ICLE Comments to the FCC on Sports Broadcasting Practices and Marketplace Developments
I. Introduction and Overview
The International Center for Law & Economics (ICLE) submits these comments in response to the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) Public Notice on “Sports Broadcasting Practices and Marketplace Developments.”[1] ICLE is a nonprofit, nonpartisan research center that promotes the use of law & economics methodologies to inform public policy. Its work aims to ensure that competition policy and regulation rest on sound economic analysis and promote consumer welfare, particularly in dynamic, technology-driven markets such as media and telecommunications.
The FCC’s request for comment comes at a critical moment for the video marketplace.[2] As ICLE has previously explained, video competition in the United States has never been more vigorous.[3] Consumers once relied on a limited set of local broadcast options. Today, they can access a wide array of video content across platforms and often treat nonbroadcast media as direct substitutes.[4] These expanded choices benefit consumers. At the same time, video providers—especially broadcasters—face growing difficulty maintaining the viewership needed to support investments in local programming, a core objective of FCC policy.[5]
Live sports have become one of the few remaining anchors of broadcast viewership.[6] Unlike scripted programming or local news, live sports deliver immediacy that viewers value. Audiences can watch games on demand after the fact, but much of the appeal lies in the shared, real-time experience.[7] Fans engage before, during, and after games, reacting collectively in ways that on-demand viewing cannot replicate.[8] These moments draw large audiences and allow local broadcasters to command premium advertising rates that sustain much of their business.[9]
Technological change, however, has fragmented the distribution of sports rights. High-profile games increasingly bypass traditional broadcasters in favor of cable networks and streaming platforms. For example, Monday Night Football airs on ESPN, with limited local simulcasts, while some English Premier League matches appear exclusively on NBC’s Peacock service.[10] The Public Notice raises two central questions: how this fragmentation affects consumer welfare, and whether broadcasters can continue to meet their public-interest obligations under the Communications Act if they lose access to these games.
The FCC’s concerns understate the benefits of this evolving marketplace. First, while the migration of sports rights to digital platforms may fragment distribution, it also expands access. Leagues increasingly use streaming services to offer more nationally available games, giving consumers greater choice.[11] Streaming also allows viewers to watch content regardless of location or access to a traditional television, often delivering a more flexible and user-friendly experience. Second, even if broadcasters lose rights to major professional leagues, they can pursue alternative programming strategies, including agreements with smaller leagues, minor league teams, or local schools.
The FCC’s legal authority in this area is also limited. The Communications Act empowers the agency to regulate broadcasters,[12] but the public-interest standard does not grant carte blanche to dictate programming choices.[13] Courts have substantially narrowed the constitutional foundations for content-based regulation, particularly those rooted in spectrum scarcity.[14] The FCC can and should use this proceeding to gather information about the evolving video marketplace. Any significant policy changes, however, should come from Congress.
Congress, for example, could revisit the Sports Broadcasting Act’s antitrust exemption. Repealing that exemption would allow leagues and broadcasters to negotiate more flexibly. If leaguewide agreements enhance competition and promote consumer welfare, they should survive antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason.
II. Competition in Video Markets Benefits Consumers
The Public Notice raises important questions about competition in the modern video marketplace. Live sports broadcasting rights sit at the center of that competition. As technological change has expanded distribution options, video markets have become more dynamic, with broadcast, MVPD, and streaming platforms offering distinct benefits tailored to different consumer preferences.
Competition for sports rights has produced substantial consumer benefits. It has expanded access to games that were previously unavailable, enabled more flexible viewing across devices and locations, and spurred innovation in pricing, features, and content delivery. While fragmentation across platforms can impose search costs and require multiple subscriptions, these tradeoffs reflect increased output and intensified competition, rather than a reduction in consumer welfare.
A. Live Sports Sit at the Center of Modern Video Competition
Video markets are undergoing rapid change driven by technological innovation. As ICLE has noted in prior FCC proceedings, the rise of multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs) and digital streaming services has shifted viewing patterns away from traditional over-the-air broadcast.[15] Consumers now prefer on-demand content they can watch on any device, regardless of location. Live sports remain the primary exception to this trend.
