing vectors).

[37] Daji Landis, Elettra Bietti & Sunoo Park, SoK: ‘Interoperability vs Security’ Arguments: A Technical Framework (2026) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.04538.

[38] Id. at 8–12 (categorising security claims into ‘security engineering concerns’, ‘security vetting concerns’, and ‘hybrid concerns’, and noting that the framework aims to identify ‘where security and interoperability are and are not in tension’).

 [39] See Satya Marar, Brightline Rules and Case-by-Case Courts: The DMA and Epic v Apple, Truth on the Mkt. (2 Feb. 2026), https://truthonthemarket.com/2026/02/02/brightline-rules-and-case-by-case-courts-the-dma-and-epic-v-apple; see also Dirk Auer, The Broken Promises of Europe’s Digital Regulation, Truth on the Mkt. (12 Mar. 2024), https://truthonthemarket.com/2024/03/12/the-broken-promises-of-europes-digital-regulation.

[40] See Selçukhan Ünekbas & Lazar Radic, Implementing the EU’s Digital Markets Act: The Seen and the Unseen, Truth on the Mkt. (25 June 2025), https://truthonthemarket.com/2025/06/25/implementing-the-eus-digital-markets-act-the-seen-and-the-unseen.

[41] Randal C. Picker, Security Competition and App Stores, Network L. Rev. (2024), https://www.networklawreview.org/picker-app-stores.

[42] David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Matchmakers: The New Economics of Multisided Platforms 138–39 (2016).

ICLE Comments to the NAIC RE: CLO Modified RBC Structure with Tranche Thickness

The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) respectfully submits these comments on the American Academy of Actuaries’ March 2026 presentation on CLO C-1 factor modeling and Proposal 2025-22-IRE MOD...

The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) respectfully submits these comments on the American Academy of Actuaries’ March 2026 presentation on CLO C-1 factor modeling and Proposal 2025-22-IRE MOD concerning CLO RBC structure with tranche thickness. At the Spring 2026 National Meeting, the RBC Investment Risk and Evaluation Working Group exposed the Academy’s CLO presentation for comment through April 16 and re-exposed a modified version of Proposal 2025-22-IRE through April 17. That re-exposure, rather than final adoption of a new factor regime, reflects an appropriately measured posture.[1]

ICLE supports the NAIC’s prudential objective. Insurer solvency oversight requires regulators to assess increasingly complex assets, and the NAIC’s work in this area is plainly consequential. Our concern is narrower and more institutional: where an accreditation-backed, nationally influential process is considering increasingly granular investment-policy judgments, the better course is to proceed with transparent incrementalism, to favor the simplest administrable rule that fits the evidence, and to avoid hard-coding methodological choices before they are clearly stable and reproducible.[2]

A substantial academic literature helps explain why that kind of restraint is warranted. In Is U.S. Insurance Regulation Unconstitutional?, Daniel Schwarcz argues that many NAIC materials function with the practical force of law because state insurance codes commonly require adherence to current NAIC manuals and related materials. He further argues that this occurs through dynamic incorporation by reference, even though the NAIC is a private entity not subject to the ordinary procedural safeguards that govern public rulemaking and administrative review.[3] Whether or not one accepts the article’s broadest constitutional conclusion, its institutional point is hard to ignore: when NAIC materials can effectively shape binding state regulatory outcomes, the case for modesty in highly technical policymaking becomes stronger, not weaker.

The NAIC accreditation program underscores that point. Schwarcz describes accreditation as creating powerful incentives for states to remain aligned with NAIC standards, including because a loss of accreditation can expose domestic insurers to costly multi-state examinations and create pressure for redomestication, job loss, and lost tax revenue.[4] At the same time, he also recognizes the real benefits of NAIC-led uniformity and agility and suggests that states could preserve those benefits while adding review safeguards, including through an interstate-compact-style oversight mechanism or by allowing a meaningful period for state review of NAIC materials before they become operative.[5] That is a useful frame here: the answer to institutional concern is not hostility to the NAIC, but procedural discipline and regulatory modesty.

The NAIC’s own recent issue brief on SVO discretion points in the same direction.[6] The brief fairly emphasizes that the NAIC cannot unilaterally reject or override a rating and that any discretionary review is intended for limited circumstances with notice rights, appeal rights, and regulator oversight. But the same brief also confirms that regulators, through the NAIC, are developing due-diligence standards for credit rating providers; that the SVO Credit Committee may place a filing-exempt security under review; that a three-notch materiality test is applied; and that, if regulators authorize removal of a CRP rating from filing exemption and no alternate CRP rating is available, the SVO’s designation becomes the NAIC designation.[7] Properly understood, the brief does not show arbitrary power. It shows that substantial evaluative authority over complex credit instruments is already concentrated within the NAIC-centered process. That is another reason to avoid layering in additional granularity unless the incremental gain is clearly justified.

Those institutional considerations matter acutely in the CLO project. The Academy’s March 2026 presentation describes a working model and the Spring 2026 meeting summary reports progress in developing model documentation. The materials are therefore best understood as an ongoing modeling exercise, not a finished policy justification for materially changing insurer capital treatment. That distinction matters because the present record does not appear to include a formal comparative analysis explaining why the more punitive, tranche-thickness-based approach should be preferred over the simpler rating-only framework as a regulatory matter.

The Academy’s presentation states that modeled tail risk can largely be explained by remaining reinvestment horizon, rating, and tranche thickness, with tranche thickness needed only for Baa3-and-below CLO debt.[8] But the presentation also offers an alternative rating-only framework that explicitly prioritizes ease of implementation. Under Option 1, the modeled after-tax factor for Baa3 is 2.73%; under Option 2, the modeled factor for Baa3 rises to 12.52% when thickness is 4% or less. The Academy also reports that, after ratings and reinvestment-horizon interactions are added, the tranche-thickness flag increases adjusted R-squared from 81.6% to 83.2%.[9] Elsewhere, however, the presentation notes that thickness differences do not trend across ratings, provide only minor improvements to model fit, and generate noisy results for B1/below, leading the Academy to use a single average premium across all Baa3/below ratings to avoid overfitting.[10] The methodology is valuable and thoughtful, but on this record it does not yet amount to a formal empirical showing that insurers should move from the simpler rating-only framework to substantially higher capital charges for thin tranches.

That conclusion is reinforced by the structure of Proposal 2025-22-IRE MOD itself.[11] The proposal expressly states that it does not contemplate any changes to factors. Instead, it would create a more granular reporting structure that separates CLOs from other long-term bonds and carves out broadly syndicated loan CLO tranches with current thickness of 4% or less for separate reporting, while leaving factors to a separate proposal if changes are later deemed necessary.[12] That is an important distinction. A reporting change can be useful as a data-gathering and transparency exercise. But where the structural proposal is plainly a precursor to later factor choices, the NAIC should resist allowing the reporting architecture to harden prematurely into an implicit endorsement of the more complex and more punitive methodology before a separate, formal justification has been published and tested.

The timing of the current process further supports restraint. The Life RBC Working Group page states that structural RBC changes must be adopted by May 15 of the reporting year and non-structural changes, including factors and instructions, by June 30.[13] With the Academy materials open through April 16 and the modified structural proposal open through April 17, there is limited room for further empirical testing, public scrutiny, state-level review, and refinement before the current-cycle deadlines. Where the institutional stakes are high and the model still presents meaningful implementation choices, the better course is to keep the near-term rule simple.

For that reason, ICLE respectfully urges the NAIC to separate the questions of disclosure, structure, and calibration. In the near term, the NAIC should favor reporting improvements that generate comparable data and improve transparency. If factor changes are pursued later, the NAIC should strongly consider beginning with the Academy’s rating-only approach, which the presentation itself identifies as easier to implement, while using any new reporting on thin tranches to gather additional evidence before adopting a thickness-based surcharge. And if tranche thickness is eventually retained, the NAIC should be wary of a hard 4% breakpoint that creates cliff effects and incentives to structure around the rule. A more graduated approach would be preferable, but only after more validation than the current record appears to provide.

In practical terms, ICLE recommends five steps. First, the NAIC should keep Proposal 2025-22-IRE MOD clearly limited to reporting architecture unless and until a separate factor proposal is independently justified on a more mature record. Second, before any increase in CLO factors is proposed, the Academy and the Working Group should publish a formal analysis explaining why the rating-only framework is inadequate and why any tranche-thickness-based surcharge is sufficiently robust, administrable, and empirically justified to warrant adoption. Third, if new CLO factors are pursued, the NAIC should begin from the rating-only framework and require additional validation before adopting tranche-thickness-driven surcharges. Fourth, any eventual use of tranche thickness should avoid abrupt cliff effects around a single 4% threshold. Fifth, given the de facto national significance of NAIC materials under accreditation and dynamic incorporation, the NAIC should build in a meaningful review period for state regulators and legislatures before major methodological changes are allowed to function as the nationwide baseline. That final point is not an attack on the NAIC. It is a recognition that the more complex and policy-laden the rule, the stronger the case for accountable review.

The NAIC’s solvency mission is legitimate, and the effort to refine insurer treatment of CLOs is serious and worthwhile. But the combination of accreditation-backed influence, dynamic incorporation, and expanding NAIC-centered evaluative discretion means that complexity should be added only when it is plainly necessary and clearly supported. On the present record, the better path is constructive caution: separate reporting from calibration, prefer the simplest workable rule, and leave time for state-level review before contested modeling choices become de facto national investment policy.

[1] Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, Risk-Based Capital Investment Risk and Evaluation (E) Working Group Summary, Spring 2026 Nat’l Meeting (Mar. 23, 2026), https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/national_meeting/2026-spnm-summary-e-rbcirewg.pdf.

[2] Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, Life Risk-Based Capital (E) Working Group, https://content.naic.org/committees/e/life-risk-based-capital-wg (last visited Apr. 13, 2026).

[3] Daniel Schwarcz, Is U.S. Insurance Regulation Unconstitutional?, 25 Conn. Ins. L.J. 189 (2018), https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/866.

[4] Id. at 201-203.

[5] Id. at 259-262.

[6] Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, SVO Discretion Issue Brief (Mar. 2026), https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/svo-discretion-issue-brief.pdf.

[7] Id.

[8] Am. Acad. of Actuaries, C-1 Subcommittee Update on CLO C-1 Factors Modeling (Mar. 2, 2026), https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/call_materials/life-pres-clo-2603.pdf.

[9] Id.

[10] Id.

[11] Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, Proposal 2025-22-IRE: CLO Modified RBC Structure with Tranche Thickness (2026), https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/ATTN_E%20Proposal%202025-22-IRE%20CLO%20modified%20RBC%20structure%20with%20tranche%20thickness.pdf.

[12] Id.

[13] Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, supra note 2.

ICLE Comments to the FTC on Unfair or Deceptive Rental Housing Fee Practices

I.         Introduction and Background The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan research center that applies economic analysis to legal and . . .

I.         Introduction and Background

The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan research center that applies economic analysis to legal and regulatory questions. These comments respond to the Commission’s Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on rental housing fee practices (ANPRM), published March 13.[1] The ANPRM asks whether a Magnuson-Moss Act trade regulation rule under Section 18 of the FTC Act should govern fee practices across the rental housing lifecycle, from application through move-out.

The ANPRM rests primarily on two enforcement actions. In December 2025, Greystar agreed to a $24 million settlement over allegations that it excluded mandatory fees from advertised rents.[2] Invitation Homes was ordered to pay $48 million in consumer redress based on similar allegations involving smart-home and utility-management charges.[3] The ANPRM quotes Chairman Andrew Ferguson’s statement that “the Commission’s work on this case has revealed that the problem involving misleading pricing representations in America’s rental markets is not limited to Greystar” and directed staff to begin developing a rule.[4]

The ANPRM identifies a real consumer-protection concern. The conduct alleged in the Greystar and Invitation Homes matters—advertising rents that excluded mandatory charges disclosed only after tenants invested time, money, and prior lease commitments—fits within established Section 5 deception doctrine. The Commission addressed that conduct through case-by-case enforcement, obtaining behavioral consent orders and substantial monetary relief.

That record does not justify a sector-wide Magnuson-Moss rule. The practices at issue are already actionable under Section 5. The Commission can continue to address similar conduct through targeted enforcement, providing both ex ante and ex post deterrence while building a more robust evidentiary record. It can also issue clear business guidance on deceptive fee-advertising practices and coordinate with state attorneys general—as in the Colorado/Greystar action—to supplement monetary remedies where AMG Capital limits federal recovery. A nationwide rule covering every landlord is not a proportionate response to misconduct alleged at two companies and is not, at present, an efficient use of Commission resources.

Even if rulemaking were warranted, the Commission has not developed the record the Magnuson-Moss process requires. Section 57a(d) requires the Commission to establish the prevalence of the targeted practices, explain how they are unfair or deceptive, and assess the rule’s economic effects on small businesses and consumers. The current record—two enforcement actions and warning letters to software vendors—does not satisfy that standard across an industry that includes approximately 17 million landlords.[5]

The comments that follow address three points. First, Section II explains why existing Section 5 deception enforcement is sufficient to address the conduct identified in the ANPRM. Second, Section III explains why the current record does not meet Magnuson-Moss requirements. Third, Sections IV through VII identify key design considerations that would determine whether any rule improves or harms consumer welfare, including the distinction between drip pricing and itemization, the interaction with rent-stabilization laws, the disproportionate burden on small landlords, and the need for a rigorous economic analysis.

II.      Section 5 Deception Enforcement Is Sufficient

The conduct described in the ANPRM—advertising base rent while omitting mandatory charges disclosed only after prospective tenants pay application fees and commit to a unit—fits comfortably within established deception doctrine under Section 5 of the FTC Act.[6]

The FTC’s 1983 Policy Statement on Deception defines a deceptive practice as one involving a representation or omission likely to mislead a reasonable consumer in a material way.[7] Advertising a price that excludes charges every tenant must pay to occupy the unit is a material omission. A reasonable consumer would rely on the advertised price in deciding whether to incur the time and expense of applying for a unit. When that price understates the true cost of renting, the omission misleads consumers and distorts their decision-making. These practices also raise search costs and can weaken price competition in rental housing markets.

The Commission has already demonstrated that it can address this conduct through case-by-case enforcement. In Greystar and Invitation Homes, the FTC obtained orders requiring the companies to advertise total rent inclusive of mandatory fees, provide clear disclosures about fee amounts and purposes, and reform related practices.[8] Invitation Homes also agreed to stop unfair security-deposit deductions.[9] These orders impose ongoing behavioral obligations on the two largest operators in their respective segments and directly govern how they present prices to consumers. The Commission also secured substantial monetary redress in both matters.

These remedies align with the nature of the violation. Deceptive advertising warrants injunctive relief that requires truthful, nonmisleading price disclosures. The Commission did not need a sector-wide trade regulation rule to bring these cases, and it does not need one to address similar conduct by other operators. The existing enforcement record also provides clear signals to the market about the Commission’s interpretation of Section 5 and the consequences of noncompliance.

Against that backdrop, the case for rulemaking rests on two premises: that AMG Capital has created an enforcement gap by limiting monetary remedies, and that civil-penalty authority is necessary to deter similar conduct across the market. Neither premise holds. Section II.A explains why AMG Capital does not justify sector-wide rulemaking, and Section II.B shows that existing enforcement already provides meaningful deterrence.

A.      AMG Capital Does Not Justify Sector-Wide Rulemaking

The Commission cites AMG Capital in the ANPRM as limiting its remedial authority.[10] In AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. FTC, the Supreme Court held that Section 13(b) of the FTC Act does not authorize courts to award equitable monetary relief, including consumer refunds, in enforcement actions brought under that provision. The Commission can no longer obtain large-scale monetary redress by attaching disgorgement claims to Section 13(b) injunctions.

The Court emphasized that the FTC may still obtain monetary relief under Section 19, subject to statutory limits. Congress authorized federal district courts to grant “such relief as the court finds necessary to redress injury to consumers,” including “the refund of money or return of property.” (15 U.S.C. § 57b(b)). Congress also limited that authority. As relevant here, the Commission may seek such relief only against parties who have engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices “with respect to which the Commission has issued a final cease and desist order which is applicable to such person.” (15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(2)).[11]

In other words, the Court rejected efforts to obtain monetary relief in the first instance under Section 13(b) to bypass the administrative process required to issue a final cease-and-desist order.

The ANPRM also notes that Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act violations “may be subject to civil penalties of up to $[53,088] per violation pursuant to section 5(m)(1)(A) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(m)(1)(A), and may be required to pay refunds to consumers or provide other relief pursuant to section 19(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. 57b(a)(1).”[12]

While AMG Capital constrains the FTC’s enforcement authority, a sector-wide rule covering every landlord in the country is not a proportionate response. Three alternatives address the asserted enforcement gap more directly.

First, behavioral consent orders remain fully available. AMG Capital limits monetary relief but does not impair the Commission’s ability to seek injunctions requiring behavioral changes or to negotiate consent orders that restructure pricing practices. The Greystar and Invitation Homes settlements—both negotiated after AMG Capital—show that the Commission can obtain meaningful behavioral relief through case-by-case enforcement. In deceptive advertising cases, requiring truthful pricing practices is the primary remedy that protects future consumers. This case-by-case approach also aligns with the statutory pathway for monetary redress under Section 19, which depends on prior administrative orders.

Second, state attorney general co-enforcement can provide monetary relief. The Colorado attorney general co-filed the Greystar complaint and secured $1 million in costs and fees under state law authority unaffected by AMG Capital.[13] State UDAP statutes in most jurisdictions provide monetary remedies independent of federal constraints. Coordinated federal-state enforcement—like the Greystar action—offers a practical path to monetary redress without rulemaking. This approach combines federal and state resources and allows enforcers to pursue the full range of remedies available under both bodies of law.

Third, business guidance and consumer education can deter misconduct without rulemaking. The Commission can issue business advisories and guidance documents explaining which fee-related practices it considers deceptive or unfair under Section 5. Targeted guidance on rental housing fee disclosures—clarifying, e.g., that mandatory charges must appear in advertised rent, that fees cannot first appear after a nonrefundable application payment, or that misrepresenting the nature or refundability of charges violates Section 5—would put housing providers on clear notice of enforcement risk. The FTC’s December 2025 warning letters to 13 property management software vendors illustrate a more targeted version of this approach. Those letters identified specific practices of concern and signaled potential enforcement risk to both recipients and the broader industry.[14] Formal guidance would extend that notice nationwide and create a clear record against which future enforcement actions can be evaluated.

The Commission also has civil-penalty authority for Magnuson-Moss rule violations, currently up to $53,088 per violation, pending the next inflation adjustment.[15] But creating that authority through a sector-wide rule that applies to every landlord, based on alleged practices involving two companies under specific facts, is not a proportionate response to the current record. The Commission’s existing tools—targeted enforcement, coordinated state action, and clear guidance—can address the conduct identified in the ANPRM.

B.       Existing Enforcement Already Provides Deterrence

The Commission’s implicit deterrence argument rests on the premise that, without civil-penalty authority, other landlords face insufficient consequences for adopting the practices alleged in the Greystar and Invitation Homes matters.[16]

The enforcement record does not support that claim.

High-profile settlements with the two largest operators in their respective segments—the nation’s largest residential property manager and the nation’s largest single-family rental company—send a clear signal to professional housing providers that the Commission will pursue this conduct. Both actions received substantial coverage in real estate industry trade publications, amplifying their deterrent effect.

The Commission also extended that signal to the technology layer that can facilitate fee obfuscation through its warning letters to property-management software vendors. By targeting both market participants and the tools that enable the conduct, the FTC has already reached the relevant actors.

General deterrence operates through visible enforcement. That mechanism is already in place and does not require extending civil-penalty authority across the entire landlord population to be effective.

III.    The Record Does Not Meet Magnuson-Moss Requirements

If the Commission concludes that enforcement and guidance are insufficient—and that deceptive fee practices are prevalent enough to justify a sector-wide rule—it must first satisfy the statutory requirements imposed by the Magnuson-Moss process before issuing any NPRM.

Section 18(d) of the FTC Act requires that a final rule’s Statement of Basis and Purpose address three elements: (1) the prevalence of the acts or practices the rule targets, (2) the manner and context in which those practices are unfair or deceptive, and (3) the rule’s economic effects, including its impact on small businesses and consumers.[17] These are substantive requirements, not procedural formalities.

Judicial review of those requirements has become more exacting. In Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, the Supreme Court eliminated automatic deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions.[18] Courts will apply independent scrutiny to whether the Commission has satisfied each element.

The current record does not meet that standard. The Commission relies on two enforcement settlements involving two operators that together represent a small share of the overall rental market. By contrast, the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2024 American Community Survey reports approximately 46 million renter-occupied units.[19] The rule would apply across a highly heterogeneous market that includes institutional REITs managing large portfolios and individual landlords renting a single property. The Commission has not established the prevalence of deceptive fee practices across that full population.

The ANPRM appropriately seeks to develop that record. But the Commission should acknowledge that the existing evidence cannot support an NPRM. It should commit to completing the required analysis before proceeding, including a rigorous assessment of economic effects on small landlords and a supply-side analysis of how a rule could affect housing availability.

IV.    Rule Design Should Target Drip Pricing, Not Itemization

These comments accept the Commission’s framing of the core harm: a landlord advertises a base rent that omits mandatory charges, discloses those charges only after the tenant has paid a nonrefundable application fee and committed to a unit, and thereby extracts payment the tenant would not have made with full information at the comparison-shopping stage. That conduct is a textbook deceptive practice under existing Section 5 authority.

The harder design question is how a rule should address price presentation—specifically, whether it should require landlords to aggregate all charges into a single “total rent” figure or permit disclosure through clearly labeled line items.

The ANPRM asks when “advertised rents start to itemize or unbundle each different type of mandatory fee or charge” and cites Howard Beales and Todd Zywicki’s observation that “unnecessarily unbundling prices into multiple parts might provide no consumer benefit and instead might be designed to confuse consumers into paying a higher price.”[20] This concern goes to price presentation—whether to show one number or multiple components—not to whether services are bundled or offered on an à la carte basis. The Commission should distinguish among three separate questions with different policy implications.

First, drip pricing is the core harm. Advertising a low base rent and revealing mandatory charges only after a tenant has invested time and money in a specific unit distorts comparison shopping. Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson show that even in competitive markets, firms have incentives to hide mandatory add-on prices when some consumers focus on headline prices.[21] A firm that advertises a lower headline price forces competitors to follow, regardless of full-information pricing. The Greystar and Invitation Homes cases fit this model.

Second, transparent upfront itemization is not deceptive. A landlord who advertises “$1,200 base rent + $150 administrative fee + $100 technology fee = $1,450 total monthly cost” provides complete and timely information. That practice is not drip pricing. Requiring landlords to collapse line items into a single undifferentiated figure would reduce information without improving transparency.

Third, service differentiation raises a distinct issue. When services such as parking, pet accommodations, or optional internet packages are genuinely optional, separate pricing allows tenants to pay only for what they use. A tenant without a car should not pay for parking embedded in rent. The relevant question is not whether charges are itemized, but whether they are mandatory. Mandatory charges should appear in the advertised total; optional services can remain separately listed without undermining transparency.

A rule that targets drip pricing is legally and economically sound. A rule that eliminates upfront itemization or treats all fee structures as presumptively deceptive would reduce the information available to consumers. The critical distinction is between when prices are disclosed and how they are presented. Any rule should focus on the timing of disclosure, not the number of line items.

V.      Key Design Considerations for Any Rule

The following subsections address key design choices any rule would need to resolve. ICLE offers these observations if, after completing the analysis required by Section 57a(d), the Commission determines that rulemaking is warranted.

These issues will determine whether a rule improves comparison shopping and transparency or instead creates unintended costs and distortions that harm renters. Section V.A addresses how a single “total rent” requirement can misstate costs and proposes a two-part disclosure framework. Section V.B examines how fee restrictions interact with rent-stabilization laws and affect housing supply. Section V.C evaluates the disproportionate compliance burden on small landlords. Section V.D considers the interaction between a federal rule and existing state law.

A.      A Single ‘Total Rent’ Figure Can Misstate Costs

The ANPRM’s clearest regulatory signal is a requirement that any advertised rental price include a “total rent” figure covering all mandatory fees and charges. The comparison-shopping objective is sound. The proposed instrument has a structural flaw.

A single “total rent” figure accurately reflects costs only if a tenant’s circumstances match the assumptions embedded in that number. Many charges do not apply universally. Parking fees apply only to tenants with vehicles. Pet fees apply only to tenants with animals. Charges under ratio utility billing systems vary with usage and cannot be calculated precisely at the time of advertising. Late fees apply only if a tenant misses a payment deadline.

Requiring all such charges to be included in a single figure will often overstate actual costs. For many fee categories, a majority of tenants will not incur the charge. A prospective tenant with a $1,500 monthly budget may disregard a unit advertised at $1,700 because the figure includes parking or pet fees she would never pay. The result is not greater transparency, but distorted comparison shopping.

Available evidence reinforces this concern. National Apartment Association research indicates that fee-transparency mandates often fail to account for the structure of housing costs and the rationale for specific charges.[22] The NAA’s tracking reveals the regulatory landscape already varies across 18 states and the District of Columbia, with requirements ranging from total-price advertising to disclosure of only specific fees.

Colorado’s approach illustrates a more tailored solution. HB 25-1090 requires disclosure of a “total price” that includes mandatory fees while excluding charges for optional services, such as parking or pet fees, when those services are not required for all tenants.[23] This distinction prevents inflated advertised prices that could deter prospective tenants from units they can afford.

A two-part disclosure framework better achieves the Commission’s goal. First, require a clearly labeled “Total Mandatory Monthly Charge”—base rent plus all fees every tenant must pay to occupy the unit, regardless of individual circumstances. This figure is comparable across units because it reflects unavoidable costs. Second, require a disclosed schedule of contingent charges, listing amounts and triggering conditions, available before any nonrefundable fee is paid.

This approach provides complete information at the comparison-shopping stage, eliminates drip pricing by requiring early disclosure of all mandatory charges, and avoids producing a single figure that misstates costs for typical tenants. The ANPRM’s questions on mandatory versus contingent fees (Questions 24 and 25) and on itemization (Question 64) support this design.

B.       Fee Restrictions May Reduce Supply in Rent-Stabilized Markets

The ANPRM does not address how federal fee regulation would interact with state and local rent-stabilization laws, commonly known as rent control. This omission is significant. It bears directly on whether a rule would help or harm the lowest-income renters it is intended to protect.

When regulations restrict or prohibit fee categories, landlords will seek to recover lost revenue. In markets without rent control, the most direct response is to increase base rent. In that setting, a rule primarily changes how housing costs are labeled—less in fees, more in rent—without necessarily reducing total costs. Any benefit to tenants depends on whether that relabeling improves budgeting and comparison shopping.

In rent-stabilized markets, landlords often cannot adjust base rent to offset lost fee revenue. Annual increases are typically capped by statute or ordinance. A landlord charging $1,700 per month with a 3% cap cannot raise rent by $100 to replace $100 in restricted fees without violating the law. The remaining adjustment options are limited: reduce service quality, defer maintenance, or exit the long-term rental market through conversion, sale, or redevelopment.

Rent regulation in the United States remains geographically concentrated but significant. More than 300 municipalities have adopted some form of rent control or stabilization.[24] Three states—Oregon, California, and Washington—have implemented statewide measures.[25] These policies tend to operate in high-cost markets where cost-burdened renters are most concentrated.

Rebecca Diamond, Tim McQuade, and Franklin Qian provide empirical evidence on how revenue constraints affect housing supply.[26] Studying San Francisco’s 1994 rent-control expansion, they find that affected landlords reduced rental supply by 15% relative to uncontrolled properties through condominium conversions, sales to owner-occupants, and redevelopment. The resulting supply contraction increased citywide rents by an estimated 5.1%, offsetting much of the policy’s intended benefit.

Rent control and fee restrictions are distinct legal tools, but both can bind landlord revenue. When they do, they create similar incentives. Supply responses—conversion, exit, and deferred maintenance—reflect the gap between operating income and costs, not the form of the constraint. A federal fee restriction that reduces net operating income in rent-stabilized markets would likely produce the same responses documented in the literature.

Older, rent-regulated housing stock is most exposed to these dynamics and disproportionately houses low-income renters. The Commission has not analyzed this risk. It should do so before proposing any rule.

C.      Compliance Costs Disproportionately Burden Small Landlords

The FTC’s enforcement record centers on the two largest operators in their respective segments. Both rely on sophisticated technology platforms, employ dedicated compliance teams, and operate at a scale that makes federal compliance costs manageable on a per-unit basis. The broader rental housing market looks very different.

According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s Rental Housing Finance Survey, nearly two-thirds of rental properties are owned by individuals, and 45% of investors own only a single property.[27] Approximately 97% of rental buildings have four or fewer units. Only 21% of small rental properties are professionally managed, compared to 50% of properties with 50 or more units. Urban Institute researchers find that “very small” (1–2 units) and “small” (3–9 units) landlords are more likely than institutional operators to supply affordable housing, less likely to evict tenants, and more likely to serve tenants of color.[28]

A federal disclosure rule that requires real-time fee consistency across multiple listing platforms would impose fixed compliance costs that do not scale with portfolio size. Determining which fees qualify as “mandatory,” integrating with multiple platforms that use different technical standards, maintaining consistency as fees change, and tracking compliance with a federal rule that may diverge from state law all create fixed burdens—whether a landlord manages one unit or 1,000 units.

Large operators can spread these costs across a broad portfolio, producing a low per-unit burden. Small landlords cannot. A landlord renting two houses through a free listing service would face the same baseline compliance obligations, resulting in a per-unit cost that may exceed any plausible consumer benefit for those tenants.

The Commission’s December 2025 warning letters to 13 property-management software vendors suggest an effort to address compliance through platform design.[29] If major platforms incorporate standardized fee-disclosure fields, compliance could become a simple data-entry task rather than a technical integration problem. That approach has merit. But the same letters confirm that the current infrastructure does not yet support seamless, real-time aggregation of fee information. A rule that assumes otherwise would require landlords to rely on manual processes the Commission has already acknowledged are not yet automated.

Harvard University’s Joint Center for Housing Studies reports that the supply of units affordable to low-income households has been declining for decades due to demolition, conversion, and rent increases.[30] Imposing meaningful compliance costs on small-property owners—without corresponding accommodations—would accelerate that trend in the segment where small landlords are most prevalent.

The Commission should address these distributional effects before proceeding. Any proposed rule should include small-entity safe harbors at the NPRM stage, not as an afterthought during the subsequent comment period.

D.      A Federal Rule Risks Conflict with Existing State Law

Landlord-tenant law has long been an area of state authority. States and localities regulate security deposits, late fees, application fees, habitability standards, and lease disclosures. Since 2021, at least 14 states and the District of Columbia have enacted fee-transparency requirements.[31] Colorado’s HB 25-1090, Oregon’s disclosure statute, and Minnesota’s total-price requirement reflect jurisdiction-specific judgments about how to balance pricing flexibility and tenant protection.

The Commission recognized this landscape in 2024–2025 when it excluded long-term residential rentals from the Unfair or Deceptive Fees Rule. That decision relied in part on industry comments noting that existing state and local laws already govern rental fee advertising.[32] Those conditions have not changed. The ANPRM does not identify new evidence that would justify reversing course. The only developments it cites are two enforcement actions against large operators—conduct the Commission addressed through existing Section 5 authority.

A federal rule that defines “mandatory fee,” “total rent,” or “clear and conspicuous disclosure” differently from state law would create overlapping and potentially conflicting obligations. The ANPRM acknowledges that state laws could “intersect” with a federal rule.[33] In practice, that means landlords may face multiple regimes with different definitions, enforcement mechanisms, and litigation risks. A landlord in Colorado, for example, must already comply with HB 25-1090’s “total price” requirement. A federal rule with a different scope of included fees would impose a second, potentially inconsistent standard. The resulting compliance costs will be passed through in higher rents.

Before issuing any NPRM, the Commission should clarify how a federal rule would interact with state law. It should specify whether the rule would preempt conflicting requirements, establish a federal floor that states may exceed, or operate alongside divergent state standards. It should also assess the incremental compliance costs created by overlapping regulation.

VI.    A Rigorous Economic Analysis Is Required Before Rulemaking

Section 57a(d) of the FTC Act requires a final rule’s Statement of Basis and Purpose to assess the rule’s economic effects on small businesses and consumers. The ANPRM also cites Executive Orders 12866 and 14215, which require agencies—including independent agencies now subject to Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs review—to identify projected costs and benefits and select approaches whose benefits justify their costs.

These requirements are often satisfied through a Preliminary Regulatory Analysis issued alongside an NPRM. But conducting that analysis after committing to a regulatory approach is not equivalent to using it to inform the decision whether to regulate or how to design the rule. Where the central risk is that a rule could harm the same population it aims to protect—through supply contraction in the affordable housing segment—the analysis should guide the rule’s design, not ratify it.

A complete analysis should address five categories of effects.

Consumer benefits from improved transparency. The ANPRM cites data showing that more than 50% of renters are cost-burdened, meaning they spend at least 30% of income on rent.[34] Those conditions primarily reflect a supply-demand imbalance driven by zoning restrictions, permitting delays, and rising construction costs—not fee opacity. Improved disclosure can reduce search costs and prevent overpayment in some cases. Those benefits should be measured directly and not conflated with the broader affordability problem, which fee transparency alone cannot resolve.

Compliance costs by provider type. The analysis should distinguish between large institutional operators and small independent landlords. Compliance costs—legal review, platform integration, and ongoing monitoring—are largely fixed. They do not scale proportionally with portfolio size. Using average per-unit estimates will understate burdens on small landlords and overstate them for large operators.

Supply-side effects. If fee restrictions reduce net operating income—either directly or through interaction with rent-stabilization laws—some units will exit the long-term rental market. Diamond et al.’s findings on San Francisco’s rent-control expansion provide a relevant benchmark for how landlords respond to revenue constraints. Even a partial replication of those effects, concentrated in the affordable segment, could increase rents enough to offset fee-related savings.

Distributional effects. The relevant question is not the impact on the average renter, but on cost-burdened renters. As noted above, Harvard’s Joint Center for Housing Studies finds that the supply of low-rent units has declined for decades due to upgrading, demolition, and rent increases.[35] Any supply reduction tied to fee regulation will disproportionately affect that segment. A cost-benefit analysis that counts transparency gains for cost-burdened renters without accounting for supply losses affecting the same group will overstate net benefits.

Quality effects. Many fees fund specific services, including pest control, utility administration, package handling, and maintenance. Reducing fee revenue without offsetting adjustments will reduce service levels or shift costs elsewhere in the operating budget. The Commission should estimate the likely magnitude of these quality effects, drawing on evidence from the rent-control literature.

A rigorous analysis across these dimensions is necessary to determine whether a rule would improve consumer welfare or impose offsetting costs that undermine its stated objectives.

VII.   Design Principles to Minimize Rulemaking Risks

If the Commission determines, after completing the required analysis, that a trade regulation rule is warranted, five design principles would reduce the risks identified in these comments.

Define “mandatory fee” precisely. The rule should define a mandatory fee as one that every tenant must pay to occupy the unit, regardless of personal circumstances or choices. Fees tied to optional services—such as parking, pet accommodations, optional internet packages, or additional storage—should not qualify. Fees embedded in the property’s operating structure that apply to all tenants should qualify. A clear definition will create a workable compliance standard and preserve optional service offerings while ensuring that unavoidable charges appear in the advertised price.

Require a two-part disclosure. The Commission should require (1) clear and prominent disclosure of the Total Mandatory Monthly Charge—base rent plus all fees that meet the definition of mandatory—at the point of first advertisement, and (2) a disclosed schedule of optional or contingent charges, including amounts and triggering conditions, available before any nonrefundable fee is paid. This approach addresses drip pricing without forcing a single aggregated figure that overstates costs for many tenants.

Focus on timing, not just format. In both enforcement actions, the harm arose because mandatory fees were disclosed only after tenants paid application fees and committed to a unit. The rule should require disclosure of all mandatory fees before any nonrefundable payment or financial commitment. Timing of disclosure is at least as important as format.

Adopt platform-based compliance standards. Rather than requiring each landlord to maintain real-time consistency across listing platforms, the Commission should establish compliance standards for listing platforms and property-management software vendors. Assigning technical obligations to entities with existing infrastructure will reduce compliance burdens, particularly for small landlords.

Design small-entity safe harbors before the NPRM stage. Landlords with five or fewer units who provide good-faith disclosure using a standardized template—issued by the Commission or implemented through compliant platforms—should be deemed in compliance. This approach preserves consumer protection while limiting supply-side risks in the affordable segment. The Commission’s Question 70 asks about exemptions for small providers. The Commission should treat those exemptions as a prerequisite to any NPRM, not a detail to resolve afterward.

VIII.      Conclusion

The Commission’s actions against Greystar and Invitation Homes addressed documented consumer harm through the appropriate tool: targeted Section 5 deception enforcement. Those cases produced behavioral consent orders requiring truthful pricing practices, along with substantial monetary redress. That approach should continue. The Commission should issue clear business guidance on fee-advertising practices it considers deceptive, pursue additional enforcement actions where similar conduct arises, and coordinate with state attorneys general to expand monetary remedies where AMG Capital limits federal recovery.

A sector-wide Magnuson-Moss rule is not a proportionate response to misconduct documented at two companies. The Commission has not yet developed the record Section 57a(d) requires, including evidence of prevalence across the full landlord population and a rigorous analysis of economic effects on small businesses and consumers. That record should be established before the Commission commits to a regulatory approach, not developed after issuing an NPRM.

If the Commission ultimately determines that rulemaking is warranted, the rule should be narrowly tailored. It should define “mandatory fees” as charges every tenant must pay to occupy a unit, regardless of personal circumstances. It should adopt a two-part disclosure framework that presents mandatory baseline charges prominently at first advertisement and provides a clear itemization of optional and contingent charges before any nonrefundable fee is collected, rather than relying on a single aggregated “total rent” figure. It should include a cost-benefit analysis that addresses supply-side effects, distributional impacts on cost-burdened renters, and interactions with rent-stabilization laws before issuing any NPRM. It should incorporate small-entity safe harbors calibrated to actual compliance costs as a precondition for proceeding. And it should clarify how federal requirements would interact with existing state fee-transparency laws, including whether they would preempt, supplement, or coexist with them.

The Commission can protect renters from deceptive fee practices through targeted enforcement of existing authority. A sector-wide rule would impose compliance costs on millions of landlords, with the greatest burden falling on small-property owners who supply affordable housing. Those costs risk harming the very renters the Commission seeks to protect.

[1] Rule on Unfair or Deceptive Rental Housing Fee Practices, 91 Fed. Reg. 12,325 (Mar. 13, 2026) (advance notice of proposed rulemaking) [hereinafter ANPRM], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-03-13/pdf/2026-04907.pdf.

[2] Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Greystar Agrees to Pay $24 Million and Stop Deceptive Advertising Practices as a Result of FTC and Colorado Lawsuit Alleging the Firm Deceived Consumers About Rent Prices (Dec. 2, 2025), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2025/12/greystar-agrees-pay-24-million-stop-deceptive-advertising-practices-result-ftc-colorado-lawsuit; see also Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC and Colorado Take Action Against Greystar, Nation’s Largest Multifamily Rental Property Manager, for Deceiving Consumers About Rent Prices (Jan. 16, 2025), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2025/01/ftc-state-colorado-take-action-against-greystar-nations-largest-multi-family-rental-property-manager (alleging fees including “valet trash,” package handling, utilities, utility-billing, “verification” fees for non-Greystar renters’ insurance, and media/smart home packages).

[3] Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Takes Action Against Invitation Homes for Deceiving Renters, Charging Junk Fees, Withholding Security Deposits, and Employing Unfair Eviction Practices (Sept. 24, 2024), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/09/ftc-takes-action-against-invitation-homes-deceiving-renters-charging-junk-fees-withholding-security.

[4] ANPRM, supra note 1, at 12,328 (citing Andrew N. Ferguson, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Concurring Statement of Chairman Andrew N. Ferguson: FTC v. Greystar Real Estate Partners (Dec. 2, 2025), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/2025.12.02-greystar-chairman-ferguson-statement.pdf).

