Self-Preferencing in Brazil: Should We Regulate Before We Understand?
Introduction
Ex-ante regulatory frameworks for digital markets—such as the European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA),[1] the United Kingdom’s Digital Markets, Competition, and Consumers Act (DMCC),[2] and Section 19a of the German Act Against Competition Restraints (GWB)[3]—target specific practices deemed harmful to competition and consumers, including the oft-debated subject of “self-preferencing.”
Typically, such regimes impose prohibitions and obligations on a limited set of powerful technology firms. For instance, the DMA prohibits “gatekeepers” from favoring their own products in rankings and indexing; the DMCC bars firms with “strategic market status” from leveraging data advantages to benefit their own offerings; and Section 19a of the GWB restricts “firms of paramount significance” from privileging their own services over rivals.
Brazil appears to be following a similar path. Bill No. 2768/2022,[4] currently under congressional review, would require digital platforms with “essential access-control power” to provide “isonomic and non-discriminatory treatment to professional and end users.”
Despite these policy movements, however, neither the economic evidence nor the Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica’s (CADE) legal precedents support a general presumption of harm or blanket ban against self-preferencing in Brazil. Rather than treating the conduct as inherently anticompetitive, Brazilian enforcement has to date favored a contextual, case-by-case approach. As I will try to address in this issue brief, this is likely not the correct regulatory direction to take.
The Concurrences Competition Law Dictionary offers a useful definition of self-preferencing:
Among exclusionary abuses of dominant position, self-preferencing is a conduct that falls under the more general category of abusive leverage, as it assumes an undertaking abusing its dominant position in a given market to extend that position in a closely related market (upstream, downstream or adjacent), to the detriment of competitor on the latter market.[5]
Under traditional competition law, self-preferencing is typically analyzed as a form of abuse of dominance, unilateral conduct, or monopolization. It may be understood as a specific type of leveraging or, alternatively, as a manifestation of the “raising rivals’ costs” (RRC)[6] theory. In this context, the conduct may be deemed unlawful when a dominant firm in one market favors its own products or services in a vertically related market, thereby either extending its dominance or impairing competitors’ ability to compete effectively in the second market.
While self-preferencing[7] has recently gained renewed attention in antitrust discussions surrounding digital markets,[8] the practice itself is far from new. It has long been a common business strategy in such traditional sectors as retail[9] and supermarkets,[10] where vertically integrated firms often promote their own brands or products. Moreover, many common and intuitive business practices—such as restaurants offering a “house wine,” gas stations selling their own fuel, large consulting firms providing accounting or legal services, or construction companies sourcing materials from their own subsidiaries—could be characterized, depending on how the conduct is framed by competition authorities, as tying practices or forms of “self-preferencing.”
Despite its growing prominence in discourse around digital markets, the term “self-preferencing” remains conceptually imprecise. The antitrust literature has not yet reached a conclusion on whether “self-preferencing” should be treated as a distinct category of harm or whether it is simply a new label for established theories of harm, such as leveraging, tying, or raising rivals’ costs (RRC). If self-preferencing is understood to apply across both digital and nondigital markets, then the characteristics of digital platforms—such as network effects, high economies of scale and scope, intensive use of data, low marginal costs, tipping dynamics, and significant (often collective) switching costs—raise other important questions. Do these characteristics transform the economic logic of self-preferencing and adapt it into a novel or slightly different theory of harm? Or, conversely, is the analytical core of traditional antitrust theory the same, with the only question being how to assess the practice within a given market context under a rule-of-reason analysis? Many major questions are yet to be answered either by the academic literature or competition-law decisions. Pablo Colomo describes the current use of “self-preferencing” as “an epithet capturing a diverse range of scenarios,” underscoring the conceptual vagueness that undermines its legal utility.[11]
Even under these various names and without a clearly defined legal framework, competition authorities have rarely treated self-preferencing as a priority for enforcement. This historical ambivalence raises another serious question: if the practice has not warranted strict antitrust intervention, should it now be subject to sweeping ex-ante prohibitions in the digital realm?