Live sports differ from other video content because they derive value from real-time consumption.[16] A viewer who misses an episode of a scripted show can avoid spoilers and watch later with little loss of value. That is not true for sports. Fans place a premium on experiencing games as they happen, alongside other viewers. Replays cannot replicate the immediacy or shared emotional experience of live competition.[17] As a result, major sporting events remain appointment viewing that audiences plan to watch in real time.
Video distributors have long recognized the value of this appointment viewing. From the earliest days of television, broadcasters used live sports to drive adoption. NBC and CBS aired sporting events to encourage Americans to purchase television sets.[18] Advertisers quickly followed, drawn by sports audiences that are large, loyal, and highly engaged.
That dynamic continues to shape the modern video marketplace. New entrants use live sports to drive adoption of emerging platforms and strengthen existing distribution models. ABC shifted Monday Night Football to cable in part to boost ESPN’s audience. The NFL launched Thursday Night Football to support its own cable channel and gain leverage in carriage negotiations.[19] World Wrestling Entertainment created one of the earliest direct-to-consumer streaming platforms by using live “pay-per-view” events to attract subscribers.[20]
Streaming platforms now follow the same playbook. Netflix and Amazon Prime Video have carried NFL games on Christmas Day, while Amazon holds primary rights to Thursday Night Football.[21] NBCUniversal streams select English Premier League matches exclusively on Peacock and has begun applying a similar strategy to its NBA rights.[22] The NBA offers League Pass to stream out-of-market games directly to consumers.[23] ESPN+ carries NHL games, PGA Tour coverage, and other sports programming.[24] Apple TV+ hosts Major League Soccer matches.[25]
These developments place live sports at the center of video competition. Streaming services rely on them to attract and retain subscribers. Linear television providers depend on them to remain relevant in an on-demand environment. Consumers, however, may face tradeoffs. Fragmentation across platforms can require multiple subscriptions to access games that were once available over the air.
B. Paywalled Sports Content Often Expands Consumer Access
Consumers often express frustration that they must subscribe to multiple services to access a league’s full slate of games, and that many contests now sit behind paywalls. As a baseline matter, however, much of this paywalled content was never available through traditional broadcast channels. The NFL illustrates this point.
Over the past two decades, the NFL has expanded its schedule beyond traditional Sunday and Monday night windows. It introduced Thursday Night Football, initially on NFL Network and now on Amazon Prime Video.[26] The league has also added Christmas Day games and early-morning international matchups. Many of these games sit behind paywalls for national audiences, though they typically remain available over the air in participating teams’ local markets. Historically, these games would not have appeared on local broadcast at all. Instead, they would have been played concurrently with existing Sunday matchups, leaving national audiences without access.
The NBA follows a similar model with League Pass, which allows fans to watch out-of-market, non-nationally televised games. Although the service requires a subscription, it offers access that did not previously exist. Before such offerings, fans outside a team’s local market had no practical way to view these games.
In this sense, paywalled sports content often expands, rather than restricts, consumer access. These services make additional games available that would otherwise remain unseen by most audiences.
C. Different Models Offer Different Consumer Benefits
The Public Notice emphasizes the benefits of broadcast television, particularly its free, over-the-air accessibility.[27] Broadcast remains valuable, but alternative distribution models offer distinct advantages that many consumers prefer.
Multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs) provide bundled access to a wide range of channels and features. A cable subscription allows consumers to access broadcast content without a separate receiver, enabling them to use a display, rather than a television with built-in tuning capability. MVPDs also increasingly bundle streaming services with traditional channel packages.[28] Charter, for example, includes HBO Max, Disney+, Hulu, ESPN, Paramount+, Peacock, and Fox One in certain offerings.[29] These bundles reduce the need for consumers to purchase multiple subscriptions a la carte.