[5] The Commission claims it conducted “research” on the issues raised in the ANPRM but cites only a joint FTC–CFPB request for information on tenant screening. See ANPRM, supra note 1, at 12,327 n.19 (citing Joint FTC–CFPB Tenant Screening Request for Information, Docket ID FTC–2023–0024, https://www.regulations.gov/docket/FTC-2023-0024). The agencies report receiving more than 600 comments, but cite no formal study, report, or systematic data analysis.

[6] 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).

[7] Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Policy Statement on Deception, appended to Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (Oct. 14, 1983), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf.

[8] Proposed Stipulated Order, FTC v. Greystar Real Estate Partners, LLC, No. 1:25-cv-00165-CNS (D. Colo. Jan. 23, 2025), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/Greystar-Order_0.pdf [hereinafter Greystar].

[9] Stipulated Order, FTC v. Invitation Homes Inc., No. 1:24-cv-04280-SEG (N.D. Ga. Sept. 27, 2024), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/2023170invitationhomesorderenteredbycourt.pdf.

[10] AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. FTC, 141 S. Ct. 1341, 1352 (2021).

[11] Id. at 1346.

[12] ANPRM, supra note 1, at 12,327.

[13] Greystar, supra note 8.

[14] Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Sends Warning Letters to 13 Property Management Software Providers Nationwide (Dec. 9, 2025), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2025/12/ftc-sends-warning-letters-13-property-management-software-providers-nationwide [hereinafter FTC Warning Letters].

[15] Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Publishes Inflation-Adjusted Civil Penalty Amounts for 2025 (Feb. 11, 2025), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2025/02/ftc-publishes-inflation-adjusted-civil-penalty-amounts-2025. Civil penalties apply to certain rule violations under Sections 5(m) and 19.

[16] ANPRM, supra note 1, at 12,327 (“The Commission believes a rule addressing unfair or deceptive rental housing fee practices could help reduce the level of unlawful activity in this area, serving as a deterrent against these practices because such a rule would allow for civil penalties to be sought against violators.”).

[17] 15 U.S.C. § 57a(d).

[18] Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).

[19] U.S. Census Bureau, 2024 American Community Survey, Table DP04, cited in ANPRM, supra note 1, at 12,326 n.8.

[20] ANPRM, supra note 1, at 12,327 (Question 7a); Howard Beales & Todd J. Zywicki, Junkyard Dogs: The Law and Economics of “Junk” Fees, CPI Antitrust Chron. (Apr. 2023), at 3, George Mason L. & Econ. Rsch. Paper No. 23-10, cited in ANPRM, supra note 1, at 12,326 nn.6, 13.

[21] Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. Econ. 505 (2006).

[22] Emily Howard, Fee Transparency Mandates by the Numbers, Nat’l Apartment Ass’n (Dec. 9, 2025), https://naahq.org/news/fee-transparency-mandates-numbers.

[23] H.B. 25-1090, 75th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2025), https://leg.colorado.gov/bill_files/40562/download.

[24] Nat’l Apartment Ass’n, Rent Control: Policy Issue, https://naahq.org/advocacy/policy/issues/rent-control (last visited Mar. 27, 2026).

[25] Dominic Butchko, Washington Joins California and Oregon in Enacting Statewide Rent Control, Conduit St. (May 12, 2025), https://conduitstreet.mdcounties.org/2025/05/12/washington-joins-california-and-oregon-in-enacting-statewide-rent-control.

[26] Rebecca Diamond, Tim McQuade & Franklin Qian, The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco, 109 Am. Econ. Rev. 3365 (2019).

[27] U.S. Census Bureau & U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 2024 Rental Housing Finance Survey: Ownership and Management, https://www.census.gov/data-tools/demo/rhfs/#/?TABLE_CODE=2 (last visited Mar. 27, 2026).

[28] Fay Walker & Owen Noble, Ensuring Safe and Affordable Housing Stock Starts with Understanding Who Owns Rental Units, Urban Inst.: Urban Wire (Sept. 6, 2022), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/ensuring-safe-and-affordable-housing-stock-starts-understanding-who-owns-rental-units.

[29] FTC Warning Letters, supra note 14.

[30] Joint Ctr. for Hous. Stud. of Harvard Univ., America’s Rental Housing 2024 (2024), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/reports/files/Harvard_JCHS_Americas_Rental_Housing_2024.pdf.

[31] See ANPRM, supra note 1, at 12,328 nn.24–25 (collecting state statutes).

[32] See Jay Harris, FTC Launches Anticipated Rulemaking on Rental Housing Fee Practices, Hudson Cook (Mar. 13, 2026), https://www.hudsoncook.com/article/ftc-launches-anticipated-rulemaking-on-rental-housing-fee-practices.

[33] ANPRM, supra note 1, at 12,335 (Question 71).

[34] ANPRM, supra note 1, at 12,326 n.2.

[35] Joint Ctr. for Hous. Stud. of Harvard Univ., supra note 30.

PRESENTATIONS & INTERVIEWS

Kristian Stout on the White House’s AI Framework

ICLE Director of Innovation Policy Kristian Stout was a guest on the Consumer Finance Monitor Podcast to discuss the White House’s 2026 National AI Policy . . .

ICLE Director of Innovation Policy Kristian Stout was a guest on the Consumer Finance Monitor Podcast to discuss the White House’s 2026 National AI Policy Framework, which marks a shift toward limiting regulation, emphasizing federal preemption of state AI laws, and prioritizing innovation, despite many unresolved policy questions. He highlighted that the framework’s pro-innovation measures may disproportionately benefit large incumbents over startups and emphasized that recent AI advances represent an acceleration of existing capabilities rather than a wholly new paradigm. Audio of the full episode is embedded below.

Mario Zúñiga on Digital Markets in Latin America

On a recent episode of the LP podcast, ICLE Senior Scholar Mario Zúñiga argued that concentrated digital markets should not automatically be labeled anticompetitive, because . . .

On a recent episode of the LP podcast, ICLE Senior Scholar Mario Zúñiga argued that concentrated digital markets should not automatically be labeled anticompetitive, because innovation, low scaling costs, and user switching can discipline even large platforms. He distinguished monopoly from abuse of dominance and favored ex post competition enforcement over broad ex ante regulation like the EU Digital Markets Act, which he believes can block consumer-benefiting practices. For Latin America, he said the priority should be expanding digital access, infrastructure, skills, and productivity, rather than copying Europe’s heavy digital regulation.

Video of the full episode (in Spanish) is embedded below.

 

Brian Albrecht on How to Spot a Monopoly

An audio version of ICLE Chief Economist Brian Albrecht’s December 2025 piece “How to Spot a Monopoly” was featured in a recent episode of the . . .

An audio version of ICLE Chief Economist Brian Albrecht’s December 2025 piece “How to Spot a Monopoly” was featured in a recent episode of the Works in Progress Out Loud podcast. Audio of the full episode is embedded below.

Dirk Auer on the DMA and the US-EU Digital Regulation Divide

ICLE Director of Competition Policy Dirk Auer appeared as a guest on a recent episode of the In Conversation with IPR & Competition Law podcast . . .

ICLE Director of Competition Policy Dirk Auer appeared as a guest on a recent episode of the In Conversation with IPR & Competition Law podcast to discuss the widening U.S.-EU divide in digital regulation, arguing that the Digital Markets Act (DMA) reflects a shift toward protecting competitors over competition. He warns that this approach risks overenforcement, geopolitical friction, and reduced access to new technologies in Europe—potentially leading to a fragmented internet by 2030. Audio of the full episode is embedded below.

ISSUE BRIEFS

Competing Against Competition: The COMPETE Act’s Antitrust Overreach

Executive Summary California Assembly Bill 1776, the COMPETE Act, would expand the state’s Cartwright Act to reach single-firm conduct for the first time in the . . .

Executive Summary

California Assembly Bill 1776, the COMPETE Act, would expand the state’s Cartwright Act to reach single-firm conduct for the first time in the Act’s 119-year history. It would create state-law liability for monopolization, attempted monopolization, maintenance of monopoly power, and monopsonization, moving California well beyond federal Section 2 doctrine.

The bill lowers the core thresholds federal courts use to separate anticompetitive conduct from competition on the merits. It makes optional market-power thresholds, recoupment in predatory-pricing cases, cross-market balancing for multi-sided platforms, as-efficient-competitor analysis, and quantitative evidence of harm. It then directs courts to interpret the law liberally and maximize deterrence.

That framework invites over-enforcement. It would expose aggressive price competition to predatory-pricing claims, require one-sided analysis of multi-sided platforms, extend monopsony liability into unsettled labor-market doctrine, and replace the consumer welfare standard with a broad mandate to protect “all trade participants” and broader social interests.

The likely result is more strategic litigation, more settlements driven by defense costs, and more pressure on firms to raise prices, reduce service quality, limit product integration, or alter employment practices to avoid liability. Because many firms serving California operate nationally, AB 1776 would also set de facto national antitrust rules and raise unresolved dormant Commerce Clause concerns.

The Legislature should proceed cautiously before enacting the COMPETE Act as written. Any single-firm conduct reform should restore recoupment, permit cross-market balancing, require market-power thresholds, retain the consumer welfare standard, address extraterritorial effects, and exclude single-firm conduct from criminal liability.

I.         Introduction

California Assembly Bill 1776, the COMPETE Act (Competition and Opportunity in Markets for a Prosperous, Equitable, and Transparent Economy),[1] would significantly expand the Cartwright Act[2] —California’s primary antitrust statute—by extending it to reach single-firm conduct for the first time in the Act’s 119-year history. To date, the Cartwright Act has targeted concerted action, leaving unilateral conduct largely to federal antitrust law—the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act.[3] AB 1776 would upend that allocation by creating state-law liability for monopolization, attempted monopolization, maintenance of monopoly power, and monopsonization by a single firm.

Proponents frame this change as closing a “gap” in California law. But the absence of single-firm liability under the Cartwright Act reflects a longstanding division of labor between state and federal regimes, under which Section 2 of the Sherman Act governs unilateral conduct.[4] While some states maintain single-firm conduct provisions, many track federal law or include harmonization clauses. Those clauses typically direct courts to interpret state statutes consistently with federal law, even if they do not require strict conformity.[5] AB 1776 breaks from that approach. It expressly provides that federal precedent is not binding, inviting state courts to adjudicate claims outside established federal doctrine.

At the same time, the bill discards much of the analytical framework that gives content to single-firm liability. Section 16732 lists 10 requirements commonly applied by federal courts and provides that none is necessary to establish liability under California law. Section 16733 instructs courts to “liberally interpret” the statute while “maximizing” deterrence. Section 16730 further provides that federal precedent is relevant only to the extent it is consistent with California law. The bill thus expands liability while rejecting the doctrinal tools that have traditionally structured and limited its application—without offering a coherent alternative.

The bill rests on two contestable premises. First, it assumes that exclusionary single-firm conduct is widespread and harmful enough to justify a new state cause of action, but the statutory text does not specify that theory of harm, and the economics literature does not support it. Second, it rejects the doctrinal standards federal courts use to distinguish anticompetitive conduct from vigorous competition, yet offers no workable substitute.

TABLE 1: Federal Law vs. AB 1776

AB 1776’s remedies—criminal liability, treble damages, private rights of action with low pleading thresholds, and no market-power requirement—are disproportionate to the harms its proponents identify, even on their own terms. The bill also lowers core liability standards. It eliminates any recoupment requirement for predatory pricing, bars cross-market balancing for multi-sided platforms, and does not require proof of market power. As a result, plaintiffs—both public and private—could prevail on claims that federal courts would reject.

These features carry significant spillover effects. The firms most likely to face liability under AB 1776 operate nationally or globally. California courts would therefore set de facto national antitrust standards by applying a lower liability threshold.

The bill applies to any firm engaged in trade or commerce in California, regardless of where it is incorporated or headquartered. A manufacturer based in Ohio, a Delaware-incorporated retailer, or a Texas-based logistics firm all face Cartwright Act liability if their conduct affects California markets or participants. The statute imposes no industry or size limits. Any company that employs California workers, sells to California consumers, or competes in California markets falls within its scope.

That breadth has practical consequences. The firms most exposed to AB 1776 are not primarily California-based. They are national and multinational companies whose California operations cannot be separated from their broader business models. Firms will not maintain one set of practices for California and another elsewhere. Instead, they will adjust their conduct nationwide to comply. The bill’s extraterritorial effects are not incidental—they are the predictable result of applying a state-specific antitrust regime to firms that operate across integrated national and global markets.

II.      Federal–State Allocation of Antitrust Authority

The Cartwright Act, enacted in 1907, formed part of a broader wave of state competition laws aimed at curbing cartel behavior and supplementing common-law remedies for monopolies and price-fixing.[6] The statute targets “trusts,” defined as combinations of two or more persons to restrain trade or suppress competition. That focus on coordinated conduct has anchored enforcement against horizontal price-fixing, bid-rigging, and market-allocation agreements.

By contrast, Section 2 of the Sherman Act governs unilateral conduct. A single firm violates federal law when it acquires or maintains monopoly power through exclusionary practices. The Cartwright Act contains no comparable provision. The California Supreme Court confirmed in Cianci v. Superior Court that the Act is “broader in range and deeper in reach” than the Sherman Act within its domain,[7] but courts have consistently recognized that this domain does not extend to unilateral conduct.[8]

As a result, California law does not provide a direct cause of action against a single firm that refuses to deal with a rival on terms that would enable competition, acquires nascent competitors to eliminate emerging threats, or uses market power to impose exclusionary contracts. Federal law reaches these forms of conduct under Section 2, but federal litigation is costly, time-consuming, and imposes demanding evidentiary burdens.

The California Law Revision Commission (CLRC) argues that state antitrust law can complement federal enforcement by expanding enforcement capacity, enabling additional private plaintiffs, and tailoring remedies to California-specific conditions.[9]

III.    The CLRC Framework and AB 1776’s Design

Assembly Bill 1776 largely codifies—nearly verbatim—the recommendations of the California Law Revision Commission (CLRC), which spent several years evaluating whether to extend state antitrust law to single-firm conduct. The bill adopts the CLRC’s core design choices: an industry-neutral framework that applies across the economy, a directive to maximize deterrence, and a break from federal antitrust doctrine as a binding guide.

Understanding AB 1776 therefore requires examining both the CLRC’s process and its proposed statutory framework. The bill translates those recommendations into enforceable law by expanding liability to unilateral conduct, lowering or eliminating traditional evidentiary screens, and granting courts broad discretion to define the contours of liability without a clear alternative framework.

A.      The CLRC’s Break from Federal Antitrust

The CLRC spent several years reviewing the state’s antitrust laws, culminating in recommendations that underpin Assembly Bill 1776. The CLRC proposed a new single-firm conduct provision that applies across the entire California economy, rather than targeting specific sectors such as technology. AB 1776 adopts this industry-neutral approach.

At the same time, the CLRC’s recommendations—enacted largely without modification—depart sharply from established federal antitrust principles. The CLRC proposed instructing courts to maximize deterrence of antitrust violations, drawing on Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc.[10] AB 1776 § 16733 codifies that directive verbatim. The CLRC also introduced “Judicial Guidance”—a list of 10 federal evidentiary screens that “may constitute evidence” of a violation but are not required to establish liability.[11] AB 1776 § 16732 adopts that list in full, making optional key elements of federal analysis, including market power (subdivision (i)), recoupment in predatory pricing (subdivision (g)), cross-market balancing for multi-sided platforms (subdivision (f)), and the as-efficient-competitor test (subdivision (h)). The CLRC further proposed barring courts from offsetting harms in one market with benefits in another; AB 1776 § 16731(b) adopts that rule. In each instance, the bill tracks the CLRC’s recommended language.

While AB 1776 closely follows the CLRC’s recommendations, ICLE scholars and others sharply criticized the Commission’s process and conclusions. In formal comments, they argue that the decision to untether California antitrust law from the federal error-cost framework and the consumer welfare standard is misguided.[12] By favoring the risk of over-enforcement (false positives) over under-enforcement (false negatives), the CLRC’s approach risks chilling procompetitive conduct, including price cutting and vertical integration.

These critics also contend that the CLRC’s framework effectively rejects key U.S. Supreme Court precedents, including Brooke Group, Trinko, and Amex, and instead aligns California law more closely with European Union competition policy.[13] They further argue that the CLRC assumes federal antitrust law has failed, yet offers little empirical evidence that California consumers or businesses suffer from reduced competition due to gaps in current enforcement.

In practice, the CLRC’s framework lowers the evidentiary burden for plaintiffs without defining a clear alternative standard. It directs courts to reduce reliance on established screens but leaves them to determine what suffices to establish liability. These changes benefit plaintiffs’ attorneys, who gain broader grounds for treble-damages litigation; state enforcers, who gain expanded authority; and competitors seeking new claims against dominant firms. While these groups have legitimate interests, a deterrence-maximizing approach departs from the prevailing law & economics consensus, which emphasizes protecting consumer welfare and avoiding over-deterrence that can harm the broader economy.

B.       AB 1776’s Statutory Framework

AB 1776 would add Sections 16730 through 16733 to the California Business and Professions Code. The bill’s enactment clause states: “An act to add Sections 16730, 16731, 16732, and 16733 to the Business and Professions Code, relating to business regulations.” It does not amend Section 16720, the Cartwright Act’s definition of “trust,” which still requires “two or more persons.” Instead, new Section 16731(a)(1) provides that “restraint of trade” includes conduct “cognizable under Section 16720, whether directed, caused, or performed by one or more persons.” This incorporation-by-reference approach extends Cartwright Act liability to single-firm conduct—covering unilateral pricing, exclusive dealing, refusals to deal, product design, and contracting practices across all industries—without revising the statute’s core definitions.

Section 16731 makes it unlawful for one or more persons to restrain trade or to “monopolize or monopsonize, to attempt to monopolize or monopsonize, to maintain a monopoly or monopsony, or to combine or conspire with another person to monopolize or monopsonize.” The inclusion of “monopsonize” marks a significant expansion. It introduces buyer-side liability into California antitrust law, extending coverage to labor markets and other input markets.

Section 16730(b) underscores that shift by identifying “workers’ freedom to choose employment” as a protected competitive interest. The bill thus explicitly incorporates labor-market competition into the statute’s core objectives.

Section 16731 requires courts to evaluate anticompetitive effects and procompetitive justifications “within the same relevant market,” prohibiting cross-market balancing.

Section 16732 lists factors that may inform liability but are not required. These include: termination of a prior course of dealing; differential treatment of rivals; below-cost pricing; conduct that “makes no economic sense” absent a harmful purpose; quantitative evidence of harm; harm on multiple sides of a platform or harm outweighing benefits on another side; a probability of recoupment in predatory pricing; comparison to an as-efficient competitor; market-share or market-power thresholds recognized under federal Section 2; and a defined relevant market where direct evidence of market power exists.

Section 16733 directs courts to interpret California antitrust law liberally and to remain “mindful that California favors ‘maximizing’ effective deterrence of antitrust violations.” Section 16730 further provides that federal precedent is not binding and may be considered only to the extent it is “consistent with California law.”

Enforcement follows existing Cartwright Act mechanisms. Private plaintiffs, the attorney general, district attorneys, and qualifying city attorneys may bring suit. Available remedies include injunctive relief, treble damages, and attorneys’ fees. The Act’s criminal provisions also apply to violations of AB 1776.

IV.    Economic Tradeoffs and Doctrinal Shifts

AB 1776 rests on two core assumptions: that exclusionary single-firm conduct is both widespread and harmful enough to justify a deterrence-maximizing regime, and that courts can identify such conduct without the analytical screens that structure federal antitrust law. Both assumptions warrant scrutiny.

Sections IV.A through IV.C examine the economic and legal implications of that shift. Together, they highlight three throughlines: the tradeoff between false positives and false negatives, the risk of protecting competitors rather than competition, and the move away from the consumer welfare standard toward a set of competing policy goals without a clear method of resolution. By lowering evidentiary thresholds and prioritizing deterrence, AB 1776 increases the likelihood of over-enforcement, weakens the distinction between harmful and beneficial conduct, and leaves courts to resolve competing interests without a principled framework.

A.      Error Costs and Overdeterrence

Antitrust enforcement produces two types of errors. A false positive condemns procompetitive conduct—penalizing behavior that benefits consumers. A false negative allows anticompetitive conduct to persist without remedy. Frank H. Easterbrook, writing before his appointment to the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, identified the asymmetry between these errors that makes careful calibration essential: markets can partially self-correct false negatives, because above-competitive profits attract entry that erodes monopoly power over time.[14] False positives do not self-correct. An erroneous condemnation deters the challenged conduct across future periods through legal precedent, chilling similar conduct by other firms.[15] ICLE scholars apply this framework to California’s reform proposals in comments to the CLRC and subsequent analyses.[16]

A maximally deterrent antitrust regime increases the risk of false positives by design. It captures more anticompetitive conduct, but only by also condemning more procompetitive conduct that less aggressive standards would permit.

The CLRC explicitly prioritizes maximizing deterrence over calibrating enforcement to specific harms. It recommends departing from federal standards—such as recoupment and below-cost pricing requirements—which it characterizes as “rigid rules” that can “unduly restrict” enforcement.[17] While the CLRC rejects an “abuse of dominance” standard due to vague thresholds, it adopts a broad “restraint of trade” framework to reach a wider range of conduct than federal law.[18] AB 1776’s directive to maximize deterrence reflects a policy choice: accept more false positives to reduce false negatives, and systematically favor plaintiffs across theories of unilateral harm, regardless of the strength of the underlying claims.

ICLE’s comments note that this approach mirrors the European Union’s precautionary approach to antitrust, which assumes markets may not self-correct effectively. That approach can yield benefits, but “comes, almost by definition, at the expense of short-term growth.[19] The comments warn that adopting such a framework “is a costly policy stance in those circumstances where it is not clearly warranted by underlying risk and uncertainty,” particularly for a state like California, whose economy depends on innovation and startup growth.

B.       Competition vs. Competitors

The Supreme Court has long held that antitrust law protects “competition, not competitors.”[20] That distinction determines whether antitrust law serves consumers—here, California citizens broadly—or instead protects individual rivals. A firm that wins customers through lower prices harms competitors but benefits consumers and should not face antitrust liability.[21] By contrast, a firm that uses exclusionary threats to cut off rivals harms the competitive process itself and may warrant intervention. The analytical tools that AB 1776 makes optional—market-power analysis, recoupment, and multi-sided platform balancing—exist to distinguish between these scenarios.

AB 1776 replaces that filtering function with a directive to maximize deterrence. Courts instructed to resolve ambiguity broadly and favor deterrence will impose liability in more cases, including those where the conduct harms a rival but not competition. The result shifts the statute’s focus from protecting competition to protecting competitors.

The empirical case for this expansion is weak. In his August 2024 presentation to the CLRC, ICLE President Geoffrey Manne showed that claims of rising market concentration remain contested.[22] Some studies based on publicly traded firms and broad industry codes suggest increasing concentration, but more granular analyses point in the opposite direction. Gerard Hoberg and Gordon Phillips, accounting for multi-industry firms, find declining average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) scores.[23] C. Lanier Benkard and co-authors report that “decreases in concentration over time are broad-based” and that this result “contradicts the prevailing popular opinion.”[24] As Manne emphasized, concentration data alone “says nothing about the amount of competition,” and therefore has no direct normative implication for antitrust policy.[25]

C.      The Consumer Welfare Standard and Its Proposed Replacement

Federal antitrust law has long organized liability around consumer welfare—harm to consumers through higher prices, reduced output, or diminished quality. The Supreme Court described the Sherman Act as “a consumer welfare prescription” in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.[26] This standard limits liability to conduct that harms consumers, not merely rivals, and provides a principled boundary for antitrust enforcement.

AB 1776 replaces that framework with a broader and less defined set of objectives. The bill declares that California antitrust law protects (1) “free and fair competition” (2) for “all trade participants, including workers and consumers,” and (3) “an environment that is conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political, and social institutions.”[27] These goals are distinct and often in tension, yet the statute does not explain how courts should resolve those conflicts. ICLE scholars warned during the CLRC process that extending protection to “trading partners” as a class—rather than focusing on consumers and the competitive process—risks politicizing enforcement and shielding less-efficient firms at consumers’ expense.[28]

These tensions arise in routine cases. A firm that lowers prices benefits consumers but harms rivals. A firm that integrates complementary features improves quality for users but reduces demand for standalone products. A firm that grows through successful competition may increase concentration, raising political concerns even if its conduct benefits consumers. Under the consumer welfare standard, courts resolve these conflicts by asking whether the net effect on consumers is positive. Under AB 1776’s “all trade participants” standard—combined with a directive to maximize deterrence—no comparable principle applies. Courts must weigh competing interests case by case, producing outcomes that are difficult to predict and hard for firms to anticipate in structuring their conduct.

V.      Predatory Pricing and the Recoupment Requirement

Federal predatory-pricing doctrine rests on a simple economic insight: below-cost pricing harms consumers only if the firm can later recoup its losses through supracompetitive prices. AB 1776 discards that requirement without replacing it, exposing firms to liability for the very conduct—aggressive price competition—that antitrust law seeks to protect.

Sections V.A and V.B explain the implications of that shift. Together, they show that removing the Brooke Group recoupment screen eliminates a core safeguard against false positives, leaves courts without a coherent test to distinguish harmful from beneficial pricing, and predictably deters procompetitive price cutting. The result is a regime that increases liability risk while weakening the economic foundation of predatory-pricing law, to the detriment of consumers.

A.      Brooke Group and Recoupment

In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,[29] the Supreme Court held that a predatory-pricing claim requires proof of two elements: (1) pricing below an appropriate measure of cost, and (2) a dangerous probability of recouping the losses through later supracompetitive pricing. The Court explained why both elements matter: “Without a dangerous probability of recoupment, it is highly unlikely that a firm would engage in predatory pricing,” and absent recoupment, “predatory pricing produces lower aggregate prices in the market, and consumer welfare is enhanced.”[30]

The logic of the recoupment requirement is straightforward. A firm that prices below cost without any realistic prospect of later monopoly pricing incurs losses with no path to recovery. Those low prices transfer value to consumers on every unit sold. The firm must eventually raise prices to competitive levels (inviting entry), exit the market, or continue absorbing losses—none of which reflects a strategy that harms consumers. Predatory pricing becomes plausible only when below-cost pricing represents a temporary sacrifice backed by an expectation of future monopoly pricing. Recoupment tests whether that expectation is economically credible.

Then-Judge Stephen Breyer underscored the error-cost stakes in Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp.: “the consequence of a mistake here is not simply to force a firm to forego legitimate business activity it wishes to pursue; rather, it is to penalize a procompetitive price cut, perhaps the most desirable activity (from an antitrust perspective) that can take place in a concentrated industry.”[31] ICLE’s comments to the CLRC and subsequent scholarship argue that eliminating the Brooke Group recoupment requirement would move California law toward the European model, which assesses pricing without regard to recoupment—a standard ICLE describes as having “no basis in economic theory or evidence.”[32]

B.       Eliminating Recoupment and Its Effects

Section 16732 of AB 1776 provides that a plaintiff need not establish “whether a defendant is likely to recoup losses from below-cost pricing” to prove a predatory-pricing violation. The bill offers no substitute analytical test. Instead, courts must evaluate such claims under a general mandate to interpret antitrust law liberally and maximize deterrence.

Under this framework, a firm that prices aggressively to gain market share, match a competitor’s promotion, or expand demand for a new product could face liability without any showing of market power, exclusionary intent, or a realistic prospect of recouping losses through supracompetitive pricing. A plaintiff need only persuade a court that prices fell below some measure of cost and that the conduct harmed a trade participant enough to justify liability.

Firms will respond predictably. The expected cost of a predatory-pricing claim equals the probability of liability multiplied by expected damages—treble damages plus attorneys’ fees. When firms cannot predict how courts will characterize their pricing—because no recoupment screen anchors the analysis and courts must maximize deterrence—they will price more conservatively. The conduct most likely to be deterred is precisely the aggressive price competition that antitrust law has traditionally protected.

The Supreme Court adopted the recoupment requirement in Brooke Group to address this problem. Before that decision, courts often condemned aggressive pricing based on intent or market structure, which led to frequent false positives.[33] Brooke Group added recoupment to reduce the risk of penalizing procompetitive price cuts. AB 1776 effectively returns California to the pre-Brooke Group regime—one federal courts abandoned because it deterred beneficial price competition.

Consumers bear the cost of that shift. When firms avoid aggressive pricing to limit litigation risk, prices rise above competitive levels. In concentrated markets, this means consumers pay more—not because firms exercise monopoly power, but because legal risk discourages price competition. Even familiar examples of sustained low pricing—such as Costco’s $1.50 hot dog and soda combo or its $4.99 rotisserie chicken—become harder to sustain under a regime that treats aggressive pricing as presumptively suspect.

VI.    Multi-Sided Markets and the Rejection of Amex

Many of California’s most significant firms—including Google, Meta, Apple, and Amazon—operate multi-sided platforms that fund services on one side of the market with revenue from another. The Supreme Court recognized in Amex that platform conduct must be evaluated across both sides to avoid systematically biased results. AB 1776 prohibits that approach, requiring courts to assess competitive harm one side at a time while disregarding offsetting benefits on the other.

Sections VI.A through VI.D show how this shift departs from the economics of platform competition. Multi-sided markets depend on cross-market interactions, and pricing decisions on one side cannot be understood in isolation. By rejecting cross-market balancing and making multi-sided harm optional, AB 1776 removes the tools needed to distinguish harmful conduct from business models that benefit consumers overall. The result is a framework that risks misidentifying harm, over-deterring efficient cross-subsidization, and exposing a wide range of industries—not just technology—to liability for standard competitive practices.

A.      Multi-Sided Platforms and Cross-Market Effects

A multi-sided platform serves multiple groups of users simultaneously, creating value by facilitating interactions among them. The economics of these platforms differ fundamentally from single-sided firms. A credit card network becomes more valuable to merchants as more consumers carry the card, and more valuable to consumers as more merchants accept it. These indirect network effects mean that pricing decisions on one side of the platform shape the size, composition, and behavior of the other.

Pricing therefore operates as an integrated system. A platform that charges merchants higher fees may use that revenue to fund consumer rewards, fraud protection, or broader acceptance, attracting more users and increasing transaction volume for merchants. The causal relationship runs in both directions. Evaluating a price increase on one side of the platform without accounting for effects on the other side produces an incomplete—and often misleading—assessment. That does not mean harms on one side can never outweigh benefits on the other. It means cross-market effects are central to competition among multi-sided platforms and cannot be ignored without risking harm to consumers.

Many of California’s most significant firms operate multi-sided platforms. Google funds free search and maps through advertising. Meta offers free social networking supported by advertising revenue. Apple’s App Store connects developers and users through a commission-based model. Amazon’s marketplace links third-party sellers with consumers while competing as a retailer. In each case, pricing decisions on one side of the platform are analytically inseparable from their effects on the other.

B.       Amex and Two-Sided Markets

The Supreme Court addressed the implications of platform economics for antitrust analysis in Ohio v. American Express Co.[34] The Court held that, because Amex operates a two-sided transaction platform, evidence of a price increase on the merchant side “cannot, by itself, demonstrate an anticompetitive exercise of market power.”[35] It emphasized that “the two-sided market for credit-card transactions should be analyzed as a whole,” warning that focusing on only one side “tends to distort the competition that actually exists” and risks “mistaken inferences” that could chill legitimate competition.”[36] The Court therefore requires plaintiffs in two-sided platform cases to show anticompetitive effects across both sides of the market before the burden shifts to defendants to offer procompetitive justifications.

This framework reflects the underlying economics of multi-sided platforms. Costs imposed on one side and benefits delivered on the other are linked through the platform’s business model. Evaluating only costs or only benefits produces a systematically biased assessment of welfare effects. Herbert Hovenkamp, a leading antitrust scholar at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, explains that market power on a multi-sided platform cannot be inferred from conditions on a single side, because apparent price increases or market power may be offset by services or subsidies on the other.[37]

ICLE applies this logic directly to the CLRC’s proposed rejection of Amex. Evidence of a price effect on one side of a two-sided platform may reflect neutral, procompetitive, or anticompetitive conduct. Distinguishing among those possibilities requires examining both sides of the platform, rather than isolating one dimension of the market.[38]

C.      Banning Cross-Market Balancing

Two provisions of AB 1776 displace the Amex framework. Section 16731(b) requires courts to evaluate anticompetitive effects and procompetitive justifications “within the same relevant market,” prohibiting cross-market balancing. Section 16732(f) further provides that plaintiffs need not show harm on more than one side of a multi-sided platform, or that harm on one side outweighs benefits on another.

Read together, these provisions require courts to assess platform conduct one side at a time and to disregard offsetting benefits on the other side. A platform that raises advertising prices to fund free consumer services would be judged solely on advertiser-side costs, without credit for consumer benefits. A payment network that charges merchants higher fees while providing cardholders with superior fraud protection and rewards could face liability based only on merchant-side effects.

The bill offers no economic justification for this approach. The CLRC dismisses Amex, asserting:

[Amex] created a confusing precedent as to the type and amount of evidence needed to show harm in cases involving two sided platforms. This case also used assumptions about the interconnectedness of the two sides that may not translate to market realities in other circumstances, and could allow firms to escape antitrust liability for causing harm on one side of a platform and masking it with benefits on the other side.[39]

ICLE scholars responded:

As in the Amex case itself, such an approach would confer benefits on certain platform-business users (in Amex, retailers) at the direct expense of consumers (in Amex, literal consumers of retail goods purchased by credit card).

Adopting such an approach in California—whose economy is significantly dependent on multisided digital-platform firms, including both incumbents and startups—would imperil the state’s economic prospects and exacerbate the incentives for such firms to take jobs, investments, and tax dollars elsewhere.[40]

By prohibiting cross-market balancing, AB 1776 adopts an analytical framework that will misidentify harm in multi-sided markets. A rule that counts costs on one side without crediting benefits on the other will find liability even when overall consumer welfare improves. Courts applying this rule cannot distinguish between conduct that harms consumers and conduct that harms only competitors. Any adverse effect on one group of users becomes actionable, regardless of offsetting benefits to others.

The predictable result is liability for business models the Supreme Court declined to condemn in Amex—models that often benefit consumers overall despite imposing costs on certain commercial users. Rather than address that distinction, AB 1776 forbids courts from considering it.

The same error extends to the bill’s treatment of vertical restraints. ICLE’s comments to the CLRC synthesize a large empirical literature showing that vertical integration and related practices produce predominantly procompetitive or neutral effects.[41] As former FTC Bureau of Economics Director Francine Lafontaine explains, when firms adopt vertical restraints, they typically improve product quality and service, benefiting consumers as well as producers.[42] Even more skeptical reviews acknowledge that few studies identify vertical practices that likely harm competition.[43] AB 1776’s decision to subject these practices to heightened scrutiny under a maximize-deterrence mandate conflicts with that empirical record.

D.      One-Sided Liability for Cross-Subsidies

The prohibition on cross-market balancing exposes any firm that subsidizes one group of users with revenue from another to antitrust liability. While technology platforms provide the most visible examples, this model appears across many industries.

Google offers free search, maps, and email to consumers while charging advertisers for access to those users. Its advertising prices cannot be evaluated in isolation from the consumer services they fund. Under AB 1776, a plaintiff could challenge those prices based solely on advertiser costs, with no credit for the consumer benefits they support.

The same structure applies to Meta, Apple, and Amazon. Meta funds free social networking through advertising. Apple charges App Store commissions while providing developers and users with software review, device integration, and payment infrastructure. Amazon charges third-party sellers marketplace fees while operating fulfillment and consumer-trust systems. A one-sided liability framework counts costs imposed on one group while ignoring the benefits delivered to another, even when both arise from the same transaction.

Credit card networks operate the same two-sided model the Supreme Court analyzed in Amex. Visa and Mastercard charge merchants interchange fees while providing consumers with fraud protection, rewards, and payment convenience. Under AB 1776, a challenge to those fees would proceed without accounting for those consumer benefits. Merchants may gain; consumers lose.

This structure extends beyond technology and finance. Newspapers and broadcasters sell advertising to fund content that consumers receive without direct payment. Grocery retailers use loyalty programs and data revenues to support lower prices. Health care systems cross-subsidize services, using profitable lines to fund emergency or community care. These models depend on integrated pricing across different user groups.

AB 1776’s one-sided analysis will identify harm where a complete assessment shows net consumer benefit. Courts will evaluate pricing and revenue models without the tools to measure their full effects. Firms that compete by delivering value across multiple sides of a market face the greatest exposure.

VII.  Monopsony and Labor-Market Uncertainty

AB 1776 extends antitrust liability to monopsonization—buyer-side market power—and identifies workers’ freedom to choose employment as a protected competition interest. Federal law offers limited precedent for applying single-firm antitrust doctrine to labor markets, and the economics literature does not provide a settled framework for defining relevant labor markets or measuring employer wage-setting power.

Sections VII.A through VII.C show how the bill codifies this uncertainty. AB 1776 applies the same expanded liability structure used for product markets—no market-power threshold, liberal interpretation, and maximum deterrence—to an area where both doctrine and measurement remain underdeveloped. The result is a regime that lacks clear standards for identifying harm, extends liability across a wide range of employers, and encourages firms to adjust hiring and compensation practices to manage legal risk rather than compete aggressively for talent.

A.      Monopsony and Unsettled Economics

As noted above, AB 1776 extends the Cartwright Act to monopsonization and identifies workers’ freedom to choose employment as a protected competition interest.[44] Federal law offers little guidance on applying Section 2 to unilateral labor-market conduct by a single employer. The analytical tools for identifying monopsony power remain far less developed than those used to assess monopoly power in product markets.

Federal antitrust enforcement in labor markets has focused on horizontal agreements among employers—no-poach agreements and wage-fixing arrangements—rather than single-employer monopsonization. AB 1776 expands liability into an area where both the doctrine and the underlying economics remain unsettled.

B.       Defining Labor Markets

ICLE scholars Geoffrey Manne, Brian Albrecht, and Dirk Auer argue that the economics literature lacks a clear consensus on how to assess labor-market power.[45] They note that standard tools used in product markets—geographic market definition, substitution analysis, and price-cost measurement—do not translate cleanly to labor markets. ICLE reiterates these concerns in its CLRC comments and subsequent analysis of the California proposals.[46]

In product markets, defining a relevant market turns on substitution. The “hypothetical monopolist” test asks whether a firm controlling all supply could profitably raise prices by 5%–10%. That inquiry maps onto observable behavior: where consumers go when prices rise. Economists can answer it using price and quantity data to estimate demand elasticities and cross-elasticities across products.

In labor markets, the parallel question is whether a single employer could profitably reduce wages. But the substitution analysis is far less tractable. Workers do not switch among employers as easily as consumers switch among products. Non-wage attributes—working conditions, career opportunities, organizational culture, job security, and proximity to family or professional networks—differentiate jobs in ways that are difficult to measure.

Individual circumstances further complicate the analysis. A software engineer in San Francisco may not view a position in Austin as a substitute, regardless of higher pay, due to family ties or housing investments—or she may, if the job offers remote work.[47] Whether two positions fall within the same labor market depends on worker-specific preferences and mobility constraints that aggregate data often cannot capture.

Geographic market definition has become especially uncertain with the rise of remote work. Pre-pandemic studies relied on commuting patterns. Today, many California workers are employed by firms based in other states, and many firms recruit across multiple regions. Research finds that employees may accept 5%–25% lower compensation for remote or hybrid work.[48] At the same time, California’s employment regulations—including expense-reimbursement requirements, daily overtime rules, and numerous local minimum-wage ordinances—have led some out-of-state employers to exclude California residents from remote hiring.[49] These factors make labor-market boundaries harder to define and monopsony power more difficult to measure.

C.      Codifying Unsettled Theory

AB 1776 applies the same expanded liability structure to monopsonization that it applies to monopolization: no market-power threshold, no required methodology for measuring labor-market power, a mandate for liberal interpretation, and an instruction to maximize deterrence. Courts applying this framework will lack settled tools to define relevant labor markets, measure wage-setting power, or distinguish aggressive competition for workers from anticompetitive conduct.