I. The Economics of Self-Preferencing: A Brief Review of the Literature
To understand the dynamics of self-preferencing, it is important to recognize that favoring one’s own products is often a rational and economically expected behavior. Michael Salinger,[12] former director of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Bureau of Economics, has noted that self-preferencing can stem from legitimate business strategies such as vertical or conglomerate integration aimed at eliminating double marginalization (EDM), which typically results in lower prices and procompetitive outcomes.
This rationale has been addressed in the broader economic literature on vertical integration. Nobel laureate Oliver Hart, building on the theory of transaction costs and incomplete contracts, explains that vertical integration can be understood as a consequence of the high costs of incomplete contracts:
In particular, when it is too costly for one party to specify a long list of the particular rights it desires over another party’s assets, then it may be optimal for the first party to purchase all rights except those specifically mentioned in the contract. Ownership is the purchase of these residual rights of control. Vertical integration is the purchase of the assets of a supplier (or of a purchaser) for the purpose of acquiring the residual rights of control.[13]
In this light, it is to be expected that firms vertically integrated under a single economic entity will rely on their own inputs, rather than sourcing them from competitors. Otherwise, vertical integration would become economically irrational or unsustainable, often leading to divestitures or spinoffs.
Therefore, in vertically integrated structures, some form of self-preferencing is not only natural, but is often a manifestation of efficiency. By internalizing transactions and eliminating double markups, vertical integration reduces costs, which can translate into lower prices and improved outcomes for consumers. As a result, in this context, self-preferencing tends to be the rule, rather than the exception, and its baseline economic effect is typically procompetitive.
Furthermore, this commercial behavior of “self-preferencing” one’s own services or products reflects a broader economic logic found on both the supply and demand sides. For instance, on the consumer side, Nobel-winning economists Daniel Kahneman and Richard Thaler describe how the “endowment effect”[14] illustrates how individuals tend to assign greater value to goods they own—e.g., assuming their used car is worth more than others of similar value or quality. While this behavior is rooted in psychology, it offers an intuitive parallel: just as consumers tend to “self-preference” their own possessions, it is natural for firms to “self-preference” their own products. This is even more reasonable for firms, when considering objective factors such as improved supply-chain control, better inventory management, or reduced transaction costs.
Moving beyond theoretical frameworks, it is essential to consider the empirical literature on self-preferencing. As discussed earlier, the term may encompass practices like leveraging, tying, or raising rivals’ costs in nondigital markets. But as the purpose of this brief is to assess proposals for a blanket ban on self-preferencing in digital markets, the literature review here will be limited to studies focusing on that specific context.
Geoffrey Manne has examined empirical studies on platform economics and found that self-preferencing practices—though observed in different settings—tend to produce positive welfare outcomes or, at worst, neutral or ambiguous long-term effects. On this basis, he challenges the use of presumptions in antitrust analysis of vertical discrimination:
The problem [with the intensive criticism of illegal presumption of vertical discrimination], however, is that the claims of presumptive harm from vertical discrimination are based neither on sound economics nor evidence.[15]
A more recent literature review analyzing the effects of self-preferencing by digital platforms similarly concludes that “the welfare effects of self-preferencing are contingent on the specific form of self-preferencing as well as the market environment in which it occurs.”[16] While the authors do not explicitly offer a competition-policy recommendation, the results logically point toward rejecting any blanket presumption of illegality and instead supporting a case-by-case, effects-based approach.
Along the same lines, economists Emilie Feyler and Veronica Postal reach a similar conclusion in their review of self-preferencing by pricing algorithms, a context that raises further concerns due to the delegation of pricing decisions to automated systems.[17] They observe that:
There is no consensus from the economic literature on whether procompetitive benefits or possible anticompetitive considerations prevail in the context of self-preferencing algorithms used by digital platforms. Nor is there a consensus on the welfare effects of a policy intervention to correct bias in algorithmic recommendations. Determining the net impact of self-preferencing algorithms on competition and consumer welfare requires individualized analysis accounting for the workings of specific algorithms, competitive context, and market environment.[18]
Finally, the fact that self-preferencing often produces pro-competitive effects has been acknowledged even by some of the competition authorities that are currently considering more targeted ex-ante regulatory measures for digital platforms. For example, the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC) noted in a report on digital practices:
Although self-preferencing conduct is often benign, self-preferencing conduct that leverages market power over a key online service into a related service, which is not justified by a procompetitive rationale, can distort competition and decrease consumer welfare.[19]
In short, the economic literature makes clear that any analysis of self-preferencing ultimately hinges on the specific facts of each case, as well as the broader market context. There is no consensus—either theoretical or empirical—to supports a general condemnation of the practice. On the contrary, many studies recognize that self-preferencing can produce efficiency gains, especially when linked to vertical integration or innovation strategies.