MVPD services also address many concerns associated with fragmented distribution. They offer integrated search and program guides that allow users to locate games regardless of channel or platform, reducing confusion. MVPD feeds also typically deliver higher-quality, lower-latency video than streaming services, often running 20–60 seconds ahead.[30] This reduces the risk of spoilers and places less strain on home broadband networks. While MVPD subscriptions may appear more expensive than individual streaming services, bundled offerings can be price-competitive—or even cheaper—when compared to purchasing multiple standalone subscriptions. Long-term pricing guarantees further enhance their appeal for some consumers.
Streaming services, however, have reshaped the video marketplace by offering a different set of benefits. Most notably, they operate across devices, allowing consumers to watch content wherever they are. This flexibility represents a significant departure from traditional viewing constraints. Consumers no longer need to be at home to watch live sports; they can follow games in real time from virtually any location.
Streaming also enables more tailored consumption. While MVPD bundles may appeal to consumers who want comprehensive access, others may prefer narrower, lower-cost options. A fan focused on a single sport or league may need only one subscription. For example, a UFC fan can access all events through Paramount+ for roughly $9–$14 per month, depending on the plan.[31] For cost-sensitive consumers, this a la carte model allows access to desired content without paying for unwanted programming.
D. Competition Drives Innovation Across Video Markets
All major video platforms recognize the value of live sports and compete using different technologies and business models. This competition can strain incumbents, but it also drives adaptation in response to consumer preferences and technological change. When streaming platforms acquire sports rights, they force traditional distributors to innovate or risk losing relevance.
MVPDs have responded by bundling streaming services with traditional channel offerings and adjusting pricing to remain competitive in the face of rising churn. Broadcasters, for their part, are deploying the ATSC 3.0 standard to improve functionality and reliability for over-the-air viewers.[32] Streaming platforms must also continue to innovate or risk losing subscribers to rivals—or even to legacy distribution models that retain distinct advantages.
These competitive dynamics extend beyond distribution to the leagues themselves. Sports leagues compete intensely for consumer attention—not only against each other, but also against other forms of entertainment, including television, movies, podcasts, and video games. This competition creates incentives to experiment with new distribution models that expand reach and increase revenue. Streaming platforms may offer broader audiences, enhanced features, or higher licensing fees. Increased media-rights revenue allows leagues to invest in players, facilities, and the on-field—or on-court—product. Because leagues typically share this revenue, even smaller-market teams can remain viable and competitive, expanding access to professional sports across more communities.
Local broadcasters also retain opportunities to adapt. While some stations may lose rights to major professional leagues, they can pursue alternative strategies to attract viewers. Broadcast’s comparative advantage lies in local presence. Stations can invest in local news, regional sports, or partnerships with smaller leagues and community teams. If audiences value this content, it can sustain viewership. If not, broadcasters will need to adjust their programming to match consumer demand.
E. Local News Is Not Dependent on Broadcast
A common claim is that declining broadcast television necessarily leads to a decline in local news.[33] That view overlooks how consumers now access information about their communities and the world.
Consumers increasingly rely on digital sources—social media, local websites, newsletters, and independent online outlets—for local news. Some applications aggregate local broadcasts from stations nationwide.[34] The traditional gatekeeping role of broadcasters and newspapers has largely disappeared. Today, individuals can launch blogs, newsletters, or video channels and reach audiences directly. Lower barriers to entry have expanded both the volume and diversity of local coverage. Stories that once may not have reached publication can now find an audience online.
The FCC’s focus on local stations risks conflating two distinct objectives: preserving local content and preserving a particular distribution technology. Policies that favor broadcast over competing platforms would distort competition and reduce consumer welfare.
If broadcasters lose access to some sports-related revenue, they must compete on their comparative advantages—local reporting, trusted on-air personalities, and coverage that national outlets cannot replicate. If broadcast television continues to provide value, the market will sustain it. If not, policy should not attempt to preserve legacy distribution models at the expense of innovation.