The exposure extends beyond technology firms. Any employer that hires a large share of workers with specialized skills in a given area—a hospital system employing specialized nurses, a logistics firm employing warehouse workers, or a media company employing niche editorial staff—could face monopsonization claims. Without a market-power threshold, firms cannot determine in advance whether their size or hiring patterns create liability risk. The open-ended standard, combined with a deterrence mandate, invites courts to resolve uncertainty in plaintiffs’ favor.

Firms will respond by adjusting employment practices. To reduce litigation risk, employers may avoid compensation strategies or hiring practices that could be characterized as evidence of wage-setting power, even when those practices reflect competition for talent. They may limit long-term commitments or rely more heavily on outsourcing to reduce direct labor-market exposure. These responses may narrow opportunities and reduce flexibility for the workers the statute aims to protect.

VIII.      The Loss of the Consumer Welfare Standard

The consumer welfare standard gives courts a single, measurable question: whether the challenged conduct leaves consumers better off or worse. That inquiry distinguishes conduct antitrust law should reach from conduct it should not and allows courts to screen out claims that allege harm to competitors but not to competition.

AB 1776 replaces that standard with a multi-objective declaration protecting “free and fair competition” for “all trade participants” and the preservation of “democratic, political, and social institutions,” without any mechanism for resolving the conflicts and tradeoffs those objectives create. Sections VIII.A and VIII.B show that these conflicts are inevitable and that removing a clear limiting principle leaves courts to balance competing interests case by case. An “all-and-sundry welfare” approach does not guide that analysis—it invites inconsistent outcomes and risks undermining the consumer benefits antitrust law is designed to protect.

A.      Consumer Welfare as a Limiting Principle

The consumer welfare standard does not privilege consumers over workers or other market participants as a normative matter. It provides courts with a coherent, measurable limit on what conduct antitrust law should reach. As the Supreme Court stated in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., the Sherman Act is “a consumer welfare prescription.”[50] The Court reinforced in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. that plaintiffs must show harm to competition, not merely harm to themselves as competitors.[51] Together, these principles establish that antitrust law does not shield market participants from losing to superior rivals.

The standard shapes how courts analyze liability. When a plaintiff challenges pricing, exclusive dealing, or product integration, a court asks whether the conduct raised prices, reduced output or quality, or limited consumer choice. If not—if the conduct harmed a competitor while benefiting consumers—the court can dismiss the claim without full merits analysis. This screening function reduces litigation costs and filters out claims that, even if factually accurate, do not describe antitrust violations.

B.       No Limiting Principle

AB 1776 replaces the consumer welfare standard with a declaration that California antitrust law protects “free and fair competition” for “all trade participants, including workers and consumers,” and “an environment that is conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political, and social institutions.”

This formulation does not function as a workable legal standard. It combines three distinct objectives—protecting competition, protecting trade participants as a class, and preserving political institutions—without providing a method to resolve conflicts among them. Those conflicts arise routinely. A firm that lowers prices benefits consumers but harms rivals; both are “trade participants.” A firm that vertically integrates to secure inputs may benefit workers and customers through stability while disadvantaging independent suppliers; all fall within the statute’s scope. The consumer welfare standard resolves these tensions by asking whether consumers are better or worse off. AB 1776 provides no comparable principle. Combined with a mandate to maximize deterrence, the statute leaves courts to prioritize among competing interests case by case, producing inconsistent and unpredictable outcomes.

Murat Mungan and John Yun identify a further consequence of overbroad liability standards. When antitrust violations no longer clearly signal consumer harm, the reputational penalty that reinforces legal sanctions weakens.[52] Firms found to have harmed consumers through anticompetitive conduct face social and market consequences that amplify deterrence. Firms found liable for conduct that the public views as competitive or beneficial do not. By extending liability to conduct whose anticompetitive character is not self-evident, AB 1776 risks diluting this reputational mechanism and, with it, the overall deterrent effect of antitrust law.

IX.   Lower Liability Standards and Extraterritorial Effects

AB 1776 systematically lowers the thresholds for antitrust liability below those federal courts have developed over decades. It makes core screening tools optional—market power, recoupment, and cross-market balancing—thereby expanding liability across a wide range of conduct that federal law would not reach.

Sections IX.A through IX.C show how these lower standards extend beyond California. Because federal law does not preempt state antitrust law, and firms operating in national or digital markets cannot realistically maintain California-specific business practices, the bill’s standards would shape conduct nationwide. California enforcement actions and settlements would set de facto national rules, while imposing compliance costs on firms across the country. That extraterritorial effect raises unresolved dormant Commerce Clause concerns about whether the burdens on interstate commerce are proportionate to California’s asserted interests.

A.      Lowering Liability Thresholds

AB 1776 establishes lower thresholds for antitrust liability than federal law. Section 16732 renders optional 10 factors that federal courts treat as requirements—not out of confusion about antitrust goals, but because experience shows each screens out claims that would condemn procompetitive conduct.

The market-power threshold requires a defendant to possess monopoly power—often inferred from a market share above 50% in a properly defined relevant market—before unilateral conduct can qualify as monopolization.[53] This requirement reflects a basic constraint: a firm without market power cannot harm the competitive process through unilateral action. Without the ability to control prices or exclude rivals, practices such as aggressive pricing, exclusive dealing, and refusals to deal remain disciplined by competition. AB 1776 removes this threshold, exposing firms of any size or position to monopolization claims.

Other federal screens serve similar functions. Recoupment distinguishes temporary price competition from predation; eliminating it collapses that distinction. The Amex framework requires cross-market analysis for two-sided platforms; prohibiting it produces systematically incomplete welfare assessments. Each screen targets a known source of error in antitrust adjudication.

The as-efficient-competitor test asks whether the challenged conduct would exclude a rival that matches the defendant’s efficiency, or only less efficient firms. That comparison identifies conduct that distorts competition rather than reflects it. AB 1776 makes this test optional, allowing liability where conduct harms only rivals that cannot match the defendant’s performance. Under this approach, even a low-price offering—such as Costco’s $1.50 hot dog and soda combo—could be characterized as unlawful predatory pricing by less efficient competitors.

B.       Nationwide Spillover Effects

These lower liability thresholds have national consequences. The California attorney general and private plaintiffs may bring antitrust cases in state courts against firms that operate nationwide. When those cases succeed under AB 1776’s standards—without market-power analysis, recoupment, or multi-sided market balancing—they produce precedents and settlements that shape firms’ conduct beyond California.

A firm that settles a predatory-pricing claim under AB 1776 will not maintain one pricing strategy in California and another elsewhere. For many businesses, especially digital platforms, geographic differentiation is costly or infeasible. Settlement terms adopted to resolve a California claim will apply across the firm’s operations. California courts, applying lower standards than federal courts, would effectively set national policy for the challenged conduct.

Federal antitrust law does not preempt state antitrust law under Parker v. Brown.[54] But when firms cannot segment their practices by state, California’s rules will govern their behavior nationwide. By enacting AB 1776, the California Legislature would influence not only in-state commerce but commercial conduct across the United States.

C.      Dormant Commerce Clause Risks

AB 1776’s extraterritorial reach raises concerns under the dormant Commerce Clause, which bars states from imposing burdens on interstate commerce that are “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”[55] Courts have not resolved whether a state antitrust law that drives nationwide changes in firm behavior—particularly through digital markets—satisfies this standard. Shira Liu concludes that the constitutional question remains unsettled.[56]

What is clear is that AB 1776’s lower liability standards would impose compliance costs on firms across the country that may exceed any in-state benefits. A firm that adjusts its national pricing strategy to avoid California liability under a no-recoupment standard changes behavior for consumers in all 50 states based solely on California law. Whether such nationwide effects are proportionate to California’s regulatory interests remains unanswered by courts and unaddressed by the Legislature.

X.      Strategic Litigation and Competitive Distortion

AB 1776’s combination of broad liability, low analytical thresholds, and treble damages creates strong incentives for strategic litigation—suits aimed at extracting settlements through defense costs rather than remedying anticompetitive harm. By weakening screening mechanisms and prioritizing deterrence, the bill increases both the volume and leverage of weak claims, shifting competitive disputes from the market to the courtroom.

A.      Strategic Litigation Incentives

AB 1776’s combination of low pleading standards, broad liability categories, no market-power threshold, and treble damages creates strong incentives for strategic antitrust litigation—claims filed not to remedy anticompetitive harm, but to leverage the cost of defense into favorable settlements.

When a statute presumes liability across a wide range of conduct and removes the analytical screens that would allow early dismissal, defending even a weak claim becomes costly. Antitrust litigation routinely requires extensive discovery, expert analysis, and depositions, often costing millions of dollars. A defendant that expects to prevail on the merits may still choose to settle because the cost of defense exceeds the cost of settlement. The resulting terms—pricing concessions, supply commitments, data-sharing obligations, or limits on business practices—reflect litigation pressure, not a judicial finding of anticompetitive conduct.

AB 1776’s directive to interpret antitrust law liberally and maximize deterrence intensifies these incentives. Courts operating under that mandate will be less likely to dismiss claims at the pleading stage, more likely to treat ambiguous evidence as supporting liability, and more inclined to resolve legal uncertainty against defendants. Each of these effects increases the expected value of weak claims—and, in turn, the number of such claims filed.

B.       Litigation as Competition

In practice, AB 1776’s private right of action will primarily benefit the plaintiffs’ bar and rivals seeking advantages they cannot achieve through competition. A less-efficient firm competing with a larger rival may be unable to match price or quality. Under AB 1776, it can instead threaten litigation—alleging predatory pricing (no recoupment required), cross-market harm in a platform business (no balancing permitted), or monopsony in labor markets (no market-power threshold). Each theory forces the defendant to incur substantial defense costs and creates settlement pressure regardless of the claim’s merits.

This form of litigation does not protect consumers. It protects the litigating rival at consumers’ expense. Settlements may require defendants to raise prices to avoid further predation claims, reduce the quality or scope of platform services to limit cross-market effects, or constrain employment practices to mitigate monopsony allegations. Each outcome benefits the rival’s competitive position while harming consumers or workers.

XI.   Comparative Frameworks and Evidence

AB 1776 does not operate in isolation. Its departures from established doctrine are best assessed against three benchmarks: federal Section 2 law, which the bill systematically weakens across key elements; New York’s Twenty-First Century Antitrust Act, which has repeatedly stalled under scrutiny; and the European Union’s Digital Markets Act, whose early enforcement record illustrates the practical effects of a similar regulatory approach.

Sections XI.A through XI.C show a consistent pattern. Where AB 1776 diverges most sharply from established frameworks—by lowering liability thresholds, rejecting analytical safeguards, and prioritizing deterrence—it aligns with approaches that have either failed to gain legislative traction or produced mixed results in practice.

A.      More Plaintiff-Favorable Standards

Table 2 compares AB 1776 with federal Section 2 doctrine across the doctrinal elements most relevant to the bill’s effects.

TABLE 2: Federal Law vs. AB 1776

AB 1776 does not simply fill the Cartwright Act’s historical gap on single-firm conduct. It adopts more plaintiff-favorable standards on each contested element, allowing the California attorney general and private plaintiffs to prevail on claims that federal courts would reject.

B.       Lessons from New York

New York State has considered extending its antitrust law to single-firm conduct since at least the 2019–2020 legislative session, when state Sen. Michael Gianaris (D-Queens) introduced the Twenty-First Century Antitrust Act as S. 8700-A.[57] He has introduced similar versions in each subsequent session.[58] The most recent version, S. 335, was introduced in January 2025.

The proposal would amend the Donnelly Act—New York’s primary antitrust statute governing restraints of trade—in two key ways. First, it would prohibit monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracy to monopolize, treating unilateral conduct similarly to agreements. Second, it would establish an “abuse of dominance” standard for firms with a dominant position in product or labor markets. That standard would allow courts to infer dominance from direct or indirect evidence, including the ability to impose supracompetitive prices or subcompetitive wages. The bill would thus lower the legal thresholds required to establish antitrust violations.

In October 2023, Sen. Gianaris presented the proposal to the CLRC’s Single-Firm Conduct Working Group, which rejected it. The group concluded that terms such as “dominant position” and “abuse of dominance” were too vague to provide workable standards.[59] Although the New York Senate has passed versions of the bill in each session since its introduction, the Assembly has not taken it up.[60] That repeated inaction reflects sustained resistance to an analytically weak framework.

AB 1776 avoids the “abuse of dominance” label but reaches a similar result through different means: lower thresholds, fewer evidentiary requirements, and a mandate to maximize deterrence. The New York experience suggests a broader pattern. Proposals that closely track federal doctrine tend to survive scrutiny; those that depart most sharply from it tend to stall.

C.      Lessons from Europe

Although AB 1776 is not modeled on the European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA),[61] the two share underlying assumptions that make the DMA’s experience relevant. The CLRC declined to adopt a formal European “abuse of dominance” standard,[62] but AB 1776 incorporates similar logic through a different route. It mirrors the European approach in three respects: it removes market-power thresholds as a prerequisite for liability, prohibits cross-market balancing, and departs from the effects-based, consumer-welfare framework that has long distinguished U.S. antitrust law. ICLE has cautioned against this “Europeanization” of California law, urging continued alignment with consumer welfare, effects-based analysis, and error-cost discipline.[63]

The DMA provides the most prominent example of this approach in practice. In force since March 2024, it authorizes the European Commission to designate firms as “gatekeepers” based on size, user base, and the provision of “core platform services.”[64] The Commission has designated firms such as Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, ByteDance, Meta, Microsoft, and Booking.com, and imposed obligations related to interoperability, data portability, and self-preferencing.[65]

These obligations apply without requiring case-specific proof of market power, consumer harm, or the absence of efficiencies.[66] The DMA’s self-preferencing rules rest on a contested premise—that integration by a platform is inherently suspect—rather than recognizing that integration often generates efficiencies.[67] AB 1776 adopts a similar shortcut by making market power, recoupment, cross-market balancing, and as-efficient-competitor analysis optional. Both regimes relax traditional screens and presume harm without requiring case-specific evidence.

Early evidence from the DMA’s implementation illustrates the risks of that approach. A 2025 survey by the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE), a Brussels-based policy institute, found that while most consumers support intervention in digital markets, 39% report needing more steps to complete tasks that were previously simple, and roughly one-third report more fragmented and confusing digital experiences.[68] A separate analysis by Carmelo Cennamo and co-authors estimates that DMA provisions could reduce revenues across EU service sectors by up to €114 billion due to lost efficiencies.[69] Sector-specific losses range from €4.4 billion to €59 billion in retail and €14 billion to €21 billion in accommodation. Neither study finds evidence of a meaningful shift in market structure toward alternative providers. Interoperability and unbundling mandates have reduced product quality, while the competitive landscape remains largely unchanged.

These outcomes reflect a broader concern. As ICLE has documented, the stated goals of digital competition policy—greater “contestability” and “fairness”—often diverge from their practical effect: redistributing value from successful firms to less-efficient rivals.[70] The mechanisms differ—conduct mandates in the DMA, expanded tort liability in AB 1776—but the underlying approach is similar: skepticism of market-power thresholds, rejection of efficiency balancing, and a willingness to second-guess business decisions without proof of consumer harm. The DMA’s record offers the best available evidence of how that approach operates in practice. California legislators should weigh that experience before adopting a framework that has degraded digital services for consumers without achieving its structural goals.

ICLE’s comments also point to broader macroeconomic patterns.[71] As the comments note, ECIPE research shows that U.S. GDP per capita exceeded the EU’s by 47% in 2010 and by 82% in 2021, a widening gap under differing regulatory approaches. Even studies often cited to support concerns about concentration cut the other way on closer review. For example, David Autor and his co-authors observe:

An alternative perspective on the rise of [large firms and increased concentration] is that they reflect a diminution of competition, due to weaker U.S. antitrust enforcement. Our findings on the similarity of trends in the United States and Europe, where antitrust authorities have acted more aggressively on large firms, combined with the fact that the concentrating sectors appear to be growing more productive and innovative, suggests that this is unlikely to be the primary explanation, although it may be important in some industries.[72]

XII.  Criminal Liability and Due Process Concerns

AB 1776 raises potential concerns for criminal enforcement under the Cartwright Act. A core principle of American law is the presumption of innocence: prosecutors bear the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As William Blackstone observed, “the law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.”[73] This principle reflects a broader tradeoff. Efforts to deter harmful conduct must be balanced against the risk of deterring lawful conduct, especially in areas of uncertainty.

Several doctrines operationalize that balance. The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that criminal laws give clear notice of prohibited conduct. The rule of lenity requires courts to interpret ambiguous penal statutes narrowly in favor of defendants. Together, these constraints limit the scope of criminal liability and protect against overreach.

AB 1776’s interpretive mandates complicate this framework. Section 16733 directs courts to construe antitrust law liberally and to remain “mindful” that California favors “maximizing” deterrence. That instruction does not distinguish between civil and criminal cases. The Cartwright Act, however, carries criminal penalties—up to three years in county jail for individuals and fines up to $6 million for corporations[74] —and it is unclear whether those penalties extend to the new single-firm conduct provisions. This issue is not theoretical. In 2024, the California attorney general announced plans to resume criminal antitrust prosecutions for the first time in 25 years.[75]

In civil cases, broad construction and deterrence mandates may be aggressive but permissible. In criminal cases, they conflict with foundational constraints: proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the rule of lenity, and the requirement of fair notice. Clear notice is easier to establish when conduct is categorically unlawful. A cartel agreement among gas stations to fix prices presents little ambiguity. By contrast, whether below-cost pricing—such as Costco’s $1.50 hot dog and soda combo—violates antitrust law depends on a complex, fact-specific inquiry. Single-firm conduct typically falls under the rule of reason, not per se illegality, making criminal enforcement more difficult to justify.

Federal practice reflects this distinction. Criminal enforcement under the Sherman Act has focused on Section 1 collusion—price-fixing and bid-rigging—where conduct is per se unlawful.[76] Proposals to extend criminal liability to Section 2 monopolization have faced resistance, based on concerns about fair notice and the difficulty of proving specific intent to harm competition.[77]

AB 1776 heightens these concerns. Its instruction to construe the statute broadly operates in tension with lenity, while its open-ended structure—making federal standards optional without specifying what suffices for liability—raises vagueness issues. A prosecutor could argue that “liberal interpretation” defines the elements of the offense, with the reasonable-doubt standard applying only to proof of those elements. That approach would expand criminal liability in practice while formally preserving the burden of proof.

The result is uncertainty about what conduct is criminal. If California courts depart from federal antitrust doctrine without clear replacement standards, firms and individuals may lack fair notice of the law’s boundaries. AB 1776 does not address this tension, and it remains unclear whether its deterrence mandate can be reconciled with the constitutional limits that govern criminal punishment.

XIII.     Conclusion and Recommendations

Assembly Bill 1776 adopts the California Law Revision Commission’s recommendations with minimal change. Those recommendations abandon the error-cost framework and the consumer welfare standard that have disciplined antitrust enforcement for decades. The bill makes optional each major evidentiary screen federal courts use to distinguish procompetitive from anticompetitive conduct—market-power thresholds, recoupment in predatory pricing, cross-market balancing for multi-sided platforms, the as-efficient-competitor test, and quantitative evidence of harm. In their place, it directs courts to maximize deterrence and construe liability broadly, a combination that predictably increases costly false positives. Markets can partially self-correct false negatives as entry erodes supracompetitive profits. False positives do not self-correct, because erroneous condemnation deters beneficial conduct going forward.

The consequences follow directly from these choices. Eliminating recoupment returns California predatory-pricing law to the pre-Brooke Group regime that federal courts rejected for overdeterring price competition. Prohibiting cross-market balancing mandates one-sided analysis of multi-sided platforms—counting costs without crediting offsetting benefits—that will mismeasure welfare for firms such as Google, Meta, Apple, Amazon, and the payment networks at issue in Amex. Extending liability to labor-market monopsony codifies an unsettled theory under an open-ended, deterrence-maximizing standard. Replacing the consumer welfare standard with a multi-objective declaration protecting “all trade participants” and broader social interests deprives courts of a coherent limiting principle.

The bill also creates strong incentives for strategic litigation. Broad liability, low analytical thresholds, treble damages, and a private right of action invite suits aimed at extracting settlements through defense costs. The likely results—higher prices, reduced service quality, or constrained business practices—benefit litigating rivals while harming consumers.

AB 1776’s reach extends beyond California. Firms serving California through digital channels cannot feasibly maintain California-specific business practices. As a result, the bill’s lower standards would set de facto national rules. That extraterritorial effect raises unresolved dormant Commerce Clause questions the Legislature has not addressed.

The interaction of AB 1776’s interpretive mandates with the Cartwright Act’s criminal penalties presents additional due-process concerns. An instruction to construe liability broadly and maximize deterrence conflicts with the rule of lenity and heightens vagueness risks, particularly if applied to single-firm conduct. With the California attorney general signaling a return to criminal antitrust enforcement, these concerns are immediate.

Comparative evidence reinforces these risks. The European Union’s Digital Markets Act—built on similar premises—has, after roughly two years, reduced the seamlessness of digital services for many users without producing measurable increases in competition. New York’s repeated failure to enact a structurally similar bill suggests that proposals departing sharply from federal doctrine face sustained scrutiny.

If the Legislature proceeds with single-firm conduct reforms, it should adopt the following changes:

  • Calibrate deterrence. Replace the mandate to maximize deterrence with a directive to calibrate enforcement to identified harms, consistent with the error-cost framework and due-process constraints.
  • Restore recoupment. Require proof of recoupment in predatory-pricing cases, consistent with Brooke Group, to preserve the distinction between competition and predation.
  • Permit cross-market balancing. Allow courts to assess harms and benefits across both sides of multi-sided platforms, consistent with Amex.
  • Require market-power thresholds. Tie liability to demonstrable market power, especially for labor-market claims where measurement remains unsettled.
  • Retain the consumer welfare standard. Use consumer welfare as the organizing principle to provide a clear limiting rule.
  • Address extraterritorial effects. Evaluate dormant Commerce Clause implications and limit the statute to conduct with substantial effects in California.
  • Commission independent economic analysis. Assess the bill’s macroeconomic effects on businesses, workers, and consumers, including nationwide spillovers.
  • Exclude single-firm conduct from criminal liability. Reserve criminal enforcement for per se unlawful collusion that provides clear notice.

AB 1776 is not a marginal adjustment. It represents a comprehensive departure from established antitrust doctrine. Any reform should preserve the analytical tools that distinguish harmful conduct from competition on the merits and should align enforcement with both economic evidence and constitutional constraints.

[1] Cal. Assemb. B. 1776, 2025–2026 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2025).

[2] Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16700–16770.

[3] State enforcers may sue under all three statutes. Private plaintiffs may sue under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26, but not under the FTC Act, which only the Federal Trade Commission may enforce. State attorneys general may bring parens patriae actions for Sherman Act violations under § 4C of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15c. Although the Clayton Act often targets concerted conduct—most notably merger review under § 7—it also reaches certain unilateral conduct. The Robinson-Patman Act, codified as an amendment to the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13, governs some forms of unilateral price discrimination. Whatever one thinks of Robinson-Patman as a policy matter, it remains relevant to assessing whether any gap exists in the law governing single-firm conduct that A.B. 1776 would fill.

[4] 15 U.S.C. § 2.

[5] See Note, Antitrust Federalism, Preemption, and Judge-Made Law, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 2557 (2020).

[6] Thomas Greene, Robert C. Fellmeth, Thomas A. Papageorge & Kathleen J. Tuttle, A Century of Government Antitrust Enforcement Under the Cartwright Act, 17 Antitrust & Unfair Comp. L. Sec. St. B. Cal. 173 (2008).

[7] Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 920 (Cal. 1985).

[8] See Asahi Kasei Pharma Corp. v. Cotherix, Inc., 204 Cal. App. 4th 1, 8 (2012); Flagship Theaters of Palm Desert LLC v. Century Theaters, Inc., 198 Cal. App. 4th 1366, 1386 (2011); Freehand Corp. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1185 (N.D. Cal. 2012).

[9] See Cal. Law Revision Comm’n, Tentative Recommendation: Antitrust Law: Single Firm Conduct (Dec. 2025), https://clrc.ca.gov/pub/Misc-Report/TR-B750.pdf (hereinafter CLRC Recommendation), at 4 (“At a minimum, adopting state law would allow such matters to proceed under state law, even if litigated in federal court.”), 7 (“Vertical integration in major California industries, along with the scale of certain digital platforms, presents competitive challenges not anticipated by the original antitrust drafters.”), 15 n.122 (“Since enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, most consumer Cartwright Act class actions have proceeded in federal court. This shift has produced several side effects, including a tendency among federal judges to conflate Cartwright claims with federal antitrust claims, treating them as effectively identical even when they are not.”).

[10] CLRC Recommendation, supra note 9, at 13.

[11] CLRC Recommendation, supra note 9, at 15.

[12] Geoffrey A. Manne, Dirk Auer, Brian Albrecht & Lazar Radic, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ., Comments on Memorandum 2025-21 on the Draft Language for Single-Firm Conduct Provision (May 23, 2025), https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/CLRC-Comments.pdf (hereinafter ICLE 2025 CLRC Comments).

[13] CLRC Recommendation, supra note 9.

[14] Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 2–4 (1984).

[15] False negatives may occasionally produce precedent, but they more often arise without enforcement and thus without comparable precedential effect.

[16] ICLE 2025 CLRC Comments, supra note 12; Geoffrey A. Manne & Dirk Auer, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ., Against the “Europeanization” of California’s Antitrust Law: Comments of the International Center for Law & Economics on the Single-Firm Conduct Expert Report (2024), https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Comments-of-the-International-Center-for-Law-California-Law-Revision-Commission-Single-Firm-Conduct.pdf; Geoffrey A. Manne, Dirk Auer & Brian Albrecht, California’s Ill-Advised Turn Toward Europeanized Theories of Harm for Single-Firm Conduct, CPI Antitrust Chron. (June 2025), https://www.pymnts.com/cpi-posts/californias-ill-advised-turn-toward-europeanized-theories-of-harm-for-single-firm-conduct.

[17] CLRC Recommendation, supra note 9, at 19 (“Indicators of anticompetitive intent vary by circumstance, and rigid rules that demand specific fact patterns can unduly restrict enforcement.”).

[18] CLRC Recommendation, supra note 9, at 9, 11.

[19] ICLE 2024 CLRC Comments, supra note 16.

[20] Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (emphasis in original).

[21] Price reductions—always valuable to consumers—often harm less efficient competitors, which may be unable to match the better deal.

[22] Geoffrey A. Manne, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ., Understanding Concentration and Competition: Implications for California’s Antitrust Policy, Presentation Before the Cal. Law Revision Comm’n (Aug. 15, 2024), https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Manne-CLRC-presentation-2024-08-15.pdf.

[23] Gerard Hoberg & Gordon M. Phillips, Scope, Scale and Concentration: The 21st Century Firm (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 30672, 2022), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w30672/w30672.pdf.

[24] C. Lanier Benkard, Ali Yurukoglu & Anthony Lee Zhang, Concentration in Product Markets (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 28745, 2021), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w28745/w28745.pdf.

[25] Manne, supra note 22.

[26] Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979).

[27] Cal. Assemb. B. 1776, § 16730 (Cal. 2025).

[28] ICLE 2025 CLRC Comments, supra note 12; Manne, Auer & Albrecht, supra note 16.

[29] Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).

[30] Id. at 224.

[31] Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983).

[32] ICLE 2025 CLRC Comments, supra note 12; Manne, Auer & Albrecht, supra note 16.

[33] U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act 51 (2008), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2009/05/11/236681.pdf.

[34] Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 585 U.S. 529 (2018).

[35] Id. at 2278.

[36] Id. at 2278, 2287.

[37] Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, 130 Yale L.J. 1952 (2021).

[38] ICLE 2025 CLRC Comments, supra note 12; Manne, Auer & Albrecht, supra note 16.

[39] CLRC Recommendation, supra note 9, at 20.

[40] ICLE 2025 CLRC Comments, supra note 12.

[41] ICLE 2024 CLRC Comments, supra note 16.

[42] Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints: Empirical Evidence and Public Policy, in Handbook of Antitrust Economics 391 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008).

[43] ICLE 2024 CLRC Comments, supra note 16, citing James C. Cooper, Luke M. Froeb, Dan O’Brien & Michael G. Vita, Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23 Int’l J. Indus. Org. 639 (2005) (surveying the empirical literature and concluding that, although “some studies find evidence consistent with both pro- and anticompetitive effects . . . virtually no studies can claim to have identified instances where vertical practices were likely to have harmed competition”); James Cooper, Luke Froeb, Daniel O’Brien & Michael Vita, Vertical Restrictions and Antitrust Policy: What About the Evidence?, Comp. Pol’y Int’l 45 (2005) (finding that “some studies find evidence consistent with both pro- and anticompetitive effects . . . virtually no studies can claim to have identified instances where vertical practices were likely to have harmed competition”).

[44] Cal. Assemb. B. 1776, §§ 16730(b), 16731(a)(2) (Cal. 2025).

[45] Geoffrey A. Manne, Brian C. Albrecht & Dirk Auer, Labor Monopsony and Antitrust Enforcement: A Distorting Mirror, 74 DePaul L. Rev. 1119 (2025).

[46] See ICLE 2025 CLRC Comments, supra note 12; Manne, Auer & Albrecht, supra note 16.

[47] See ICLE 2025 CLRC Comments, supra note 12; Manne, Auer & Albrecht, supra note 16.

[48] Zoë Cullen, Bobak Pakzad-Hurson & Ricardo Perez-Truglia, Home Sweet Home: How Much Do Employees Value Remote Work?, 115 AEA Papers & Proc. 276 (2025).

[49] See Michael J. Nader, Managing a California Remote Work Policy: Determining Which Laws Apply, Ogletree Deakins: Insights (Apr. 1, 2022), https://ogletree.com/insights-resources/blog-posts/managing-a-california-remote-work-policy-determining-which-laws-apply; Justworks, HR Compliance for Remote-First Companies: Managing HR Compliance Across Remote Teams (2026), https://assets.ctfassets.net/mnc2gcng0j8q/4cMqUT8G5XIzKjNVqXaDEb/6b07b29650b0dcda8f47e8e7f9967bd4/HR_Compliance_for_Remote-First_Companies_-_Guide.pdf (noting that “[s]ome states may create excessive compliance burdens or tax exposure,” leading “companies to exclude them from approved remote work locations”).

[50] Reiter, supra note 26.

[51] Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (“Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury—i.e., injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from what makes the defendant’s conduct unlawful. The injury must reflect the anticompetitive effect of the violation or of conduct the violation made possible.”) (emphasis in original).

[52] Murat C. Mungan & John M. Yun, A Reputational View of Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Standard, 61 Hous. L. Rev. 569 (2024), https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2962&context=facscholar.

[53] United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (“We defined monopoly power as ‘the power to control prices or exclude competition.’ Such power may ordinarily be inferred from a predominant market share.”).

[54] Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); see also California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989).

[55] Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).

[56] Shira Liu, Dormant Commerce Clause: A Potential Brake on State Antitrust Legislation, 33 Competition: J. Antitrust, UCL & Privacy Section 1 (2023) (observing that constitutional uncertainty persists because courts must apply the “notoriously unclear” Pike balancing test to assess whether the nationwide burdens of expansive state antitrust laws—such as those governing mergers or diverging from federal standards—clearly exceed their local benefits).

[57] S. 8700-A, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019), https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/S8700.

[58] See, e.g., S. 933-C, 2021–2022 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021), https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2021/S933; S. 6748, 2023–2024 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2023), https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2023/S6748; S. 335, 2025–2026 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2025), https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2025/S335.

[59] The Bus. Council, S. 6748-B (Gianaris) / A. 10323 (Peoples-Stokes) (May 20, 2024), https://www.bcnys.org/memo/s6748-b-gianaris-a10323-peoples-stokes (reporting that the CLRC’s Single-Firm Conduct Working Group “outright rejected the Twenty First Century Anti-Trust Act and its proposed adoption of vague and undefined legal standards”).

[60] Jared P. Nagley & Helen Cho Eckert, Amending New York’s Donnelly Act: If at First You Don’t Succeed, Try, Try, and Try Again, Nat’l L. Rev. (Jan. 31, 2025), https://natlawreview.com/article/amending-new-yorks-donnelly-act-if-first-you-dont-succeed-try-try-and-try-again.

[61] Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on Contestable and Fair Markets in the Digital Sector and Amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828, 2022 O.J. (L 265) 1, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R1925 (hereinafter Digital Markets Act).

[62] CLRC Recommendation, supra note 9, at 9 (“The Commission considered creating a distinct single-firm conduct framework for firms with significant market power, drawing on EU law prohibiting ‘any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or a substantial part of it.’ The Commission ultimately declined to adopt such an approach, citing concerns about the vagueness and arbitrariness of defining thresholds for substantial market power, the use of differing conduct standards, and the failure of similar efforts in the United States.”).

[63] ICLE 2025 CLRC Comments, supra note 12, at 2–4; Manne, Auer & Albrecht, supra note 16.

[64] Digital Markets Act, supra note 61, arts. 2(1), 3(1)–(2).

[65] Eur. Comm’n, Gatekeepers Under the Digital Markets Act, https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/gatekeepers_en (last visited Apr. 22, 2026).

[66] Digital Markets Act, supra note 61, arts. 5–7 (establishing ex ante obligations for designated gatekeepers without requiring case-by-case effects analysis).

[67] Giuseppe Colangelo, Antitrust Unchained: The EU’s Case Against Self-Preferencing, 72 GRUR Int’l 538, 542–46 (2023); Lazar Radic, Opening the Walled Garden: Global Regulation and the Unbundling of Apple’s Ecosystem, Truth on the Mkt. (Mar. 19, 2026), https://truthonthemarket.com/2026/03/19/opening-the-walled-garden-global-regulation-and-the-unbundling-of-apples-ecosystem (“The MSCA—like the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA)—takes a different approach. It restricts forms of integration precisely where platforms often integrate for efficiency . . . These interventions assume, rather than demonstrate, that platform control is more likely to suppress than enhance competition . . . That assumption sits uneasily with the empirical literature on digital platforms”).

[68] Eur. Ctr. for Int’l Pol. Econ., What About Us? Consumer Response to the Digital Markets Act, Occasional Paper No. 10/2025, at 3 (2025), https://ecipe.org/publications/consumer-response-to-the-digital-markets-act.

[69] Carmelo Cennamo et al., Economic Impact of the Digital Markets Act on European Businesses and the European Economy 5 (CCIA Eur., June 2025), https://www.dmcforum.net/publications/economic-impact-of-the-digital-markets-act-on-european-businesses-and-the-european-economy.

[70] Lazar Radic, Geoffrey A. Manne & Dirk Auer, Regulate for What? A Closer Look at the Rationale and Goals of Digital Competition Regulations, 22 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 201 (2025), https://lawcat.berkeley.edu/record/1312409?v=pdf.

[71] ICLE 2024 CLRC Comments, supra note 16.

[72] David Autor, David Dorn, Lawrence F. Katz, Christina Patterson & John Van Reenen, The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms, 135 Q.J. Econ. 645, 651 (2020) (citations omitted; emphasis added).

[73] 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 358 (George Sharswood ed., 1893).

[74] See S. 763, 2025–2026 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2025).

[75] See, e.g., Niall E. Lynch & Sydney Kirlan-Stout, Criminal Antitrust Enforcement by the California Attorney General: What Can We Expect?, CPI Columns Cartel (Aug. 2024), https://www.pymnts.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Cartel-Column-August-2024-Full.pdf.

[76] See Joseph Matelis & Daniel Richardson, Criminal Enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 36 Antitrust 61, 65 (2022) (“Significantly, no grand jury appears to have returned a criminal Section 2 indictment in more than four decades, and nearly 50 years have passed since a grand jury returned an indictment based solely on a Section 2 charge.”); ABA Section of Antitrust L., Comments in Response to the Antitrust Modernization Commission’s Request for Public Comment on Criminal Penalties 5 (Nov. 14, 2005), https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/public_studies_fr28902/criminal_pdf/051114_ABA_Criminal_Remedies.pdf (“For generations, the Antitrust Division has limited criminal enforcement to hard-core cartel conduct. While not an absolute guarantee against prosecuting other conduct, this practice reflects a long-standing, near-universal consensus that only such conduct warrants criminal prosecution.”).

[77] See Matelis & Richardson, supra note 76, at 66–68.

The Wrong Track: How the Railway Safety Act Risks Derailing Innovation

Executive Summary American freight railroads are safer today than at any point in their history. Accident rates, hazardous-material releases, and employee fatalities have all declined . . .

Executive Summary

American freight railroads are safer today than at any point in their history. Accident rates, hazardous-material releases, and employee fatalities have all declined over the past two decades, driven largely by private investment and innovation.

The Railway Safety Act, introduced after the 2023 East Palestine derailment, would impose prescriptive mandates, including crew-size requirements, federal detector standards, expanded inspections, and accelerated tank-car replacement timelines. These measures assume additional regulation will improve safety.

This issue brief argues the Act is unlikely to do so. It mandates sweeping rulemakings without cost-benefit analysis, relies on rigid requirements that risk locking in current technology, and includes provisions—especially the two-person crew mandate—that lack a clear evidentiary basis. It also expands regulation in ways that dilute focus on the highest-risk operations and may exceed the industry’s capacity to comply.

The costs are substantial. Compliance could reach billions of dollars, while the scale of accident reduction needed to justify those costs is implausible given current trends. Law & economics research further shows that regulatory accumulation in freight transportation raises costs, reduces output, and weakens innovation-driven growth.

A better approach is performance-based regulation: set measurable safety targets and allow firms flexibility in how to achieve them. Policymakers should preserve voluntary industry initiatives and support smaller carriers through targeted funding.

Freight rail safety is improving. The priority should be to sustain that progress, not impose mandates that risk undermining it.

I.          Introduction: A Safer Industry Meets Rising Regulatory Pressure

American freight railroads are safer today than at any point in their history. Over the past two decades, the train accident rate per million train-miles has fallen by more than 38%,[1] h hazardous-materials train accident rates have declined by at least 61%,[2] and employee on-duty fatalities reached an all-time low of seven in 2023.[3] Bureau of Labor Statistics injury-rate data place rail transportation squarely in the middle of the American industrial landscape—comparable to general freight trucking and retail trade, and well below air transportation, warehousing, and urban transit.[4] Freight rail remains one of the safest modes of surface freight transport in the United States, and the gap continues to widen.

Political demand for sweeping new railroad safety mandates has nevertheless surged. The February 2023 derailment of Norfolk Southern Train 32N in East Palestine, Ohio—caused by an overheated wheel bearing[5] —pushed rail safety to the center of public debate. Congress responded by introducing and reintroducing the Railway Safety Act across two successive sessions.[6]

This issue brief argues that the proposed Railway Safety Act, despite its rhetorical appeal, suffers from three fundamental deficiencies. First, it mandates sweeping federal rulemakings without requiring cost-benefit analysis, in tension with Executive Order 14192’s deregulatory framework.[7] Second, its prescriptive mandates risk locking in current technology and discouraging the innovation that has driven the industry’s safety gains. Third, several prominent provisions—particularly the two-person crew mandate—appear driven less by safety evidence than by political economy concerns. A better approach would recognize the industry’s substantial safety gains and avoid layering on regulations that do not address identifiable problems. Short of that, policymakers should adopt performance-based regulation that sets measurable safety targets while preserving flexibility to innovate.

The Railway Safety Act also offers a useful case study in how political-economy dynamics can produce net-harmful regulation. A high-profile incident generated intense public demand for action. Concentrated interest groups then shaped the legislative response, while policymakers largely overlooked a factual record of improving safety and ongoing innovation. The result is a bill that would likely impose billions in compliance costs without demonstrated safety benefits, even as the industry’s baseline trajectory remains positive.

This pattern is not unique to rail policy. It reflects a broader regulatory tendency: policymakers confronting complex, technical systems often focus on prescriptive solutions crafted under political pressure, rather than evaluating how those mandates may displace more effective, innovation-preserving alternatives. Error-cost analysis and regulatory forbearance provide a more reliable framework for achieving public-interest goals without foreclosing beneficial market adaptation.