Accordingly, the current body of economic research does not support a presumption of illegality, let alone a blanket ban on self-preferencing by digital platforms. This is not to say that self-preferencing—as a form of leveraging, tying, or raising rivals’ costs—can never harm competition or consumers. It can and should be assessed according to the legal and economic evidence of each particular case. But moving from the current analytical stage, in which the practice is presumptively legal and often efficiency-enhancing, toward strict regulatory prohibitions appears to be, at the very least, very premature.
II. Despite CADE’s Limited Case Law on Self-Preferencing, the Rule of Reason Still Reigns
Building on this economic rationale, international antitrust case law—including the approach adopted by Brazil’s competition authority, CADE—generally treats self-preferencing as presumptively lawful and subject to a rule-of-reason analysis. As will be discussed, however, CADE’s case law on self-preferencing remains notably limited. Given the distinctive characteristics of digital markets, some Brazilian antitrust scholars—such as Beatriz Kira and Diogo Coutinho[20]—have argued that CADE should not only adapt existing theories of harm to the digital context, but also develop new ones tailored to these environments. From this perspective, self-preferencing is seen as a novel theory of harm that requires further conceptual and doctrinal refinement in digital competition enforcement.
In terms of case law, the EU’s Google Shopping decision is widely regarded as the international benchmark for self-preferencing in digital markets. The core allegation in that case[21] was that Google leveraged its market power to manipulate search results, favoring its own service—Google Shopping—by limiting the visibility of competing price-comparison platforms. The case illustrates a sharp divergence in how competition authorities assess similar conduct. In 2017, the European Commission[22] fined Google €2.42 billion for abusing its dominance in the search-engine market by granting an illegal advantage to its own comparison service. By contrast, in 2019, CADE’s Administrative Tribunal[23] dismissed the charges in a split 3–3 vote, with the former president casting the deciding vote in favor of dismissal.
The key difference in approach lies in evidentiary thresholds. While the European Commission found potential anticompetitive effects sufficient to establish liability, the majority at CADE relied on Technical Note No. 34/2018[24] from its Department of Economic Studies (DEE), which concluded that Google’s conduct stemmed from product innovations aimed at improving the user experience and delivering more accurate search results. The practice was therefore judged to be procompetitive, rather than anticompetitive. The dismissal was also grounded in a lack of robust evidence and a net-effects analysis of alleged predatory innovation, which found overall procompetitive efficiencies. In short, while the EU condemned Google’s self-preferencing, CADE saw insufficient grounds for a condemnation. This raises even further doubts about whether an ex-ante prohibition on self-preferencing is necessary for Brazil as, in the benchmark case, CADE decided that the practice was not ultimately anticompetitive. This lack of international convergence is also supported by the antitrust literature.[25]
The self-preferencing discussion in Brazil has not been limited to monopolization cases; it has also appeared (albeit rarely) in vertical-merger reviews. One notable example was the Nike/SBF–Centauro transaction, in which self-preferencing concerns played a central role. The merger involved the acquisition by SBF Group—owner of the “Centauro” sporting-goods retail chain—of the entire equity interest in Brazilian Nike that was previously held by the international Nike Group. As a result of the deal, SBF became the exclusive distributor of Nike products in Brazil and took over the operation of Nike’s physical and online retail channels. According to the parties, the transaction would allow SBF to integrate Nike’s operations into its existing omnichannel retail model.
In reviewing the deal, CADE’s General-Superintendent[26]—the authority’s investigative arm—found no evidence of either total or partial vertical foreclosure (discussed here under the label “self-preferencing”). While it acknowledged Nike’s dominant position in the “wholesale market for sporting goods” (a dominant position is presumed under Brazilian competition law when a firm’s market share exceeds 20% in a defined relevant market, according to Article 36, §2º), the SG concluded that SBF would not have the ability to foreclose access to Nike products for competing retailers.
