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Showing 9 of 1749 Publications in Antitrust & Consumer Protection
TOTM Ever since David Teece and coauthors began writing about antitrust and innovation in high-tech industries in the 1980s, we’ve understood that traditional, price-based antitrust analysis . . .
Ever since David Teece and coauthors began writing about antitrust and innovation in high-tech industries in the 1980s, we’ve understood that traditional, price-based antitrust analysis is not intrinsically well-suited for assessing merger policy in these markets.
For high-tech industries, performance, not price, is paramount — which means that innovation is key…
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TOTM This symposium offers a good opportunity to look again into the complex relation between concentration and innovation in antitrust policy. Whilst the details of the . . .
This symposium offers a good opportunity to look again into the complex relation between concentration and innovation in antitrust policy. Whilst the details of the EC decision in Dow/Dupont remain unknown, the press release suggests that the issue of “incentives to innovate” was central to the review. Contrary to what had leaked in the antitrust press, the decision has apparently backed off from the introduction of a new “model”, and instead followed a more cautious approach. After a quick reminder of the conventional “appropriability v cannibalization” framework that drives merger analysis in innovation markets (1), I make two sets of hopefully innovative remarks on appropriability and IP rights (2) and on cannibalization in the ag-biotech sector (3).
TOTM The US agriculture sector has been experiencing consolidation at all levels for decades, even as the global ag economy has been growing and becoming more . . .
The US agriculture sector has been experiencing consolidation at all levels for decades, even as the global ag economy has been growing and becoming more diverse. Much of this consolidation has been driven by technological changes that created economies of scale, both at the farm level and beyond.
TOTM Modern agriculture companies like Monsanto, DuPont, and Syngenta, develop cutting-edge seeds containing genetic traits that make them resistant to insecticides and herbicides. They also develop . . .
Modern agriculture companies like Monsanto, DuPont, and Syngenta, develop cutting-edge seeds containing genetic traits that make them resistant to insecticides and herbicides. They also develop crop protection chemicals to use throughout the life of the crop to further safeguard from pests, weeds and grasses, and disease. No single company has a monopoly on all the high-demand seeds and traits or crop protection products. Thus, in order for Company A to produce a variety of corn that is resistant to Company B’s herbicide, it may have to license a trait patented by Company B in order to even begin researching its product, and it may need further licenses (and other inputs) from Company B as its research progresses in unpredictable directions.
TOTM Since Brussels has ordered Ireland to recover 13€ billion from Apple, much ink has been spilled on the European Commission’s (EC) alleged misuse of power and breach . . .
Since Brussels has ordered Ireland to recover 13€ billion from Apple, much ink has been spilled on the European Commission’s (EC) alleged misuse of power and breach of the “rule of law.” In the Irish Times, Professor Liza Lovdahl-Gormsen wrote that the EC has been “bending” competition law to pursue a corporate taxation agenda in disguise. Former European Commissioner Neelie Kroes went so far as to suggest that the EC was attempting to rewrite international tax rules.
TOTM Earlier this week the European Commission cleared the merger of Dow and DuPont, subject to conditions including divestiture of DuPont’s “global R&D organisation.” As the . . .
Earlier this week the European Commission cleared the merger of Dow and DuPont, subject to conditions including divestiture of DuPont’s “global R&D organisation.” As the Commission noted:
The Commission had concerns that the merger as notified would have reduced competition on price and choice in a number of markets for existing pesticides. Furthermore, the merger would have reduced innovation. Innovation, both to improve existing products and to develop new active ingredients, is a key element of competition between companies in the pest control industry, where only five players are globally active throughout the entire research & development (R&D) process.
In addition to the traditional focus on price effects, the merger’s presumed effect on innovation loomed large in the EC’s consideration of the Dow/DuPont merger — as it is sure to in its consideration of the other two pending mergers in the agricultural biotech and chemicals industries between Bayer and Monsanto and ChemChina and Syngenta. Innovation effects are sure to take center stage in the US reviews of the mergers, as well.
TOTM What does it mean to “own” something? A simple question (with a complicated answer, of course) that, astonishingly, goes unasked in a recent article in . . .
What does it mean to “own” something? A simple question (with a complicated answer, of course) that, astonishingly, goes unasked in a recent article in the Pennsylvania Law Review entitled, What We Buy When We “Buy Now,” by Aaron Perzanowski and Chris Hoofnagle (hereafter “P&H”). But how can we reasonably answer the question they pose without first trying to understand the nature of property interests?
TOTM In Brussels, the talk of the town is that the European Commission (“Commission”) is casting a new eye on the old antitrust conjecture that prophesizes . . .
In Brussels, the talk of the town is that the European Commission (“Commission”) is casting a new eye on the old antitrust conjecture that prophesizes a negative relationship between industry concentration and innovation. This issue arises in the context of the review of several mega-mergers in the pharmaceutical and AgTech (i.e., seed genomics, biochemicals, “precision farming,” etc.) industries.
ICLE White Paper Summary A novel theory of harm is crystalising in European Union (“EU”) merger control. Under this theory, the EU Commission (“Commission”) can intervene in mergers . . .
A novel theory of harm is crystalising in European Union (“EU”) merger control. Under this theory, the EU Commission (“Commission”) can intervene in mergers that it considers generally reduce innovation incentives in an industry as a whole. This theory of harm can be referred to as the Significant Impediment to Industry Innovation (“SIII”) theory. This policy paper first attempts to describe the content and extent of the SIII theory (I). Second, it shows that the SIII theory marks a departure from established EU merger control practice (II). Third, it discusses the economic foundations of the SIII theory (III). Finally, it puts forward best practices for the assessment of mergers in R&D intensive industries (IV). With this, the present paper hopes to assist in the development of sound merger control policy in innovative markets, and undermine crude conjectures on the relationship between market structure, patent statistics and industry innovation theory.
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