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TOTM In response to my post about the optimal institutional design for merger enforcement and the problems associated with dual federal enforcement, a reader points me . . .
In response to my post about the optimal institutional design for merger enforcement and the problems associated with dual federal enforcement, a reader points me to this related paper by Jon Klick, Francesco Parisi, and Norbert Schulz in the International Review of Law and Economics which models alternatives for allocating decision-making across multiple agencies. One of the fundamental insights is that fragmented regulatory authority can result in actions that produce various sorts of externalities in regulatory competition. For example, in concurrent regulation, one might think of the first agency’s decision to approve a merger as increasing the size of the rents that can be extracted by the second actor. This might be a good model of the sizeable extraction achieved by the FCC in the satellite radio merger.
Read the full piece here.
TOTM I’ve done some more thinking about my recent post on the problems associated with claims that infer greater antitrust enforcement quality solely from enforcement activity . . .
I’ve done some more thinking about my recent post on the problems associated with claims that infer greater antitrust enforcement quality solely from enforcement activity and come to the conclusion that my post oversimplified matters. I remain rather skeptical about this inference but wanted to highlight some of the nuances in the debate that I skimmed over in the previous post. In the spirit of highlighting some of these issues, and because I’ve always wanted to try one of these posts, here’s a hypothetical dialogue between myself (JW) and an anonymous economist with a more interventionist bent (AE) in the spirit of highlighting some of the complexities of the potential link between enforcement activity and consumer welfare…
TOTM GW Law received a $5.1 million award to fund a Center for Competition Law resulting from the settlement of a class-action antitrust suit brought by . . .
GW Law received a $5.1 million award to fund a Center for Competition Law resulting from the settlement of a class-action antitrust suit brought by Michael Hausfield (of Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, P.L.L.C., and a GW alum).
TOTM So Dr. Miles is dead. May he rest in peace. No great surprises in the majority opinion in Leegin. Justice Kennedy, quite rightly, emphasized points . . .
So Dr. Miles is dead. May he rest in peace.
No great surprises in the majority opinion in Leegin. Justice Kennedy, quite rightly, emphasized points we have asserted numerous times on this blog. Most notably…
TOTM Ronald Cass, dean emeritus of Boston University Law School, argues in today’s WSJ that the Supreme Court should overrule Dr. Miles… Read the full piece . . .
Ronald Cass, dean emeritus of Boston University Law School, argues in today’s WSJ that the Supreme Court should overrule Dr. Miles…
TOTM So it looks like Dr. Miles is going down. That’s a good thing. For non-antitrusters, Dr. Miles is a 1911 Supreme Court decision holding that . . .
So it looks like Dr. Miles is going down. That’s a good thing.
For non-antitrusters, Dr. Miles is a 1911 Supreme Court decision holding that “minimum vertical resale price maintenance” is per se illegal — that is, automatically illegal without inquiry into the practice’s actual effect on competition. Minimum vertical resale price maintenance (or “RPM”) occurs when a manufacturer requires dealers who sell its product to charge no less than a set price for that product. For example, Ford might require its dealers to charge at least $30,000 for an Explorer.
TOTM I’ve had the pleasure of spending the last few weeks curled up with Herbert Hovenkamp’s wonderful new book, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution, which . . .
I’ve had the pleasure of spending the last few weeks curled up with Herbert Hovenkamp’s wonderful new book, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution, which I’m reviewing for the Texas Law Review. Hovenkamp is a sharp thinker and a wonderfully clear writer, and the book is a fantastic read for scholars and students alike. As a reviewer, though, I’m charged with pointing out the weak spots. Hovenkamp’s discussion of Illinois Brick‘s indirect purchaser rule is, I believe, one of those spots.
TOTM WSJ Law Blog and the WSJ report that Universal Music has now settled with the NY AG’s office for $12 million as a result of . . .
WSJ Law Blog and the WSJ report that Universal Music has now settled with the NY AG’s office for $12 million as a result of Spitzer’s continued attack on what he describes as “corrupt practices” in the music industry. (HT: Bill) The settlement also requires Universal, like Sony BMG and EMG before it, to cease and desist all payola-related activities. The WSJ story reports that EMG, the final major industry player, should settle within the month, making final Spitzer’s payola ban.
