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Popular Media As the Biden administration and the Senate wrangle over the next nominee to chair the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), they will likely debate the nominee’s . . .
As the Biden administration and the Senate wrangle over the next nominee to chair the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), they will likely debate the nominee’s views on contentious policy issues such as net neutrality and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. But a key element of current Chairman Ajit Pai’s legacy is a commitment to improved rulemaking processes and quality. That commitment is evident in changes to the structure and processes of the FCC made to ensure that quality economic analysis informs policy decisions.
Read the full piece here.
TL;DR It comes as no surprise to anyone that illegal conduct occurs online. Unfortunately, the individuals and businesses engaging in illegal activity may avoid detection by using tools that hide their identity. This makes enforcement difficult or even impossible.
It comes as no surprise to anyone that illegal conduct occurs online. Unfortunately, the individuals and businesses engaging in illegal activity may avoid detection by using tools that hide their identity. This makes enforcement difficult or even impossible.
In some cases, there may be targeted solutions available whereby intermediaries are required to record and verify the identity of business customers. In principle, this approach could be used to directly pursue parties actually liable for illicit content with minimal burden on either the platforms, or non-business customers.
Read the full explainer here.
Regulatory Comments In order to maximize the benefits of broadband to society, including through the provision of public safety communications and services, public policy must promote the . . .
In order to maximize the benefits of broadband to society, including through the provision of public safety communications and services, public policy must promote the proper incentives for broadband buildout. Both the 2015 Title II Open Internet Order (the “OIO”) and the 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order (the “RIFO”) were premised on this. But each adopted a different approach to accomplishing this objective.
The OIO premised its rules on the theory that ISPs are “gatekeepers,” poised to kill the golden goose of demand for broadband by adopting business practices that could reduce edge innovation.
The key insight of the virtuous cycle is that broadband providers have both the incentive and the ability to act as gatekeepers standing between edge providers and consumers. As gatekeepers, they can block access altogether; they can target competitors, including competitors to their own video services; and they can extract unfair tolls. Such conductwould, as the Commission concluded in 2010, “reduce the rate of innovation at the edge and, in turn, the likely rate of improvements to network infrastructure.” In other words, when a broadband provider acts as a gatekeeper, it actually chokes consumer demand for the very broadband product it can supply.
The RIFO, on the other hand, properly conceives of ISPs as intermediaries in a two-sided market that aim to maximize the value of the market by adopting practices, like pricing structures and infrastructure investment, that increase the value for both sides of the market.
We find it essential to take a holistic view of the market(s) supplied by ISPs. ISPs, as well as edge providers, are important drivers of the virtuous cycle, and regulation must be evaluated accounting for its impact on ISPs’ capacity to drive that cycle, as well as that of edge providers. The underlying economic model of the virtuous cycle is that of a two- sided market. In a two-sided market, intermediaries—ISPs in our case—act as platforms facilitating interactions between two different customer groups, or sides of the market— edge providers and end users. . . . The key characteristic of a two-sided market, however, is that participants on each side of the market value a platform service more as the number and/or quality of participants on the platform’s other side increases. (The benefits subscribers on one side of the market bring to the subscribers on the other, and vice versa, are called positive externalities.) Thus, rather than a single side driving the market, both sides generate network externalities, and the platform provider profits by inducing both sides of the market to use its platform. In maximizing profit, a platform provider sets prices and invests in network extension and innovation, subject to costs and competitive conditions, to maximize the gain both sides of the market obtain from interacting across the platform. The more competitive the market, the larger the net gains to subscribers and edge providers. Any analysis of such a market must account for each side of the market and the platform provider.
In other words, the fundamental difference of approach between the two Orders turns on whether it is edge innovation, pushing against ISP incentives to expropriate value from edge providers, that primarily drives network demand and thus encourages investment, or whether optimization decisions by both ISPs and the edge are drivers of network value. The RIFO rightly understands that ISPs have sharp incentives both to innovate as platforms (and thus continue to attract and retain end users), as well as to continue to make their services useful to edge providers (and, by extension, the consumers of those edge providers’ services).
The D.C. Circuit upheld RIFO’s fundamental rationale as a supportable basis for the FCC’s rules in Mozilla v. FCC. But it also accepted that three specific concerns were insufficiently examined in the RIFO, and remanded the case to the FCC to address them. Among these was the question of the RIFO’s implications for public safety. In its Public Notice seeking to refresh the record on the remanded issues, the Wireline Competition Bureau asks (among other things):
These are the questions to which this comment is primarily addressed.
In Part I, we discuss how the RIFO fosters investment in broadband buildout, in particular by enabling prioritization and by reducing the effects of policy uncertainty. In Part II, we describe how that network investment benefits public safety both in both direct and indirect ways. In Part III, we highlight the benefits to public safety from prioritization, in particular, which is facilitated by the RIFO.
Read the full comments here.
Regulatory Comments We begin our analysis of the California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) with a discussion of the standardized regulatory impact assessment (SRIA) prepared for the AG’s Office by Berkeley Economic Advising and Research, LLC.
We begin our analysis of the California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) with a discussion of the standardized regulatory impact assessment (SRIA) prepared for the AG’s Office by Berkeley Economic Advising and Research, LLC. The bottom-line cost figures from this report are staggering: $55 billion in upfront costs and $16.5 billion in additional costs over the next decade. The analysis includes large benefits as well, but as we show in the full comments, the actual costs are even higher than the SRIA estimates and the benefits fall far short of making up for those costs.