The decision was appealed[27] by Netshoes, a competitor of SBF in the retail market, which argued that vertical foreclosure (self-preferencing) remained a risk and that behavioral remedies—specifically, an obligation to distribute Nike products on isonomic and nondiscriminatory terms—were necessary. In the end, CADE’s Administrative Tribunal and the merging parties negotiated an “administrative consent decree”[28] that required SBF to ensure equal and nondiscriminatory distribution of Nike products, thus addressing the self-preferencing concerns raised during the merger review.
The SulAmérica/Rede D’Or merger was another notable vertical-integration case in which the concept of “self-preferencing” appeared. But unlike the previous case, in which the SBF Group had both physical and online retail stores selling sporting goods (Nike and many other sporting-goods brands’ products), the SulAmérica case did not involve digital markets.
The transaction involved the incorporation of SulAmérica by Rede D’Or, resulting in the unification of their operations. Rede D’Or is one of the largest private health-care networks in Brazil, offering hospital, clinical, diagnostic, and related services across several states. SulAmérica, in turn, is a major player in the Brazilian insurance market, with a strong focus on health, dental, life, and personal accident coverage. According to the parties, the deal aimed to align and expand their respective health-related ecosystems to deliver integrated care and insurance services.
The vertical theory of harm raised in the case was that SulAmérica, as a health insurer, would likely “self-preference” Rede D’Or’s hospitals and clinics by steering patients toward them and discriminating against competing health-care providers—in other words, a traditional vertical-foreclosure scenario. Notably, a technical note from CADE’s Department of Economic Studies (DEE)[29] did not refer to the conduct as “self-preferencing,” but instead used the more established categories of “input and customer foreclosure.” The merger was ultimately approved without restrictions, based on CADE’s assessment that the parties lacked both the ability and the incentive to engage in anticompetitive foreclosure of rival hospitals.
These two cases show that CADE is attentive to conduct that could be labeled as self-preferencing. As previously discussed, however, the term “self-preferencing” lacks standardized definition. In both vertical-merger cases it examined, CADE analyzed the transactions under classical vertical theories of harm—namely, input and customer foreclosures, whether total or partial. These well-established concepts have more recently begun to be described as “self-preferencing” in both digital and nondigital markets. In this sense, for instance, one could say that AT&T would “self-preference” Time Warner content on its cable TV platforms in the noted AT&T/Time Warner merger, instead of saying that AT&T would partially foreclosure Time Warner contents to AT&T’s competitors. But these are, at their core, classic vertical-foreclosure scenarios—not the exact same type of theory applied in Google Shopping. While such rebranding (from vertical foreclosure to “self-preference”) may not be inaccurate, it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile this form of vertical analysis with the standalone abuse-of-dominance theory that underlies calls for a blanket ban on self-preferencing.
Returning to the monopolization cases, the rule-of-reason approach, as applied by CADE in the Google Shopping case, remains the standard framework to assess self-preferencing allegations. A significant ongoing example is the MSC/Maersk[30] investigation, in which the Brazilian Association of Customs Terminals and Premises (ABTRA) accuses Maersk, MSC, and their jointly controlled terminal operator BTP of leveraging their vertical integration and cooperative agreements to self-preference and favor BTP over competing terminals at the Port of Santos. The alleged conduct involves discriminatory and exclusionary practices that allegedly grant BTP undue competitive advantages in container-handling and bonded-storage services.
At this stage, CADE’s General-Superintendent has requested a study from the Department of Economic Studies (DEE) to assess whether the conduct generates efficiencies and, if so, how they compare to the potential anticompetitive effects. The fact that this self-preferencing case is being analyzed under a rule-of-reason framework, rather than treated as per-se illegal, reinforces CADE’s preference for case-by-case evaluation over broad ex-ante prohibitions. That Brazil’s most important current “self-preferencing” case falls totally outside the digital-market context (few markets are more “nondigital” than ship transportation and container handling), however, highlights the lack of clarity and standardization around the term.
III. Conclusion
Given the current stage of the self-preferencing debate in competition law, condemning a unilateral conduct practice solely under a self-preferencing theory of harm—regardless of how the term is defined—remains a high bar for enforcement.