F. Fragmentation Imposes Costs but Likely Benefits Consumers
The Public Notice identifies fragmentation of sports-viewing rights as a central concern, citing both consumer confusion and rising costs:
Many games are still available for free over broadcast TV, but there has been a surge in recent years of games going behind the paywalls of various streaming services. While this can increase the number of games and sports available to fans, many consumers today find it more difficult to find the events they want to watch and are now paying to sign up for one or more video distribution platforms that consumers can find difficult to navigate.[35]
These concerns have some force. As rights fragment across platforms, consumers may no longer be able to watch all games through a single service or via over-the-air broadcast. Some fans must now subscribe to multiple platforms to access nationally televised games. Fragmentation can also create search costs and confusion, with approximately 87% of fans reporting difficulty identifying where specific games are available.[36] Streaming introduces additional challenges, including latency, reliability concerns, and access barriers tied to broadband availability and cost.
Even so, these effects do not necessarily reduce consumer welfare. As discussed above, consumers now have more choices for both entertainment generally and live sports specifically. Competition among platforms and leagues continues to drive innovation in pricing, features, and distribution. The relevant question is not whether fragmentation imposes some costs, but whether those costs outweigh the benefits of expanded access and increased competition. In the case of sports media rights, the evidence suggests that the benefits are likely to predominate.
III. Legal Limits on FCC Authority Over Sports Broadcasting
The Public Notice frames this inquiry as an examination of competition in the video marketplace, with particular focus on whether broadcasters can meet their public-interest obligations without revenues from live sports.[37] As a legal matter, however, the FCC has limited authority to regulate private contracts between professional sports leagues and streaming platforms or to require that leagues distribute games over broadcast television. Even when streaming platforms are affiliated with broadcast networks, the agency lacks authority to compel the airing of specific content. Any mandate requiring broadcast carriage of particular programming would raise serious constitutional concerns and, in any event, would require congressional action.
Because the FCC regulates broadcast licenses, it may attempt to invoke its public-interest authority to discourage networks from shifting sports content from broadcast to streaming platforms. The Public Notice suggests as much, stating:
At the same time, sports remain inherently local, despite the increasingly national nature and reach of both professional and college sports events. Just as communities turn to their local TV broadcasters for news, weather, and emergency information, they do the same for coverage of their local sports teams. Many sporting events that were previously available through free broadcast and traditional pay-TV packages, are now only available through a myriad of stand-alone subscription streaming services. This shift has led to notable frustration among many consumers and sports fans. Sports fans are increasingly left with a fragmented ecosystem that requires them to subscribe to multiple services to watch their favorite teams.[38]
The Public Notice further asks:
To what extent do current sports media rights contracts conflict with or impede TV broadcasters from meeting their public interest obligations? How should these arrangements be considered in the context of broadcasters’ public interest obligations and the FCC’s duty to ensure licensees meet their statutory requirements?[39]
These questions suggest the FCC may view carriage of professional sports as part of a broadcaster’s obligation to promote localism. Under that theory, the agency could argue that broadcast licensees must air local-team games on broadcast stations, either exclusively or alongside streaming distribution. It may also contend that shifting games to streaming platforms reduces local-station revenue and undermines their ability to fund news and other community programming.
Both theories face serious legal hurdles.
A. Scarcity Doctrine Does Not Support Sports Regulation
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s authority to regulate broadcast content based on spectrum scarcity.[40] Because only a limited number of broadcasters could operate without interference, licensed stations were treated as “public trustees,” allowing the FCC to impose speech regulations that would violate the First Amendment if applied to print media.
Even at the time, however, that authority had limits that would constrain any attempt to regulate sports broadcasting decisions.
First, Red Lion addressed the Fairness Doctrine, which required broadcasters to present contrasting viewpoints on public issues. While constitutionally suspect, the doctrine rested on explicit congressional authorization. The Communications Act specifically reflects similar principles in its equal-time provisions, and the Court relied on that statutory foundation in upholding the FCC’s rule.[41] No comparable statutory directive requires broadcast networks to air local sports games, rather than distribute them via streaming platforms. To the contrary, the Sports Broadcasting Act suggests the FCC lacks authority to regulate these arrangements.[42] The statute permits leagues to negotiate collective broadcast agreements and impose certain blackouts, placing sports-media rights largely outside FCC control rather than subjecting them to additional oversight.
