Satellite-Spectrum Policy Changes Are Needed
TL;DR
Background: A recent surge in low-earth-orbit (LEO) satellite deployments is reshaping communications policy. If only a fraction of LEO filings at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) are realized, thousands of new satellites will soon join the 11,700 already in orbit. Between 2020 and 2023, total network capacity increased eightfold and is projected to reach 240 Tbps by 2028, with nearly all growth from non-geostationary (NGSO) systems.
But… As outlined in a new report issued jointly by the International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) and New America’s Wireless Future Project, this rapid proliferation has strained available spectrum and exposed the limits of outdated regulatory frameworks. The FCC’s rules were built for smaller constellations and now struggle to accommodate dense LEO networks that share fixed-satellite service (FSS) frequencies between 10.7–30.0 GHz with incumbent GEO systems.
However… To sustain growth and competition, both the ITU and FCC must modernize licensing and coordination regimes, expand satellite-spectrum access, and promote efficient sharing among incumbents and new entrants.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Modernization of Satellite Licensing
The Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) satellite-licensing framework was designed for an era when constellations numbered in the hundreds, not the tens of thousands. Today’s LEO systems face a backlog of duplicative filings, unpredictable review timelines, and inconsistent conditions that all contribute to slowed innovation.
To keep pace with the rapid commercialization of space, the FCC should standardize the presumption that compliant LEO applications are in the public interest. A clear and uniform set of rules—rather than bespoke, case-by-case determinations—would bring licensing into line with how terrestrial wireless services are authorized. It would also create greater predictability for new entrants, while maintaining rigorous sustainability and interference-mitigation standards.
The FCC should also implement a “shot clock” that sets firm deadlines to review applications. The absence of defined timelines has meant that approvals often take years under the current highly uncertain process. The shot clock should include flexibility for complex cases and incomplete submissions, while giving applicants and investors greater confidence that their projects will not languish in procedural limbo. Similar mechanisms at agencies like the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) demonstrate that transparent, time-bounded review can enhance accountability without compromising rigor.
Deployment milestones should also be restructured to encourage steady progress and reduce speculative filings. Instead of the current six- and nine-year buildout deadlines, the FCC could require graduated benchmarks, paired with financial incentives and penalties tied to verified performance. This approach would help regulators distinguish between legitimate operators and speculative applicants, while aligning investment incentives with real-world progress.
Finally, higher cost-based application fees should be introduced to expand FCC staffing and improve processing capacity. Performance bonds could complement these fees by tying partial refunds to the successful completion of milestones. For instance, applicants might post a $5 million bond, with portions released as launch targets are met and forfeited if deadlines are missed. Together, these reforms would make the licensing process both faster and better equipped to manage the explosion of satellite activity shaping global broadband access.
Better Market Access for Spectrum Sharing
As the LEO-satellite sector expands, spectrum access has become both a technical and economic bottleneck. The FCC’s traditional coordination process is straining under the weight of dozens of new entrants. To promote more efficient use of increasingly congested spectrum, the recent ICLE–New America report recommends expanding market-based coordination tools that would allow satellite operators to trade, negotiate, or modify coordination rights under transparent, enforceable rules. If properly structured, such flexibility could reduce delays, improve coexistence, and align incentives toward efficient use.
Allowing operators to negotiate or trade adjustments to interference-protection metrics would let the parties optimize coexistence based on real technical conditions, rather than rigid regulatory defaults. For example, operators could agree to relax coordination thresholds in return for compensation or reciprocal operating flexibility. This would enable denser use of shared bands without sacrificing interference protection. These private coordination agreements already occur informally; codifying them through clear FCC guidance would encourage further use, improve transparency, reduce disputes, and ensure equitable access for later entrants.
The report also explores whether limited, carefully designed auctions could supplement coordination markets by assigning priority in interference protection, rather than the existing first-come, first-served framework or “interference allowances.” Unlike traditional exclusive-use auctions, this would preserve shared access, while introducing price signals that reward spectrum-efficient design. Such a system could, for instance, allocate tradable shares of allowable interference within a band, creating incentives for operators to deploy technologies that minimize spectral impact. Auctions of this kind would require rigorous safeguards to prevent speculation or excessive concentration but they could serve as a valuable complement to the current coordination rules.
Ultimately, the goal is to align incentives so that each operator values efficient coexistence. As orbital and spectral congestion grows, flexible market-based coordination could help the United States lead in shaping a sustainable model for spectrum governance—one that keeps pace with both innovation and the sheer scale of modern satellite networks.
Satellite Spectrum Coexistence
To sustain the growth of LEO systems, the FCC should expand the available spectrum pipeline for satellite operations. As detailed in the ICLE–New America report, the commission’s pending Satellite Spectrum Abundance proposals would allocate additional capacity in the upper 12 GHz and lower 42 GHz bands for NGSO FSS operations. Adding 500 MHz to the existing 10.7–12.7 GHz downlink Ku-band (extending it to 13.25 GHz) would create a larger contiguous block for LEO downlinks, improving throughput, reducing latency, and enhancing overall service quality for broadband users.
The FCC should also explore new allocations for mobile satellite service (MSS) in the low mid-band spectrum, evaluating band segments that are unsuitable for terrestrial mobile networks but ideal for MSS operations. A complementary rulemaking should solicit public input on how existing MSS bands could be shared more efficiently among multiple operators. Together, these steps would strengthen the satellite-spectrum pipeline, increase flexibility for both FSS and MSS providers, and ensure that the U.S. regulatory framework keeps pace with the scale and diversity of next-generation satellite networks.
For more on this issue, see “Low Earth Orbit Satellites: Policies to Promote Spectrum Sharing, Foster Competition, and Close Digital Divides: A Report of the LEO Policy Working Group.”