Recent academic work underscores the stakes. Bentley Coffey, Patrick McLaughlin, and Pietro Peretto show in a multi-industry endogenous-growth model that per-unit transportation costs constrain innovation-driven growth; policies that raise those costs—including cumulative regulation—can dampen the translation of manufacturing productivity gains into aggregate output.[8] Their companion empirical paper finds that a 5% increase in federal regulatory restrictions on a freight transportation mode raises unit costs by 0.8–2.3% and reduces quantities shipped by 1.4–4.1%, with effects that persist and compound over time.[9] In this context, the Railway Safety Act is likely to do more harm than good.

II.          The Railway Safety Act: Structure, Mandates, and Tensions

The Railway Safety Act first appeared as S. 576 in March 2023, introduced by Sen. Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio) in the immediate aftermath of the East Palestine derailment. The Senate Commerce Committee approved the bill in May 2023, but it never reached the floor during the 118th Congress.[10] Lawmakers reintroduced it in the House in February 2025 (H.R. 928) and again in the Senate on Feb. 24, 2026 (S. 3903), led by Sen. Jon Husted (R-Ohio) and cosponsored by Sens. Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.), Roger Marshall (R-Kan.), Eric Schmitt (R-Mo.), Tammy Baldwin (D-Wis.), Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.), Bernie Moreno (R-Ohio), and John Fetterman (D-Pa.).[11]

The bill’s core provisions include a mandatory two-person crew for all Class I freight trains; a federal framework governing the spacing, maintenance, sensitivity, and data protocols for wayside defect-detection systems; an expanded definition of “high-hazard trains” (HHT) using a five-car threshold for flammable gases; accelerated tank-car retrofit and phaseout timelines; expanded pre-departure and locomotive inspection requirements; state notification requirements for hazardous-material movements; and higher civil penalties.[12]

These mandates sit uneasily alongside the current administration’s deregulatory framework. Executive Order 14192, issued Jan. 31, 2025, directs agencies to identify at least 10 existing regulations for repeal for every new rule they propose.[13] For fiscal year 2025, the order further requires that the total incremental cost of all new regulations be “significantly less than zero.”[14]

An executive order does not bind Congress, but it highlights a clear policy divide. The administration has articulated a pro-growth, deregulatory agenda, while some congressional constituencies continue to favor prescriptive mandates. That tension raises a central question: whether additional command-and-control safety rules make sense when, as discussed infra, the industry’s safety record continues to improve under the current framework.

The Railway Safety Act would require the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to issue a series of new rules with significant compliance costs. This is precisely the type of regulatory expansion Executive Order 14192 seeks to prevent. The interaction between the two is not merely theoretical. If the FRA attempted to comply with both simultaneously, it would need to repeal a substantial number of existing rules and demonstrate a net reduction in regulatory costs—an implausible outcome given the scope of the Act’s mandates.

Much of the political momentum behind the Railway Safety Act rests on the perception that train derailments are a growing crisis. A commonly cited comparison notes more than 1,300 U.S. derailments in 2019, compared with just 73 in the European Union, even though EU rail traffic spans more than five times as many rail-kilometers.[15] That comparison obscures more than it reveals.

First, roughly 60% of U.S. derailments occur in rail yards at very low speeds—the functional equivalent of parking-lot fender benders.[16] Mainline derailments, which pose the greatest risk to public safety, remain at historic lows. Second, the EU uses different reporting methodologies, emphasizing rates per billion train-kilometers and often excluding comparable low-severity yard incidents. Third, the underlying systems differ fundamentally. The U.S. network is freight-dominant and moves far more tonnage per rail-kilometer, while European systems are overwhelmingly passenger-oriented. Direct comparisons between the two are not meaningful.

The long-term trend is clear. Federal Railroad Administration data show equipment-caused train accidents have declined 38% since 2005,[17] and axle- and bearing-related accidents have fallen roughly 81% since the early 1980s. The agency attributes much of this progress to the widespread adoption of wayside hot-bearing detectors and related monitoring technologies.[18] These gains have occurred under the existing regulatory framework. Any policy change should therefore account for how new mandates might disrupt the innovation that produced them.

III.          Private Incentives and Prescriptive Safety Regulation

Prescriptive safety regulation typically rests on a familiar market-failure story: firms underinvest in safety because they do not fully internalize the social costs of accidents, and government mandates must close the gap. The Railway Safety Act adopts that logic. The freight rail industry’s response after East Palestine, however, complicates the narrative.

Within months of the derailment, Class I railroads deployed roughly 1,000 additional wayside detectors, lowered bearing-temperature alert thresholds, adopted industry-wide predictive analytics, and expanded first-responder access to real-time railcar data—investments that outpaced any plausible federal rulemaking.[19] These actions reflect strong private incentives: liability exposure, reputational capital, network reliability, and the economics of asset preservation. In this environment, the case for additional prescriptive regulation weakens. The proposed mandates would largely codify existing practices, but at higher cost and with less flexibility.

The industry has also committed to developing a shared standard for bearing-trending analysis—an algorithmic approach that identifies degradation patterns before absolute temperature thresholds trigger alerts.[20] This trajectory suggests that the Act does not correct a market failure. It instead layers compliance costs onto an already-functioning incentive structure, with effects that extend beyond the industry’s balance sheet.

The Minnesota Wayside Detector System Study, a legislatively mandated assessment completed in March 2026, reinforces this point.[21] The study surveys roughly five wayside-detection technologies deployed on Minnesota’s rail system and 11 additional detector types in use across North America, including hot-bearing detectors, wheel-impact load detectors, acoustic bearing detectors, dragging-equipment detectors, and machine-vision inspection portals. It also examines emerging systems such as distributed fiber-optic sensing and light detection and ranging (LiDAR)-based infrastructure monitoring.[22]

The study’s cost-benefit analysis proves especially revealing. It models three detector-spacing scenarios—10, 15, and 20 miles—applied statewide to nearly 1,000 miles of Class II and Class III track. In each case, recurring operating costs exceed quantified safety benefits, producing a negative cumulative net impact over a 10-year horizon.[23] Because a state legislature commissioned the study, not the industry, its findings carry particular weight. They undermine the premise that federally mandated detector standards would generate net benefits, especially for smaller carriers.

Federal Railroad Administration inspections point in the same direction. In January 2024, the FRA published its High-Hazard Flammable Train Route Assessment, summarizing inspections of more than 2,600 wayside detectors across 28 railroads. Inspectors found that railroads generally monitored detector performance closely, though they identified issues at roughly 120 sites, including calibration drift and inverted transducers.[24] The broader lesson is straightforward: voluntary industry standards often precede federal regulation, not the reverse, because firms can adapt more quickly than regulators.

IV.          Structural and Analytical Defects in the Railway Safety Act

Even setting aside the political-economy dynamics discussed above, the Railway Safety Act suffers from a set of analytical and structural defects that warrant separate attention. Its core provisions impose prescriptive, uniform mandates rather than risk-weighted, performance-based approaches that an error-cost framework would favor. The bill also omits the cost-benefit discipline that typically constrains major rulemakings. Several key terms—from the five-car threshold in the expanded high-hazard-train definition to fixed detector-spacing and two-person-crew requirements—appear to reflect negotiated compromises rather than empirical evidence about where risk actually concentrates.

These design choices have concrete consequences. They direct safety capital toward specifications likely to become obsolete before regulators finalize implementing rules. They shield incumbent detection technologies from competition by next-generation alternatives. They also impose fixed compliance costs on smaller carriers that do not track marginal risk on their networks. The result is a regulatory regime that treats a dynamic engineering problem as a static checklist—one that predictably produces less safety, less innovation, and more concentrated harm among the least well-resourced participants than the performance-based alternatives discussed above.

A.             The Absence of Cost-Benefit Constraints

The most fundamental objection to the Act is structural. It mandates sweeping DOT rulemakings without requiring the agency to show that each rule’s benefits justify its costs. This approach departs from the longstanding cost-benefit framework set out in OMB Circular A-4—reinstated in its 2003 form by Executive Order 14192—which requires rigorous analysis for economically significant regulations.[25] More importantly, the Act’s prescriptive mandates would limit the Federal Railroad Administration’s ability to make evidence-based regulatory decisions. Even if the agency’s own analysis shows that a requirement’s costs exceed its safety benefits, the statute would require the agency to proceed.

Available estimates suggest that the compliance burden would run into the billions over a decade. One analysis places the cost of the detector-spacing provision alone between $1.1 billion and $2.2 billion.[26] The 2008 Positive Train Control mandate—a single, comparable requirement—cost U.S. freight railroads roughly $10 billion to $15 billion over its implementation period.[27] The Act would layer multiple additional mandates on top of that baseline, with cumulative costs that could rival or exceed the PTC experience.

To justify expenditures of that magnitude, proponents would need to show that the Act prevents a comparable volume of accidents. Before adopting such costly measures, Congress should at least direct the Congressional Research Service or the FRA to estimate the likely compliance burden.

Empirical benchmarks highlight the gap. An analysis of FRA accident data commissioned by the North Carolina Department of Transportation finds that the average property-damage cost of a rail incident is about $122,000 in 2020 dollars.[28] Even high-severity derailments—those involving roughly 40 or more loaded freight cars—reach only about $2.6 million.[29]

A simple break-even calculation illustrates the mismatch. Assume total compliance costs comparable to Positive Train Control—about $10 billion over a decade. Using the $122,000 average property-damage figure, the Act would need to prevent roughly 80,000 incidents to cover its costs. Even valuing each prevented event at $2.6 million, the Act would still need to prevent nearly 4,000 severe derailments over the same period. Neither scenario is plausible. Mainline derailments on Class I railroads number in the low hundreds each year, and the long-term trend continues to decline. No realistic set of prescriptive mandates could reduce incidents at the scale required to satisfy this cost-benefit threshold.

The empirical literature reinforces these concerns. Recent work finds that regulatory accumulation in freight transportation suppresses investment in productivity-enhancing innovation: a 5% increase in regulatory restrictions raises unit shipping costs by 0.8–2.3% and reduces freight volumes by 1.4–4.1%, with effects that compound over time.[30] These are not one-time adjustment costs; they represent persistent constraints on economic growth. The broader literature reaches similar conclusions. One estimate finds that federal regulation added since 1949 reduced annual U.S. output growth by about one percentage point on average, resulting in a 28% reduction in output by 2005.[31]

B.             Misaligned Risk Targeting in Core Provisions

Expanding the HHT definition to include flammable gas may respond to East Palestine. The Act’s five-car threshold, however—far below the existing standard of 20 or more continuous tank cars or 35 total—rests on no clear risk assessment and would sweep a far larger set of trains into heightened regulation.[32] Existing voluntary “Key Train” practices, codified in Circular OT-55-R, already impose 50-mph speed limits and siding requirements on the highest-risk movements, including those carrying toxic-inhalation-hazard materials, large volumes of hazmat, or spent nuclear fuel.[33] Lowering the threshold risks shifting attention away from genuinely high-risk operations toward routine freight traffic, imposing costs without corresponding safety gains.

The Act’s expanded locomotive and pre-departure inspection requirements reflect a prescriptive, process-oriented approach. They dictate how railroads must inspect equipment rather than what safety outcomes they must achieve. Nothing in the record suggests that more manual inspections would have prevented the East Palestine derailment, which resulted from a bearing failure that developed between automated detector readings, not from an inspection lapse.[34]

C.             Prescriptive Design and Innovation Suppression

The regulatory-design literature has long identified the limits of this approach. Cary Coglianese and David Lazer distinguish among technology-based regulation, which specifies means; performance-based regulation, which specifies ends; and management-based regulation, which requires firms to design their own safety systems to a specified vision.[35] Performance-based and management-based approaches generally outperform prescriptive mandates because they preserve flexibility and encourage efficient solutions. Railroads have already deployed acoustic bearing detectors, machine-vision portals, and trending-analysis algorithms. But the Federal Railroad Administration’s existing prescriptive framework has not adapted to allow these technologies to satisfy regulatory requirements, effectively reducing the return on safety innovation and likely discouraging further investment.

The Act’s provisions establishing federal standards for detector thresholds, spacing, and data protocols pose a particular risk to innovation. The relevant technology remains in flux. The Minnesota study identifies five wayside-detector types currently deployed in the state, 11 additional types in use elsewhere in North America, and a set of emerging technologies—including distributed fiber-optic sensing for landslide and rockfall detection, light detection and ranging (LiDAR)-based infrastructure monitoring, and IoT-enabled remote-condition systems—many still in pilot-project phases.[36] A federal rule written today would codify 2026-era technology. Given the Federal Railroad Administration’s multi-year rulemaking timelines, the resulting standards could become obsolete before they take effect.

Positive Train Control offers a cautionary example. Congress mandated PTC in 2008, locking in a technological specification before the system had fully matured. Implementation ultimately cost the industry roughly $10 billion to $15 billion and required repeated statutory deadline extensions.[37] The mandate imposed substantial costs and delays while foreclosing potentially superior alternatives.[38] The Act’s detector and tank-car provisions risk repeating that pattern.

Coffey, McLaughlin, and Peretto’s growth model explains why this matters beyond railroads. In their framework, transportation is an integral component of production, and per-unit transportation costs set a lower bound on market prices and returns to innovation. When prescriptive mandates raise those costs, they do more than reallocate resources within the transportation sector; they weaken the innovation-growth feedback loop across the broader economy.[39] Technology-freezing regulation in freight rail thus carries macroeconomic consequences.

D.            Tank Car Mandates and Capacity Constraints

Section 110 illustrates similar design flaws. It accelerates the phaseout of older-generation tank cars in certain Class 3 flammable-liquid service, setting a primary deadline of Dec. 31, 2027, with a one-year fallback to Dec. 31, 2028 if the secretary determines that manufacturing or retrofit capacity is insufficient. Section 110(b) directs the secretary to remove or revise any conflicting deadlines immediately, and Section 110(d) requires a Government Accountability Office (GAO) review of manufacturing and retrofit capacity within 18 months of enactment.

This acceleration largely duplicates a transition already in progress. Bureau of Transportation Statistics data show that compliance with DOT-117 standards rose from 56% in 2021 to 59% in 2022, with about 6,914 additional cars built or retrofitted in 2023—a trajectory that would converge on the current statutory deadline of May 1, 2029 without further intervention.[40] At most, the Act advances compliance by roughly 17 months. Section 110(b)’s directive to revise conflicting deadlines also risks creating a regulatory gap by voiding existing schedules before new ones take effect, introducing uncertainty into fleet planning and capital investment.

Capacity constraints compound the problem. The Bureau of Transportation Statistics reports that certified facilities produced or retrofitted about 6,914 tank cars in 2022, reflecting the system’s practical annual throughput.[41] Compressing the deadline to December 2027 would require the industry to process the remaining noncompliant fleet at a pace well above demonstrated capacity. If that compression leads to equipment shortages or service disruptions, it would impose costs on shippers and consumers without clear incremental safety benefits, given that safer tank-car designs are already entering the fleet through market-driven replacement.[42]

E.              The Two-Person Crew Mandate

The Act’s two-person crew mandate presents a similar evidentiary gap. The Federal Railroad Administration concluded in 2019 that it “cannot provide reliable or conclusive statistical data” on whether one-person crews are safer or less safe than multiple-person crews.[43] The agency reversed course in its 2024 final rule without introducing new statistical evidence, relying instead on qualitative judgments about redundancy.[44] The mandate would override collective-bargaining agreements and eliminate the operational flexibility railroads use to tailor staffing to route conditions, traffic density, and available technology. Its primary effect would be to preserve employment levels—a legitimate policy goal in some contexts, but one better addressed through collective bargaining than through safety regulation.

V.          A Performance-Based Alternative

If prescriptive mandates are the wrong tool, what should replace them? The regulatory-design literature and the railroad industry’s recent experience point to a performance-based approach.

First, the Federal Railroad Administration should adopt performance-based regulation. Instead of prescribing detector spacing, crew size, and inspection procedures, the agency should set measurable safety targets—derailments per million train-miles, hazmat release rates, bearing-failure rates—and allow railroads to determine how best to achieve them. Marc Scribner finds the FRA has been “highly prescriptive” and “slow to adopt performance-based alternatives,” and calls for a systematic shift toward outcome-oriented regulation.[45]

First, the Federal Railroad Administration should adopt performance-based regulation. Instead of prescribing detector spacing, crew size, and inspection procedures, the agency should set measurable safety targets—derailments per million train-miles, hazmat release rates, bearing-failure rates—and allow railroads to determine how best to achieve them. Marc Scribner finds the FRA has been “highly prescriptive” and “slow to adopt performance-based alternatives,” and calls for a systematic shift toward outcome-oriented regulation.

Third, smaller carriers need targeted support, not unfunded mandates. The Minnesota study shows that detector mandates would impose net losses on rural short-line railroads. Existing programs—the Consolidated Rail Infrastructure and Safety Improvements (CRISI) Program, Infrastructure for Rebuilding America (INFRA) grants, and state initiatives such as Minnesota’s Short Line Infrastructure Maintenance Tax Credit—can help smaller carriers adopt safety technologies at a pace consistent with their financial capacity.[46]

Finally, the macroeconomic evidence supports regulatory restraint. Coffey, McLaughlin, and Peretto find that regulatory accumulation in freight transportation reduces labor, fuel, and capital productivity across all major freight modes. Their counterfactual simulations show that these costs do not remain within the regulated firms; they propagate through the supply chain, raising prices, reducing shipment volumes, and weakening the innovation-driven growth process. Performance-based regulation that limits prescriptive rule accumulation, preserves investment incentives, and allows railroads to allocate resources toward the highest-return safety technologies would advance both safety and economic growth.

VI.          Conclusion

The Railway Safety Act responds to a real tragedy. But sound regulatory design requires more than urgency and good intentions. The Act imposes sweeping prescriptive mandates without cost-benefit justification, in tension with Executive Order 14192’s deregulatory framework. It targets risks imprecisely, substitutes uniform rules for evidence-based prioritization, and would require the Federal Railroad Administration to proceed with rulemakings even where costs exceed benefits.

These design flaws carry predictable consequences. The Act risks locking in current-generation technology, discouraging the innovation that has driven decades of safety gains, and imposing fixed compliance costs that fall hardest on smaller carriers. It would layer billions of dollars in new mandates onto an industry where accident rates, hazmat releases, and equipment-related failures have all declined over time under the existing framework. Its most visible provision—the two-person crew mandate—lacks a clear evidentiary basis and reflects political compromise more than demonstrated safety need.

The broader lesson extends beyond rail policy. Prescriptive, command-and-control regulation often treats dynamic engineering and operational problems as static compliance exercises. In doing so, it can displace more effective, innovation-preserving approaches while introducing economy-wide costs. As the law & economics literature shows, regulatory accumulation in freight transportation raises per-unit costs, suppresses productivity, and weakens the innovation-growth process that underpins long-run economic performance.

A better approach is available. Performance-based regulation would set clear, measurable safety targets—such as derailments per million train-miles or hazmat release rates—while allowing railroads to determine how best to meet them. Policymakers should preserve the voluntary, industry-led initiatives that have already accelerated safety improvements, continue to rely on the FRA’s collaborative advisory process, and provide targeted support to smaller carriers through existing funding programs. This framework aligns incentives, encourages technological progress, and directs resources toward the highest-return safety investments.

Freight rail safety is improving. The central policy challenge is not to react reflexively to high-profile incidents, but to sustain and accelerate that progress. The Railway Safety Act, as currently structured, risks doing the opposite—imposing large, certain costs in pursuit of uncertain and unquantified benefits.

[1] Fed. R.R. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Train Accident (Not at Highway-Rail Crossings) Summary, https://data.transportation.gov/stories/s/dsuf-xcni (last visited May 1, 2026) (showing incidents fell from 4.139 per million miles in 2005 to 2.554 in 2025).

[2] Fed. R.R. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Rail Safety Overview Report (1.12), https://data.transportation.gov/stories/s/Rail-Safety-Overview-Report-1-12-/dsuf-xcni (last visited May 1, 2026) (reporting 39 hazmat releases in 2005 and 15 in 2025); see also Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., Press Release, FRA 2023 Data Affirms Rail’s Strong, Sustained Safety Record (Mar. 4, 2024), https://www.aar.org/news/fra-2023-data-affirms-rails-strong-sustained-safety-record (claiming a roughly 75% reduction based on FRA data not currently available).

[3] Fed. R.R. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Employee on Duty Fatalities, Injuries, and Illnesses, https://data.transportation.gov/stories/s/Employee-on-Duty-Fatalities-Injuries-and-Illnesses/khzx-vxu4 (last visited Apr. 24, 2026) (showing a 68% decline since 2005).

[4] Bureau of Lab. Stats., U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Table 1: Incidence Rates of Nonfatal Occupational Injuries and Illnesses by Industry and Case Type, 2024, https://www.bls.gov/iif/nonfatal-injuries-and-illnesses-tables/table-1-injury-and-illness-rates-by-industry-2024-national.htm (last visited May 1, 2026) (reporting incidence rates per 100 full-time workers: rail transportation (3.4), general freight trucking (3.1), retail trade (3.0), construction (2.2), grocery stores (4.1), air transportation (6.5), urban transit systems (6.1), and warehousing and storage (4.8)).

[5] Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., Norfolk Southern Railway Derailment with Subsequent Hazardous Material Release and Fires, East Palestine, Ohio (Feb. 3, 2023), NTSB/RIR-24/05, https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RIR2405%20CORRECTED.pdf.

[6] Railway Safety Act of 2023, S. 576, 118th Cong. (2023); Railway Safety Act of 2025, H.R. 928, 119th Cong. (2025); Railway Safety Act of 2026, S. 3903, 119th Cong. (2026); see also Press Release, Sen. Maria Cantwell, Cantwell, Husted, Colleagues Reintroduce Bipartisan Railway Safety Act (Feb. 24, 2026), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2026/2/cantwell-husted-colleagues-reintroduce-bipartisan-railway-safety-act.

[7] Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation, Exec. Order No. 14,192, 90 Fed. Reg. 9,065 (Feb. 6, 2025).

[8] Bentley Coffey, Patrick A. McLaughlin & Pietro F. Peretto, Transportation, Innovation and Growth (Working Paper, Apr. 9, 2026), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6444398.

[9] Bentley Coffey, Patrick A. McLaughlin & Pietro F. Peretto, Regulation and the Cost of Moving Goods (Hoover Inst. Econ. Working Paper, Mar. 20, 2026), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/26108-McLaughlin-Coffey-Peretto.pdf.

[10] S. 576, 118th Cong. (2023); see also Cong. Budget Off., Cost Estimate for S. 576 (Sept. 2023), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59947.

[11] H.R. 928, 119th Cong. (2025); S. 3903, 119th Cong. (2026).

[12] S. 3903, 119th Cong. §§ 102–109 (2026).

[13] Exec. Order No. 14,192, § 3, 90 Fed. Reg. at 9,065, supra note 7.

[14] Id. § 3(b).

[15] See Alex N. Press, As Rail Executives Grow Richer, Train Derailments Have Become Commonplace, Jacobin (Feb. 2023), https://jacobin.com/2023/02/train-derailments-east-palestine-norfolk-southern-profits; see also Gregory Labelle, Letter: Does the U.S. Even Care About Rail Safety? The Numbers Suggest It Doesn’t, LehighValleyLive.com (Apr. 11, 2023), https://www.lehighvalleylive.com/opinion/2023/04/does-the-us-even-care-about-rail-safety-the-numbers-suggest-it-doesnt-letter.html. U.S. figures derive from FRA Form 6180.54 accident/incident data; see Fed. R.R. Admin., Off. of Safety Analysis, Train Accidents and Rates, https://safetydata.fra.dot.gov/officeofsafety/publicsite/query/TrainAccidentsFYCYWithRates.aspx. EU figures derive from Eurostat; see Eurostat, Railway Safety Statistics in the EU, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Railway_safety_statistics_in_the_EU.

[16] Fed. R.R. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Accident/Incident Data (2019), https://data.transportation.gov/stories/s/2ju5-8zxb (showing 784 yard derailments out of 1,344 total derailments in 2019).

[17] Fed. R.R. Admin., supra note 2.

[18] Fed. R.R. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Off. of Rsch., Dev. & Tech., An Implementation Guide for Wayside Detector Systems (2019), https://railroads.dot.gov/elibrary/implementation-guide-wayside-detector-systems.

[19] See Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., Freight Railroads Announce Key Safety Measures in Drive to Zero Accidents (Mar. 2023), https://www.aar.org/news/freight-railroads-announce-key-safety-measures-in-drive-to-zero-accidents (announcing approximately 1,000 additional hot-bearing detectors, a 170°F alert threshold, and expanded trending analysis); Ian Jefferies, Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., Statement for the Record Before the Subcomm. on R.Rs., Pipelines & Hazardous Materials, H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure 3 (July 23, 2024), https://www.congress.gov/event/118th-congress/house-event/LC73449/text [hereinafter Jefferies Statement] (citing FRA and AAR data and describing implementation of voluntary commitments, including expansion of AskRail to more than 2.3 million first responders); Fed. R.R. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Safety Advisory 2023-01: Evaluation of Policies and Procedures Related to the Use and Maintenance of Hot Bearing Wayside Detectors, 88 Fed. Reg. 13,376 (Mar. 3, 2023); see also Cong. Rsch. Serv., East Palestine, OH, Train Derailment and Hazardous Materials Shipment by Rail: Frequently Asked Questions, R47435 (2024).

[20] CPCS Transcom for Minn. Dep’t of Transp., 2025 Wayside Detector System Study (2026), https://www.lrl.mn.gov/docs/2026/mandated/260603.pdf [hereinafter MnDOT CPCS Report]; see also Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., Freight Railroads Announce Key Safety Measures in Drive to Zero Accidents (Mar. 2023), https://www.aar.org/news/freight-railroads-announce-key-safety-measures-in-drive-to-zero-accidents.

[21] MnDOT CPCS Report, supra note 20.

[22] Id. §§ 2.1, 3.1 (cataloguing 16 distinct wayside detector technologies); id. at 34 (describing distributed fiber-optic sensing); id. (describing light detection and ranging (LiDAR)).

[23] MnDOT CPCS Report, supra note 20, ch. 6, Economic and Industry Impacts, at 53–58 (modeling 10-year cost-benefit scenarios at 10-, 15-, and 20-mile detector spacing on Class II and III track and finding negative cumulative net impacts across all scenarios).

[24] Fed. R.R. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., High-Hazard Flammable Train Route Assessment & Legacy Tank Car Focused Inspection Program: Summary Report (Jan. 22, 2024), https://railroads.fra.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.gov/files/2024-01/HRA%20Final%20Report_01.22.24.pdf.

[25] Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation, supra note 7; Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Circular A-4 (2003).

[26] Michael F. Gorman, Rail Safety Policy After East Palestine, Regulation (Summer 2023), https://www.cato.org/regulation/summer-2023/rail-safety-policy-after-east-palestine.

[27] Cong. Rsch. Serv., Positive Train Control (PTC): Overview and Policy Issues, R42637 (2018), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R42637; see also Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., Positive Train Control, https://www.aar.org/issue/positive-train-control (estimating industry PTC investment at approximately $15 billion).

[28] Steven Bert et al., The Comprehensive Cost of Rail Incidents in North Carolina, Report No. FHWA/NC/2020-44, at 7 & app. fig. 45, at A-19 (Inst. for Transp. Rsch. & Educ., N.C. State Univ., Dec. 2020).

[29] Id. at 7 fig. 6 & app. figs. 45 & 47, at A-19, A-21.

[30] Coffey, McLaughlin & Peretto, Regulation and the Cost of Moving Goods, supra note 9.

[31] John W. Dawson & John J. Seater, Federal Regulation and Aggregate Economic Growth, 18 J. Econ. Growth 137 (2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2223315.

[32] Compare 49 C.F.R. § 171.8 (current HHFT definition), with S. 576 § 102 (proposed HHT definition).

[33] Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., Recommended Railroad Operating Practices for Transportation of Hazardous Materials, Circular OT-55-R (eff. July 1, 2022), https://www.aar.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/2022-07-01-OT-55-R-CPC-KBD.pdf.

[34] Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., supra note 5.

[35] Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 Law & Soc’y Rev. 691, 693–96 (2003), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=297162.

[36] MnDOT CPCS Report, supra note 20, figs. 2 & 10, at 5–6 & 16–17, §§ 3.2.4–3.2.5, at 32, 34.

[37] Jerry Ellig & Patrick A. McLaughlin, Preventing a Regulatory Train Wreck: Mandated Regulation and the Cautionary Tale of Positive Train Control (Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper, June 2016), https://www.mercatus.org/media/57556/download.

[38] Id.

[39] Coffey, McLaughlin & Peretto, Transportation, Innovation and Growth, supra note 8.

[40] Railway Safety Act of 2026, S. 3903, 119th Cong. § 110(a), (c), (d) (2026); Bureau of Transp. Stat., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Fleet Composition of Rail Tank Cars Carrying Flammable Liquids: 2023 Report to Congress (Sept. 2023), https://www.bts.gov/sites/bts.dot.gov/files/2023-09/BTS_Tank_Car_Report_To_Congress_9_13_2023.pdf (reporting monthly production rates); Cong. Rsch. Serv., Freight Rail Safety Issues in the 119th Congress, R47911 (2025) (summarizing industry concerns about accelerated retrofit timelines in current Railway Safety Act proposals).

[41] Bureau of Transp. Stat., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Fleet Composition of Rail Tank Cars Carrying Flammable Liquids: 2023 Report to Congress v–vi (Sept. 2023), https://www.bts.gov/sites/bts.dot.gov/files/2023-09/BTS_Tank_Car_Report_To_Congress_9_13_2023.pdf.

[42] Id.

[43] Train Crew Staffing, 84 Fed. Reg. 24,735, 24,741 (May 29, 2019), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-05-29/pdf/2019-11088.pdf.

[44] Train Crew Size Safety Requirements, 89 Fed. Reg. 25,502, 25,508 (Apr. 9, 2024), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/04/09/2024-06625/train-crew-size-safety-requirements.

[45] Marc Scribner, Toward Performance-Based Transportation Safety Regulation, Competitive Enter. Inst. (Mar. 2017), https://cei.org/studies/toward-performance-based-transportation-safety-regulation.

[46] MnDOT CPCS Report, supra note 20, ch. 6.

Health Policy Without Accountability: The Rise of Global Health DoDOs

Executive Summary Global health governance has shifted in ways that weaken democratic accountability while concentrating policy influence. The World Health Organization (the WHO), once a . . .

Executive Summary

Global health governance has shifted in ways that weaken democratic accountability while concentrating policy influence. The World Health Organization (the WHO), once a technical coordinating body, now operates within a broader ecosystem of Democratically Deficient Organizations (DoDOs)—intergovernmental institutions, philanthropic foundations, NGOs, and private actors that shape policy without meaningful public oversight. The move from assessed contributions to donor-driven, earmarked funding has severed the link between WHO priorities and member-state control. In its place, a small group of funders—most notably the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and Bloomberg Philanthropies—now exert outsized influence over global health agendas.

This brief shows how that system operates in practice. In tobacco control and pandemic governance, foundation funding, WHO authority, NGO advocacy, and academic research reinforce one another to produce policy consensus insulated from scrutiny. Law & economics frameworks help explain the result: incentives favor persistence over performance. The WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) has not accelerated global declines in smoking, while discouraging harm-reduction approaches that have succeeded in countries such as Sweden. Proposals to expand WHO authority in pandemic preparedness risk replicating the same institutional failures revealed during COVID-19.

The problem is not insufficient resources, but weak accountability. The brief proposes reforms to restore it: rebalance WHO funding toward assessed contributions, strengthen transparency and conflict-of-interest rules, open governance processes, embrace harm reduction, and return policymaking authority to domestic democratic institutions. Without such changes, the continued expansion of the DoDO model will deepen existing failures—with consequences measured in human lives.

“The urge to save humanity is almost always a false front for the urge to rule.”

— H.L. Mencken

I.        Introduction

The World Health Organization was founded in 1948 with a mandate to coordinate international efforts to combat disease and improve public health. In its early decades, it built considerable prestige through tightly targeted, outcome-oriented vertical programs: mass vaccination campaigns, technical assistance to developing nations, and focused assaults on diseases such as smallpox, malaria, yaws, and tuberculosis.[1] The eradication of smallpox in 1980 remains the WHO’s signature achievement—and arguably the greatest accomplishment of any international organization.[2]

The seeds of institutional decay, however, were already taking root. In 1978, the Alma-Ata Declaration announced the goal of “Health for All by the Year 2000,” shifting the WHO’s strategy from vertical disease control to a comprehensive, horizontal model centered on primary health care and the social determinants of health.[3] This was not a marginal adjustment. It marked a shift in institutional character. Health policy became as political as scientific. In that arena, the advantage rarely goes to those with the best evidence; it goes to those with the loudest voices and the deepest pockets.[4]

This strategic pivot opened the door to broader structural changes in global health governance—changes that fit squarely within the framework of Democratically Deficient Organizations (DoDOs).[5] As explained in the introductory paper in this series, the DoDO concept describes how intergovernmental bodies, NGOs, foundations, and corporations exercise substantial policy-shaping authority while remaining largely insulated from democratic accountability. The result is a self-reinforcing ecosystem: failure justifies expansion, dissent is recast as moral deviance, and those most affected by policy decisions have little meaningful voice in shaping them.

This paper applies the DoDO framework to global health. The global health DoDO ecosystem centers on the WHO, alongside a constellation of philanthropic foundations (led by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and Bloomberg Philanthropies), advocacy NGOs (often funded by those same foundations), pharmaceutical companies, and a revolving cadre of public health academics whose careers depend on the regulatory apparatus they help design.

Bruce Yandle’s “Baptists and bootleggers” analogy provides a useful complement. Baptists supply the moral justification for regulation, while bootleggers quietly profit from it.[6] In global health governance, the “Baptists” include public health campaigners, WHO officials, and celebrity philanthropists who frame every policy question in terms of lives saved or children protected. The bootleggers include pharmaceutical companies that benefit from regulatory choices, consulting firms that administer programs, NGOs whose funding depends on sustained crisis, and academics whose grants and publications flow from institutional consensus. No conspiracy is required. Incentives do the work.

II.        The Political Economy of WHO Financing

To understand how the WHO became a DoDO, follow the money. The organization’s original design relied on assessed contributions from member states—mandatory dues based on national income. The World Health Assembly (WHA) retained collective control over how those funds were spent.[7] The system was imperfect, but it preserved at least a loose connection between the WHO’s priorities and the collective will of its members. That connection has now been severed.

By the 2023–2024 biennium, roughly 84% of the WHO’s budget came from voluntary contributions, most of them earmarked by donors rather than the WHA.[8] In that same period, the United States was the largest contributor, followed by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and Germany. Each of those three donors individually provided more funding than most member states combined.[9] Lawrence Gostin, himself a WHO collaborating center director, noted in 2015 that the organization fully controlled only about 20% of its budget.[10] Donors effectively dictate the rest.

This is not just a shift in financing. It is a quiet transformation in governance. When a private foundation contributes more to a UN agency than nearly every sovereign state—and specifies how the money must be spent—it acquires policymaking authority without any of the constraints that bind even the most dysfunctional governments. The Gates Foundation faces no elections, no parliamentary scrutiny, no freedom-of-information requests, and no judicial review. It answers only to its founders.[11]

Devi Sridhar and Ngaire Woods describe this arrangement as “trojan multilateralism”: the use of multilateral institutions to advance bilateral and private donor agendas.[12] The pattern is familiar. A foundation selects a priority—polio eradication, pandemic preparedness, vaccine delivery. It funds WHO programs aligned with that priority, often building parallel structures such as GAVI (the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization) and CEPI (the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations) that sit alongside, and often sidestep, the WHO’s formal governance. It also funds academic research to validate the approach, NGOs to advocate for it, and media coverage to amplify it. The appearance of multilateralism remains. The substance does not. Accountability to member states—let alone voters—evaporates.[13]

The concern here is not philanthropy as such. Foundations can and often do support valuable health interventions. A foundation that builds clinics or expands vaccine access raises few objections. The problem arises when funding comes with policy conditions. At that point, financial support becomes a vehicle for influence. In intergovernmental bodies and executive agencies—already distant from democratic oversight—those conditions further dilute accountability. In the case of the WHO, earmarked funding has compounded weak WHA oversight and accelerated its evolution into a DoDO.

III.        Gates and the Philanthropic Policy Model

The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation warrants particular scrutiny—not because its intentions are necessarily malign, but because its influence is so extensive that it reshapes the structure of global health governance. With annual spending on health-related activities averaging roughly $4 billion in recent years, much of it directed to NGOs and academic researchers, the foundation is not merely a major donor. It operates as a de facto health policy institution, shaping spending priorities and regulatory agendas, especially at the WHO and in lower-income countries.[14]

Anne-Emanuelle Birn traces the origins of this model to the Rockefeller Foundation’s dominance of international health in the early 20th century.[15] Linsey McGoey’s analysis of the Gates Foundation shows how its grant-making creates a dense web of financial dependencies that discourages dissent.[16] Universities, think tanks, NGOs, and media organizations that receive Gates funding have strong incentives to endorse its approach and equally strong incentives to avoid scrutinizing it. McGoey’s conclusion is blunt: there is “no such thing as a free gift.” Every grant carries strings, whether acknowledged or not.

The foundation’s influence on the WHO raises sharper concerns. It funds not only the academics and NGOs whose research and advocacy inform WHO decision making, but also the WHO itself—both directly and indirectly. For example, it funds GAVI, which the WHO helps govern.[17] More importantly, as David McCoy and his co-authors document in The Lancet, the foundation participates directly in policymaking across the system:[18]

The foundation actively engages in policy making and agenda setting activities; it has representatives that sit on the governing structures of many global health partnerships; it is part of a self-appointed group of global health leaders known as the H8 (together with WHO, the World Bank, GAVI Alliance, the Global Fund, UNICEF, the United Nations Population Fund [UNFPA], and UNAIDS); and has been involved in setting the health agenda for the G8. The Gates Foundation is also involved in setting the research agenda of several public health priorities, a role that was controversially criticised by the former head of WHO’s malaria programme, who complained that the dominance of the Gates Foundation in malaria research risked stifling the diversity of views among scientists.[19]

This is the DoDO ecosystem in full view. A large philanthropic foundation—accountable primarily to its founders and board—funds research, advocacy, and media, while also participating directly in policymaking and agenda setting. The foundation and its institutional allies operate largely outside democratic oversight, yet shape regulatory and policy decisions that affect billions.

IV.        Bloomberg and the Financing of Tobacco Control

If the Gates Foundation shows how one large DoDO can shape health policy broadly, Bloomberg Philanthropies shows how a single DoDO can dominate a narrow regulatory domain. Since 2005, Michael Bloomberg has committed more than $1.6 billion to global tobacco-control initiatives through the Bloomberg Initiative to Reduce Tobacco Use.[20]

The initiative operates through a network of implementing partners, including the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids (CTFK), Vital Strategies, the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, the CDC Foundation, and the WHO.[21] These organizations provide technical assistance, fund advocacy campaigns, support research, and help governments implement tobacco-control policies in low- and middle-income countries.

Through this structure, philanthropic funding supports both the development of global norms—particularly those associated with the WHO’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)—and the domestic advocacy needed to entrench those norms in national regulatory systems.

Adopted in 2003, the FCTC was the first treaty negotiated under WHO auspices and remains the organization’s most ambitious exercise of normative authority. More than 180 countries are parties. Its objectives were straightforward: reduce tobacco use, limit exposure to secondhand smoke, and address the global burden of tobacco-related disease.[22]

The results have fallen short. When the FCTC entered into force in 2005, the world had roughly 1.1 billion smokers. Nearly two decades later, that number remains largely unchanged.[23] Population growth of about 20% has produced a corresponding decline in prevalence, but that decline largely reflects trends already underway before the treaty.