Second, the scarcity rationale underlying Red Lion no longer fits the modern media environment. The doctrine emerged when access to audiences depended on FCC-issued broadcast licenses. Today, cable, satellite, fiber, and digital platforms provide content producers with numerous pathways to reach consumers. Treating broadcast speech as uniquely scarce—while functionally identical content flows over other platforms—conflicts with current technological and economic realities. The First Amendment should expand protections for speech, not preserve restrictions based on outdated assumptions about media scarcity.
B. Major Questions Doctrine Limits FCC Authority
FCC authority over sports broadcasting rights is doubtful even apart from First Amendment concerns. The Supreme Court has recently emphasized, through the major questions doctrine, that agencies require clear congressional authorization to regulate issues of vast economic and political significance.[43]
Few markets fit that description more clearly than live-sports media rights. The FCC initiated this proceeding precisely because of the central role those rights play for businesses, communities, and the broader economy.
In West Virginia v. EPA,[44] the Court identified several indicators of a major-questions problem:
- The agency asserts sweeping new regulatory authority from a long-extant statute.
- The claimed authority rests on an ancillary or broadly worded provision.
- Congress has repeatedly declined to address the issue through legislation.
Those factors weigh against any expansive reading of the FCC’s public-interest authority here. The Communications Act’s public-interest standard applies to broadcast licensees, not to streaming platforms or the broader video marketplace. Efforts to regulate how leagues distribute games across platforms would represent a substantial expansion of that authority.
Congress’ treatment of sports-media rights reinforces this conclusion. By granting antitrust exemptions for certain leaguewide broadcasting agreements, Congress signaled that these arrangements fall within its own policy domain. If the FCC seeks to dictate how such agreements operate, it will require a clear delegation of authority from Congress.
IV. The Sports Broadcasting Act Distorts Video Markets
Despite the local nature of sports fandom, video rights generate greater value when sold on a leaguewide basis to national networks and advertisers. Centralized rights allow networks to select and schedule the most attractive matchups, maximizing audience size and advertising revenue. Early on, however, most leagues lacked centralized media deals. Individual franchises negotiated their own broadcast contracts, effectively acting as separate media entities. Teams in larger markets—or with broader national appeal—captured significantly more revenue than smaller-market rivals, threatening leaguewide competitive balance and financial stability.
The NFL responded by restricting how teams could sell broadcast rights. One rule barred franchises from entering agreements that extended into another team’s territory,[45] preserving the value of local audiences for smaller-market teams. At the same time, these restrictions limited teams’ ability to compete for viewers beyond their home markets.
Courts soon subjected these rules to antitrust scrutiny. In United States v. NFL, courts held that several league broadcasting restrictions violated the Sherman Act and blocked the NFL’s attempt to enter a leaguewide contract with CBS in 1961—even as the rival American Football League secured a collective agreement with ABC.[46]
The NFL then turned to Congress. In response, Congress enacted the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 (SBA), which allows professional sports leagues to sell “sponsored telecasting” rights collectively to television networks. Those networks, in turn, distribute games to local affiliates.[47] The statute reflected the technological landscape of the time, when broadcast television dominated and cable had not yet emerged as a significant distribution channel.
Media-rights agreements have since expanded dramatically. The SBA, however, is not necessary for leaguewide agreements to comply with antitrust law. Under rule-of-reason analysis, joint restraints—such as leaguewide media deals—are permissible if their procompetitive benefits outweigh any anticompetitive effects.[48] T The NCAA, for example, operates without SBA protection yet imposes various restrictions on member institutions, and athletic conferences routinely negotiate collective media deals.