Regarding the antitrust duty to deal, “[c]ompetition law does not impose a general duty to share competitive advantages with rivals and does not protect the structure of the market; hence, not every exclusionary effect automatically undermines competition.”[31] Similarly, as the practice carries a procompetitive and presumably legal rationale, “firms are not under a general duty to subsidize rivals.”[32]
Second, “self-preferencing is often inextricably linked to the procompetitive benefits that come with the integration of products and services. […] Experience and economic analysis suggest that the practices that are typically labeled as forms of self-preferencing should not be deemed prima facie unlawful irrespective of their effects – whether de jure or de facto.”[33]
In Brazil, a recent study conducted by the Legal Grounds Institute[34] quantitatively analyzed CADE’s decisions involving self-preferencing allegations, offering a holistic assessment of how the authority has approached the issue. While the number of relevant cases remains limited, the study offers important insights into the ongoing political debate over ex-ante regulation. One of its primary conclusions was that the low conviction rate does not justify a general prohibition: “When we look at markets in general, there have been few convictions for self-preferencing in CADE’s jurisprudence, with a conviction rate of 27% over the past 10 years.”[35] The study also notes that CADE tends to view self-preferencing as potentially pro-competitive:
As the analysis of CADE’s case law shows, the impact of self-preferencing conduct is far from being inherently anticompetitive. Indeed, even in convictions of a particular practice of self-preferencing, there is usually divergence among commissioners, including in so-called digital markets, what shows a lack of certainty that is uncongenial to a per se regulation.[36]
Moreover, the Legal Grounds Institute study underscores that CADE’s record does not justify a regulatory policy shift in digital markets:
There is no history at CADE of convictions for self-preferencing conduct in digital markets. One may argue that this supposed lenience is the very reason for changing the approach, but the point here is that making self-preferencing ex ante forbidden may be a radical move that inverts the spectrum of a vertical practice that may bring efficiencies and benefits to consumers in different contexts.[37]
The message of this issue brief is straightforward. Despite the absence of a clear and consistent definition, self-preferencing is presumptively lawful under CADE’s approach, given its potential procompetitive benefits. The next logical step would be to build a more substantial body of case law through enforcement actions against self-preferencing, condemning such conduct where actual anticompetitive harm is proven (since, in the current scenario and according to the Legal Grounds Institute study, CADE has never convicted any self-preferencing case in digital markets).
With sufficient precedent, it may become reasonable to adopt a presumption of illegality of self-preferencing in digital markets, shifting the burden of proof to defendants or applying other procedural or competition tools to ease enforcement. But only if that proves insufficient should ex-ante regulation be considered—i.e., once it is clearly demonstrated that self-preferencing typically harms competition and consumers, and the risk of overenforcement is low.
It is important to emphasize that moving through each of these stages typically requires time, case development by competition authorities, and the support of robust economic evidence. Even if one the finds the current pace of antitrust enforcement exceedingly slow, bypassing these steps—i.e., jumping directly from the status quo stage to full ex-ante prohibition, as envisioned in PL 2768/2022 or as may potentially be proposed by the Ministry of Finance—ignores the necessary legal and economic foundations for such an extreme shift in policy. Such an approach cannot be considered sound regulatory practice.
[1] Regulation 2022/1925, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 Sept. 2022, on Contestable and Fair Markets in the Digital Sector and Amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act), Eur. Comm. (Oct. 12, 2022), at 1, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022R1925.
[2] Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024, UK Gov. (May 24, 2024), at c. 13, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2024/13/enacted.
[3] Gesetz Gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [GWB] [Act Against Restraints of Competition], Fed. Minist. Justice (Jul. 27, 1957), BGBl. I at 1081, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gwb/englisch_gwb.html.
[4] Projeto de Lei No. 2.768, Câmara dos Deputados (2022), https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/prop_mostrarintegra?codteor=2214237&filename=PL%202768/2022.
[5] Self-Preference, Concurr. Dict. Compet. Law (Sep. 15, 2022), https://www.concurrences.com/en/dictionary/self-preference-111802.
[6] Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 267 (1983), https://www.jstor.org/stable/1816853.