Steven Hoffman and his co-authors confirm this point in a rigorous quasi-experimental analysis published in the BMJ, finding “no evidence to indicate that global progress in reducing cigarette consumption has been accelerated by the FCTC treaty mechanism.”[24]

Some countries have achieved sharper declines in smoking prevalence—notably Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Japan. These outcomes largely reflect the availability of lower-risk nicotine alternatives, including snus, e-cigarettes, and heated tobacco products, which enable substitution away from combustible cigarettes.

Sweden provides the clearest population-level example. Since the introduction of snus in the 1970s, Swedish consumers have steadily shifted toward this lower-risk form of smokeless tobacco. Most EU countries banned snus in 1992, preventing similar substitution. Sweden secured an exemption when it joined the EU in 1995.

The divergence is stark. Adult male smoking prevalence in Sweden has fallen below 5%, far below the EU average of more than 20%.[25] Smoking-related mortality among Swedish men is correspondingly the lowest in the EU, a pattern Lars Ramström and Tom Wikmans link to substitution from cigarettes to snus.[26]

The EU ban on snus created a decades-long natural experiment across an entire customs union. The outcome is clear: harm reduction works.[27] Continuing the experiment looks less like caution than inertia bordering on negligence. (Proposed as a formal trial, it would likely fail any ethics review.)

The FCTC and the WHO have nonetheless rejected snus as a harm-reduction tool. A 2003 WHO report states: “There is no evidence to recommend that any smokeless tobacco product should be used as part of a harm reduction strategy.”[28] More recent guidance reiterates the position,[29] emphasizing risks while discouraging comparative claims about relative harm.[30]

The WHO applies an even more precautionary approach to e-cigarettes—rebranded as “electronic nicotine delivery systems,” or ENDS—despite evidence that they are far less harmful than cigarettes and more effective than conventional nicotine-replacement therapies at supporting cessation.[31]

The FCTC sits at the center of Bloomberg’s campaign. The institutional architecture is a textbook DoDO. Bloomberg funds academic research that provides intellectual support. It funds NGOs such as CTFK and members of the Global Alliance for Tobacco Control (GATC), which lobby governments to adopt FCTC-aligned policies. It also funds the WHO, which supplies the normative framework those NGOs deploy.

Bloomberg Philanthropies is not the only funder. The Gates Foundation, the Wellcome Trust, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and various governments also contribute.[32] In some cases, government agencies fund NGOs that advocate for the agencies’ own policies, creating the appearance of grassroots support and short-circuiting democratic scrutiny.[33]

Pharmaceutical companies add another layer. Firms that manufacture nicotine-replacement therapies and cessation drugs benefit from regulatory limits on competing nicotine products. Some have funded advocacy organizations that lobby for those restrictions.[34] The logic of Yandle’s model becomes visible: bootleggers underwriting Baptists.

Taken together, this ecosystem reflects a top-down agenda shaped by a small group of funders, with Bloomberg at its center. Money flows through academics and NGOs that generate and promote policy arguments,[35] creating the appearance of broad consensus while narrowing the range of acceptable views.

This manufactured consensus is reinforced by expansive interpretations of FCTC Article 5.3. Intended to shield policy from tobacco-industry influence, it has been applied so broadly that it restricts engagement with entities only tangentially connected to tobacco.

The result borders on the absurd. The FCTC Conference of the Parties has met behind closed doors since 2010, excluding journalists and the public,[36] while NGOs aligned with the prevailing framework participate and publicly shame dissenting countries through “Dirty Ashtray Awards.”[37]

Interpol was denied observer status at COP6 in 2014 because it had accepted funding from Philip Morris International for anti-smuggling efforts.[38] The WHO’s Tobacco Cessation Consortium, launched in 2022, excludes tobacco and non-medical nicotine firms under Article 5.3 while including pharmaceutical and technology companies as partners.[39]

The contrast is stark. Companies that profit from medically sanctioned cessation products are welcomed. Companies that produce lower-risk alternatives—often more effective at helping smokers quit—are excluded.

The consequences can be perverse. In 2022, the WHO refused Emergency Use Listing for Covifenz, a COVID-19 vaccine developed by the Canadian company Medicago, because Philip Morris International held roughly a one-third stake in the firm. Health Canada had already authorized the vaccine, with efficacy exceeding 70%.[40] The WHO’s objection was not safety, but institutional policy under the FCTC.

The result was that low- and middle-income countries lost access to a viable vaccine during a pandemic because of a tobacco company’s investment. It is difficult to imagine a clearer case of policy overriding public health.

Some insiders have begun to question the system. Former WHO department directors Robert Beaglehole and Ruth Bonita conclude in The Lancet that the FCTC “is no longer fit for purpose, especially for low-income countries,” and call for harm reduction to be integrated into the framework.[41]

The treaty now functions less as a tool for harm reduction than as an institution oriented toward its own preservation.[42] The incentives embedded in the DoDO ecosystem have, so far, impeded reform.

V.        Cascades, Consensus, and Policy Entrenchment

The persistence of failed policies in the face of contrary evidence demands explanation. Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein’s concept of availability cascades offers a useful framework.[43] An availability cascade occurs when repetition, not evidence, drives belief. The more often a claim circulates in public discourse, the more cognitively “available” it becomes—and the more likely people are to accept it as true.[44]

In the global health DoDO ecosystem, these cascades are driven by availability entrepreneurs. The mechanism is straightforward. A foundation funds research at a prestigious university. The research supports the foundation’s preferred policy. The foundation funds NGOs to promote the findings. Those NGOs lobby the WHO. The WHO issues guidance citing the research. Governments implement the guidance. The foundation then funds further research showing that implementation falls short, justifying additional funding and renewed intervention.

This circuit operates with minimal external constraint. At no point does meaningful democratic accountability enter the process. Research circulates within a closed funding network. NGOs answer to donors, not the populations they claim to represent. The WHO’s governance structures are dominated by health ministry officials rather than elected representatives. Governments often implement WHO guidance through administrative action rather than legislation, further insulating the process from political scrutiny.

Christopher Snowdon has documented a related phenomenon in the form of “sock puppet” NGOs—organizations that present as independent but rely on funding from the same entities whose policies they promote.[45] In that setting, a government agency uses an NGO to advance policies that would struggle under direct political scrutiny.

In global health, the pattern is broader and less transparent. Funding often originates from private foundations rather than governments, obscuring the underlying relationships.

The Gates Foundation’s simultaneous funding of the WHO, GAVI, academic research centers, and advocacy NGOs creates what can fairly be described as full-spectrum dominance of the policy space. Nearly every voice in the conversation is, directly or indirectly, funded by the same source.

VI.        Institutional Expansion Without Reform

The FCTC model is now spreading across global health governance with notable speed. The same DoDO architecture—WHO normative authority, foundation funding, NGO advocacy, and closed-door decision making—has expanded beyond tobacco to alcohol, sugar, ultra-processed foods, and pandemic governance.[46]

The proposed WHO Pandemic Agreement (formerly the “Pandemic Treaty”) marks the most ambitious extension of this model to date.[47] Drawing on the FCTC precedent, it would expand the WHO’s role in pandemic preparedness and response. Proposed provisions include surveillance obligations, benefit-sharing requirements for pathogen data, and “sustainable financing” mechanisms that would further entrench reliance on voluntary contributions—and with it, donor influence over priorities.

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the institutional weaknesses the DoDO framework predicts. The WHO’s delayed response to the initial outbreak, its acceptance of Chinese government assurances, and its reluctance to investigate the laboratory-leak hypothesis reflected structural constraints, not isolated errors. An organization dependent on the goodwill of powerful member states and donors will predictably hesitate to challenge them.[48]

The Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response reached a similar conclusion: the WHO lacked both the authority and the independence to respond effectively. The proposed remedy—more authority, more funding, more institutional machinery—misses the point. Expanding the powers of an institution already shaped by donor influence does not resolve the underlying problem.[49] It reinforces it.

The pattern extends to pharmaceutical regulation. The WHO’s prequalification program, funded in significant part by the Gates Foundation through UNITAID, plays a central role in determining which drugs and vaccines qualify for purchase with international donor funds.[50]

Despite decades of WHO involvement, substandard and falsified medicines remain widespread in low- and middle-income countries. Institutional incentives emphasize process compliance—reports, meetings, and grant disbursement—over measurable outcomes.[51]

The system excels at coordination and documentation. It performs less well at ensuring that patients in Lagos or Dhaka receive effective medicines.[52]

VII.        Incentives, Insulation, and Persistence

The preceding analysis reveals a consistent structural logic that defines health DoDOs. Several reinforcing mechanisms sustain the system and explain its persistence.[53]

Incentive misalignment. Every actor in the health DoDO ecosystem benefits from the continuation of the problem rather than its resolution. The WHO’s budget expands with each new health crisis. Foundations justify their existence by identifying new threats. NGOs rely on ongoing emergencies to sustain funding. Pharmaceutical companies profit from both disease and treatment. Academics build careers around an expanding regulatory apparatus. This is not conspiracy but ecology. Each actor pursues its own incentives, and those incentives align in ways that perpetuate the system.[54]

Democratic insulation. The system operates at a remove from democratic accountability. International agreements bind successor governments. Voluntary contributions bypass legislative appropriations. Expert committees, rather than elected officials, set technical standards. The populations most affected—often in developing countries—have little or no voice in the institutions that shape the policies governing their health.

Knowledge monopoly. Foundations influence not only policy, but the production of policy-relevant knowledge. By funding research, training researchers, and shaping institutional prestige, they exercise significant agenda-setting power. Dissent rarely faces direct censorship. It is filtered out through funding decisions. Researchers who challenge prevailing assumptions risk losing grants, publication opportunities, and career advancement. The result is a self-reinforcing consensus.

Failure as justification. Failure does not trigger reform; it triggers expansion. When the FCTC falls short of reducing global tobacco use, the response is to call for stronger implementation and additional funding. When the WHO underperforms during crises such as Ebola or COVID-19, the response is to expand its authority and resources. Mancur Olson’s logic of collective action explains why.[55] The beneficiaries of the system—bureaucrats, consultants, NGOs—are concentrated, organized, and motivated. The costs fall on diffuse populations that face high barriers to collective action. The system therefore persists, even when its results do not justify its expansion.

VIII.        Accountability Before Expansion

The health DoDO complex may be the most consequential of all DoDO ecosystems because its failures are measured in human lives. Eight million tobacco deaths annually. Millions more from malaria, tuberculosis, and childhood diseases that persist not for lack of effective interventions, but because the institutional apparatus prioritizes process over outcomes. A pandemic response that too often deferred to institutional constraints. And now a proposed Pandemic Agreement that would entrench the same structures that failed.

The path forward requires more than marginal reform. It requires restructuring international health cooperation around accountability and subsidiarity.

Funding reform. The WHO’s financing model must restore the primacy of assessed contributions. As long as the organization depends on voluntary, earmarked funding from a small group of donors, it will reflect their priorities rather than those of its members. If governments are unwilling to fund the WHO through assessed contributions, that reluctance is itself informative. It suggests they do not value its activities enough to support them through democratic fiscal processes.

Transparency and conflicts of interest. The revolving door among foundations, the WHO, and the NGO sector should be transparent and subject to conflict-of-interest rules at least as stringent as those applied to the tobacco industry under Article 5.3. If influence from Philip Morris is unacceptable, influence from major foundations should face comparable scrutiny. At a minimum, equivalent standards of transparency and accountability should apply.

Open governance. The FCTC’s decision-making process must be opened to public scrutiny. Closed-door negotiations on policies affecting billions are incompatible with democratic governance. Excluding journalists, independent researchers, and dissenting voices protects institutional incumbents, not the public.

Harm reduction. Harm reduction should be treated as a core principle of health policy, not a deviation from orthodoxy. Evidence from Sweden, the United Kingdom, Japan, and New Zealand shows that risk-proportionate regulation saves lives. The FCTC’s refusal to incorporate this evidence reflects institutional incentives, not scientific caution.

Democratic control. Health policies that affect domestic populations should be determined by domestic democratic institutions, not delegated to international bodies with attenuated accountability. International cooperation has a role in coordination, information sharing, and technical assistance. It is not a substitute for democratic self-governance.

The architects of the postwar international order understood that legitimacy flows from accountability. They designed the WHO to serve its member states, not to direct them. That relationship has reversed. Restoring it will require confronting not only entrenched institutional interests, but also the assumption that technical expertise and good intentions can substitute for democratic consent.

They cannot. They never have. In global health, where the stakes are measured in millions of lives, the cost of that assumption is too high to ignore.

[1] World Health Org., The Third Ten Years of the World Health Organization: 1968–1977, 45–60 (1978).

[2] Frank Fenner et al., Smallpox and Its Eradication 1345–48 (World Health Org. 1988).

[3] World Health Org., Declaration of Alma-Ata, Int’l Conf. on Primary Health Care (Sept. 12, 1978), https://www.who.int/teams/social-determinants-of-health/declaration-of-alma-ata.

[4] Marcos Cueto, The Origins of Primary Health Care and Selective Primary Health Care, 94 Am. J. Pub. Health 1864, 1864–74 (2004).

[5] Julian Morris, Defending Democracy from the DoDOs: How Power Escapes Democratic Control, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. 4–6 (Mar. 12, 2026), https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Defending-Democracy-from-the-DoDOs.pdf.

[6] Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists—The Education of a Regulatory Economist, 7 Regulation 12, 12–16 (1983); Adam Smith & Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists: How Economic Forces and Moral Persuasion Interact to Shape Regulatory Politics 15–40 (Cato Inst. 2014).

[7] Devi Sridhar & Ngaire Woods, Trojan Multilateralism: Global Cooperation in Health, 4 Global Pol’y 325, 325–35 (2013).

[8] World Health Org., Programme Budget 2022–2023: Financial Overview and Contributors (2023), https://open.who.int (last visited Mar. 10, 2026); see also Flexibly Funding WHO? An Analysis of Its Donors’ Voluntary Contributions, 8 BMJ Glob. Health e011232 (2023).

[9] Id.

[10] Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Normative Authority of the World Health Organization, 129 Pub. Health 854, 856–58 (2015).

[11] Sophie Harman, The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and Legitimacy in Global Health Governance, 22 Global Governance 349, 349–68 (2016).

[12] Sridhar & Woods, supra note 7.

[13] Devi Sridhar, Who Sets the Global Health Research Agenda? The Challenge of Multi-Bi Financing, 9 PLoS Med. e1001312 (2012).

[14] Calculations by authors based on Bill & Melinda Gates Found., 2023 Annual Report (2024), and Bill & Melinda Gates Found., 2024 Annual Report (2025) (finding roughly $2 billion in annual spending classified as “global health,” with comparable additional spending on closely related categories such as vaccine development, malaria, and tuberculosis).

[15] Anne-Emanuelle Birn, Philanthrocapitalism, Past and Present: The Rockefeller Foundation, the Gates Foundation, and the Setting(s) of the International/Global Health Agenda, 12 Hypothesis e8 (2014).

[16] Linsey McGoey, No Such Thing as a Free Gift: The Gates Foundation and the Price of Philanthropy (Verso 2015).

[17] David McCoy et al., The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation’s Grant-Making Programme for Global Health, 373 Lancet 1645, 1645–53 (2009).

[18] Judith Richter, Public-Private Partnerships and International Health Policy-Making: How Can Public Interests Be Safeguarded? 31–50 (World Health Org. 2004).

[19] McCoy et al., supra note 17, at 1650.

[20] Bloomberg Philanthropies, Bloomberg Initiative to Reduce Tobacco Use, https://www.bloomberg.org/public-health/reducing-tobacco-use (last visited Apr. 2, 2026); Philanthropy N.Y., Bloomberg Philanthropies Launches $420 Million Initiative to Reduce Tobacco Use Globally (Feb. 2, 2023), https://philanthropynewyork.org/news/bloomberg-philanthropies-commits-additional-420-million-reduce-tobacco-use-globally (last visited Apr. 2, 2026).

[21] Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, Bloomberg Initiative to Reduce Tobacco Use, https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/what-we-do/global/bloomberg (last visited Apr. 2, 2026).

[22] WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control art. 5.3, May 21, 2003, 2302 U.N.T.S. 166.

[23] GBD 2019 Tobacco Collaborators, Spatial, Temporal, and Demographic Patterns in Prevalence of Smoking Tobacco Use and Attributable Disease Burden in 204 Countries and Territories, 1990–2019, 397 Lancet 2337 (2021); World Health Org., Global Report on Trends in Prevalence of Tobacco Use 2000–2030 (4th ed. 2021).

[24] Steven J. Hoffman et al., Impact of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control on Global Cigarette Consumption: Quasi-Experimental Evaluations Using Interrupted Time Series Analysis and In-Sample Forecast Event Modelling, 365 BMJ l2287 (2019); see also Steven J. Hoffman & Cigdem Tan, Overview of Systematic Reviews on the Health-Related Effects of Government Tobacco Control Policies, 15 BMC Pub. Health 744 (2015).

[25] Eur. Comm’n, Special Eurobarometer 539: Attitudes of Europeans Towards Tobacco and Related Products (2023).

[26] Lars Ramström & Tom Wikmans, Mortality Attributable to Tobacco Among Men in Sweden and Other European Countries: An Analysis of Data in a WHO Report, 12 Tobacco Induc. Dis. 14 (2014).

[27] Id.; see also Karl Fagerström & Elsy-Britt Schildt, Should the European Union Lift the Ban on Snus? Evidence from the Swedish Experience, 98 Addiction 1191, 1191–95 (2003).

[28] World Health Org., Scientific Advisory Committee on Tobacco Product Regulation (SACTob), Recommendation on Smokeless Tobacco Products 4 (2003).

[29] World Health Org. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Secretariat, Smokeless Tobacco Products: Guide to Drafting Regulation to Implement the WHO FCTC 4, 8 (2024).

[30] Id. at 22.

[31] Julian Morris, The World Health Organization’s Opposition to Tobacco Harm Reduction: A Threat to Public Health?, Reason Fdn. (2016); Ann McNeill et al., E-Cigarettes: An Evidence Update—A Report Commissioned by Public Health England (Aug. 2015) (finding vaping approximately 95% less harmful than combustible cigarettes); Royal Coll. of Physicians, Nicotine Without Smoke: Tobacco Harm Reduction 56–75 (2016) (endorsing e-cigarettes as a cessation tool); Peter Hajek et al., A Randomized Trial of E-Cigarettes Versus Nicotine-Replacement Therapy, 380 New Eng. J. Med. 629, 629–37 (2019) (finding e-cigarettes nearly twice as effective as nicotine-replacement therapy for smoking cessation); Angela Difeng Wu et al., Electronic Cigarettes for Smoking Cessation: An Overview of Systematic Reviews and Evidence and Gap Map, Addiction (Mar. 26, 2026) (reporting higher ≥6-month cessation rates with nicotine e-cigarettes across multiple comparisons); Renée O’Leary et al., Examining E-Cigarettes as a Smoking Cessation Treatment: A Critical Umbrella Review Analysis, 266 Drug Alcohol Depend. 112520 (2025) (finding e-cigarettes more effective than other cessation treatments).

[32] See, e.g., Bill & Melinda Gates Found., Michael Bloomberg and Bill Gates Join to Combat Global Tobacco Epidemic, https://www.gatesfoundation.org/ideas/media-center/press-releases/2008/07/michael-bloomberg-and-bill-gates-join-to-combat-global-tobacco-epidemic (last visited Apr. 2, 2026); Wellcome Tr., Commercial Determinants of Health Programme; Robert Wood Johnson Found., Tobacco Policy Research and Advocacy Programs, https://www.rwjf.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2026). Philanthropic funding for global tobacco-control advocacy often flows through a small set of intermediary organizations—such as the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, Vital Strategies, and the International Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease—that distribute grants, coordinate advocacy campaigns, and provide technical assistance to governments. This structure creates a tightly integrated policy network aligning funding, research, and advocacy. See Sridhar & Woods, supra note 8.

[33] Christopher Snowdon, Sock Puppets: How the Government Lobbies Itself and Why 8–18 (Inst. of Econ. Aff. 2012).

[34] See, e.g., Pfizer Inc., U.S. Medical, Scientific, Patient and Civic Organization Funding Report: Fourth Quarter 2014 (2015) (listing grants to the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, including $25,000 for the “2014 Youth Advocates of the Year Event”), https://cdn.pfizer.com/pfizercom/responsibility/grants_contributions/Yes_Report-2014-08.29.2017.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2026).

[35] Bloomberg Philanthropies, E-cigarettes, https://www.bloomberg.org/public-health/reducing-tobacco-use/e-cigarettes (last visited Apr. 4, 2026).

[36] See, e.g., World Health Org. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Conf. of the Parties, Fifth Sess., Summary Record of the Second Committee B Meeting, ¶ 2, FCTC/COP/5/REC/2 (Nov. 17, 2012), https://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop5/FCTC_COP5_REC2.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2026); World Health Org. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Conf. of the Parties, Rules of Procedure, Rule 5 (providing that sessions may be closed to the public).

[37] See Framework Convention Alliance (now Global Alliance for Tobacco Control), Dirty Ashtray Awards, COP advocacy materials (issued at successive Conferences of the Parties).

[38] WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Guidelines for Implementation of Article 5.3 (2008) (recommending that governments limit interactions with the tobacco industry and avoid partnerships with tobacco-related entities); see also WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Conf. of the Parties, Sixth Sess., Interpol’s Application for Observer Status, FCTC/COP/6/4 (July 24, 2014); see also Interpol, Interpol Global Complex for Innovation and Cooperation on Illicit Trade (discussing cooperation on illicit tobacco trade).

[39] World Health Org., Pharma, Tech and Social Media Companies Join Forces with WHO to Launch the Tobacco Cessation Consortium During World Health Summit in Berlin, Germany (Oct. 20, 2022), https://www.who.int/news/item/20-10-2022-pharma–tech-and-social-media-companies-join-forces-with-who-to-launch-the-tobacco-cessation-consortium-during-world-health-summit-in-berlin–germany.

[40] Tony Kirby, Philip Morris Ejected from Canadian Vaccine Collaboration, 11 Lancet Respiratory Med. e40 (2023); see also WHO Refuses Emergency Use Listing for Medicago COVID-19 Vaccine Due to Philip Morris International Ties, Tobacco Asia (Mar. 18, 2022).

[41] Robert Beaglehole & Ruth Bonita, Tobacco Control: Getting to the Finish Line, 399 Lancet 1865 (2022).

[42] Christopher Snowdon, Killjoys: A Critique of Paternalism 85–96 (Inst. of Econ. Aff. 2017) (discussing the “closed shop” dynamics of FCTC COP meetings).

[43] Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 683, 683–768 (1999).

[44] Id. at 720–35.

[45] Snowdon, supra note 33, at 15–18 (describing how government-funded NGOs can create an “astroturf” effect that simulates grassroots support for policies originating within the bureaucracy).

[46] Ilona Kickbusch et al., The Commercial Determinants of Health, 401 Lancet 1223 (2023); Jeff Collin, Kelley Lee & Karen Bissell, The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: The Politics of Global Health Governance, 23 Third World Q. 265 (2002); Christopher Snowdon, The Art of Suppression: Pleasure, Panic and Prohibition Since 1800 185–220 (Little Dice 2011).

[47] World Health Org., WHO Pandemic Agreement: Zero Draft, WHO Doc. A/INB/4/3 (Feb. 1, 2023).

[48] Indep. Panel for Pandemic Preparedness & Response, COVID-19: Make It the Last Pandemic 22–40 (2021); Lawrence O. Gostin, Suerie Moon & Benjamin M. Meier, Reimagining Global Health Governance in the Age of COVID-19, 110 Am. J. Pub. Health 1615 (2020); World Health Org., WHO-Convened Global Study of Origins of SARS-CoV-2: China Part (2021) (describing the laboratory-incident hypothesis as “extremely unlikely,” a conclusion later questioned by governments and scientific commentators); David Relman, Opinion: To Stop the Next Pandemic, We Need to Unravel the Origins of COVID-19, 375 Science 1262 (2021).

[49] Lawrence O. Gostin, The Future of the World Health Organization: Lessons Learned from Ebola, 93 Milbank Q. 475, 480–82 (2015).

[50] Roger Bate, Phake: The Deadly World of Falsified and Substandard Medicines 145–70 (AEI Press 2014).

[51] World Health Org., Substandard and Falsified Medical Products (Fact Sheet) (updated 2023), https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/substandard-and-falsified-medical-products; Shinobu Ozawa et al., Prevalence and Estimated Economic Burden of Substandard and Falsified Medicines in Low- and Middle-Income Countries, 1 JAMA Network Open e181662 (2018); Roger Bate et al., Substandard and Falsified Anti-Tuberculosis Drugs: A Preliminary Field Analysis, 17 Int’l J. Tuberculosis & Lung Disease 308, 308–11 (2013).

[52] Amir Attaran et al., How to Achieve International Action on Falsified and Substandard Medicines, 345 BMJ e7381 (2012).

[53] Morris, supra note 5, at 15–18.

[54] Yandle, supra note 6, at 14–15; Morris, supra note 5, at 4–7.

[55] Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 53–65 (Harvard Univ. Press 1965).

SHORT FORM WRITTEN OUTPUT

AI Risk and the Very Large Hammer

The trick in AI policy is not deciding whether artificial intelligence is risky. Of course it is. So are electricity, aviation, pharmaceuticals, and teenagers with . . .

The trick in AI policy is not deciding whether artificial intelligence is risky. Of course it is. So are electricity, aviation, pharmaceuticals, and teenagers with driver’s licenses. The harder question is where the risk attaches, and whether a given proposed fix targets that point or simply hands policymakers a very large hammer labeled “AI.”

recent post by Dean Ball, a senior fellow at the Foundation for American Innovation, tees up that familiar tension. On one hand, there is a strong case against broad, ex ante regulation of AI systems. On the other, highly capable systems may pose risks that are hard to dismiss—particularly in areas like cyber operations or biosecurity. The question is how to reconcile those instincts without defaulting to heavy-handed control.

That framing is useful. It also leaves something important underspecified.

The debate still tends to treat “AI” as a single object of governance, rather than a layered system in which different interventions operate in very different ways. Knowing Dean Ball personally, I doubt he intended that simplification. But his post could leave that impression. It is worth unpacking why the distinction matters.

Once those layers collapse, any risk can justify sweeping oversight. Once they are separated, many proposed interventions look far less precise than their advocates suggest.

Read the full piece here.

Stack Wars: The Garage Myth Meets the Five-Layer Cake

The canonical story of the modern tech firm still starts in a metaphorical garage. William Hewlett and David Packard with the audio oscillator. Steve Jobs . . .

The canonical story of the modern tech firm still starts in a metaphorical garage. William Hewlett and David Packard with the audio oscillator. Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak with the Apple I. Jeff Bezos with a door-desk and a handful of mail-order books. We like the simplicity—one inventor, one widget, one market. It’s comforting. Sometimes, it’s even useful.

As a description of how value gets created at the technological frontier in 2026, it is badly outdated.

Watch Jensen Huang’s recent conversation with Dwarkesh Patel and the gap becomes obvious. Asked whether NVIDIA risks commoditization, Huang does not just answer the question—he reframes it. On its face, the concern is reasonable. NVIDIA “sends a GDS2 file to TSMC,” which fabricates the dies, packages them with high-bandwidth memory (HBM) from SK Hynix and Micron, and hands them off to a Taiwan-based original design manufacturer (ODM). Meanwhile, NVIDIA “fundamentally makes software that other people manufacture.”

The jargon is worth unpacking because it is the point. A GDS2 file is the final design file used to manufacture a chip. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC) fabricates the chip dies. HBM is the fast memory stacked close to advanced processors. An ODM builds products for another company to sell under its own brand.

In other words, the “product” is not a thing NVIDIA simply makes and ships. It is a coordinated chain of design, fabrication, packaging, memory, systems, software, and deployment.

Huang’s response shifts the lens. NVIDIA’s job, he says, is to turn “electrons to tokens”—to do “as much as necessary, as little as possible.” Whatever the firm does not need to do, it pushes to partners. Whatever it does do, it structures so that everyone else can coordinate around it.

That’s the business.

NVIDIA’s moat is not the graphics processing unit (GPU). It is the coordination layer that makes hundreds of upstream and downstream actors rational in betting on its platform. That list runs long: TSMC, ASML, SK Hynix, Lumentum, Coherent, hyperscalers—the giant cloud providers that buy and operate massive computing infrastructure—artificial-intelligence (AI) labs, framework communities, application developers, financiers, and even, as Huang half-jokes, the plumbers and electricians wiring data-center buildouts.

In short, ecosystem orchestration—not discrete product innovation—is the dominant value-creation pattern in the AI economy.

That reality does not map cleanly onto the categories regulators reach for: single-product monopoly, classic two-sided “matching” platforms, or vertical foreclosure. It also cuts against policymakers’ instincts about where innovation comes from. If the underlying economic phenomenon is ecosystem coordination, analysis that fixates on discrete—and often poorly defined—“products” will miss the mark.

Get the framework wrong, and policy will not just misfire. It will penalize the coordination that drives growth.

The costs do not stay contained. Broad export controls aimed at slowing Chinese competition will also hit U.S. firms and erode the durability of American technological leadership. That tradeoff remains underweighted in a policy debate still anchored to a chip-centric view of the industry.

Read the full piece here.

Reverse Patent Pools and Other TTBER Tall Tales

In standard-essential patent (SEP) licensing, every procedural tweak is also a skirmish over bargaining power. That is what makes licensing negotiation groups (LNGs) more than . . .

In standard-essential patent (SEP) licensing, every procedural tweak is also a skirmish over bargaining power. That is what makes licensing negotiation groups (LNGs) more than an obscure acronym in the European Commission’s 2026 Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation (TTBER) and accompanying Guidelines (TTGs). LNGs would allow technology implementers to bargain collectively with rights holders. Depending on whom you ask, that is either a sensible way to reduce transaction costs—or a buyer cartel with a compliance memo.

The draft TTGs introduced a dedicated section on LNGs and, more notably, offered a soft antitrust safe harbor. In practice, qualifying LNGs would have avoided a full case-by-case assessment if they satisfied a defined set of conditions.

That approach did not come out of nowhere. A few months earlier, the European Commission signaled its position in an informal guidance letter issued jointly with the German competition authority, addressing the creation of the Automotive Licensing Negotiation Group.

That episode sets the stage for this post. It begins by situating LNGs within the broader SEP debate. It then examines the competition-law risks they raise, the limits of analogizing them to patent pools, and their uneasy fit with the Huawei framework.

Finally, it turns to the final TTGs. While the Commission dropped the proposed safe harbor, it kept a dedicated section on LNGs—raising the obvious question: was the intervention worth it?

Read the full piece here.

Merger Guidelines for the Industrial Policy Curious

The European Commission published its draft “guidelines on the assessment of mergers under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings” . . .

The European Commission published its draft “guidelines on the assessment of mergers under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings” yesterday. The title does what titles of merger guidelines usually do: it lowers expectations. That is useful misdirection. The document itself is anything but dull.

The draft guidelines span more than 100 pages and raise a host of issues. This post zeroes in on one that should give competition lawyers pause: the quiet politicization of competition law through soft-law instruments that sidestep—and ultimately erode—the coherence of established frameworks.

On the surface, the document updates the European Union’s merger-review framework. Read more closely, and a different project emerges: a systematic effort to advance industrial policy through competition law, dressed up as technical refinement.

What follows breaks down how the guidelines do this, the mechanisms they deploy, and why that trajectory should concern you.

Read the full piece here.

Before Brazil Scrubs In: The Case Against Digital-Market Surgery

Brazil’s digital markets do not need a regulatory savior so much as a careful doctor. Bill 4,675/2025 arrives with the bedside manner of a reform, but the . . .

Brazil’s digital markets do not need a regulatory savior so much as a careful doctor. Bill 4,675/2025 arrives with the bedside manner of a reform, but the instruments of major surgery: a new bureaucracy, decade-long designations, and open-ended obligations for firms deemed systemically important. Before Congress scrubs in, it should ask whether the patient is actually failing—or whether Brazil’s existing antitrust tools are already doing much of the work.

Late last year, the Brazilian government submitted the bill to the Chamber of Deputies as part of its “Digital Brazil Agenda.” The proposal borrows from Europe’s Digital Markets Act (DMA), but it is not a straight copy. Its structure more closely resembles the United Kingdom’s Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act (DMCC).

Unlike the DMA, the bill would not impose a fixed list of obligations as soon as a company is designated. Instead, it creates a second-stage process in which the Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) would study the designated firm’s markets and then decide which firm-specific duties to impose.

That may sound more restrained. It is still a major shift in Brazilian competition policy.

The bill would amend the Brazilian Competition Law (BCL) to create a new Digital Markets Superintendency (SMD) within CADE. It would empower CADE to designate firms as having “systemic relevance in digital markets” for up to 10 years. It would then allow the agency to impose tailor-made “special obligations” drawn from an open-ended statutory menu.

I have previously written here at Truth on the Market about several problems with this proposal. The bill risks quietly pushing aside the consumer-welfare standard and replacing it with vague goals like “the protection of the competitive process” and “the promotion of freedom of choice.”

Lazar Radic and I have also examined the institutional risks of creating the new SMD. That office would duplicate much of the work of CADE’s existing General Superintendence (SG), rather than building digital-market expertise inside CADE’s current investigative body.

The scale of this proposed overhaul deserved a more comprehensive look. To that end, Geoffrey Manne, Dirk Auer, and I recently published an International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) white paper, “Digital Overreach: A Premature Turn to Ex Ante Regulation in Brazil.” Policymakers, legal practitioners, and academics should consult the full paper for a detailed economic and institutional assessment of the proposed regime.

This post highlights several of the paper’s central claims. Bill 4,675/2025 raises serious institutional concerns, and it may be unnecessary, given Brazil’s existing antitrust toolkit.

Europe’s early experience also offers a warning. Importing a DMA-style model could bring meaningful tradeoffs, including higher compliance and operational costs, more user friction, and further strain on Brazil’s already notorious “Custo Brasil”—the regulatory and structural cost of doing business in the country.

With that in mind, here are several points the Brazilian Congress should consider before enacting an ex ante regime like Bill 4,675/2025.

Read the full piece here.

The Hidden Premise: Smuggling Paternalism Through the Back Door

Afamiliar pattern has taken hold in platform regulation—and in the academic and policy commentary that surrounds it. Critics spot a real phenomenon, recast it as . . .

Afamiliar pattern has taken hold in platform regulation—and in the academic and policy commentary that surrounds it. Critics spot a real phenomenon, recast it as market failure, and then press for intervention that far outstrips what the evidence can support. The result: arguments that read as persuasive but collapse under scrutiny. They conflate distinct problems, gloss over the lack of a limiting principle, and land on remedies that are unadministrable, counterproductive, or both.

recent Economist essay by a former competition lawyer offers a clean example.  Writing in the magazine’s By Invitation section, Marie Potel-Saville argues that digital platforms engage in “cognitive exploitation” through infinite scroll, dark patterns, and dopaminergic feedback loops—practices that, in her view, erode the conditions necessary for functioning markets. Her proposed fix would flip the burden of proof, forcing platforms to show they are “not predatory by design” before deployment. The piece is polished and clearly motivated by real concern. It also neatly illustrates the problem it sets out to diagnose.

Read the full piece here.

Europe’s Tech Referee Grades Its Own Homework

The European Commission has reviewed its flagship tech law and declared success. That verdict tells you less about the Digital Markets Act (DMA) than about the referee. . . .

The European Commission has reviewed its flagship tech law and declared success. That verdict tells you less about the Digital Markets Act (DMA) than about the referee.

Across Europe, familiar services now feel off. Google search no longer opens with a clickable map for hotels. Apple’s AirPods still lack live translation. Consent screens interrupt routine tasks. These changes trace back to the DMA, in force since 2024, which dictates how designated ‘gatekeepers’—Apple, Meta, Alphabet and Amazon— must design products for European users.

Read the full piece here.

The DMA’s AI Dilemma: Too Soon, Too Late, or Both?

The European Commission’s first review of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) lands at an awkward moment. Just as Brussels begins to test whether its flagship digital regulation . . .

The European Commission’s first review of the Digital Markets Act (DMA) lands at an awkward moment. Just as Brussels begins to test whether its flagship digital regulation works, AI threatens to change the game the DMA was built to police. The question is not just whether the DMA can handle AI. It is whether lawmakers built it for the right market at all.

As AI spreads, it has sharpened an old question in a new setting: How should competition policy preserve room for innovation while also addressing the anticompetitive risks new technologies can create? The pace of AI development raises an even more pointed concern. Can recently adopted ex ante rules—rules meant to prevent competitive harm before it occurs—remain “future-proof” in digital markets? The DMA did not anticipate AI’s rapid rise. It may age faster than expected.

That concern looks more urgent with the emergence of assistive and agentic AI. These tools could reshape core digital intermediation functions, including web browsing, online search, and e-commerce. Put less grandly: They may change how users find, choose, and buy things online. AI assistants and agents increasingly act as standalone interfaces, allowing users to access third-party goods, services, and content without leaving a conversational environment. That shift could reconfigure where—and how—competitive power concentrates.

This backdrop highlights a familiar tension. Competition law moves slowly, but it adapts. Its open-ended standards can evolve with changing market realities. Sector-specific regulation works differently. It can target problems quickly and directly, but it often locks in assumptions about how markets operate. When technology shifts, those assumptions can break.

The DMA illustrates the tradeoff. Despite its recent adoption, the regime already risks rapid aging. Lawmakers designed it for a digital ecosystem that AI-driven intermediation may soon transform.

Against that backdrop, the European Commission asked stakeholders whether the DMA can address AI-powered services as they roll out. It also considered whether to revise the list of core platform services—the categories of digital services covered by the DMA—and the obligations attached to them.

New AI entrants sit at the center of that inquiry. When existing gatekeepers integrate AI into their ecosystems, the DMA may capture those services. The regulation does not clearly reach new, standalone AI operators.

The report tempers expectations. So far, the Commission has taken a cautious line. It views the DMA as fit for purpose and does not propose amendments. In the Commission’s view, the regulation has proved adaptable enough to keep pace with developments like AI. Even so, its analysis focuses mainly on how existing gatekeepers deploy AI within designated core platform services.

That leaves a mixed picture. The Commission is, at once, both right and wrong.

Read the full piece here.

The FCC Lets Satellite Innovation Breathe

The Federal Communications Commission is finally catching up to the satellites orbiting above it. A pending FCC vote to modernize spectrum-sharing rules would replace a . . .

The Federal Communications Commission is finally catching up to the satellites orbiting above it.

AI, Antitrust, and the Mirage of Data Dominance

Not all supposed barriers to entry are created equal. The ones that matter for antitrust are not just costs, advantages, or inputs controlled by leading . . .

Not all supposed barriers to entry are created equal. The ones that matter for antitrust are not just costs, advantages, or inputs controlled by leading firms. They are durable impediments that keep rivals from entering, expanding, and disciplining market power. That distinction matters in generative artificial intelligence (AI), where policymakers increasingly worry that control over data will entrench a small group of large technology firms.

My recent Albany Law Journal of Science and Technology article, “Is Data Really a Barrier to Entry? Rethinking Competition Regulation in Generative AI,” co-authored with Satya Marrar, challenges that assumption head-on. We argue that fears of data scarcity and monopolization are overstated—and that premature regulation may do more to stifle AI innovation than to protect competition. (See here for a March 2025 Mercatus Center Working Paper version of this article.)

Yes, data matters. But data is not destiny. Standing alone, it is not a sound basis for sweeping ex ante regulation or speculative antitrust attacks on generative AI markets.

Read the full piece here.

Africa’s Imitation Game in Competition Law

African competition authorities are importing the wrong model of competition enforcement—and doing so without the institutional capacity to make even the right model work. Across . . .

African competition authorities are importing the wrong model of competition enforcement—and doing so without the institutional capacity to make even the right model work.

Across the continent, regulators are reaching for Europe’s most ambitious digital frameworks. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Competition and Consumer Commission (CCC) recently overhauled its regime to introduce gatekeeper regulation modeled on the European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA). Nigeria’s Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (FCCPC) fined Meta million for what it framed as a privacy and competition violation grounded in European-style reasoning—albeit flawed. South Africa’s Competition Commission (SACC) has moved from market inquiry to enforcement on digital platforms.