Congress enacted the SBA when broadcast networks held substantial market power and leagues sought mechanisms to preserve competitive balance. Today, the market has shifted. The SBA applies only to broadcast television rights, while broader video markets have become more competitive. Leaguewide deals now tend to benefit national networks more than local affiliates by concentrating valuable rights at the network level. Those rights, in turn, drive retransmission negotiations, with cable operators valuing access to live sports more than local programming.[49]
Repealing the SBA would not eliminate leaguewide media agreements or restrictions on local contracting. It would, however, subject those arrangements to rule-of-reason scrutiny. That approach already applies in other contexts. For example, the NFL’s Sunday Ticket package—now distributed by YouTube TV—is the subject of ongoing antitrust litigation. An amicus brief filed by ICLE identifies several procompetitive features of the arrangement.[50]
Sunday Ticket originally helped DirecTV attract satellite subscribers and now serves a similar function for YouTube TV.[51] Exclusive licensing allows the distributor to internalize the benefits of its investments, including improvements in production quality and platform features, without free-rider concerns. Bundling out-of-market games also enables more efficient pricing and expands access to content that would otherwise remain unavailable. Although the litigation remains pending, these features illustrate why such agreements can survive rule-of-reason review even without a statutory exemption.
At the same time, if the anticompetitive harms of league-imposed restrictions outweigh their benefits, courts can invalidate them. Striking down rules that require leaguewide contracting could allow individual teams to negotiate directly with local broadcasters. That shift could strengthen local affiliates by enabling them to acquire valuable sports rights and improve their bargaining position with networks. Greater financial stability, in turn, could support increased investment in local content. Repealing the SBA would not guarantee this outcome, but it would ensure that sports-media restraints face the same antitrust scrutiny as other industries, regardless of the underlying technology.
V. Conclusion
ICLE appreciates the FCC’s efforts to examine competition in video markets at a time of rapid technological and economic change. Live sports broadcasting rights sit at the center of that evolution. As distribution has expanded across broadcast, MVPD, and streaming platforms, competition for these rights has intensified, driving innovation in pricing, features, and delivery. Consumers now benefit from greater access to sports content, more flexible viewing options, and a wider range of services tailored to different preferences. While fragmentation can impose search costs and require multiple subscriptions, it reflects increased output and competition—not a reduction in consumer welfare.
These same dynamics create strong incentives for firms to adapt. Broadcasters, MVPDs, and streaming platforms each compete by offering distinct advantages, while sports leagues experiment with new distribution models to expand reach and increase revenue. Even as traditional broadcast models face pressure, local content can persist through market-driven adjustments, rather than regulatory intervention.
The FCC should proceed with caution. The Communications Act does not grant the agency broad authority to regulate how networks distribute content or to dictate the terms of private agreements between leagues and media companies. Efforts to do so would raise serious constitutional and statutory concerns, including under the First Amendment and the major questions doctrine. If policymakers determine that intervention is warranted, Congress—not the FCC—must provide clear direction.
Congress could, for example, revisit the Sports Broadcasting Act. Repealing the SBA would not eliminate leaguewide media agreements, but it would subject them to rule-of-reason antitrust scrutiny, consistent with other industries and technologies. That approach would allow courts to weigh procompetitive benefits against any anticompetitive harms, ensuring that evolving sports-media markets continue to serve consumers.
[1] Sports Broadcasting Practices and Marketplace Developments, Public Notice, MB Docket No. 26-45 (Feb. 25, 2026), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-118A1.pdf [hereinafter Public Notice].
[2] See Comments of the Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ., 2022 Quadrennial Regulatory Review, MB Docket No. 22-459 (Dec. 17, 2025), https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/FCC-Broadcast-Ownership-NPRM-2025.pdf; see also Comments of the Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ., Empowering Local Broadcast TV Stations to Meet Their Public Interest Obligations: Exploring Market Dynamics Between National Programmers and Their Affiliates, MB Docket No. 25-322 (Dec. 10, 2025), https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Network-Affiliation-Comments-of-the-International-Center-for-Law-Economics.pdf.