[7] Guillaume Duquesne et al., What Constitutes Self-Preferencing and Its Proliferation in Digital Markets, in Digital Markets Guide – Fourth Edition (Global Competition Rev. ed., Oct. 2, 2024), https://globalcompetitionreview.com/guide/digital-markets-guide/fourth-edition/article/what-constitutes-self-preferencing-and-its-proliferation-in-digital-markets.
[8] Competition Policy in Digital Markets: The Combined Effect of Ex Ante and Ex Post Instruments in G7 Jurisdictions, Organ. Econ. Co-oper. Dev. (Oct. 4, 2024), https://doi.org/10.1787/80552a33-en.
[9] Amanda Athayde, Direito da Concorrência e Supermercados: Como Essas Plataformas de Dois Lados Podem Trazer Riscos aos Consumidores?, 16 Rev. Direito GV (Feb. 10, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1590/2317-6172201940.
[10] Carolina Saito, Self-Preferencing Apenas em Mercados Digitais?, JOTA (Dec. 21, 2022), https://www.jota.info/artigos/self-preferencing-apenas-em-mercados-digitais.
[11] Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, Self-Preferencing: Yet Another Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 43 World Compet. 417 (2020), https://doi.org/10.54648/woco2020022.
[12] Michael A. Salinger, Self-Preferencing, in Global Antitrust Institute Report on the Digital Economy (Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright eds., 2020), at 329, 329–368, https://gaidigitalreport.com/2020/08/25/self-preferencing.
[13] Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 691 (1986), https://doi.org/10.1086/261404.
[14] Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1325 (1990), https://doi.org/10.1086/261737.
[15] Geoffrey A. Manne, Against the Vertical Discrimination Presumption, Concurrences No. 2-2020 (May 2020), https://www.concurrences.com/en/review/issues/no-2-2020/foreword/against-the-vertical-discrimination-presumption-94267-en.
[16] Yuta Kittaka, Susumu Sato, & Yusuke Zennyo, Self-Preferencing by Platforms: A Literature Review, 66 Jpn. World Econ. 101191 (2023), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.japwor.2023.101191.?
[17] Emilie Feyler & Veronica Postal, Can Self-Preferencing Algorithms Be Pro-Competitive?, CPI Antitrust Chron. (Jun. 2023), at 5, available at https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/5-CAN-SELF-PREFERENCING-ALGORITHMS-BE-PRO-COMPETITIVE-Emilie-Feyler-Veronica-Postal.pdf.
[18] Id.
[19] Digital Platform Services Inquiry: Discussion Paper for Interim Report No. 5: Updating Competition And Consumer Law For Digital Platform Services, Aust. Compet. Consum. Comm. (Feb. 2022), available at https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Digital%20platform%20services%20inquiry.pdf.
[20] Beatriz Kira & Diogo R. Coutinho, Ajustando as Lentes: Novas Teorias do Dano Plataformas Digitais, 9 Rev. De Defesa da Concorrência 82, (Jun. 2021), https://doi.org/10.52896/rdc.v9i1.734
[21] Dario da Silva Oliveira Neto, Otávio Augusto de Oliveira Cruz Filho, & Alexandre Cordeiro Macedo, The Rule of Reason and the Fundamentals Against More Presumption-Based Illegality Legal Standards: Highlights on CADE’s Decisions on Digital Economy Issues, 12 J. Antitrust Enforc. 570 (2023), https://doi.org/10.1093/jaenfo/jnad042.
[22] Commission Decision of 27 June 2017, Case AT.39740 – Google Search (Shopping), 2018 O.J. (C 9) 11, Eur. Comm. (Jun. 27, 2017), available at https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_14996_3.pdf.
[23] Paulo Burnier da Silveira & Victor Oliveira Fernandes, The Brazilian Competition Authority Decides to File Charges Against a Multinational Technology Company Due to One of Its Online Shopping Platform Features (Google), e-Competitions Bulletin, Art. No. 91181 (Jun. 2019) https://www.concurrences.com/en/bulletin/news-issues/june-2019/the-brazilian-competition-authority-decides-to-file-charges-against-a-en.
[24] Nota Técnica nº 34/2018/DEE/CADE, Processo Administrativo nº 08012.010483/2011-94, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Nov. 19, 2018), https://sei.cade.gov.br/sei/modulos/pesquisa/md_pesq_documento_consulta_externa.php?DZ2uWeaYicbuRZEFhBt-n3BfPLlu9u7akQAh8mpB9yODP3s4Xkowv9qF35FkSAM2hxXtRYnrpkhxBAKRhUpTIm_kb0guWVNihPtzC9415xikED6rDoAPiQUYFTrqj2ZO.