These moves may signal sophistication—and, at first glance, progress. The reality is less encouraging. African institutions are investing heavily in rulemaking while systematically underinvesting in the capacity to administer those rules with competence. The result is not rigorous enforcement, but mimicry. Stripped of the analytical discipline that gives it value, regulation becomes a set of empty forms.

Read the full piece here.

From Competition to Exclusion: Can Discounts Go Too Far?

When does a discount cross the line from competition to exclusion?  That question now sits before a federal district court weighing the U.S. Justice Department’s . . .

When does a discount cross the line from competition to exclusion?  That question now sits before a federal district court weighing the U.S. Justice Department’s (DOJ) antitrust case against Visa Inc. and its debit-card business, where Visa holds a 60% share. In the waning days of the Biden administration, on Sept. 24, 2024, the DOJ filed a complaint in the Southern District of New York alleging violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act under two primary theories of harm.

First, the DOJ claims Visa imposes “de facto exclusivity” on merchants. The theory: merchants route nearly all debit transactions through Visa to hit volume thresholds that unlock loyalty discounts on transaction fees. That, in turn, deprives rival debit networks of the scale they need to compete.

Second, the DOJ alleges Visa neutralizes potential competitors—such as Apple—by sharing monopoly profits through agreements that turn would-be entrants into partners, rather than threats in fintech (i.e., using online technology to deliver financial services).

As to the first theory, the complaint zeroes in on Visa’s use of loyalty discounts, or rebates, to steer transaction routing. Merchants receive these discounts only after hitting volume thresholds—often 90% or more of total debit transactions. Route more to Visa, pay less. Route less, lose the discount. The DOJ argues this structure operates as a de facto exclusive-dealing arrangement that deters merchants from sending transactions to rival networks.

Step back for a moment. Why do merchants have any routing choice at all? If a consumer uses a Visa debit card at the point of sale, doesn’t the consumer decide the network?

Not quite.

In 2010, Congress enacted the Durbin Amendment as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act; it took effect in 2012. The amendment requires that each debit card connect to at least two unaffiliated networks capable of processing transactions. Typically, one network appears on the “front of the card”—Visa, Mastercard, American Express, or Discover—and another on the “back of the card.” That second option usually involves a PIN-debit network with roots in ATM transactions, such as STAR, NYCE, Accel, Pulse, or Shazam. At the point of sale, the merchant—not the consumer—chooses how to route the transaction.

This post advances three considerations for assessing the legality of loyalty discounts.

First, antitrust law generally resists punishing firms for offering lower prices. As a result, claims of predatory pricing (prices so low they force rivals to exit) or exclusionary discounting (pricing structures that induce buyers to concentrate purchases with a single supplier) face well-defined legal and economic hurdles.

Second, the legality of loyalty discounts often turns on two factors: whether the discounts span multiple products, and how much of a buyer’s demand remains “contestable” versus “non-contestable.” For example, if a merchant processes 100 debit transactions per period but only 20 can be routed to a PIN network, the contestable share is 20%.

Third, the DOJ’s emphasis on harm through denying rivals “scale” raises a threshold problem. The complaint never defines scale, specifies the level required for competition, or ties the concept to market-specific evidence.

Read the full piece here.

The Price of Watching Prices: Italy’s Slow Slide from Markets to Management

If regulators could make markets behave simply by watching them more closely, Italy would be about to crack the code. Instead, the Italian government’s latest . . .

If regulators could make markets behave simply by watching them more closely, Italy would be about to crack the code.

Instead, the Italian government’s latest energy measures suggest something else: when prices rise, the instinct is not just to subsidize costs, but to supervise how those costs flow through the system—down to how firms bid, price, and earn margins. The result looks less like market oversight and more like a slow drift toward price control, dressed up as “pass-through” enforcement.

That shift matters. It reflects a broader belief that competition can be fine-tuned from above by monitoring costs, constraining pricing, and scrutinizing margins. The two decrees at the center of Italy’s response—the Decreto Carburanti and the Decreto Bollette—put that belief into practice.

Read the full piece here.

No-Fly Zone: Why AI Doesn’t Need Helicopter Regulation

hen a new product or service appears, some public officials default to helicopter regulation. The instinct to “do something, anything” rarely pays off—just ask helicopter . . .

hen a new product or service appears, some public officials default to helicopter regulation. The instinct to “do something, anything” rarely pays off—just ask helicopter parents and their kids. An overbearing approach drains the finite resources of lawmakers, enforcement agencies, and innovators. The public bears the cost: officials fixate on a single issue instead of more pressing problems, and consumers wait longer for innovations held up by regulatory hurdles.

The White House’s AI Action Plan takes a lighter touch. It directs the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to prioritize innovation, which has translated into more measured enforcement and fewer regulatory burdens. So far, the FTC and the U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) have resisted calls to recast the agencies as all-purpose AI regulators.

Read the full piece here.

The Waterbed Effect Doesn’t Hold Water

Afamiliar concern in antitrust-adjacent debates goes like this: when a company such as Walmart grows large enough, it can strong-arm suppliers into steep discounts. Suppliers, . . .

Afamiliar concern in antitrust-adjacent debates goes like this: when a company such as Walmart grows large enough, it can strong-arm suppliers into steep discounts. Suppliers, in turn, recoup those lost margins by charging smaller grocery stores more. Those smaller stores raise prices. The big chain’s gains come at everyone else’s expense—prices fall on one end because they rise on the other. That’s the “waterbed effect.”

It’s a—maybe not compelling—but a story. A 2023 New York Times op-ed argued that this mechanism drives high grocery prices, noting that “as suppliers cut special deals for Walmart and other large chains, they make up for the lost revenue by charging smaller retailers even more, something economists refer to as the water bed effect.” The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has raised concerns about it for years. The United Kingdom’s Competition Commission has investigated it.

Regulators that have actually examined the waterbed effect tend to be skeptical. In its 2008 groceries investigation, the UK Competition Commission considered the theory and declined to rely on it, finding the evidence insufficient. Two years earlier, the UK Office of Fair Trading concluded that “there are theoretical questions that would need to be resolved before concluding that the price differentials observed are evidence of a waterbed effect.” As Eric Fruits put it on this blog, the waterbed was a notion without a model—and without a model, it was headed the same way as the real-world waterbed.

Then it got a model.

In 2011, Roman Inderst and Tommaso Valletti published a paper in the Journal of Industrial Economics that gave the waterbed a formal theoretical foundation. Their model features a supplier selling to a large buyer and smaller rivals. The large buyer’s scale gives it bargaining leverage, so the supplier compensates by charging the smaller rivals more. In the model, that is exactly what happens: the large buyer pays less, and the smaller rivals pay more. That result is straightforward.

The paper goes further. It claims the waterbed harms consumers—not just smaller firms, but shoppers at the checkout, who face higher prices on average. That is the result that matters for antitrust, which turns on consumer harm. It is also how the authors close their abstract.

I have a new working paper that shows consumer harm is impossible in their model.

Read the full piece here.

The Last Mile Is a Paper Trail: Why Broadband Gets Stuck

Everyone wants faster broadband—no one wants to wait for the permits. Modern communications infrastructure doesn’t stand still. Providers must keep investing in upgrades and expansion . . .

Everyone wants faster broadband—no one wants to wait for the permits.

Modern communications infrastructure doesn’t stand still. Providers must keep investing in upgrades and expansion to meet consumer demand. Next-generation applications—artificial intelligence (AI), artificial reality (AR), and virtual reality (VR)—will require robust infrastructure to support them. That infrastructure depends on sustained investment from a wide range of firms, including broadband providers.

Those providers invest only when they can expect a return. Policymakers who want to unlock the benefits of next-generation infrastructure should focus on reducing the transaction costs tied to broadband deployment. Lower those costs, and more projects will pencil out.

Permitting stands out as one of the most significant of those costs. Before breaking ground or attaching wireless facilities to buildings and towers, providers must secure approvals from multiple local and federal authorities. These costs include not just permit fees, but also the uncertainty of denial and the delays that can stall projects.

H.R. 2289, the American Broadband Deployment Act (ABDA), offers one path forward. Sponsored by Rep. Earl L. “Buddy” Carter (R-Ga.), the bill would impose shot clocks on local permitting authorities to accelerate approvals and franchising, and require fees to remain cost-based and reasonable. More notably, it would streamline federal environmental and historic-preservation review, significantly reducing the burden on providers. The House Energy and Commerce Committee has cleared the measure, and the full House is expected to take it up in the coming weeks.

If the United States wants to lead in next-generation applications, it needs the infrastructure to match. Broadband deployment represents just one piece of that puzzle, but it’s a critical one. Reducing transaction costs will do more than ease deployment—it will encourage the investment needed to build the networks of the future.

Read the full piece here.

AI’s Scientific Ethos and the Moat That Wouldn’t Hold

Google may have built the foundation of the modern AI economy—and then published the instructions. In 2017, eight researchers across Google’s Brain and Research divisions . . .

Google may have built the foundation of the modern AI economy—and then published the instructions.

In 2017, eight researchers across Google’s Brain and Research divisions released a paper titled “Attention Is All You Need.” What followed is now familiar: a technological inflection point, rapid diffusion, and an explosion of competitors building on the same core idea. Less appreciated is the mechanism behind it. This is not just a story about a breakthrough. It is a story about why that breakthrough did not—and perhaps could not—remain proprietary.

That dynamic is the focus of this post. The norms that govern AI research—what I will call the “scientific ethos”—systematically undermine any single firm’s ability to hoard knowledge for long. The transformer is the clearest example.

Read the full piece here.

PRO Codes Act: The Hidden Costs of ‘Free’ Standards

TL;DR Background: The Promoting Responsible and Open Codes Act (PRO Codes Act) is framed as a transparency measure to ensure that standards incorporated into law are . . .

TL;DR

Background: The Promoting Responsible and Open Codes Act (PRO Codes Act) is framed as a transparency measure to ensure that standards incorporated into law are freely accessible. It would require standards-development organizations (SDOs) to post incorporated standards online at no cost or risk losing copyright protection. Supporters argue this guarantees public access to binding legal obligations.

But… Standards development relies on a delicate economic model. Most SDOs fund the costly, expert-driven creation and updating of technical standards through copyright revenues. The PRO Codes Act would condition copyright on government use, effectively converting a property right into a revocable license. Moreover, by treating all SDOs alike, it collapses distinctions between voluntary, expert-driven bodies and those that lobby for statutory adoption—risking the incentives that sustain the broader standards ecosystem.

Moreover… Courts already balance access and incentives through doctrines such as fair use and the government-edicts rule. These tools permit public dissemination, while preserving copyright. A sweeping statutory mandate would replace this flexible framework with a blunt rule—one that risks destabilizing standards development, reducing investment in technical expertise, and weakening U.S. leadership in global standards-setting.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

From Property Right to Permission Slip

The PRO Codes Act does more than expand access to the law. By tying copyright protection to whether a standard is incorporated into regulation, it effectively creates a zero-price compulsory-licensing regime. Government action becomes the trigger for extinguishing exclusivity, transforming copyright from a stable property right into a contingent one.

This shift extends beyond standards-setting. If Congress establishes that government use can condition or eliminate copyright protection, it sets a precedent for other domains where private works serve public functions. The result is not just greater access, but greater uncertainty about the durability of intellectual-property rights.

Over time, this conditionality could chill investment in complex, high-cost works that depend on predictable exclusivity for cost recovery—especially where government adoption is foreseeable.

One Size Fits None

Not all SDOs operate the same way. Voluntary-adoption organizations rely on expert consensus and copyright revenues, and regulators incorporate their standards by reference based on technical merit. By contrast, some organizations lobby for wholesale adoption and then monetize access. The PRO Codes Act targets perceived problems in the latter model, but imposes costs across the entire ecosystem—including organizations that do not control whether their standards are incorporated into law.

A more tailored approach would focus on the real issue: not the existence of copyright, but the interaction between lobbying for wholesale legal adoption and reliance on exclusivity. By failing to distinguish between these models, the PRO Codes Act risks solving a narrow problem with a broad rule.

That approach may blunt incentives for voluntary, expert-driven standards development while doing little to address the specific dynamics at issue. In effect, it replaces a problem of institutional design and incentives with a one-size-fits-all mandate.

Killing the Golden Geese

Standards are a classic public good. They require significant upfront investment, but cost almost nothing to distribute. Copyright provides the exclusion mechanism that enables cost recovery and cross-subsidization across thousands of standards, many with limited commercial demand. Remove that mechanism, and both the quantity and quality of future standards will likely decline.

The effects would be uneven but significant. Demand is highly skewed, with a small number of widely adopted “core” standards generating much of the revenue that supports the broader portfolio. If those standards are forced into free distribution, the cross-subsidy that sustains niche or emerging standards begins to unravel.

Over time, SDOs may shift resources toward projects with clearer funding paths or scale back updates and maintenance for less commercially viable standards. The result is not just fewer standards, but slower revision cycles and weaker technical quality—especially where up-to-date guidance is most critical.

From Scalpel to Sledgehammer

Existing case law has developed a nuanced framework. Courts allow free public dissemination of standards in certain contexts—particularly for nonprofit or educational uses—while preserving copyright protections more broadly. This case-by-case approach expands access without eliminating incentives. The PRO Codes Act would replace this calibrated system with a rigid statutory rule.

That flexibility matters because contexts differ. Courts distinguish between wholesale enactment of a code, incorporation by reference, nonprofit republication, and commercial reuse, tailoring outcomes accordingly. In some cases, they recognize fair use to ensure access; in others, they preserve copyright where needed to sustain the underlying enterprise.

This incremental approach allows doctrine to evolve alongside technology and market practices. A brightline statutory mandate, by contrast, risks displacing this adaptive framework with a one-directional solution that expands access while eliminating the legal tools courts use to balance competing interests.

Undermining Our Own Playbook

The PRO Codes Act is framed as a transparency reform, but it operates as a structural change to copyright. By addressing concerns tied to a subset of SDOs through a broad statutory rule, it risks undermining the economic foundation of standards development as a whole. A more measured approach would preserve existing legal doctrines that already balance public access with the incentives needed to sustain the system.

The United States benefits from a decentralized, private-sector-led standards system that draws on global expertise. Weakening its intellectual-property foundation could slow innovation, reduce participation, and cede influence to countries pursuing more centralized standards strategies.

This risk is not theoretical. U.S. leadership in standards-setting depends on private organizations’ ability to convene global experts and continuously update technically sophisticated frameworks at scale. The model attracts international participation because it operates at arm’s length from direct political control and relies on sustainable funding.

If those incentives weaken, participation may shift toward jurisdictions where standards development aligns more closely with state policy and industrial strategy. In that environment, technical standards can become tools of geopolitical competition, shaping supply chains, interoperability, and market access..

A policy that weakens U.S.-based SDOs could carry downstream effects on competitiveness, innovation ecosystems, and the global diffusion of U.S.-aligned technical norms.

For more on this topic, see the International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) issue brief “SDOs, Copyright, and the Threat of Surreptitious Compulsory Licensing” by Kristian Stout. 

Bad Medicine: Why Breaking Up Big Health Care Could Make It Worse

Washington has found its latest villain: “Big Medicine.” The proposed fix? Break it up and hope the pieces behave better than the whole. Americans have real . . .

Washington has found its latest villain: “Big Medicine.” The proposed fix? Break it up and hope the pieces behave better than the whole.

Americans have real reasons to be frustrated about high health care costs, and large conglomerates rank somewhere between unpopular and reviled—roughly where Microsoft’s “Clippy” sat in the 1990s. So it’s no surprise that Sens. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) have teamed up to introduce S. 3822, the Break Up Big Medicine Act (BMBA). The bipartisan bill targets vertical integration—firms operating at multiple levels of the supply chain—in health care.

If enacted, the BMBA would bar parent companies of prescription-drug or medical-device wholesalers from owning or controlling health care providers or management services organizations (MSOs). It would also prohibit parent companies from owning or controlling both insurers or pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) and care providers.

The bill defines “providers” broadly. It sweeps in physician practices and hospitals, along with pharmacies, urgent- and emergency-care providers, and ambulatory-surgery centers. MSOs include entities that support providers with “payroll, human resources, employment screening, payer contracting, billing and collection, coding, information technology … patient scheduling, property or equipment leasing, and administrative or business services,” as well as other nonclinical functions.

The BMBA never defines “control.” That omission matters. It could extend the prohibition beyond full ownership to cover negative controls, minority equity stakes with governance rights, or other governance arrangements.

The compliance timeline is tight. Covered entities would have just one year to divest prohibited assets. That is a tall order. Untangling conglomerates, splitting data systems, reallocating contracts, and rebuilding independent management structures carry significant operational risk. The bill also opens the door to enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), U.S. Justice Department (DOJ), and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), as well as state attorneys general and private plaintiffs. It authorizes the FTC and DOJ to challenge future mergers and acquisitions, and it imposes penalties that include forced divestiture and profit disgorgement.

States have already experimented with similar “break up” efforts. Arkansas, for example, is locked in a constitutional fight over a law that bars PBMs from owning or controlling pharmacy chains. Even supporters of stricter PBM regulation have criticized the measure for risking pharmacy closures, creating “pharmacy deserts,” and limiting access to medicines in rural areas. Other states—including MassachusettsCalifornia, and Oregon—have taken a different tack, imposing structural limits on health care ownership primarily through expanded merger review.

Supporters of the BMBA argue that separating ownership will boost competition. In their view, integration creates conflicts of interest that allow firms to leverage supply chains, exclude rivals, limit patient choice, and raise prices. But the economic evidence offers a more complicated picture. Vertical integration can create harmful conflicts in some cases. In others, it can align incentives, reduce costs, and improve how firms meet patient needs. Blanket bans risk missing that distinction—and may produce the opposite of their intended effect.

Read the full piece here.

Too Much Order, Too Soon: The Case Against AI Term Sheets

Washington may be closing in on an AI “term sheet.” The industry, meanwhile, is already writing its own rules. Recent commentary suggests U.S. artificial intelligence . . .

Washington may be closing in on an AI “term sheet.” The industry, meanwhile, is already writing its own rules.

Recent commentary suggests U.S. artificial intelligence (AI) policy may be coalescing around a federal framework. A widely discussed Tech Policy Press piece argues that a short “term sheet” emerging from negotiations between the White House and industry could reshape American AI policy. An Axios report, meanwhile, highlights how Anthropic imposed constraints on its latest model before release. Taken together, these developments point to two distinct—and too often conflated—mechanisms of governance: political coordination and market discipline. Washington policy debates fixate on the former. The latter already shapes behavior across the industry.

That distinction matters. A political “term sheet” can influence expectations, shape investment decisions, spur compliance planning, and create focal points for firms trying to anticipate the regulatory landscape. It can affect how boards, general counsel, venture investors, enterprise customers, and journalists define “responsible AI.” In that limited sense, the strongest version of the term-sheet argument holds: nonbinding political coordination can produce real economic effects before Congress enacts a statute or an agency promulgates a rule.

But that concession does not answer the harder question—whether those effects are beneficial. The issue is not whether a term sheet shapes expectations. It is how it shapes them, and whether it improves or distorts the market process through which information about AI safety, reliability, and value emerges. Skepticism is warranted. In a fast-moving industry defined by dispersed knowledge, entrepreneurial experimentation, and radical uncertainty, a politically generated focal point can do more than reduce uncertainty at the margin. It can create the wrong kind of certainty—and in the AI context, that may prove worse than having less of it.

Read the full piece here.

Brussels’ AI Squeeze: Regulating What It Leaves Standing

Brussels has boxed itself into a familiar corner: first limit how a platform can make money, then regulate what is left. The European Commission’s case against . . .

Brussels has boxed itself into a familiar corner: first limit how a platform can make money, then regulate what is left. The European Commission’s case against Meta over WhatsApp is a near-perfect illustration.

On April 15, the European Commission sent Meta a Supplementary Statement of Objections. It signaled its intent to order the company to restore third-party AI assistants’ access to WhatsApp under the terms that applied before Meta’s Oct. 15, 2025 policy change. The move—an interim-measures procedure—marks the latest front in an increasingly strained effort to police competition in generative AI.

The case makes little sense from a consumer-welfare standpoint. It reads less like a coherent theory of harm and more like an attempt to “do something” about generative AI, with the analysis shaped to fit that goal. The Commission proposes to deploy one of its most far-reaching—and rarely used—enforcement tools to protect competitors in a market that, by almost any reasonable metric, remains intensely competitive.

The result is what Robert Bork famously called a “policy at war with itself.”

Read the full piece here.

Schrödinger’s Quantum Market: Regulating What May or May Not Exist

Competition authorities are gearing up to regulate quantum computing. The problem: there is no market there yet. In March 2026, the Italian Competition Authority (AGCM) . . .

Competition authorities are gearing up to regulate quantum computing. The problem: there is no market there yet.

In March 2026, the Italian Competition Authority (AGCM) launched an “IC59 fact-finding inquiry” into quantum, citing concerns that ongoing developments could shape long-term competition. Drawing on lessons from artificial intelligence (AI) and cloud markets, the AGCM flagged familiar risks: lock-in, technological preemption, and barriers to knowledge and entry.

The move reflects a broader shift in European competition policy following the Digital Markets Act (DMA). Regulators now focus less on prices and market share, and more on how markets are designed and governed—especially where control over key inputs may entrench gatekeepers and confer durable advantages.

That shift carries real risks for emerging technologies like quantum computing. The AGCM casts its inquiry as a “timely reconnaissance” of a nascent market—exploratory, not enforcement-driven. Even so, treating the quantum ecosystem as if it were already a mature market risks overstating what we can know about its trajectory. The technology remains too uncertain for reliable market analysis. Any risk assessment necessarily rests, at least in part, on incomplete and uncertain information, raising the prospect of unintended consequences for technological development.

Competition law rests on familiar assumptions: markets generate observable signals, and analysts can use those signals to assess competitive dynamics and identify harm. Authorities evaluate conduct—pricing, access restrictions, exclusionary agreements—against established benchmarks grounded in current market conditions and evidence. In quantum computing, however, market structures remain too underdeveloped to support meaningful competition analysis.

Read the full piece here.

‘Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis after Kodak,’ by Benjamin Klein

In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services that a firm without market power in photocopiers might still possess market . . .

In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services that a firm without market power in photocopiers might still possess market power in photocopier parts and service. The Court’s logic turned on opportunistic hold-up: Kodak could profit by trading short-run exploitation of locked-in customers for long-run losses in equipment sales. That tradeoff, the Court concluded, could establish antitrust market power.

Benjamin Klein’s 1993 article, “Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis after Kodak,” alls this a category error. Hold-up is real; Klein helped define it in “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process” (1978), co-authored with Robert Crawford and Armen Alchian.

But hold-up is not market power. The Court took the framework Klein helped build and pressed it into service for a task it was never meant to perform.

That misstep carries a broader lesson for law & economics. The Court in Kodak relied on sound economic concepts—hold-up, switching costs, lock-in—but aimed them at the wrong legal question. Law & economics demands more than importing good economics into legal disputes. It requires matching the right economic concept to the right legal question. Klein’s contribution lies in doing exactly that—and in understanding both sides well enough to know the difference.

Read the full piece here.

Rinse, Repeat, Reject: ‘Washing’ Claims in Antitrust

Although not a single, Mitski’s “Washing Machine Heart” ranks among her most popular songs. Its insistent drumbeat echoes the spin cycle of an old washing . . .

Although not a single, Mitski’s “Washing Machine Heart” ranks among her most popular songs. Its insistent drumbeat echoes the spin cycle of an old washing machine, recalling the singer’s frustration with her romantic life.

Competition policy has its own fixation on “washing.” In this context, “washing” describes efforts by undertakings to invoke public policy goals—such as sustainability, privacy, or sovereignty—to justify anticompetitive conduct. The terminology has proliferated. “Greenwashing” is now standard; “privacy-washing” has gained traction; and “sovereignty-washing” has entered the lexicon. Many commentators now treat these risks as widespread and in need of urgent attention.

That concern is overstated. European Union competition law leaves little room for undertakings to defend otherwise anticompetitive conduct by invoking public policy objectives. The risk of successful “washing” strategies remains low under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and almost nonexistent under Article 102 TFEU.

Read the full piece here.

Turning Down the Thinking: A Law & Economics Trilogue on AI Throttling

Three section leads at the International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) read the same viral GitHub post and reached three different conclusions. Call it a trilogue—three views, one problem, and...

Three section leads at the International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) read the same viral GitHub post and reached three different conclusions. Call it a trilogue—three views, one problem, and a technology that refuses to sit still.

The GitHub issue filed last week against Anthropic’s Claude Code product carried a blunt title: “Claude Code is unusable for complex engineering tasks with the Feb updates.” The author—Stella Laurenzo, an AMD senior AI director—laid out a detailed account of technical decline.

According to Laurenzo, months of session-log data show that from January to March, median “thinking” output fell roughly 70%. The model began bailing out or asking permission to continue about 10 times per day—up from zero before early March. Self-contradictions in its reasoning tripled. API requests spiked, suggesting users had to retry repeatedly to get usable results.

Most striking, performance appeared to degrade during peak GPU-load hours and recover late at night. That pattern offers circumstantial—but suggestive—evidence that quality was being throttled as a function of server demand, rather than any deliberate design improvement.

The issue went viral. Within about 20 minutes of reading it, three of us found ourselves in a lively disagreement about how to understand it through a law & economics lens.

Read the full piece here.

C’est Presumé: France’s AI Copyright Shortcut

Generative AI strains nearly every layer of copyright law. Policymakers have focused most on one pressure point: the use of copyrighted works to train AI . . .

Generative AI strains nearly every layer of copyright law. Policymakers have focused most on one pressure point: the use of copyrighted works to train AI models. Fitting that practice into a legal framework that supports both creative industries and the AI sector has proved difficult.

Against that backdrop, a recent French Senate proposal would add a striking procedural innovation. It creates a presumption that AI systems used protected works whenever there is a plausible indication of such use. In practice, that shifts the burden of proof in civil cases. Plaintiffs would no longer need to show their works were used in training or deployment. AI providers would have to prove they were not.

At first glance, the idea has intuitive appeal. It responds to a well-known problem in AI litigation: information asymmetry. Model developers control the key facts—training data, model architecture, and deployment. Rightsholders and other outsiders often lack visibility into whether and how their works were used. Seen this way, the proposal aims to rebalance evidentiary burdens in light of technological change. Done carefully, that approach could benefit both creators and AI developers.

The details matter. The French proposal collapses distinct categories of evidence into a single trigger for burden shifting. That choice carries significant consequences for how the rule would operate in practice.

Read the full piece here.

A Fistful of Discretion: The UK’s DMCC After Two Years

When Sergio Leone shot “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly” in 1966, he refused to hand the audience a clean moral. The “Good” wasn’t . . .

When Sergio Leone shot “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly” in 1966, he refused to hand the audience a clean moral. The “Good” wasn’t really good. The “Bad” looked almost restrained next to the Civil War’s industrial-scale carnage. And the “Ugly” drew your sympathy—even as you questioned why.

Two years into the Competition and Markets Authority’s (CMA) enforcement of the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act (DMCC), a similar ambiguity hangs over the United Kingdom’s flagship digital-competition regime. Plenty deserves praise. Plenty invites criticism. More unsettling, the balance between the two may turn less on the statute itself than on who stands at the regulatory saloon door.

On balance, this story looks more encouraging than the one unfolding across the Channel under the European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA). The CMA has largely resisted the European Commission’s instinct to fire every barrel at once. At times, it has declined to fire at all. It has also shown a real—if uneven—sensitivity to the costs of intervening in markets that may already function tolerably well.

But those same features expose the regime’s fragility. The DMCC’s better outcomes reflect well-exercised regulatory discretion. And discretion can evaporate with a change in government.

With that caveat in mind, let’s survey the terrain.

Read the full piece here.

The Nanny State Goes Shopping

Antitrust used to ask a simple question: are firms making consumers worse off? Increasingly, it asks a different one: are consumers making the “wrong” choices? . . .

Antitrust used to ask a simple question: are firms making consumers worse off? Increasingly, it asks a different one: are consumers making the “wrong” choices?

The consumer welfare standard (CWS) often draws criticism as narrow or inattentive to broader concerns. That familiar critique rests on a basic misunderstanding of what the standard is designed to do.

At bottom, the disagreement concerns what should trigger antitrust intervention. Under the CWS, intervention is warranted when market power distorts consumer demand—when firms restrict output and raise prices, blocking transactions that would otherwise occur. The issue is not what consumers choose, but whether firms have constrained or manipulated those choices.

Many contemporary critiques start from a different premise. They would justify intervention even when consumers freely select among available options. On this view, market outcomes—the dominance of certain platforms, levels of concentration, particular business models—count as problematic not because demand is distorted, but because they reflect preferences that regulators or scholars dislike. Neo-Brandeisian theorists have pushed to replace the CWS with a new legal standard, arguing that the existing framework errs in “orienting antitrust toward material rather than political ends” and should instead serve as a tool for “improving democratic self-government.”

That shift creates a paradox. Proponents frame their approach as populist and democratic , urging that antitrust operate “not solely as part of corporate law, but also as part of political law” in service of the “public interest.” Yet it requires sidelining the preferences of the very consumers it claims to protect.

In practice, this approach replaces the public’s revealed preferences with an abstract vision of what regulators think the “Public Interest” should be. That vision often runs in the opposite direction—correcting, rather than enabling, consumer choices. We call this “anti-consumer welfare antitrust”: anti-consumer in substance, while functioning as a welfare check for laggard competitors, politically salient groups, and other rent-seekers.

The result is predictable. Real consumers end up footing the bill for regulators’ paternalism and for the academic theories that encourage it.

Read the full piece here.

Opening Pandora’s Interface: AI Assistants and the DMA

If the Digital Markets Act (DMA) is going to force open the most sensitive parts of modern smartphones, it will have to answer a basic . . .

If the Digital Markets Act (DMA) is going to force open the most sensitive parts of modern smartphones, it will have to answer a basic question it has so far sidestepped: how much security risk is too much in the name of interoperability?

In January, the European Commission opened proceedings to define Google’s duties under the DMA for Android. The focus: how much access third-party AI services should get to features like hotword detection, on-screen content, and audio-output monitoring—capabilities Google currently reserves for its own AI assistants. The Commission has six months to issue a specification decision, and its announcement already signals where it may land.

This marks the first time the Commission has applied Article 6(7) DMA—the interoperability obligation for operating systems—to AI-assistant features. It has already deployed the same provision against Apple. In March 2025, it issued two specification decisions requiring Apple to open iOS connectivity features—near field communication (NFC), Wi-Fi, Bluetooth pairing, and notification forwarding—to third-party devices. In doing so, the Commission developed a narrow “integrity” doctrine that sharply limits when gatekeepers may restrict interoperability on security and privacy grounds.

The key question is whether that doctrine can hold when applied to the more sensitive system access that AI services demand. I argue that the Commission should offer a more robust, explicit account of Article 6(7) for AI-facing features—one that advances the DMA’s aims while accommodating security controls. Otherwise, the DMA risks an awkward outcome: interoperability for an AI assistant’s sensory inputs—what appears on a screen or plays through a device’s speakers—would face a weaker legal safety valve than something like sideloading an app.

The legal basis for the Android proceedings lies in Article 6(7) DMA, which requires gatekeepers to:

… allow providers of services and providers of hardware, free of charge, effective interoperability with, and access for the purposes of interoperability to, the same hardware and software features accessed or controlled via the operating system … as are available to services or hardware provided by the gatekeeper.

Article 6(7) also reaches “hardware or software features” not formally part of the operating system if they are “available to, or used by” the gatekeeper in providing services “together with, or in support of” the operating system.

Read the full piece here.

Cloudy Logic: The DMA’s Search for a Gatekeeper

The Digital Markets Act (DMA) was supposed to target gatekeepers. Instead, it is chasing a market that has no gate. Last November, the European Commission . . .

The Digital Markets Act (DMA) was supposed to target gatekeepers. Instead, it is chasing a market that has no gate.

Last November, the European Commission opened three market investigations  into whether Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure qualify as gatekeepers under the DMA—even as it acknowledged that no cloud service provider meets the act’s own quantitative thresholds. That admission deserves more attention than it has received. It is not a procedural footnote. It is a quiet confession that the framework does not fit.

The DMA was always a blunt instrument—an agglomeration of highly heterogeneous companies and products shoehorned into a single, static regulatory regime, united by little more than size, American origin, and political unpopularity in Brussels. No category in the law’s sprawling list of core platform services (CPS) better exposes that incoherence than cloud computing.

Cloud is not a platform. It is not a gateway. It does not connect millions of consumers to businesses. It is B2B infrastructure. Yet the Commission now presses ahead with bespoke investigations to sidestep the logic—and the thresholds—its own regulation imposes. Understanding why, and what it reveals, goes to the core of what is wrong with the DMA.

Read the full piece here.

Could Scania Become the “Sweeper” in the Truck Cartel Damages Claims?

Last week, the Spanish Supreme Court held a hearing on several appeals against four Provincial Court rulings regarding Scania’s liability for damages caused by the . . .

Last week, the Spanish Supreme Court held a hearing on several appeals against four Provincial Court rulings regarding Scania’s liability for damages caused by the truck cartel. Although each appeal is distinct, the hearing focused on the common issues raised by these newer claims.

This post does not aim to summarize the hearing or to speculate about the outcome of the appeals (a matter on which the Supreme Court will surely rule before the end of April). Instead, it focuses on the final point raised by Scania’s counsel in oral argument: could Scania become the “sweeper” in Spanish truck cartel damages litigation? Put differently, can it end up being the defendant against whom claims are still viable even when actions against the manufacturer of the truck actually purchased are no longer available, or are procedurally more difficult.

Read the full piece here.

The COMPETE Act: California’s Hostile Takeover

TL;DR Background: California Assembly Bill 1776, known as the COMPETE Act, would amend the state’s Cartwright Act by regulating single-firm conduct. It expands the definition . . .

TL;DR

Background: California Assembly Bill 1776, known as the COMPETE Act, would amend the state’s Cartwright Act by regulating single-firm conduct. It expands the definition of an illegal trust to include actions by “one or more persons” that monopolize a market and directs courts to reject federal antitrust standards. The bill eliminates the need to prove market-power thresholds and relaxes requirements for establishing predatory pricing.

But… Disconnecting California antitrust law from the federal error-cost framework could harm consumers and chill innovation. U.S. antitrust policy aims to avoid false positives—mistakenly condemning lawful, competitive conduct. Such judicial errors can deter firms from lowering prices or improving products. By making it easier for plaintiffs to prevail, AB 1776 risks penalizing conduct that benefits consumers.

Moreover… This expansion of liability would likely impose significant economic costs. An analysis by the Computer and Communications Industry Association estimates that AB 1776 could reduce California’s gross domestic product by $1 trillion and eliminate 1.6 million jobs over 10 years. Such a regulatory environment would likely drive businesses away.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

When Caution Gives Way to Overreach

For decades, federal courts have applied an “error-cost” framework in antitrust cases, recognizing that markets often self-correct. False positives—when courts punish lawful conduct—cause lasting harm by deterring investment and innovation. Federal courts therefore require strong evidence before intervening. AB 1776 would abandon that discipline.

The bill directs courts to interpret the law liberally and allows plaintiffs to prevail without showing defined market power. It treats traditional indicators of market power as optional, without offering clear substitutes.

In a public comment, ICLE warns that removing these safeguards would skew enforcement toward costly false positives and leave liability to the subjective judgments of courts and juries.

Cheap Prices, Expensive Mistakes

Predatory pricing occurs when a firm prices below cost to drive rivals from the market.

In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court set a demanding standard: plaintiffs must show below-cost pricing and a dangerous probability of recoupment through later monopoly pricing. The Court cautioned that punishing low prices without likely recoupment would deter the price competition antitrust law seeks to protect.

If recoupment is unlikely, low prices benefit consumers. AB 1776 would eliminate this requirement and other limiting principles. As then-Judge Stephen Breyer explained, “the consequence of a mistake… is to penalize a procompetitive price cut.” Without clear limits, firms may raise prices to avoid liability—the opposite of sound antitrust policy.

Don’t Look at the Other Side

Much of the digital economy relies on multi-sided platforms. Credit-card networks serve cardholders, merchants, and banks. Social-media platforms serve users, advertisers, and content creators.

In Ohio v. American Express Co., the U.S. Supreme Court held that courts must evaluate both sides of a platform to assess competitive effects. Drawing on work by Richard Schmalensee & David Evans and Benjamin Klein, Andres Lerner, Kevin Murphy, & Lacey Plache, the Court emphasized that both sides matter.

AB 1776 would render such analysis unnecessary. It bars courts from weighing harms in one market against benefits in another, even when they are economically linked.

As Herbert Hovenkamp observes, this is “like doing cost-benefit analysis by looking only at costs.” A platform could face liability for raising advertising prices to fund free consumer services, without any consideration of consumer benefits.

No Clear Limits, No Clear Law

AB 1776 does not merely relax federal standards—it rejects them. The bill repeatedly cites established doctrines, only to disclaim them as nonbinding.

It emphasizes that the Cartwright Act is “broader in range and deeper in reach” than the Sherman Act and treats federal precedent as persuasive, at most. At the same time, it removes core limiting principles—= like market-power thresholds, recoupment requirements, and structured liability tests—all without replacing them.

This pattern extends to other doctrines. In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court set a narrow standard for imposing a duty to deal, describing it as “at or near the outer boundary” of liability. AB 1776 instead treats traditional factors—such as terminating a prior course of dealing—as optional evidence.

The result is a regime with fewer rules and more discretion, increasing uncertainty for businesses and investors.

The Monopsony Mirage

AB 1776 would also target “monopsonization,” or excessive buyer-side power.

The bill focuses on firms as dominant buyers of labor. While antitrust law can address wage suppression, measuring labor-market power is notoriously difficult. Labor markets have unclear boundaries, and economists disagree on how to assess wage-setting power.

ICLE scholars note there is no consensus on the proper framework for labor monopsony. Writing unsettled theories into law would likely invite speculative litigation and complicate compensation practices.

When Everyone Is Protected, No One Is

AB 1776 opens with a sweeping statement of purpose. It aims to protect “free and fair competition,” “all trade participants,” and even an “environment” conducive to democratic, political, and social institutions.

This departs from the U.S. Supreme Court’s principle in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States that antitrust law protects “competition, not competitors.” By attempting to protect everyone, the bill obscures necessary tradeoffs.

The result is a standard that risks condemning conduct that benefits consumers, without clear guidance on how to balance competing interests.

When Punishment Loses Its Sting

Companies comply with antitrust law not only to avoid penalties, but also to protect their reputations. In a Houston Law Review article, Murat C. Mungan and John M. Yun describe how overbroad enforcement can weaken this signal—the “stigma dilution effect.”

Under the consumer-welfare standard, a violation clearly signals consumer harm. AB 1776 blurs that signal by treating pro-consumer conduct—such as lower prices or better products—as potential violations.

When violations become too broadly defined, a guilty verdict loses meaning. Paradoxically, that loss of stigma could encourage, rather than deter, the conduct the law targets.

For further analysis, see ICLE’s comments to the California Law Revision Commission Study of Antitrust Law, “Against the ‘Europeanization’ of California’s Antitrust Law” and the Truth on the Market post “California Dreamin’ or an Antitrust Nightmare?” by Daniel J. Gilman.

California’s BASED Act: Flawed Antitrust Economics

TL;DR Background: California Senate Bill 1074, known as the BASED Act, seeks to stop large digital platforms from favoring their own products over those of . . .

TL;DR

Background: California Senate Bill 1074, known as the BASED Act, seeks to stop large digital platforms from favoring their own products over those of competitors. Sen. Scott Wiener (D-San Francisco) introduced the bill. It applies to platforms with at least 100 million monthly active U.S. users and a market value above $1 trillion, targeting practices such as search ranking, use of third-party data, and limits on data portability.

But… The bill replaces the consumer-welfare standard with a framework that protects specific competitors. It broadly restricts platforms from integrating or prioritizing their own services, treating harm to a rival as evidence of harm to competition—even when those practices benefit consumers.