[3] Eric Fruits, Video Competition in the United States, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. (Feb. 2025), https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/tldr-Video-Competition-Overview-250225.pdf; see also Ben Sperry, Live Sports, Video Competition, and Antitrust, Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. (May 22, 2025), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/live-sports-video-competition-and-antitrust.
[4] Eric Fruits, The FCC’s Broadcast-Ownership Review: Will the Agency Open the Door for Comprehensive Reform?, Truth on the Mkt. (Sept. 29, 2025), https://truthonthemarket.com/2025/09/29/the-fccs-broadcast-ownership-review-will-the-agency-open-the-door-for-comprehensive-reform.
[5] Public Notice, supra note 1, at 3-4.
[6] Jeffrey Westling & Ben Sperry, The 65-Year-Old Law That Still Shapes How You Watch Sports, Truth on the Mkt. (Mar. 11, 2026), https://laweconcenter.org/resources/the-65-year-old-law-that-still-shapes-how-you-watch-sports.
[7] See Reddit, The Business of Fandom 6, 11 (2026), https://www.business.reddit.com/resources/the-business-of-sports-fandom [hereinafter Reddit Report] (reporting that sports engagement on Reddit rose 22% in 2025, reaching 16 billion monthly views and more than 99 million monthly interactions, and explaining that fan discussion occurs before, during, and after games, driving demand for real-time viewing).
[8] Id. at 5.
[9] See Michael Mondello & John Fortunato, The Economics of Sport Broadcasting, in Sport Broadcasting for Managers 55, 58 (Hunter Fujak & Stephen Frawley eds., 2022), https://courses.worldcampus.psu.edu/canvas/su23/22351—2406/common/corefiles/The_Economics_of_Sport_Broadcasting.pdf (explaining that live sports command premium advertising value because viewers cannot skip commercials during live broadcasts).
[10] Joe Lucia, NBC Is Moving All Premier League Matches on July 15th to Peacock, Awful Announcing (July 8, 2020), https://awfulannouncing.com/nbc/nbc-is-moving-all-premier-league-matches-on-july-15th-to-peacock.html.
[11] Nicole Sperling, Netflix and the N.F.L. Sign a Three-Season Deal, N.Y. Times (May 15, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/15/business/media/netflix-nfl-live.html.
[12] 47 U.S.C § 301.
[13] Ben Sperry & Jeffrey Westling, The FCC’s Sleeping Power Over the Press, Truth on the Mkt. (Mar. 17, 2026), https://truthonthemarket.com/2026/03/17/the-fccs-sleeping-power-over-the-press.
[14] Ben Sperry, First Amendment Jurisprudence Should Reflect Economic Reality: Why Red Lion and Pacifica Must Fall, Truth on the Mkt. (Oct. 14, 2025), https://truthonthemarket.com/2025/10/14/first-amendment-jurisprudence-should-reflect-economic-reality-why-red-lion-and-pacifica-must-fall.
[15] Comments of Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ., MB Docket No. 22-459, supra note 2; Comments of Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ., MB Docket No. 25-322, supra note 2.
[16] Mondello & Fortunato, supra note 9, at 58.
[17] Reddit Report, supra note 7, at 6.
[18] Westling & Sperry, The 65-Year-Old Law That Still Shapes How You Watch Sports, supra note 6.
[19] “MNF” to ESPN for $8.8B; Sunday Night Goes to NBC for $3.6B, Sports Bus. J. (Apr. 18, 2005), https://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/Daily/Issues/2005/04/19/Sports-Media/MNF-To-ESPN-For-$88B-Sunday-Night-Goes-To-NBC-For-$36B.
[20] Marc Graser, WWE Network to Launch in February as Streaming Service, Variety (Jan. 8, 2014), https://variety.com/2014/digital/news/wwe-network-to-launch-in-february-as-streaming-service-1201036864.
[21] Streamers Netflix, Amazon Set NFL Viewership Records on Christmas, Associated Press (Dec. 31, 2025), https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/47465593/streamers-netflix-amazon-set-nfl-records-christmas.
