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What’s Missing from Tyler’s IO Reading List

Tyler Cowen has posted the reading list for his 2010 Industrial Organization class in the George Mason economics department.  He asks for recommendations.  Below the fold are my suggestions to supplement Section I or II of Cowen’s reading list. The first order of business is getting Coase, Klein, Crawford Alchian (1978), Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Williamson (1971, 1975) added to the theory of the firm reading.

Section I: Firm Behavior, Antitrust, Vertical and Horizontal Control

Must-Reads

2010 DOJ/ FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines

Harold Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief about Monopoly, in Industrial Concentration: The New Learning 164 (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al. eds., 1974).

Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1984).

Elizabeth Granitz & Benjamin Klein, Raising Rivals’ Costs: The Standard Oil Case, 39 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1996).

Roy Kenney and Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Block Booking, 26 J. Law & Economics 497 (1983).

Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J. L. & Econ. 265 (1988).

Benjamin Klein & Joshua D. Wright, The Economics of Slotting Contracts, 50 J. L. & Econ. 421 (2007).

Thomas Krattenmaker & Steve Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 Yale LJ (1986).

Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs,73 AER Papers and Proceedings (1983).

George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. Pol. Econ. (1964).

Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 837 (1990).

Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 American Economic Review 18 (March 1968).

Optional

Orley Ashenfelter, David Ashmore, Jonathan B. Baker, Suzanne Gleason & Daniel S. Hosken, Empirical Methods in Merger Analysis: Econometric Analysis of Pricing in FTC v. Staples, 13 Intl. J. Econ. Bus. 265 (2006)

Jonathan Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 17 Journal of Economic Perspectives 27-50, Fall 2003 (to be read in conjunction with Crandall & Whinston)

George Bittlingmayer & Thomas W. Hazlett, DOS Kapital, Has Antitrust Action Against Microsoft Created Value in the Computer Industry, 55 Journal of Financial Economics 239 (2000)

Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman (2002), ‘The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries’

Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints:
Empirical Evidence and Public Policy (2008)

Barry Nalebuff (2004), ‘Bundling as an Entry Barrier’

Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Quantitative Methods in Antitrust, in 1 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW
AND POLICY 723 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008)

Section II: Microeconomics of the Firm

Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62
AMER. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).

R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).

Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford, & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21(2) J.L. & Econ 297 (1978)

Oliver Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM.
ECON. REV. 112 (1971).

Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (The Free Press, 1975).

Filed under: antitrust, economics