Moreover…SB 1074 flips the burden of proof, requiring platforms to justify challenged conduct as narrowly tailored and necessary for procompetitive purposes. That stringent standard, combined with significant legal risk, creates strong incentives to remove integrated features, reduce functionality, and avoid litigation.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Rivals ≠ Competition

Antitrust law protects consumers and the competitive process, not individual firms. SB 1074 instead shields specific competitors by restricting how platforms design and integrate products.

Proponents—including Y Combinator CEO Garry Tan and Economic Security California Action Vice President Teri Olle—argue the bill will help startups succeed without platform interference. 

That view misreads antitrust economics. It assumes that harm to a rival signals harm to competition. Conduct that harms a class of rival firms is not anticompetitive unless it distorts the competitive process and leaves consumers worse off.

When platforms integrate features—such as embedding a native map in search results—they may disadvantage standalone rivals. That often reflects normal competition. As ICLE scholars note, removing integrated features does not restore competition; it benefits competitors by denying consumers a superior option.

The bill also lowers the bar for plaintiffs, allowing private antitrust claims without showing harm to competition or consumers. Combined with a presumption that broad categories of conduct are unlawful, this shifts antitrust away from evidence-based analysis toward categorical condemnation.

Integration Works

SB 1074 rests on an unproven assumption: that self-preferencing and vertical integration inherently harm markets. The evidence points the other way.

Reviews of the literature find that vertical integration is typically efficient and benefits consumers. A meta-analysis by Francine Lafontaine and Margaret Slade finds that integration’s efficiency gains usually outweigh its anticompetitive risks.

Evidence from digital markets reinforces that conclusion. Platform integration often expands output and increases engagement. Facebook’s integration of Instagram boosted demand across photography apps. Google’s entry into the Android photography-app market increased user attention, benefiting independent developers.

Evidence from e-commerce also aligns. A 2023 study of Amazon’s private-label products found that removing these offerings would reduce consumer surplus by nearly 4%. SB 1074 ignores this evidence and treats standard integration—often used to eliminate double markups—as unlawful discrimination.

Design by Lawsuit

To evaluate a law, lawmakers must ask how firms will respond.

SB 1074 flips the legal burden of proof. It requires platforms to show that challenged conduct is narrowly tailored, nonpretextual, and reasonably necessary to achieve a procompetitive purpose—and that benefits outweigh harms.

In complex digital markets, that standard is nearly impossible to meet. It gives courts an effective veto over product design and would create a de facto guilty-until-proven-innocent regime.

Faced with steep penalties and private lawsuits under California’s Cartwright Act—including treble damages—platforms will act defensively. They will remove integrated features, scale back quality controls, and unbundle services, forcing users to rely on third-party tools.

The risk to platforms stems not just from the law’s penalties, but from its vague terms. Concepts like “manipulation” of rankings or “neutral methodology” lack clear benchmarks in systems built on constant iteration. That ambiguity invites opportunistic litigation and makes compliance unpredictable.

Evidence from the European Union shows the result. One-third of consumers report less seamless and more confusing digital experiences under similar rules. SB 1074’s regime would similarly push firms to prioritize legal risk over user-friendly innovation.

Not Just ‘Self-Preferencing’

The bill’s focus on “self-preferencing” sounds narrow. It is not. SB 1074 covers a broad, nonexhaustive set of conduct, including vertical-integration practices that are often benign or procompetitive.

It also imposes sweeping interoperability and data-access mandates that constrain how platforms collect data, structure systems, and design products. These operate as affirmative obligations, not just prohibitions.

Key terms remain vague. Requirements like “useful” data portability or restrictions on sharing data lack clear limits. In complex systems, making data “useful” to all users may be costly, infeasible, or in tension with privacy and security.

The bill also applies to artificial intelligence systems defined in extremely broad terms. A limited safe harbor for “neutral methodology” leaves that concept undefined and places the burden on platforms, creating further uncertainty.

Arbitrary Targets

SB 1074 applies only to platforms with at least 100 million monthly U.S. users and a market value above $1 trillion. These thresholds abandon neutral enforcement and target a small set of firms.

This approach contradicts the analysis of the California Law Revision Commission, which found that exclusionary conduct can arise in any industry and advised applying any new statute across sectors. It also warned against arbitrary market-power thresholds.

The bill’s thresholds produce odd results. A firm like Walmart could qualify based on overall valuation and website traffic, regardless of market power in any relevant market. The $1 trillion cutoff is also not indexed to inflation, ensuring more and more firms will fall within scope over time.

For further analysis, see ICLE’s “Comments on California SB 1074” and the Truth on the Market post “California Dreamin’ or an Antitrust Nightmare?” by Daniel J. Gilman.

The Paramount Question Isn’t Paramount

Big mergers make headlines. They don’t always make antitrust problems. In a previous commentary, I explored the antitrust implications of a potential acquisition of Warner Bros. . . .

Big mergers make headlines. They don’t always make antitrust problems.

In a previous commentary, I explored the antitrust implications of a potential acquisition of Warner Bros. Discovery (WBD). That uncertainty is now resolved. On Feb. 27, Paramount Skydance Corp. agreed to acquire WBD for roughly $110 billion in enterprise value—$31 per share, all cash.

The merger has already drawn concern from politicians and regulators (see here and here). But antitrust analysis does not turn on headline valuations or deal size. The relevant question is whether the transaction is likely to harm competition in a meaningful way. On that score, the evidence points in the opposite direction.

Read the full piece here.

This bill would exacerbate the affordability crisis

As the country enters the home stretch toward the 2026 midterm elections, two political trends are clear. First, affordability ranks as the most urgent economic . . .

As the country enters the home stretch toward the 2026 midterm elections, two political trends are clear. First, affordability ranks as the most urgent economic concern of American families. Second, Washington politicians have record-low ratings in response to the question about whether they care about the needs of ordinary people.

As if to prove the latter point, Washington Democrats have queued up new legislation that would drive up retail prices of groceries, gasoline and other household necessities — the Fair Prices for Local Businesses Act.

Read the full piece here.

California Dreamin’ or an Antitrust Nightmare?

California is about to run a live-fire experiment in antitrust—and the working hypothesis appears to be that decades of case law and economic learning were . . .

California is about to run a live-fire experiment in antitrust—and the working hypothesis appears to be that decades of case law and economic learning were optional.

In January, I published a short post—“Rewriting Antitrust, California Style”—that touched on the inner workings (machinations?) of the California Law Review Commission (CLRC). I flagged concerns about the staff’s recommendations on single-firm conduct. I was hardly alone. The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) submitted comments, as did Bilal Sayyed and Tech Freedom; Joe Coniglio and the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation; Daniel Francis of New York University School of Law; and Herbert Hovenkamp, who offered a characteristically concise note on cross-market effects.

My own comments were unusually (for me) brief. I raised a high-level concern about efforts to distance California from federal antitrust law and promised more as the CLRC process unfolded. Time flies. In the interim, two—count ’em, two—antitrust bills have landed before the California Legislature.

The first is California Assembly Bill 1776, laboriously titled in search of an acronym: the Competition and Opportunity in Markets for a Prosperous, Equitable and Transparent Economy (COMPETE) Act. It is a direct descendant of the CLRC recommendations. The Assembly Judiciary Committee advanced the bill April 7 on a strict party-line vote and re-referred it to the Appropriations Committee. Jonathan Nuechterlein—a former Federal Trade Commission (FTC) general counsel—recently analyzed the bill, its prospects, and its defects.

The second is California Senate Bill 1074, the Blocking Anticompetitive Self-Preferencing by Entrenched Dominant Platforms—the “BASED” Act. The acronym tries a bit too hard—and lands a bit obscure. State Sen. Scott Wiener (D-San Francisco) introduced the bill, reportedly with enthusiastic backing (if not drafting) from Y Combinator and Economic Security California—a misnomer, but never mind.

Both bills appear to be based on faith in unconstrained judicial intervention and a general rejection of established antitrust principles–or, at least, a rejection of U.S. antitrust. The BASED Act in particular seems to embody a “neo-Brandeisian” animus towards large tech firms and a rejection of consumer welfare. Neither the facts of federal enforcement experience nor decades of economic learning seem to have made much of an impact.

Spoiler alert for the impatient reader who, on the one hand, reads my posts here at Truth on the Market but, on the other, cannot quite predict my reaction: I do not care for either bill. Taken together, they look like a recipe for disaster.

Read the full piece here.

The Barriers Behind the Border

Not all trade barriers are created equal. The ones that matter most do not sit at the border. They sit inside markets, shaping who can . . .

Not all trade barriers are created equal. The ones that matter most do not sit at the border. They sit inside markets, shaping who can compete—and who cannot—before competition even begins.

The recently released 2026 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE) catalogs foreign barriers to U.S. exports, foreign direct investment, and electronic commerce, country by country. It is a long document, and it invites a superficial reading as a grab bag of discrete complaints.

That reading misses the point. Some barriers frustrate but remain manageable. Others matter more. They reshape entire markets, steering outcomes away from competition on the merits. Those are the barriers the United States should prioritize. They impose the greatest economic costs and offer the greatest gains if negotiated away.

This is where Shanker Singham’s framework for anticompetitive market distortions (ACMDs) proves useful. The problem is not simply that governments block imports at the border. It is that they skew domestic markets through favoritism, discriminatory regulation, weak property-rights protections, or state-backed commercial privilege. In Singham’s Growth Commission white paper, ACMDs fall into three pillars: domestic competition, international competition, and property rights.

This post applies Singham’s framework to five major jurisdictions—China, the European Union, India, Indonesia, and Mexico—where ACMDs documented in the NTE impose significant economic harm.

Read the full piece here.

The Fatal Conceit of Cheap Drugs

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Hikma v. Amarin to answer a narrow question. It may end up saying far more about how policymakers misunderstand . . .

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Hikma v. Amarin to answer a narrow question. It may end up saying far more about how policymakers misunderstand pharmaceutical markets.

On its face, the case is narrow. It asks whether a generic drug manufacturer can face liability for inducing patent infringement based on how it markets a product approved under a so-called “skinny label.” The dispute turns on whether Hikma’s conduct plausibly encouraged physicians to prescribe its generic drug for a patented use.

But the Court’s decision to grant certiorari hints at something broader. It reflects a persistent belief that regulators and courts can engineer complex pharmaceutical markets to deliver lower prices—chiefly by speeding generic entry.

That belief misses the mark. Worse, it risks undermining the innovation that produces new therapies in the first place.

Read the full piece here.

A Cure Worse Than the Scroll

The App Store Accountability Act (ASAA) promises to protect children online—but it would do so by imposing sweeping mandates on everyone else. Panic over doomscrolling, brainrot, gambling, pornography, online predators, and . . .

The App Store Accountability Act (ASAA) promises to protect children online—but it would do so by imposing sweeping mandates on everyone else.

Panic over doomscrollingbrainrotgambling, pornography, online predators, and minors’ interactions with AI chatbots has fueled a familiar policy response: calls to age-gate the internet, social media, and apps.

The ASAA fits squarely in that trend. The bill has cleared the U.S. House Energy and Commerce Committee and now heads to the full House for consideration. It mirrors several state-level proposals. The ASAA would require Google Play and Apple’s App Store to verify the age of all users using “commercially reasonable methods,” and would bar minors unless they have parental consent.

Some of this will sound uncontroversial. Lawmakers have long required age verification to buy cigarettes or alcohol, or to enter casinos and strip clubs. More than 20 states now impose similar requirements on pornographic websites. Few object, in principle, to reasonable safeguards that protect minors from harmful or inappropriate content.

The ASAA goes much further.

It would expose all app-store users to new privacy and security risks, while saddling even developers of age-appropriate content with compliance burdens. The likely result: less competition and less innovation in the app economy. At the same time, the bill would do little to empower parents or meaningfully improve protections for children.

Put simply, the costs outweigh the benefits.

Read the full piece here.

Rethinking Competitor Collaboration in the AI Era

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) have opened a joint public inquiry into whether to update antitrust guidance for collaborations among competitors. . . .

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) have opened a joint public inquiry into whether to update antitrust guidance for collaborations among competitors. That’s good news. Modern markets—especially those shaped by artificial intelligence—need clear rules that distinguish genuinely harmful collusion from productive, welfare-enhancing cooperation.

No one seriously disputes that naked price-fixing and horizontal market-division schemes remain unlawful. But not every agreement among rivals amounts to a cartel. In innovation-driven sectors, collaboration often reduces risk, combines complementary assets, and enables new products and productive capacity that would not emerge nearly as quickly through atomized action. Law & economics scholars have long recognized this point, and it should anchor any new guidance.

AI provides a particularly useful test case. Building and deploying advanced systems requires vast, specialized inputs: semiconductors, cloud capacity, engineering talent, model-evaluation tools, cybersecurity safeguards, privacy-preserving techniques, land, electricity, transmission access, cooling systems, and sometimes shared technical standards. In that environment, antitrust overdeterrence can be as harmful as underenforcement. Guidance that treats coordination with reflexive suspicion will raise costs, slow deployment, and weaken dynamic competition. Sensible safe harbors and administrable rule-of-reason principles, by contrast, can promote innovation without giving cover to true cartel conduct.

That is the core point. Updated competitor-collaboration guidance should make clear—early and often—that collaboration aimed at expanding innovation, infrastructure, interoperability, privacy, and safety usually promotes competition. The law should target agreements that suppress rivalry, not those that make rivalry more effective.

Read the full piece here.

The Hype Cycle Meets Malpractice Law: Why the Jobs Persist

Dario Amodei, CEO of Anthropic, recently declared that “50% of all entry-level lawyers, consultants, and finance professionals will be completely wiped out within the next 1–5 years.” . . .

Dario Amodei, CEO of Anthropic, recently declared that “50% of all entry-level lawyers, consultants, and finance professionals will be completely wiped out within the next 1–5 years.” That’s a remarkable claim—and probably wrong in a way that reveals something important about the gap between what AI can do and what the economy will actually do with it.

AI is undeniably impressive. It can already handle a wide range of professional tasks. Large language models draft legal memos, build financial models, and generate the sort of analysis that fills the early years of many careers. The technical capability is real.

But “can perform the tasks” does not mean “will eliminate the jobs.” Between those two claims lies an enormous institutional chasm—one the AI hype cycle, which conveniently serves both fundraising and regulatory agendas, tends to gloss over.

Read the full piece here.

Crisis Opportunism: Germany’s Turn to Antitrust Without Limits

Geopolitical shocks rarely just move markets. They move policy—and not always in good ways. Fuel prices are climbing sharply across Europe following military escalation in the Middle . . .

Geopolitical shocks rarely just move markets. They move policy—and not always in good ways.

Fuel prices are climbing sharply across Europe following military escalation in the Middle East and disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The political demand for “something to be done” can be nearly irresistible.

In Germany, several major political groups have answered that demand with the “Kraftstoffmaßnahmenpaket,” or “Fuel Market Intervention Package.” Lawmakers filed the draft legislation March 17, and the lower house of the Bundestag has already approved it. The government is targeting April 1 for entry into force.

The speed alone should raise concern.

The bill’s explanatory memorandum admits, with unusual candor: “No substantive contributions from third parties were considered in drafting.” Policymakers considered no alternative approaches. The process ran from filing to final vote in nine days. There was no consultation. No meaningful impact assessment. The only estimate—a back-of-the-envelope calculation—suggests compliance costs (“Erfüllungsaufwand”) “should not exceed” €200,000 for the State.

As for costs to businesses and citizens, the bill claims the “draft law will not create any compliance costs.” That assertion is plainly wrong to anyone familiar with price controls or similar interventions. For legislation that restructures a core instrument of German competition enforcement, the lack of scrutiny is hard to defend.

Crisis conditions create political urgency. But, as Roberta Roman0 suggests, “legislating in the immediate aftermath of a public scandal or crisis is a formula for poor public policymaking.”

The procedural critique, though valid, is not the most interesting one.

The more consequential problem lies in what the Kraftstoffmaßnahmenpaket does to the law—specifically, to Section 32f of the Act Against Restraints of Competition (ARC), the market-investigation tool introduced through the 11th ARC Amendment in 2023.

The bill frames its changes as temporary responses to a fuel crisis. In fact, they are not limited to the fuel sector. They apply across all markets. And what the bill describes as a procedural simplification turns out, on closer inspection, to be something quite different: a substantive expansion of state authority over lawful commercial conduct, one that stretches well beyond what competition policy can coherently justify.

Read the full piece here.

LONG FORM WRITING

Superior Bargaining Power, Antitrust, and Digital Markets: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective

The abuse of economic dependence is undergoing a revival, driven by the growing policy emphasis on restoring fairness in digital markets. Legal provisions originally . . .

Abstract

The abuse of economic dependence is undergoing a revival, driven by the growing policy emphasis on restoring fairness in digital markets. Legal provisions originally intended to address bargaining power imbalances in traditional, brick-and-mortar settings are now being repurposed as part of the digital enforcement toolkit. Yet the scope and antitrust character of these rules remain contested. Indeed, a central paradox persists. If antitrust law aims to protect competition rather than individual competitors, it is unclear why abuses of economic dependence belong under its purview rather than contract law. Conversely, if such abuses do affect market dynamics, the distinction from abuses of dominant position becomes blurred. Drawing on the insights of transaction cost economics, this paper offers a critical analysis of national provisions on the abuse of economic dependence and outlines a framework for defining the scope and criteria of such abuse as a standalone antitrust offence, with the aim of ensuring consistency between its application and the principles of transaction cost economics.

 

Market Microstructure and Informational Efficiency: The Role of Intermediation

The competitive market is informationally efficient; people only need to know prices to implement a competitive allocation. However, the standard formulation of competitive markets . . .

Abstract

The competitive market is informationally efficient; people only need to know prices to implement a competitive allocation. However, the standard formulation of competitive markets assumes that prices are not set by strategic agents but by “supply and demand” and thus neglects the underlying role of market microstructure. We show that if prices are determined by strategic agents, then intermediation is necessary for markets to achieve informational efficiency. We study two specific market microstructures: a model where trade is intermediated by market-makers and a model of random matching and bargaining. First, we show that an economy where competition among market-makers determines prices can approximate the informational efficiency of the competitive model. Second, we show that as the complexity of the economy increases, matching markets require infinitely more information than the competitive market.

Cultural Exception, Single Market Objectives and Regulatory Gaming in the EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive: The Adverse Effects of Financial Obligations

European policymakers have long sought to strike an appropriate balance between supporting EU-native cultural production and pursuing the objectives of internal market harmonisation. To . . .

Abstract

European policymakers have long sought to strike an appropriate balance between supporting EU-native cultural production and pursuing the objectives of internal market harmonisation. To this end, the 2018 reform of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD) introduced a set of measures for on-demand audiovisual media (VOD) providers, including catalogue quotas, prominence requirements and financial contributions. However, the coherence and effectiveness of these provisions remain highly contested. In particular, national implementations of financial obligations have produced adverse effects. They have intensified fragmentation among Member States and enabled them to prioritise domestic works over non-national European productions. Such fragmentation of the European audiovisual market will also preserve a heterogeneous ecosystem of producers, making it exceedingly difficult for a local service to scale and evolve into a pan-European platform. Consequently, despite the ambitions of EU policymakers, the emergence of European champions capable of competing with foreign players on an equal footing is likely to remain elusive. Moreover, the AVMSD rules on financial obligations create opportunities for regulatory gaming, insofar as Member States use the policy goal of fostering cultural and linguistic diversity as a convenient pretext for subsidising their local economies.

Should Antitrust Pursue Multiple Policy Goals?

Some scholars argue that antitrust should abandon the consumer welfare standard and adopt a “welfare dashboard” that considers not just competition, but all social . . .

Abstract

Some scholars argue that antitrust should abandon the consumer welfare standard and adopt a “welfare dashboard” that considers not just competition, but all social values that antitrust could possibly influence, including democracy, inequality, and small business protection. Recently, some advocates of this approach have argued that it is firmly grounded in modern economics. As we explain, the opposite is true. Economic policy research virtually never employs broad welfare frameworks like this because they are unworkable. Among other problems, resolving tradeoffs between diverse phenomena like competition and democracy requires assigning them “welfare weights” that no one knows how to specify. The sheer impracticality of this approach means that it inevitably collapses into subjective speculation.

While consumer welfare has well-known limitations, most of them are minor in single-market antitrust analysis, and those that remain can be addressed using better methods to measure welfare. A key benefit of consumer welfare is that it provides a sensible means of aggregating the different variables associated with competition (e.g. price and quality) using observable data, without requiring subjective welfare weights. In antitrust’s adversarial system, this provides a shared normative framework for resolving policy disagreements objectively. By contrast, a dashboard allows each side to assert different (often incommensurable) normative values with no way to resolve the conflict.

Read at SSRN.

Abduction and the Demand Curve

We prove that Berry inversion (recovering a market’s latent demand index from observed shares) is necessary, not just sufficient, for identifying every market’s demand . . .

Abstract

We prove that Berry inversion (recovering a market’s latent demand index from observed shares) is necessary, not just sufficient, for identifying every market’s demand curve. The experimental average equals the market-specific demand curve if and only if demand is additively separable in price and the latent state, a condition standard discrete-choice models violate. When separability fails, Berry inversion is the abduction step (recovering the market’s latent state from data) in Pearl’s causal hierarchy: without it, even price-only counterfactuals are set-identified, and counterfactuals that also change product characteristics require a stronger recoverability condition. In a merger simulation, market-specific price predictions differ by a factor of two, driven entirely by unobserved demand conditions that experiments cannot distinguish.

Generative AI: When Fair Use Becomes Unfair Competition

Introduction The rise of artificial intelligence (“AI”) systems trained on large datasets, which often include copyrighted works, has led to thorny questions of how to . . .

Introduction

The rise of artificial intelligence (“AI”) systems trained on large datasets, which often include copyrighted works, has led to thorny questions of how to apply intellectual property law in this developing space. Around the world, policymakers have been considering different approaches to striking a balance between protecting copyright holders and promoting innovative new uses of copyrighted material, such as generative AI.1 Courts have also considered how copyright law, which in the United States includes doctrines like fair use, applies to the use of copyrighted material as inputs to train datasets.2

Assuming that Congress is not about to step in with some form of a “text and data mining” exemption in copyright law,3 there are, broadly speaking, two ways to facilitate training. First, the content can be licensed. However, the sheer scale of data needed, coupled with a very low marginal value for individual works, potentially makes this approach impractical. Second, developers hope to use “fair use” as an affirmative defense to any infringing acts. The issue here is that, technically, this constitutes an infringement in the first place—otherwise, an affirmative defense would not be necessary.

Moreover, it is not facially obvious that an excused infringement would not violate other bodies of law outside of copyright—for instance, competition law. Thus, even if copyright law permits certain uses through fair use or other exceptions, consumer protection or competition authorities could step in as well and police attempts to use copyrighted material as inputs for training as “unfair.” For instance, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) offered a comment to the U.S. Copyright Office in October 2023 arguing that “under certain circumstances, the use of pirated or misuse of copyrighted materials could be an unfair practice or unfair method of competition under Section 5 of the FTC Act.”4 The FTC went so far as to even say “conduct that may be consistent with copyright laws nevertheless may violate Section 5.”5

Below, we consider the intersection between copyright and competition policy in the context of using copyrighted works as inputs for generative AI. Part I provides context by introducing an economic approach to the questions of copyright and fair use for AI inputs, including looking at cases which have been considered so far in the United States. Part II then considers the intersection of FTC Section 5 with copyright law, outlining the FTC’s proposed approach in its comment to the Copyright Office. Part III then argues the FTC’s approach would lead to contradictions between copyright and competition and consumer protection law reducing the incentives for innovation and competition that underlie both.

I.      Law and Economics of AI and Copyright

To properly understand the intersection between copyright law, AI, and competition policy, a background in the economics of copyright is necessary. While this is an evolving area without established answers, the Copyright Office has conducted considerable work to frame the economic issues at play when examining the use of copyrighted works in artificial intelligence training.6 Courts have also begun to issue decisions in cases involving copyright and AI training.

A.      The Economic Foundations of Copyright and AI Innovation

Copyright law functions as a crucial mechanism for fostering innovation by establishing exclusive property rights that incentivize creative development.7 These rights enable creators to prevent unauthorized exploitation of their work, providing essential economic incentives that ultimately enhance collective social welfare. Creative works, being inherently non-excludable and non-rivalrous, constitute public goods that would face significant underproduction without copyright protection, as unfettered copying would substantially diminish expected returns on creative investment.8

This protective framework necessarily grants rightsholders a degree of market power that can elevate prices and potentially restrict access to resources.9 To maintain an appropriate equilibrium, copyright systems incorporate temporal limitations and exceptions—particularly fair use—that serve as critical counterbalances promoting broader societal interests.10 This delicate balance between creator compensation and public access represents the fundamental challenge underlying copyright policy.

The system exhibits what might be characterized as a “hydraulic relationship” between various elements of copyright protection.11 Similar to fluid dynamics, where pressure applied in one chamber creates corresponding movement elsewhere, strengthening protections in one domain often necessitates increased flexibility in another to preserve systemic balance.12 This hydraulic principle becomes particularly evident when transformative technologies like AI challenge established frameworks. Imposing significant restrictions at the input stage may require corresponding flexibility regarding outputs and vice versa.

AI systems present unprecedented challenges for policymakers and courts attempting to balance creative production incentives against beneficial utilization of copyrighted materials for technological advancement. While AI training on copyrighted materials could potentially alter creative incentives, excessive licensing requirements or competition-oriented obligations could significantly impair innovation and utility in AI development.

Several fundamental principles warrant consideration in this context. First, copyright’s inherent limitations prove highly relevant to AI training scenarios. Copyright law protects specific expressions rather than underlying ideas—a distinction that is potentially significant when AI systems transform inputs into novel expressions.13 The fair use doctrine further permits transformative applications that generate new expressions from protected works.14 While fair use remains contentious in AI contexts, the substantial good-faith debate demonstrates the uniqueness of AI training and the difficulty of applying traditional copyright frameworks to this innovation.15

Second, requiring individualized licensing for all copyrighted works used in AI training would impose prohibitive practical challenges and transaction costs.16 Contemporary AI models commonly train on billions of text fragments and images from across the internet. Negotiating separate licenses for each protected work would necessitate millions of transactions, rendering comprehensive licensing practically impossible at the scale required for effective AI development.17

While proponents have proposed collective licensing models to address these challenges through clearinghouses that negotiate blanket licenses for rightsholder groups,18 significant obstacles persist. Not all content owners would participate in such collectives, creating coverage gaps particularly for independent creators.19 Mandatory collective licensing could potentially create concerning monopolistic structures that eliminate competitive pressure.20 As the Supreme Court recognized in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS,21 even voluntary collective licensing arrangements require careful antitrust scrutiny to ensure they do not create arrangements that “threaten the proper operation of our predominantly free-market economy.”22 In the absence of clear market failure, voluntary solutions might be preferable, as evidenced by some media companies already negotiating direct arrangements.23 The current landscape features an inconsistent patchwork of approaches, with some major content owners demanding licenses while numerous smaller creators remain outside any collective framework.24

Furthermore, determining appropriate licensing fees presents fundamental valuation challenges. AI models utilize billions of inputs, making it nearly impossible to determine the value of individual contributions during training. Given the vast volume of necessary input data, even conventionally valuable content may have extremely small marginal value in training contexts.

These practical difficulties suggest that focusing regulatory attention on outputs rather than inputs represents a more economically sound approach. This would prioritize addressing copyright violations in final outputs while maintaining the creativity-innovation balance that copyright law aims to achieve.

This output-focused approach circumvents the implementation challenges associated with comprehensive input licensing. Once outputs are generated and commercially deployed, valuation becomes more feasible in defined markets. The contribution assessment of particular inputs would rely on similarity analysis—a familiar approach in copyright adjudication. Additional protections for creators’ distinctive characteristics would facilitate commercial negotiations,25 while standard copyright mechanisms would remain available to address infringing uses.

B.     Recent Cases

A growing body of litigation has been examining whether AI developers may legally use copyrighted materials to train their models. Although most cases remain in early procedural stages, two significant judicial decisions provide important precedent. The following analysis examines the courts’ reasoning in these pivotal cases.

1.      Thomson Reuters v. Ross Intelligence

In Thomson Reuters Enterprise Center GmbH v. Ross Intelligence, Inc.,26 the Delaware District Court examined Ross Intelligence’s use of “Bulk Memos” to train its AI legal-research tool.27 A third party, LegalEase, created these memos based on Westlaw headnotes. Initially, Ross sought to license Westlaw headnotes directly from Thomson Reuters but was refused because Thomson Reuters didn’t want to assist a potential competitor. As an alternative strategy, Ross purchased Bulk Memos from LegalEase—documents described as “lawyers’ compilations of legal questions with good and bad answers.” 28 LegalEase directed its lawyers to create these memos using Westlaw headnotes, which Thomson Reuters had developed by extracting legal principles from judicial opinions. Ross subsequently used these Bulk Memos to train an AI system designed to compete in the legal research market.

The question at issue was whether the copies of the Bulk Memos made by Ross for the training of its AI model infringed the rights held by Thomson Reuters in the Westlaw headnotes.

First, the court considered whether the record established a case of copyright infringement. Thomson Reuters had to show that “(1) it owned a valid copyright and (2) Ross copied protected elements of the copyright work.”29 This was important here because Thomson Reuters claimed to hold a copyright over headnotes that were created by quoting and summarizing parts of judicial opinions that are not copyrightable.30 After concluding that (most of) the headnotes were copyrightable,31 the court had to determine whether copying occurred, which means Thomson Reuters had to prove “(a) actual copying, and (b) substantial similarity.”32 The court found the actual copying was present because the “Bulk Memo questions for this batch closely resemble the headnotes’ text and that the headnotes differ significantly from the text of the judicial opinions.”33 The court, under the same reasoning, found most of the Bulk Memos were substantially similar to the Westlaw headnotes. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment “on the headnotes [for which the] language very closely tracks the language of the Bulk Memo question but not the language of the case opinion.”34

Then, applying Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith,35 the court emphasized that when a new use shares the same or highly similar purpose as the original work, this strongly indicates a lack of transformation.36 In this case, Ross’s use of Westlaw headnotes to develop a competing legal research tool meant the underlying purpose of the original expression remained fundamentally unchanged.37 Rather than adding new meaning, commentary, or purpose, Ross merely repackaged the headnotes in a format that served virtually identical functionality—helping users locate relevant legal cases. Consequently, the court determined that factor one (which considers the purpose and character of the use) weighed heavily against a finding of fair use because the use was commercial and not transformative.38

Ross attempted to draw an analogy to “intermediate copying” cases, such as Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. 39 and Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp.,40 where courts permitted limited copying of functional code for the purpose of reverse engineering.41 Ross’s analogy compared AI training (converting protected works into numerical weights) with reverse engineering (copying application programming interfaces to create compatible software).

The court, however, distinguished these cases on the basis that they involved functional computer code—primarily comprising unprotected ideas—and were necessary for ensuring compatibility between systems.42 By contrast, the Westlaw headnotes constitute creative expression, and the copying at issue was not essential to uncover any unprotected elements.43 This distinction further undercut the argument that Ross’s use could be deemed transformative.

The commercial nature of Ross’s use also contributed to the court’s adverse view. By seeking to profit from a product that competes directly with Westlaw, Ross’s use maintained the same “research” or “reference” purpose inherent in Westlaw’s headnotes. This commercial aim, coupled with the absence of any significant recontextualization of the original material, reinforced the conclusion that Ross’s copying failed to achieve the requisite transformation.44

Ultimately, because Ross’s appropriation of the headnotes did not introduce any new meaning or commentary beyond their original function, the court held that the copying was insufficiently transformative to qualify for fair use. The convergence of an unaltered purpose and the direct competition with Westlaw’s established market for headnotes served as a pivotal basis for rejecting the fair-use defense in this case.

On factor two, which focused on the nature of the original work, the court found that the Westlaw headnotes were “not that creative” compared to the original judicial opinions, thus siding with Ross.45 Factor three, on how much of the work was used, also went to Ross.46 The court found that “[t]here is no factual dispute: Ross’s output to an end user does not include a West headnote. . . . Because Ross did not make West headnotes available to the public, Ross benefits from factor three.”47

Factor four, which is the most important factor of fair use, is the “likely effect on the market for the original.”48 Here, the court again pointed out that Ross intended to create a market substitute to compete with Westlaw. The court emphasized that while the public may have an interest in judicial opinions, the “public has no right to Thomson Reuters’s parsing of the law. Copyrights encourage people to develop things that help society, like good research tools. Their builders earn the right to be paid accordingly.”49 On balance, the court decided that the factors weighed against the fair-use defense. This case has become the first AI and copyright case to be appealed to a circuit court.50

Despite the Ross decision, general purpose large language models (“LLMs”) might successfully establish fair use under its market-effects analysis. Unlike Ross’s specialized legal research tool, general purpose LLMs typically operate in different markets than the original works they process during training.51 The Ross court itself explicitly differentiated between Ross’s product and generative AI systems:

Ross was using Thomson Reuters’s headnotes as AI data to create a legal research tool to compete with Westlaw. It is undisputed that Ross’s AI is not generative AI (AI that writes new content itself). Rather, when a user enters a legal question, Ross spits back relevant judicial opinions that have already been written.52

Unlike Ross’s product, which directly competed with Westlaw’s legal research service, general purpose LLMs serve fundamentally different purposes than the original works in their training data. These models create new content rather than reproducing existing works, potentially transforming input data into novel outputs like stories or images.53 This creative function distinguishes them from tools that merely repackage copyrighted content.

This distinction strengthens the transformative-use argument for general purpose LLMs. When an AI generates original content inspired by—but not duplicating—existing works, the transformation process substantially alters both the form and function of the source material.54 This transformative quality presents a stark contrast to the Ross case, where the copied content served essentially the same purpose in both original and derivative forms.

However, while general purpose LLMs may not directly compete with original works, they could potentially impact derivative markets by diminishing future licensing opportunities for rightsholders. Despite this concern, under the Ross framework, the distinct market positioning of general purpose LLMs might still favor AI developers in fair-use analyses. Nevertheless, given the multifaceted approach of fair use, this market distinction alone cannot guarantee protection without careful consideration of all relevant factors that safeguard creators’ economic interests.

2.      Tremblay v. OpenAI

In Tremblay v. OpenAI, Inc.,55 the Northern District of California considered whether AI systems trained on copyrighted materials could infringe copyright law through their outputs.56 The court evaluated a motion to dismiss focusing specifically on allegations of vicarious copyright infringement.

The central question was whether ChatGPT’s outputs violated copyright law when the underlying model had been trained on plaintiffs’ copyrighted books.57 Unlike Ross, which focused on the copying of works during training, Tremblay addressed whether the outputs themselves constituted infringement.

The court framed its analysis around vicarious infringement,58 first assessing whether plaintiffs had adequately alleged direct infringement in ChatGPT’s outputs. The plaintiffs argued that because OpenAI had copied their books for training purposes, “every output” of ChatGPT automatically qualified as an infringing derivative work. However, the court rejected this reasoning, emphasizing that copyright infringement requires proof of both actual copying and unlawful appropriation (substantial similarity).59 Critically, the “[p]laintiffs fail to explain what the outputs entail or allege that any particular output is substantially similar—or similar at all—to their books.”60

This decision highlights an important principle: Copyright infringement should be evaluated at the output stage based on substantial similarity to original works. While the litigation continues, this holding contributed significant clarity to the application of copyright law to AI systems. It properly places the emphasis on analyzing specific outputs rather than automatically deeming all generations from a model trained on copyrighted materials as infringing. Copyright holders retain protection against substantially similar outputs, but training an AI on copyrighted works does not render all its outputs presumptively infringing.

3.      Bartz v. Anthropic PBC 61

In Bartz v. Anthropic PBC,62 the Northern District of California considered another putative class action against an AI firm, alleging infringement for unauthorized copies of their works to train their LLM.63 Anthropic motioned for summary judgment on the grounds of fair use.64

Rather than treating all copying as a monolithic “AI training” use, the court carefully parsed Anthropic’s conduct into separate analytical buckets:

(1) Copies used specifically to train large language models, which the court found transformative under traditional fair-use analysis;65

(2) The format conversion of legitimately purchased print books into digital library copies, which qualified as fair use under a distinct format-shifting rationale;66 and

(3) The creation of a general-purpose digital library using pirated materials, which failed fair-use scrutiny entirely.67

This tripartite structure proves crucial because each category of copying serves different purposes, involves different acquisition methods, and implicates different copyright concerns. Determining infringing use cases therefore requires independent analysis under the four-factor fair-use framework.68

Importantly, the court’s analysis was limited to input-side copying and did not address whether AI-generated outputs might themselves infringe copyright, noting that “[a]uthors do not allege that any LLM output provided to users infringed upon [a]uthors’ works,”69 and explicitly stating that “if the outputs were ever to become infringing, [a]uthors could bring such a case.”70

The court’s methodical separation of these use cases demonstrates how courts will likely approach future AI copyright cases: not as broad categorical determinations about AI training, but as nuanced examinations of specific copying practices and their individual justifications.

The court’s analysis of the use of copies in AI training represents perhaps the most significant judicial endorsement to date of AI development under fair-use doctrine. The court grounded its reasoning in an analogy to human learning, noting that “[l]ike any reader aspiring to be a writer, Anthropic’s LLMs trained upon works not to race ahead and replicate or supplant them—but to turn a hard corner and create something different.”71

This framing proved crucial in distinguishing the case from Thomson Reuters Enter. Centre GmbH v. Ross Intel. Inc., where the court found against fair use.72 The key distinction lay in the nature of the AI system: Ross involved training “a competing AI tool for finding court opinions in response to a given legal topic,” which was “not transformative.”73 By contrast, Anthropic’s Claude represents generative AI that creates new content, rather than merely replicating the function of existing databases.

The court’s analysis was bolstered by a critical factual finding: No infringing content ever reached users. The court emphasized that “[a]uthors do not allege that any infringing copy of their works was or would ever be provided to users by the Claude service.”74 This absence of direct downstream infringement proved dispositive, as the court noted that filtering software prevented any exact copies or substantial reproductions from reaching the public.

The decision also rejected the authors’ argument that computers should be treated differently from humans in learning contexts. In particular, in rejecting the argument that an LLM learning the creative techniques of source material did not constitute fair use, the court observed that copyright “does not extend to ‘method[s] of operation, concept[s], [or] principle[s],’”75 thus analogizing a work’s intangible elements to a “method of operation.”76

In a separate but equally important holding, the court found that Anthropic’s conversion of purchased print books to digital formats constituted fair use under a format-shifting theory. Drawing on precedents from Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,77 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.,78 and the Authors Guild v. Google, Inc. 79 litigation, the court concluded that “[s]torage and searchability are not creative properties of the copyrighted work itself but physical properties of the frame around the work or informational properties about the work.”80

This analysis proved crucial because it established that legitimate acquisition followed by format conversion differs fundamentally from unauthorized copying. The court emphasized that “every purchased print copy was copied in order to save storage space and to enable searchability as a digital copy. The print original was destroyed. One replaced the other.”81 Importantly, there was no evidence that digital copies were shared outside the company.82

The decision carefully cabined this holding, noting that while the authors “might have wished to charge Anthropic more for digital than for print copies,”83 the U.S. Constitution’s language “nowhere suggests that [the copyright owner’s] limited exclusive right should include a right to divide markets or a concomitant right to charge different purchasers different prices for the same book . . . .”84 This reasoning reinforces the first-sale doctrine, while accommodating technological needs for format conversion.

The court’s treatment of pirated library copies represents the decision’s most significant limitation on AI companies. Despite finding the ultimate training-use transformative, the court firmly rejected the notion that transformative downstream use can cure upstream piracy. As the court colorfully noted, citing Anthropic’s oral arguments:

You can’t just bless yourself by saying I have a research purpose and, therefore, go and take any textbook you want. That would destroy the academic publishing market if that were the case.85

The court identified the fundamental flaw in Anthropic’s approach: “[b]uilding a central library of works to be available for any number of further uses”86 constituted a separate use from training LLMs. Critically, Anthropic “retained pirated copies even after deciding it would not use them or copies from them for training its LLMs ever again.”87 This retention for general purposes, rather than specific transformative use, proved fatal to the portion of the decision judging the fair-use defense on the storage of pirated materials.