[25] Stephanie Vendemiatto Penereiro, Gustavo H. Kastrup, & Vitor Jardim Machado Barbosa, My Game, My Rules? O Enforcement Concorrencial do Brasil e do Mundo Relacionado ao Self-Preferencing, 1 Revista do IBRAC 59 (2023), https://revista.ibrac.org.br/index.php/revista/article/view/4/200.
[26] Anexo ao Parecer nº 17/2020/CGAA2/SGA1/SG/CADE, Ato de Concentração nº 08700.000627/2020-37, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Aug. 14, 2020), https://sei.cade.gov.br/sei/modulos/pesquisa/md_pesq_documento_consulta_externa.php?DZ2uWeaYicbuRZEFhBt-n3BfPLlu9u7akQAh8mpB9yNTvbEsQO6hM4OLUe5kpdugnCyZMLfLGz5eayQTZTy02uMnJteFo2jdtk-_FQpl06dcoGt93zn7JdCop-gADKVf.
[27] Netshoes, Recurso, Ato de Concentração nº 08700.000627/2020-37, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Sep. 1, 2020), https://sei.cade.gov.br/sei/modulos/pesquisa/md_pesq_documento_consulta_externa.php?DZ2uWeaYicbuRZEFhBt-n3BfPLlu9u7akQAh8mpB9yMvMUTZBztCiz5nljNFMlkJvwl3YPZynNDv5kWSSpe2bDOZrYHo1dL8Ce0Fxl3C11PFB8qSKBzf7vVP88QdTuqA.
[28] Acordo em Controle de Concentrações (ACC), Ato de Concentração nº 08700.000627/2020-37, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Sep. 1, 2020), https://sei.cade.gov.br/sei/modulos/pesquisa/md_pesq_documento_consulta_externa.php?DZ2uWeaYicbuRZEFhBt-n3BfPLlu9u7akQAh8mpB9yOJ5Xgeo8sm-drSUFY508gQJfKN3pzncQ4fYtcjfPxiS6altjTAqLGQxIK58F6YEAmxwhfAXx-sQcY3S1AuruPN.
[29] Nota Técnica nº 30/2022/DEE/CADE, Ato de Concentração nº 08700.003959/2022-35, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Nov. 7, 2022), https://sei.cade.gov.br/sei/modulos/pesquisa/md_pesq_processo_exibir.php?1MQnTNkPQ_sX_bghfgNtnzTLgP9Ehbk5UOJvmzyesnbE-Rf6Pd6hBcedDS_xdwMQMK6_PgwPd2GFLljH0OLyFT3Fr3NpoLkb1FQLNxKAd0MsaW6nmX9fL2xwRSOPcl3m.
[30] Nota Técnica nº 33/2023/CGAA11/SGA1/SG/CADE, Inquérito Administrativo nº 08700.003945/2020-50, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Apr. 19, 2023), https://sei.cade.gov.br/sei/modulos/pesquisa/md_pesq_documento_consulta_externa.php?HJ7F4wnIPj2Y8B7Bj80h1lskjh7ohC8yMfhLoDBLddY_X9cUsOiZo-Yts3uZC_BQ0G32xOmbb4JI-YXQ1fHyor_kWJ6kWm6VhlFtk9QIzigvujo4VOIKycL8XASUJFs-.
[31] Giuseppe Colangelo, Antitrust Unchained: The EU’s Case Against Self-Preferencing, Int’l Ctr. L. Econ. (Sep. 22, 2022), available at https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/ICLE-White-Paper-2022-09-22-Antitrust-Unchained-The-EUs-Case-Against-Self-Preferencing.pdf.
[32] Colomo, supra note 11.
[33] Id.
[34] Legal Ground’s Report on the Impact of Bill 2768 on Legal Certainty: Summary of the Findings, Leg. Grounds Inst. (2024), available at https://legalgroundsinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/FindingsReportSelf-Preferencingfinal.pdf.
[35] Id.
[36] Id.
[37] Id.