We also draw on the the early evidence coming out of the EU related to GDPR enforcement and compliance to highlight some potential pitfalls that California is facing. In particular, after its first twelve month period in force, the compliance costs were astronomical; enforcement of individual “data rights” led to unintended con- sequences; “privacy protection” seems to have undermined market competition; and there have been large unseen — but not unmeasurable — costs in forgone startup investment.
Finally, we note that, despite the DC Circuit trimming the FCC’s 2018 Restoring Internet Freedom Order, the fact remains that the FCC still retains a conflict-preemption authority to specifically preempt state laws that are incompatible with its regulations. The DC Circuit only limited the FCC’s ability to generally preempt all potentially conflicting state laws, requiring that each preemption be challenged in a fact-intensive inquiry. Similarly, it is also possible that the broad extent of the CCPA’s rules, and their impositions on firms outside of California’s borders could lead to Dormant Commerce Clause challenges. Activities that “inherently require a uniform system of regulation” or that “impair the free flow of materials and products across state borders” violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. As the FCC noted in its RIF Order, Internet-based communications is such a type of activity.
We therefore offered the following suggestions:
Continue reading the full comments
Regulatory Comments ICLE filed a letter summarizing its analysis of the relevant empirical literature on mobile carrier mergers as part of the Tunney Act review process.
The central question of a merger review is the likely effect that the transaction will have on consumers. The DOJ’s complaint against the Sprint-T-Mobile merger is built upon the allegation that the proposed transaction represents a reduction from four to three national facilities-based mobile network operators (a so-called “4-to-3 merger”), and that such a transaction would reduce competition and result in “higher prices, reduced innovation, reduced quality and fewer choices” in the marketplace. This is an empirical question that has been studied by numerous scholars in recent years.
The upshot of the empirical literature is that, in fact, such mergers appear to increase, not decrease, innovation. Moreover, the research is, at best, inconclusive with respect to the price effects of such mergers. Based on these findings, we believe that the DOJ was correct to approve the transaction, and that this is so regardless of the expected competitive effects of the Final Judgment’s Divestiture Package, which is likely unnecessary to ensure that the market remains competitive.
ICLE filed a letter summarizing its analysis of the relevant empirical literature on mobile carrier mergers as part of the Tunney Act review process.
The letter and attached analysis can be read here.
ICLE White Paper The merger between T-Mobile and Sprint has been characterized as a “4-to-3 merger” because after the merger there will be 3 national mobile network operators. . . .
The merger between T-Mobile and Sprint has been characterized as a “4-to-3 merger” because after the merger there will be 3 national mobile network operators. Concerns have been raised regarding the effects of such mergers on competition and consumer welfare. Seeking to understand and evaluate the basis for these concerns, the International Center for Law and Economics (ICLE) undertook a comprehensive review of the economic effects of mergers and other factors affecting market concentration in the wireless telecommunications industry. The review found:
When evaluating the merits of a merger, authorities are charged with identifying the effects on the welfare of consumers. On the basis of the studies that we review, “4-to-3 mergers” appear to generate net benefits to consumer welfare in the form of increased investment, while the effects on price are inconclusive.
Click here to download the report.
Click here to download the appendices.
Regulatory Comments In a submission to the Australian Treasury on 12 September 2019, a group of esteemed international scholars critiqued the recently published Final Report of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) Digital Platforms Inquiry.
In a submission to the Australian Treasury on 12 September 2019, a group of esteemed international scholars critiqued the recently published Final Report of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) Digital Platforms Inquiry.
In its report, the ACCC claims that competition in the media, communications, advertising and other markets it investigated is “not working,” and that substantial regulatory and legislative changes are necessary to solve—and would solve—the problems caused by ineffective competition.
But the premise that competition is not working is not well supported by evidence presented in the report. Meanwhile, the report’s conclusion misses the bigger picture: Government intervention is appropriate only if it produces net social benefits. Yet the ACCC almost entirely omits consideration of the adverse effects of its proposed interventions, which in many cases are likely worse than the alleged problems. As such, the report’s proposals should be treated with great caution.
The submission tackles three “significant oversights”:
The submission notes in conclusion that “The ACCC’s lackadaisical assessment of regulatory costs is all-the-more troubling given that its report focuses on an extremely dynamic industry. What is only a small regulatory cost today could severely hamper competition in the future.”
Click here to read the full submission.
TOTM In a remarkable ruling issued earlier this month, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held in Oberdorf v. Amazon that, under Pennsylvania products liability law, Amazon could be found liable for a third party vendor’s sale of a defective product via Amazon Marketplace.
In a remarkable ruling issued earlier this month, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held in Oberdorf v. Amazon that, under Pennsylvania products liability law, Amazon could be found liable for a third party vendor’s sale of a defective product via Amazon Marketplace. This ruling comes in the context of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which is broadly understood as immunizing platforms against liability for harmful conduct posted to their platforms by third parties (Section 230 purists may object to myu use of “platform” as approximation for the statute’s term of “interactive computer services”; I address this concern by acknowledging it with this parenthetical). This immunity has long been a bedrock principle of Internet law; it has also long been controversial; and those controversies are very much at the fore of discussion today.
TOTM This morning a diverse group of more than 75 academics, scholars, and civil society organizations — including ICLE and several of its academic affiliates — published a set of seven “Principles for Lawmakers” on liability for user-generated content online, aimed at guiding discussions around potential amendments to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996.
This morning a diverse group of more than 75 academics, scholars, and civil society organizations — including ICLE and several of its academic affiliates — published a set of seven “Principles for Lawmakers” on liability for user-generated content online, aimed at guiding discussions around potential amendments to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996.