[22] Nick Mangione, How to Watch the NBA on NBC and Peacock: Schedule, Tip-Off Times, and More, Peacock Blog (Aug. 15, 2025), https://www.peacocktv.com/blog/nba-schedule-on-peacock-and-nbc.
[23] NBA League Pass, NBA (last visited Mar. 24, 2026), https://support.watch.nba.com/hc/en-us/articles/115000585974-NBA-League-Pass.
[24] All of ESPN. All in One Place, ESPN (last visited Mar. 24, 2026), https://plus.espn.com.
[25] Eben Novy-Williams & Jacob Feldman, Apple, MLS Deal Will End in 2029 With Revised Payment Structure, Sportico (Nov. 14, 2025), https://www.sportico.com/leagues/soccer/2025/apple-mls-streaming-contract-change-1234876902.
[26] Alex Sherman & Jabari Young, NFL Finalizes New 11-Year Media Rights Deal, Amazon Gets Exclusive Thursday Night Rights, CNBC (Mar. 18, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/18/nfl-media-rights-deal-2023-2033-amazon-gets-exclusive-thursday-night.html.
[27] Public Notice, supra note 1, at 1.
[28] Spectrum Streaming: Get Over $100 Per Month of Apps Included, Spectrum (last visited Mar. 24, 2026), https://www.spectrum.com/cable-tv/streaming.
[29] Id.
[30] Tom Butts, Super Bowl LVI Streaming Averaged 50–60 Seconds Behind Cable When Compared to In-Stadium Experience, TV Tech. (Feb. 14, 2022), https://www.tvtechnology.com/news/super-bowl-lvi-streaming-averaged-50-60-seconds-behind-cable.
[31] Macy Meyer, UFC Streaming Moves to Paramount Plus in Multibillion-Dollar Deal, CNET (Aug. 11, 2025), https://www.cnet.com/tech/services-and-software/ufc-streaming-moves-to-paramount-in-multi-billion-dollar-deal.
[32] Comments of the Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ., Authorizing Permissive Use of the “Next Generation” Broadcast Television Standard, GN Docket No. 16-142 (Jan. 15, 2026), https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/ATSC-Comments.pdf.
[33] Big Tech Is a Threat to Local Journalism, Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters (last visited Mar. 24, 2026), https://www.nab.org/bigtech.
[34] See, e.g., NewsON, https://www.newson.us.
[35] Public Notice, supra note 1, at 1.
[36] Jake Bickerton, Report Finds Sports Fragmentation Is Frustrating Fans, Sport Broadcast (Mar. 13, 2026), https://www.broadcastnow.co.uk/broadcasting/report-finds-sports-fragmentation-is-frustrating-fans/5214803.article.
[37] Public Notice, supra note 1, at 4-5.
[38] Id. at 3-4.
[39] Id. at 4-5.
[40] Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400–01 (1969).
[41] 47 U.S.C. § 315.
[42] 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1295.
[43] See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (2022).
[44] Id.
[45] David L. Anderson, The Sports Broadcasting Act: Calling It What It Is—Special Interest Legislation, 17 UC Law SF Comm. & Ent. L.J. 945, 946 (1995).
[46] Id. at 949-950.
[47] Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1295.
[48] See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
[49] Comments of Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ., MB Docket No. 25-322, supra note 2, at 6.
[50] Brief for Former Antitrust Enforcers as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, In re Nat’l Football League Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., No. 24-4115 (9th Cir. June 17, 2025).
[51] See Lillian Rizzo, NFL “Sunday Ticket” Goes to YouTube in Seven-Year, $2 Billion Annual Deal, CNBC (Dec. 22, 2022), https://www.cnbc.com/2022/12/22/nfl-sunday-ticket-youtube-tv.html; see also John Ourand, The Rise of Sunday Ticket, Sports Bus. J. (Sept. 1, 2019), https://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/Journal/Issues/2019/09/02/Media/Sunday-Ticket (describing the prior history of NFL Sunday Ticket).