The court’s analysis drew important distinctions from cases where intermediate copying was excused. Unlike Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. 88 or Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,89 where copies were “immediately transformed into a significantly altered form” and deployed directly into transformative uses, Anthropic’s pirated copies were “downloaded and maintained ‘forever’” for a general purpose library.90

The decision explicitly rejected the argument that eventual transformative use can retroactively justify initial piracy, emphasizing that “[e]ach use of a work must be analyzed objectively” under Warhol’s framework.91 This holding establishes that AI companies cannot rely on fair use as a blanket justification to acquire copyrighted materials through unauthorized means.

4.      Kadrey v. Meta

On June 25, 2025, Judge Vince Chhabria granted Meta’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment on fair-use grounds in Kadrey v. Meta Platforms, Inc.92 Thirteen well-known authors, led by Richard Kadrey, had alleged that Meta’s Llama models were trained on copies of their books scraped from “shadow libraries.”93 The court acknowledged the direct copying but held the training use lawful under 17 U.S.C. § 107, emphasizing that the plaintiffs’ two principal theories of market harm—(i) occasional “regurgitation” of snippets and (ii) the loss of a putative licensing market for training data—were “clear losers.”94

Yet the opinion pointedly identified a third, undeveloped theory that might change the calculus: If AI outputs “flood the market with similar works,” the resulting market dilution could undercut authors’ ability to sell their original books.95 The judge characterized that argument as “potentially winning,” but found the record devoid of evidence tying the Meta Llama model’s current or foreseeable outputs to any substitution effect for the plaintiffs’ works.96 In consequence, the ruling is a victory for broad-purpose training on the facts presented, not a blanket endorsement of unlicensed training writ large.

The decision therefore extends the line begun in Bartz v. Anthropic by reaffirming that large scale ingestion of text can be transformative and thus fair use. What is new—and worrisome—is the court’s willingness to frame market harm around speculative output substitution rather than the copying of inputs itself. If accepted by courts, that conflation opens a path for future plaintiffs to survive early motions even without locating infringing passages: They need only posit that model-generated books might depress demand for their own. If embraced, such a dilution theory would shift the fair-use inquiry toward policing downstream creativity, a result at odds with copyright’s traditional focus on actual substitution.

For present purposes, Kadrey underscores two messages that animate the next Part of this paper. First, courts remain skeptical of licensing-market and snippet-regurgitation claims, signaling a judicial appetite for doctrinal clarity over rhetoric. Second, and more importantly, the “market dilution” dicta reveal how quickly copyright analysis can become entangled with broader competition-policy concerns when judges conflate learning inputs with generative outputs. Untangling those strands—protecting training while addressing genuinely infringing outputs—will be essential to preserving both innovation incentives and the integrity of authors’ markets.

C.      Summary

The economic analysis of copyright’s foundational principles, coupled with emerging judicial interpretations in cases involving artificial intelligence, is beginning to clarify the legal landscape for AI systems trained on copyrighted materials. This evolving jurisprudence reflects the courts’ efforts to balance the tension inherent in copyright’s hydraulic system—protecting creators’ economic incentives while facilitating technological innovation that serves distinct markets. Through decisions such as Thomson Reuters v. Ross IntelligenceTremblay v. OpenAI, and Bartz v. Anthropic PBC, courts are contributing toward a nuanced framework that distinguishes between different types of AI systems based primarily on their economic impact on copyright holders’ markets.

The developing jurisprudential framework appears to establish two significant principles. First, some courts have rejected the proposition that all outputs from an AI system trained on copyrighted materials are per se infringing; rather, plaintiffs must demonstrate substantial similarity between specific outputs and protected works, consistent with traditional copyright infringement analysis. Second, whether the resulting AI system directly competes with the market for the original copyrighted works may substantially influence the fair-use inquiry at the training stage. This analytical approach potentially creates a viable path for general-purpose LLMs to qualify for fair-use protection where their outputs serve distinctly different market functions than the original works used in training.

If the Anthropic decision gains traction in other courts, it would seem to draw a clear roadmap for AI companies navigating copyright law. First, strategic sourcing beats piracy: Companies should acquire training materials through legitimate channels—purchase, licensing, or authorized access. The court’s finding that format shifting of legitimately acquired materials constitutes fair use further provides a viable path for companies needing digital copies for computational purposes.

Second, output liability emerges as the next frontier. Because no infringing content reached users in this case, future litigation will likely focus on whether AI-generated outputs themselves infringe copyright. The court explicitly noted that “if the outputs were ever to become infringing, [a]uthors could bring such a case.”97

Third, the decision signals potential legislative solutions. It very well may be the case that generative AI will create hurdles for creators seeking to monetize their work. But it also could be that new markets emerge to allow artists to be remunerated on, for example, some sort of new property right in “name, image, and likeness.”98 That would, however, likely require some sort of legislative enactment, perhaps by amending the Lanham Act99 with an extension of the concept of trademark.

Notwithstanding these initial judicial determinations, it would be premature to conclude that all such uses of copyrighted materials will ultimately receive official sanction. As the subsequent Part explores, competition authorities may exercise their regulatory discretion to characterize even technically non-infringing or excused infringing uses of copyrighted materials as constituting unfair methods of competition. This introduces an additional layer of legal complexity that transcends traditional copyright analysis.

II.     How Can Fair Use Be Unfair?

Assuming judicial recognition of a fair-use exception for the incorporation of copyrighted materials as training inputs for AI systems, a complex regulatory question emerges regarding the FTC’s potential jurisdiction over such otherwise permissible activities. This jurisdictional inquiry necessitates examination of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), which confers broad authority to proscribe “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” in commerce.100 The subsequent analysis first delineates the Commission’s statutory authority under Section 5 jurisprudence and attendant agency interpretations, followed by an examination of the Commission’s recent commentary to the United States Copyright Office regarding the potential application of this authority to artificial intelligence training methodologies that utilize copyrighted materials.

A.      Section 5 Authority

Section 5 of the FTC Act states that “[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.”101 The Commission may not declare an act or practice unlawful “on the grounds that such act or practice is unfair unless the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”102

Case law and FTC guidance have further developed these high-level principles. Below, unfair methods of competition (“UMC”) and unfair or deceptive acts or practices (“UDAP”) will both be introduced in order to better understand the FTC’s argument on how the use of copyrighted materials as AI inputs could violate the FTC’s Section 5 authority.

1.      UMC Unfairness

The jurisprudential framework defining “unfair methods of competition” has evolved primarily through case law interpretation and administrative guidance.103 Understanding this evolution is essential to evaluating the FTC’s current approach to AI training and copyright.

a. Historical Development and Judicial Foundation104

From its inception, Congress intended Section 5 to provide the FTC with greater flexibility than that afforded by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, allowing it to address anticompetitive practices that might not fit neatly within the strict definitions of existing antitrust statutes. This design aimed to prevent the new antitrust framework from becoming static and unable to adapt to novel forms of anticompetitive conduct.

A landmark Supreme Court decision, FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,105 significantly affirmed the FTC’s expansive authority under the UMC prong.106 The Court held that the FTC could proscribe practices as “unfair” even if those practices did not violate the letter or the spirit of the antitrust laws.107 The Sperry & Hutchinson ruling empowered the Commission to consider broader “public values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter . . . of the antitrust laws” when determining whether a method of competition was unfair.108 This decision is foundational to understanding the FTC’s capacity to act against conduct that might otherwise be permissible under traditional antitrust analysis.

More recently, the Commission’s 2022 “Policy Statement Regarding the Scope of Unfair Methods of Competition Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act”109 signaled a renewed commitment to a broad interpretation of its UMC authority. This statement explicitly asserts that Section 5’s reach extends beyond the Sherman and Clayton Acts, targeting conduct that may violate “‘the spirit’ of the antitrust laws” or is in its “incipiency.”110 The 2022 Policy Statement emphasizes that the FTC will focus on conduct that “goes beyond competition on the merits”111 and “tend[s] to negatively affect competitive conditions.”112 Notably, it suggests that demonstrating actual anticompetitive harm or market power, often a rigorous requirement in traditional antitrust litigation, may not be necessary in all Section 5 UMC cases.113 This approach effectively lowers the evidentiary burden for the FTC compared to standard antitrust enforcement, enabling challenges to conduct that might survive scrutiny under the Sherman or Clayton Acts.

This policy reflects an intent to use Section 5 as a dynamic tool, potentially to counteract judicial interpretations that some argue have narrowed the scope of traditional antitrust statutes, such as the Supreme Court’s decision in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,114 which constrained the essential facilities doctrine.115

b.      Analytical Framework

The test for identifying whether conduct is an unfair method of competition includes first a determination that the challenged conduct is a method of competition, and second that it is unfair.116

To constitute a method of competition under the Commission’s analytical framework, the challenged conduct must satisfy two threshold criteria. First, it must represent affirmative action “undertaken by an actor in the marketplace,”117 rather than merely reflecting structural market conditions such as entry barriers or industry concentration levels. Second, the conduct must necessarily implicate competitive dynamics. The Commission has indicated that certain behaviors outside traditional antitrust boundaries—including the misuse of regulatory processes or violations of generally applicable laws, may satisfy this requirement when they affect competition.118

For instance, the Commission cites Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp. 119 for the proposition that defrauding the patent office could be a basis for an antitrust violation.120 The Court found such abuse of regulatory process could be a basis for a Sherman Act Section 2 claim, but it was not a per se violation.121 The Commission also cites In re American Cyanamid Co.,122 as an example of finding misleading statements and withholding of information leading to a patent could be found to be an unfair method of competition.123

The concept of “unfairness” within the Commission’s Section 5 jurisprudence encompasses conduct that “goes beyond competition on the merits.”124 The Commission employs two principal criteria to evaluate whether conduct constitutes impermissible, non-meritorious competition: first, whether the conduct is “coercive, exploitative, collusive, abusive, deceptive, predatory, or involve[s] the use of economic power of a similar nature,” and second, whether it “tend[s] . . . to negatively affect competition conditions.”125

These evaluative criteria operate on a sliding scale within the Commission’s analytical framework, such that compelling evidence of one criterion may diminish the quantum of evidence required for the other.126 Significantly, the Commission has clarified that actual anticompetitive harm need not be demonstrated; rather, a tendency to produce negative competitive effects suffices to establish a violation.127

When presented with a prima facie case of an unfair method of competition, the Commission will consider potential justifications, albeit within narrowly circumscribed parameters. The Commission categorically rejects mere pecuniary benefits accruing to the respondent as sufficient justification.128 Any proffered justification must be legally cognizable, non-pretextual, and narrowly tailored to minimize competitive harm.129 Furthermore, the Commission requires that the asserted benefits manifest in the same market where the competitive harm occurs.130 Even when these stringent requirements are satisfied, the claimed benefits must outweigh the competitive harm to constitute a valid defense.131

2.      UDAP Unfairness

The Commission’s authority to designate consumer practices as “unfair” or “deceptive” under Section 5 underwent significant legislative curtailment following congressional concerns regarding perceived administrative overreach in the late 1970s.132 In response to congressional scrutiny, the Commission promulgated its Policy Statement on Unfairness, which articulated interpretive principles aligned with the statutory parameters subsequently codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).133

Under this framework, unjustified consumer injury constitutes the cardinal consideration in consumer unfairness analysis. To satisfy the statutory threshold, such injury must satisfy three conjunctive elements: It must be (1) substantial, (2) not outweighed by countervailing consumer or competitive benefits, and (3) not reasonably avoidable through consumer action.134

The substantiality requirement mandates that actionable harm transcend mere triviality or speculative injury. While economic detriment typically satisfies this criterion, substantial health and safety risks may likewise establish unfairness, whereas subjective or emotional harms generally fall outside the Commission’s enforcement purview.135

The Commission’s balancing inquiry acknowledges that “[m]ost business practices entail a mixture of economic and other costs and benefits,”136 necessitating careful evaluation of offsetting market advantages. Under this calculus, practices are deemed unfair only when “injurious in [their] net effects,”137 requiring the Commission to weigh consumer injury against potential market efficiencies.

Finally, the reasonable avoidability criterion reflects the Commission’s deference to market self-correction through informed consumer choice. As articulated in the Policy Statement, “[n]ormally we expect the marketplace to be self-correcting, and we rely on consumer choice—the ability of individual consumers to make their own private purchasing decision without regulatory intervention—to govern the market.”138 The Commission thus directs its enforcement authority not toward “second-guess[ing] the wisdom of particular consumer decisions, but rather to halt some form of seller behavior that unreasonably creates or takes advantage of an obstacle to the free exercise of consumer decision making.”139 Paradigmatic examples include information asymmetries that prevent meaningful comparison shopping, coercive service contract tactics, and fraudulent health claims—practices that undermine the consumer’s capacity for autonomous market participation.140

3.      The Convergence Problem: UMC and UDAP Unfairness Standards

The distinction and potential for overlap between UMC “unfairness” and UDAP “unfairness” can create significant regulatory ambiguity with particular relevance to AI copyright issues. While UDAP unfairness is governed by the codified three-part test in § 45(n) focusing on consumer injury, UMC unfairness, particularly as articulated in the 2022 Policy Statement, appears more open-ended. It relies on “indicia of unfairness” (such as conduct being coercive, exploitative, or abusive) and a “tendency to negatively affect competitive conditions.”141

This divergence implies that conduct not meeting the “substantial consumer injury” threshold for UDAP unfairness might still be challenged as an “unfair method of competition” if it is deemed to adversely affect the broader competitive landscape, even if direct, quantifiable consumer harm is less apparent or does not meet the § 45(n) criteria. This offers an alternative avenue for the FTC to intervene against conduct that might have been cleared under one specific aspect of its authority or by a court applying a similar consumer injury standard.

This regulatory flexibility becomes particularly problematic in the AI training context. Consider a scenario where an AI developer’s use of copyrighted materials under fair use cannot satisfy the UDAP unfairness standard because consumers suffer no substantial injury—indeed, consumers may benefit from improved AI capabilities. Under the more expansive UMC framework, however, the same conduct could be characterized as “exploitative” of rightsholders or as having a “tendency to negatively affect competitive conditions” in content markets, even without demonstrable consumer harm.

This dual-track approach effectively allows the FTC to forum shop within its own authority, selecting the standard most likely to yield enforcement success rather than applying consistent principles. Such regulatory arbitrage undermines legal predictability and threatens to circumvent the careful limitations Congress imposed on UDAP authority following the Commission’s overreach in the 1970s.

B.      FTC Comment to Copyright Office

With the foregoing analytical framework established, it becomes possible to examine the Commission’s potential application of unfairness principles to copyrighted materials used in artificial intelligence training. In 2023, the United States Copyright Office initiated an inquiry regarding artificial intelligence and copyright law,142 to which the Commission submitted a formal comment articulating its relevant enforcement interests and identifying potential competition and consumer protection concerns implicated by generative AI technologies.143

In its submission, the Commission first catalogued its enforcement activities relating to artificial intelligence business practices before addressing competitive concerns. The Commission asserted that “rapid development and deployment of AI also poses potential risks to competition,” with particular emphasis on market concentration among “dominant” technology firms possessing critical AI inputs including technological infrastructure, computational resources, and training data access.144 Based on these market dynamics, the Commission maintained that its unfair methods of competition authority constituted an essential regulatory tool.

With specific reference to copyrighted works as training inputs, the Commission stated that “under certain circumstances, the use of pirated or misuse of copyrighted materials could be an unfair practice or unfair method of competition under Section 5 of the FTC Act.”145 Certain applications of this principle align logically with established unfairness jurisprudence. For instance, the Commission noted that copyright-violative conduct—such as unauthorized training on protected expression or commercializing outputs that mimic creators’ distinctive attributes—may constitute unfair methods of competition or unfair practices, particularly when such conduct “deceives consumers, exploits a creator’s reputation or diminishes the value of her existing or future works, reveals private information, or otherwise causes substantial injury to consumers.”146 Such reasoning comports with traditional unfairness analysis where copyright infringement (absent fair use) serves as the predicate violation.

However, the Commission’s position extends considerably further, asserting that “conduct that may be consistent with the copyright laws nevertheless may violate Section 5.”147 This expansive interpretation potentially encompasses lawful uses of copyrighted material—including those protected under the fair use doctrine—within the ambit of unfairness regulation.

The Commission’s justification for this jurisdictional expansion appears questionable upon scrutiny. The Commission contends that “[m]any large technology firms possess vast financial resources that enable them to indemnify the users of their generative AI tools or obtain exclusive licenses to copyrighted (or otherwise proprietary) training data, potentially further entrenching the market power of these dominant firms.”148 This argument’s persuasiveness depends entirely on the premise that fair use would not apply to smaller AI companies seeking to utilize identical data. If fair use doctrine permits such utilization—as recent jurisprudential developments suggest it might for general-purpose systems—then both established technology firms and emerging competitors would enjoy equivalent legal access to these inputs.

Moreover, the Commission’s market power reasoning with respect to licensing deals could paradoxically support imposing affirmative dealing obligations on major copyright holders (at least with respect to their relations with small AI developers), an outcome that would seem to contradict established antitrust principles. For example, Thomson Reuters, as one of two dominant legal research providers through its Westlaw service, might under such logic be compelled to license its proprietary headnotes to market entrants like Ross Intelligence to facilitate competitive AI development. This reasoning would effectively transform copyright—a legal regime designed to grant exclusive rights—into a vehicle for mandatory licensing, at least for entities with substantial market share.

The tension becomes particularly apparent when considering the essential facilities doctrine in antitrust jurisprudence. While this doctrine has been significantly narrowed by the Supreme Court in cases such as Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, the Commission’s approach could be an attempt to resurrect a more expansive interpretation specifically for copyright holders.149 If a dominant technology firm’s exclusive licensing of copyrighted materials constitutes an unfair method of competition due to potential market foreclosure, then symmetrically, a dominant copyright holder’s refusal to license to potential competitors would logically present similar competitive concerns. This interpretive approach would effectively subordinate copyright law’s exclusivity principles to competition policy considerations whenever a copyright holder achieves significant market position.

Furthermore, such reasoning introduces significant doctrinal inconsistency. The Copyright Office and courts have carefully delineated when fair use applies to innovative technologies, calibrating intellectual property protections to balance creator incentives with technological progress. Allowing the Commission to determine that legally permissible uses under copyright law—including fair use—nonetheless constitute unfair methods of competition would create competing legal standards that undermine this carefully crafted equilibrium. Copyright holders and AI developers would face contradictory legal obligations, where conduct explicitly permitted under one legal regime could simultaneously be prohibited under another.

In sum, the Commission has advanced the proposition that even fair use of copyrighted materials in AI training may constitute an unfair method of competition or unfair act or practice. The subsequent analysis will demonstrate that this regulatory approach would potentially undermine innovation and competition—the foundational values that animate copyright, antitrust, and consumer protection jurisprudence.

III. The FTC Should Not Discourage Innovation by Undermining Copyright and Fair Use

The optimal approach would harmonize copyright and competition law by preventing unsuccessful copyright infringement claims from serving as the foundation for unfairness claims. Courts should preserve copyright law’s carefully calibrated balance by limiting independent unfairness claims.

This Part analyzes how the FTC’s Copyright Comment makes incorrect assumptions about the market for AI training, which colors its analysis. Then, it makes a case for why the law of unfairness should be limited to situations where there is a clear underlying violation of copyright law, unexcused by fair use. Finally, it considers how courts have handled state-level unfair competition claims as an example of reading copyright law and competition law consistently.

A.      FTC’s Comment to the Copyright Office Makes Incorrect Assumptions About the AI Training Market

The FTC’s proposed approach misunderstands the dynamism in AI technology markets and risks overweighting rightsholder interests in AI training contexts. The Commission’s perspective reflects several problematic assumptions about both the technical functioning of AI and market realities.

First, the approach effectively grants rightsholders protections exceeding traditional copyright boundaries. No legal consensus exists on how AI systems conceptually engage with copyrighted works. While arguments exist that AI models “memorize” content,150 research demonstrates that careful data curation can significantly reduce such memorization.151 Moreover, AI systems only make “true” copies during training; they transform works into tokens and abstract “weight” adjustments rather than storing original text sequences.152 The resulting model contains billions of parameters that form “a vast sea of numbers, with no direct correspondence to the original text.”153 This tokenization process enables models to learn language patterns without reproducing creative expression in their permanent files.154 Thus, fair use remains a live controversy requiring careful consideration before agencies impose competition-based restrictions.155

Second, the FTC’s approach would itself create prohibitive transaction costs. Much internet content used in AI training lacks centralized management, making comprehensive rightsholder identification virtually impossible. Even if possible, the transaction costs would likely lead to less-capable AI models due to input constraints, or force reliance on synthetic data with potentially negative effects on model quality.156

Third, value assignment at the input stage presents insurmountable challenges. Copyright Office analysis confirms that with foundation models ingesting billions of works, individual works’ influence becomes so diluted that even minimal licensing transaction costs would exceed that work’s share of model utility.157 Even highly valuable literary collections represent mere drops in the vast training corpus. Traditional valuation methods become impractical—multiplying per-work fees by millions or billions yields astronomically high costs disconnected from actual impact on the model.

Furthermore, monetization in generative AI occurs primarily at the output stage when models produce valuable content, not during data ingestion. Without methods to connect specific generated content to particular training examples, input valuation remains highly speculative and likely de minimis for most individual works.

Finally, restrictive approaches risk creating AI systems that disproportionately reflect perspectives from entities with market power or established licensing frameworks. This undermines representation of independent creators and non-commercial knowledge sources, potentially producing AI systems biased toward commercially dominant viewpoints rather than reflecting the full spectrum of human knowledge and creative expression.

B.      Unfairness Without Violation? Why the FTC Should Not Treat Alleged or Excused Legal Conduct as Unfair Competition

The FTC’s invocation of Section 5 unfairness authority in contexts involving other legal regimes bears a striking resemblance to the tort doctrine of negligence per se. Under that doctrine, a violation of a statute may serve as evidence of breach in a negligence case, but courts impose strict limits on when such violations may be used to establish tort liability.158 Crucially, negligence per se applies only where there has been an actual violation of a statute, and that violation is unexcused.159 If the defendant raises and successfully invokes a statutory defense—such as impossibility, necessity, or compliance under emergency conditions—then the mere fact of technical noncompliance is insufficient to establish liability.160 Similarly, if the statute was not designed to prevent the type of harm at issue, courts will not apply the negligence per se doctrine.161

By contrast, the FTC’s theory of unfairness lacks these core doctrinal constraints. The Commission’s 2023 comment to the U.S. Copyright Office asserts that even uses of copyrighted material “consistent with copyright laws” may still constitute unfair methods of competition under Section 5.162 This approach treats legal compliance not as a defense but as a separate, potentially irrelevant question—allowing the Commission to recharacterize excused conduct (such as a use found to be fair under the Copyright Act) as independently “unfair.”

The FTC’s treatment of legal violations, more notably, non-violations, under its unfairness authority exhibits a profound internal inconsistency. In some regulatory contexts, the FTC treats clear statutory violations as proxies for anticompetitive harm. For instance, in labor and employment cases, the Commission has suggested that violations of workplace safety or labor laws may be evidence of an exercise of market power.163 Yet in others, such as copyright and fair use, the FTC implies that conduct consistent with the governing legal framework may nonetheless be deemed “unfair.”164 This inconsistency reveals a troubling elasticity in the agency’s approach: where it suits the enforcement agenda, legal compliance may be disregarded or recharacterized as evidence of harm.

Consider the FTC’s increasing interest in labor market practices. In recent policy discussions, the agency has emphasized the relationship between employer conduct—such as wage suppression, no-poach agreements, or safety violations—and potential labor market concentration.165 A violation of Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations, for example, is often cited not only as a harm in itself but as a symptom of monopsony power.166

Yet in stark contrast, when addressing uses of copyrighted materials in AI training, the FTC takes precisely the opposite view. The Commission’s 2023 comment to the U.S. Copyright Office asserted that “conduct that may be consistent with copyright laws nevertheless may violate Section 5.”167 In other words, even where courts have determined that no copyright violation has occurred the FTC reserves the right to label that same conduct “unfair.” This reveals a reverse asymmetry: Here, non-violation still equals market abuse.

This doctrinal inconsistency erodes the distinction between unlawful conduct and conduct that the law affirmatively permits. Courts, by contrast, have consistently treated legal compliance and affirmative defenses as relevant, and often dispositive, in determining liability. In copyright law, the fair use doctrine is not a mere procedural hurdle; it is a substantive determination that the conduct in question does not give rise to liability. As the Supreme Court has held, fair use is not a lesser form of infringement but a doctrine that “permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.”168

Copyright law (including its fair use doctrine and related limitations) is a fully articulated legal regime, carefully constructed by Congress and interpreted by courts to balance exclusive rights with innovation and expressive freedom. By asserting that conduct “consistent with copyright law” may still constitute an unfair method of competition under Section 5, the FTC risks imposing liability for actions that the Copyright Act explicitly permits. This threatens to unravel the statutory equilibrium, subjecting developers and creators to duplicative or conflicting standards.

Allowing the FTC to treat alleged or excused violations of other laws as per se “unfair” under Section 5 creates a regulatory framework unmoored from statute, judicial precedent, or objective standards. Such an approach threatens to convert Section 5 into a floating liability regime, where enforcement decisions hinge not on defined legal boundaries but on agency discretion. In this framework, legal compliance—including compliance confirmed by judicial findings—offers no safe harbor, while allegations alone may suffice to trigger regulatory sanction.

This discretionary expansion of unfairness authority poses serious risks for legal predictability and innovation. By failing to cabin its enforcement actions to conduct that is clearly unlawful and unexcused, the FTC fosters an environment of retrospective enforcement—where conduct deemed permissible at the time may be recharacterized as unfair after the fact. This uncertainty chills risk-taking and innovation, particularly in areas like AI development where legal doctrines such as fair use remain actively contested.

To safeguard the integrity of both legal compliance and competition enforcement, the FTC should constrain its unfairness authority to situations involving clear statutory violations that are not excused by affirmative defenses or legal exceptions. This would ensure that Section 5 complements, rather than contradicts, the substantive laws it touches—and restores much-needed stability to the Commission’s enforcement approach.

C.      The FTC’s Pattern of Treating Lawful Conduct as Unfair: Precedents for Copyright Overreach

The FTC’s assertion that conduct “consistent with copyright laws nevertheless may violate Section 5”169 is not an isolated position but reflects a broader pattern of regulatory expansion. Examining the Commission’s enforcement history reveals multiple instances where it has challenged conduct that was arguably permissible under other legal frameworks or had been cleared by specialized authorities. These precedents illuminate the practical risks of allowing the FTC to second-guess copyright law’s careful balance through unfairness claims.

1.      Circumventing Sherman Act Requirements: Invitations to Collude

The FTC’s treatment of inchoate anticompetitive conduct demonstrates its willingness to expand beyond traditional legal boundaries. In Drug Testing Compliance Group, LLC, the Commission challenged a mere invitation to collude as an unfair method of competition, even though no agreement was formed.170 Under established Sherman Act jurisprudence, such conduct would not constitute a violation because it lacks the requisite “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy” element.171 Unlike under the 2015 UMC Policy Statement,172 the current version allows for much more expansive enforcement actions against “incipient” threats to competition.173

This approach effectively allows the FTC to prosecute conduct that the Department of Justice could not pursue under traditional antitrust law. While the Commission characterizes this as addressing “incipient” violations, it fundamentally alters the legal landscape by criminalizing preparatory conduct that Congress chose not to prohibit directly. The parallel to copyright is clear: just as the FTC bypasses Sherman Act requirements by invoking Section 5, it seeks to bypass fair-use determinations by recharacterizing potentially lawful copying as unfair competition.

2.      Meta-Regulation of Specialized Agencies: Orange Book Patent Listings

The Commission’s challenges to pharmaceutical patent listings in the FDA’s Orange Book reveal another dimension of regulatory overreach. These patents are granted by the USPTO—which presumes their validity—and listed through FDA procedures. Yet the FTC routinely challenges the listing of certain medical devices under its unfair methods of competition authority.174

This creates a precedent where the FTC positions itself as a meta-regulator, second-guessing determinations made by agencies with specialized expertise. The USPTO evaluates patent validity, and the FDA administers the listing process according to established regulations. By recharacterizing the use of these regulatory entitlements as anticompetitive, the FTC undermines the coherence of the federal regulatory framework.

The copyright parallel is direct: Just as the FTC challenges patent holders’ use of USPTO-granted rights and FDA procedures, it seeks to challenge AI developers’ use of copyright materials that courts might deem protected by fair use. In both contexts, the Commission treats compliance with an established legal regime as irrelevant to its broader unfairness authority.

3.      Expanding Beyond Specific Statutory Frameworks: Data Privacy Practices

Perhaps most relevant to the copyright context is the FTC’s approach to data privacy. The Commission has explicitly asserted that data practices may be “unfair” under Section 5 even when they comply with specific privacy statutes like COPPA, HIPAA, or state laws like the CCPA.175 This principle directly parallels the Commission’s position on copyright: that conduct “consistent with copyright laws nevertheless may violate Section 5.”

This approach transforms the FTC into a roving commission empowered to find “unfairness” wherever specific statutory schemes permit conduct the Commission disfavors. Rather than respecting the policy choices embedded in specialized legislation, the Commission treats its general unfairness authority as superior to Congress’s specific enactments.

4.      The Outer Boundary of Section 5 Authority

The Commission’s most ambitious extensions of stand-alone Section 5 authority have arisen in the so-called “patent ambush” context. Dell,176 Rambus,177 N-Data,178 and Unocal 179 show the Commission reaching past established patent and contract doctrines when it believed deception inside a collective decision-making body created ex-post market power. They represent the high-water mark of Section 5’s expansion—bold enough to secure consent orders in DellN-Data, and Unocal, yet fragile enough to collapse on appeal in Rambus.

All four episodes shared three elements. First, the challenged firm took part in a collective-choice process whose legitimacy depends on candor: an SSO in Dell,180 Rambus,181 and N-Data and a public rule-making in Unocal.182 Second, the Commission alleged concrete deception capable of inducing reliance. Dell and Unocal flatly denied owning relevant patents;183 Rambus and N-Data withheld or repudiated licensing commitments while watching rivals devote investments into the chosen technology.184 Third, the deception was said to confer ex post market power by locking an entire industry into the patented technology once switching became impracticable.185 Only when those three predicates lined up did the Commission feel confident invoking its stand-alone unfair-competition authority.

Even then, the outcomes were mixed. Dell capitulated quickly,186 and N-Data settled after a divided vote that drew two dissents questioning the theory’s novelty.187 Rambus, by contrast, is the cautionary limit case: the D.C. Circuit vacated the Commission’s order because it could not see proof that the relevant standards body would have adopted a different standard “but for” the nondisclosure.188 Unocal settled only after a merger placed negotiating pressure on the company.189 Taken together, the quartet shows that Section 5 can fill gaps left by patent, contract, or fraud doctrines—but only where intentional deception distorts a decision-making forum and plausibly produces durable market power.

That historical pattern is instructive precisely because it is absent from the Commission’s current rhetoric on generative-AI training. In the patent-ambush cases, the Commission did not claim that exercising a valid patent was inherently “unfair.” The gravamen was the deceptive acquisition of that patent-enhanced position—an “extra element” beyond the lawful assertion of a statutory right. By contrast, the FTC’s 2023 comment to the Copyright Office asserts that an AI developer’s use of copyrighted materials may violate Section 5 even when a court holds the copying to be fair use. In other words, the Commission now proposes to condemn conduct because it complies with the governing intellectual-property regime, not because it secretly subverts it. That move would stretch Section 5 well past the boundary charted by DellRambusN-Data, and Unocal.

The distinction matters for both doctrine and policy. Section 5 interventions premised on deception do not threaten the predictability of patent (or copyright) law because they target conduct the specialist regime never intended to bless. Declaring “unfair” a use that copyright affirmatively permits, by contrast, would create a direct conflict between two federal statutes, depriving innovators of any stable safe harbor. Far from policing a gap, the Commission would manufacture one.

5.      Implications for Copyright and AI Innovation

These precedents reveal a consistent pattern: The FTC regularly treats compliance with other legal frameworks as potentially irrelevant to its unfairness analysis. Whether the conduct involves Sherman Act requirements, USPTO/FDA procedures, or specific privacy statutes, the Commission maintains that its Section 5 authority operates independently.

Applied to copyright, this pattern suggests the FTC would likely pursue unfairness claims against AI training practices regardless of fair-use determinations. Just as it challenges disfavored patent listings despite USPTO approval, or data practices despite HIPAA compliance, the Commission would likely characterize fair use of copyrighted materials as “unfair” whenever it serves broader enforcement objectives.

This approach fundamentally undermines legal predictability and the careful policy balances Congress has struck. Copyright law, like patent and privacy law, reflects specific Congressional choices about how to balance competing interests. Allowing the FTC to override these determinations through open-ended unfairness claims effectively nullifies the specialized frameworks Congress has created.

D.      State Law Unfair Competition Claims and Copyright Fair Use: Recent Jurisprudence

While the FTC operates under federal statutory authority and thus is not constrained by copyright preemption principles that limit state unfair competition claims,190 the judicial reasoning in the preceding state cases offers valuable guidance. The same logic that applies to preemption of copyright claims recast as duplicative state competition claims applies in equal force to the use of open-ended federal unfairness authority to end-run the Copyright Act. The preemption of claims that recast copyright causes of action as non-copyright causes of action would prevent regulatory authorities from obtaining, in effect, duplicative opportunities to penalize identical conduct under different legal theories. Moreover, this analytical framework provides essential legal certainty for artificial intelligence developers by ensuring that conduct deemed permissible under copyright doctrine cannot be subsequently recharacterized as unfair competition without additional elements of wrongdoing. Maintaining this doctrinal consistency across legal regimes serves the fundamental interests of both regulatory predictability and technological innovation.

Recent litigation has examined whether state law unfair competition claims can succeed in cases where copyright fair use might apply to AI training. Courts have generally been skeptical of such claims, finding them preempted by federal copyright law absent additional elements beyond mere copying, and for good reason. The principle of copyright preemption stems from the Copyright Act’s express provision that state law claims are preempted when they concern works “within the subject matter of copyright” and assert “legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright.”191 Courts have consistently interpreted this provision to bar state unfair competition claims that merely restate copyright infringement allegations without an “extra element” that qualitatively differentiates the claim from copyright protection.192 This doctrine preserves the federal scheme’s integrity by ensuring that copyright’s carefully balanced rights and limitations cannot be circumvented through alternative state law theories addressing identical conduct.

As noted above, in Thomson Reuters v. Ross,193 that court rejected Ross’s fair-use defense for copying Westlaw’s copyrighted headnotes to train an AI legal research tool. In the District of Delaware litigation, Thomson Reuters had characterized Ross’s actions as both copyright infringement and unfair competition, the court held the unfair competition claim preempted due to the “gravamen of [the] claim [being] the same as . . . [the] copyright claim.”194 Notably, the FTC has previously cited this case as an example where an AI developer’s conduct might constitute an “unfair method of competition” regardless of copyright liability determinations.195

In Tremblay v. OpenAI, Inc., plaintiffs alleged both copyright infringement and unfair competition related to the training of GPT models on their books without permission.196 The court dismissed the unfair competition claim in July 2024 while allowing the copyright claim to proceed.197 The judge determined that the state law unfair competition allegations lacked the necessary “extra element” beyond unauthorized copying (such as deception or passing off) required to escape federal copyright preemption.198

Similarly, in the GitHub Copilot litigation concerning AI training on open-source code, the court dismissed unfair competition claims brought under California law to the extent they were based on other failed claims.199 Without an independent wrong beyond reproduction of code snippets, the unfair competition theory could not stand.200

These cases illustrate a consistent principle: State law unfair competition claims involving AI training data cannot succeed when they merely restate copyright infringement allegations. Courts have required an “extra element” such as misrepresentation, passing off, or consumer deception to overcome copyright preemption. When fair use applies—or even potentially applies—to the underlying copying, courts have rightfully rejected attempts to reframe the same conduct as unfair competition without additional wrongful elements beyond the copying itself.

Conclusion

The FTC’s proposed approach risks undermining innovation without adequately addressing the core challenges at the intersection of copyright and AI. By potentially treating even fair use of copyrighted materials as “unfair competition,” the Commission would create regulatory uncertainty that could significantly hamper AI development.

A more balanced approach would recognize what might be called the “hydraulics of copyright”—when pressure is applied in one area of copyright law, it creates a counterbalancing effect elsewhere. Rather than restricting AI development at the input stage through potentially overlapping and contradictory regulatory regimes, policymakers should focus on solutions at the output stage. This would recognize both the transformative nature of AI training and the legitimate interests of creators in protecting their works from direct competition.

When AI models generate outputs that substantially resemble protected works, copyright law already provides mechanisms to challenge such outputs. Strengthening these protections while permitting fair use at the training stage would maintain the essential balance between protecting creators and encouraging innovation.

The FTC should limit its unfairness authority to cases where courts have found copyright infringement without fair-use protection. This approach would align copyright law with competition and consumer protection principles while maintaining the balance necessary for innovation. Ideally, Congress should also clarify that the preemption principles embodied in 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) for state competition claims should also guide federal agencies’ application of unfairness authority to AI training.

By focusing regulatory attention on outputs rather than inputs, AI innovation can flourish while creators receive appropriate protection and compensation. This forward-looking approach acknowledges the dynamic nature of AI markets and the shared goal of all relevant legal frameworks: promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare through a vibrant creative economy.

Toward a Simple Economic Framework for Analysis of Business Ecosystems

This chapter develops a progression of frameworks to analyze economic organization for both single- and multi-product production, culminating in a framework for studying business . . .

Abstract

This chapter develops a progression of frameworks to analyze economic organization for both single- and multi-product production, culminating in a framework for studying business ecosystems. The first stage draws on transaction cost economics, focusing on how governance affects the costs of transactions. The second incorporates transaction value economics, highlighting how interactions can create value through mechanisms such as knowledge sharing. The third extends these perspectives by integrating insights from property rights economics, along with additional insights from transaction value economics, to account for how governance influences the value of future transactions via its impact on investment and innovation, with a particular focus on the latter. This progression provides a structured, economically grounded approach for analyzing coevolution and other defining features of business ecosystems within an antitrust-relevant framework – analysis that has become especially relevant and important with the proliferation of digital business ecosystems.

Read the full piece at SSRN.

Evolutionary AI in Practice: Japan’s Bottom-Up Innovation Model and the Co-Evolution of Industrial and Competition Policy

This Article argues that Japan’s trajectory in artificial intelligence is best understood as an evolutionary process in which bottom-up deployment of AI across industrial . . .

Abstract

This Article argues that Japan’s trajectory in artificial intelligence is best understood as an evolutionary process in which bottom-up deployment of AI across industrial and service domains co-evolves with a policy framework that integrates restrained industrial support and anticipatory competition enforcement. In contrast to the centralized foundation-model strategies pursued in the United States and China and the regulatory-led framework emerging in the European Union, Japan’s approach highlights how sustained deployment, domain specialization, and incremental learning can reshape both industrial structure and the focus of competition policy. Drawing on developments across robotics, manufacturing, mobility, and enterprise software, the Article introduces the concept of the deployment layer to explain how value creation and competitive bottlenecks increasingly arise at the interfaces through which AI systems are operationalized rather than within models alone. This perspective reframes industrial policy debates by suggesting that compute access, experimental deployment, and organizational learning may matter more than large-scale frontier-model subsidies, while competition policy must increasingly address control over data, infrastructure, and integration pathways. The Article concludes that Japan’s experience illustrates an alternative governance model for AI in which industrial policy and competition enforcement evolve together through iterative market learning, offering a framework for understanding AI governance as a process of policy co-evolution rather than discrete regulatory intervention.

Read the full piece at SSRN.

ICLE ON SOCIAL MEDIA

April Threads 2026

Threads from ICLE scholars on trending issues for the month of April 2026. Just got the new EU merger guidelines. Still working through them. Sharing . . .

Threads from ICLE scholars on trending issues for the month of April 2026.