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The Apple E-Book Kerfuffle Meets Alfred Marshall’s Principles of Economics

Popular Media From a pure antitrust perspective, the real story behind the DOJ’s Apple e-book investigation is the Division’s deep commitment to the view that Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) . . .

From a pure antitrust perspective, the real story behind the DOJ’s Apple e-book investigation is the Division’s deep commitment to the view that Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) clauses are anticompetitive (see also here), no doubt spurred on at least in part by Chief Economist Fiona Scott-Morton’s interesting work on the topic.

Of course, there are other important stories here (see Matt Yglesias’ excellent post), like “how much should a digital book cost?” And as Yglesias writes, whether “the Justice Department’s notion that we should fear a book publishers’ cartel is borderline absurd, on par with worrying about price-fixing in the horse-and-buggy market.”

I can’t help but notice another angle here.  For those not familiar, the current dispute over e-books emerges over a shift in business models from a traditional one in which publishers sold at wholesale prices to bookstores who would, in turn, set the prices they desired — sometimes below the book’s cover price — and sell to consumers at retail.  Much of the dispute arises out of the incentive conflict between publishers and retailers with respect to the profit-maximizing price.  The WSJ describes the recent iteration of the conflict:

To build its early lead in e-books, Amazon Inc. AMZN +0.19% sold many new best sellers at $9.99 to encourage consumers to buy its Kindle electronic readers. But publishers deeply disliked the strategy, fearing consumers would grow accustomed to inexpensive e-books and limit publishers’ ability to sell pricier titles.

Apple’s proposed solution was a move to what is described as an “agency model,” in which Apple takes a 30% share of the revenues and the publisher sets the price — readers may recognize that this essentially amounts to resale price maintenance — an oft-discussed topic at TOTM.  The move to the agency-RPM model also entailed the introduction of an MFN clause stipulating that publishers could not sell to rivals at a lower price.

Whether Apple facilitated a collusive agreement among publishers or whether this industry-wide move to the agency-model is an efficient and consumer-welfare enhancing method of solving the incentive conflict between publishers and retailers remains to be seen.  What is somewhat new in this dispute about book distribution is the technology involved; but the underlying economics of vertical incentive conflict between publishers and retailers is not!

Many economists are aware Alfred Marshall’s Principles of Economics textbook was apparently the first commodity sold in the United States under an RPM agreement!  (HT: William Breit)  The practice apparently has deeper roots in Germany.  The RPM experiment was thought up by (later to become Sir) Frederick Macmillan.  Perhaps this will sound familiar:

In 1890 Frederick Macmillan of the Macmillan Company was casting about for a book with which to conduct an experiment in resale price maintenance.  For years it had been the practice in Great Britain for the bookselllers to give their customers discounts off the list prices; i.e. price cutting had become the general practice.  In March, 1890, Mr. Macmilan had written to The Bookseller suggesting a change from the current discount system and had inserted a form to be filled out by the dealers.

Experimentation with business models to align the incentives of publishers and sellers is nothing new; it is only wonderful coincidence that the examples involve a seminal economics text published as the Sherman Act was enacted.  Nonetheless, an interesting historical parallel and one that suggests caution in interpreting the relevant facts without understanding the pervasive nature of incentive conflicts within this particular product line between publishers and sellers.  One does not want to discourage experimentation with business models aimed at solving those incentive conflicts.  What remains to be seen is whether and why the move to the new arrangement was executed through express coordination rather than unilateral action.

Filed under: antitrust, cartels, contracts, doj, e-books, economics, error costs, law and economics, litigation, MFNs, monopolization, resale price maintenance, technology, vertical restraints Tagged: agency model, Amazon, antitrust, Apple, doj, e-books, iBookstore, major publishers, MFN, most favored nations clause, per se, price-fixing, publishing industry, Rule of reason, vertical restraints

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

The DOJ’s Problematic Attack on Property Rights Through Merger Review

Popular Media The DOJ’s recent press release on the Google/Motorola, Rockstar Bidco, and Apple/ Novell transactions struck me as a bit odd when I read it.  As . . .

The DOJ’s recent press release on the Google/Motorola, Rockstar Bidco, and Apple/ Novell transactions struck me as a bit odd when I read it.  As I’ve now had a bit of time to digest it, I’ve grown to really dislike it.  For those who have not followed Jorge Contreras had an excellent summary of events at Patently-O.

For those of us who have been following the telecom patent battles, something remarkable happened a couple of weeks ago.  On February 7, the Wall St. Journal reported that, back in November, Apple sent a letter[1] to the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) setting forth Apple’s position regarding its commitment to license patents essential to ETSI standards.  In particular, Apple’s letter clarified its interpretation of the so-called “FRAND” (fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory) licensing terms that ETSI participants are required to use when licensing standards-essential patents.  As one might imagine, the actual scope and contours of FRAND licenses have puzzled lawyers, regulators and courts for years, and past efforts at clarification have never been very successful.  The next day, on February 8, Google released a letter[2] that it sent to the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), ETSI and several other standards organizations.  Like Apple, Google sought to clarify its position on FRAND licensing.  And just hours after Google’s announcement, Microsoft posted a statement of “Support for Industry Standards”[3] on its web site, laying out its own gloss on FRAND licensing.  For those who were left wondering what instigated this flurry of corporate “clarification”, the answer arrived a few days later when, on February 13, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) released its decision[4] to close the investigation of three significant patent-based transactions:  the acquisition of Motorola Mobility by Google, the acquisition of a large patent portfolio formerly held by Nortel Networks by “Rockstar Bidco” (a group including Microsoft, Apple, RIM and others), and the acquisition by Apple of certain Linux-related patents formerly held by Novell.  In its decision, the DOJ noted with approval the public statements by Apple and Microsoft, while expressing some concern with Google’s FRAND approach.  The European Commission approved Google’s acquisition of Motorola Mobility on the same day.

To understand the significance of the Apple, Microsoft and Google FRAND statements, some background is in order.  The technical standards that enable our computers, mobile phones and home entertainment gear to communicate and interoperate are developed by corps of “volunteers” who get together in person and virtually under the auspices of standards-development organizations (SDOs).  These SDOs include large, international bodies such as ETSI and IEEE, as well as smaller consortia and interest groups.  The engineers who do the bulk of the work, however, are not employees of the SDOs (which are usually thinly-staffed non-profits), but of the companies who plan to sell products that implement the standards: the Apples, Googles, Motorolas and Microsofts of the world.  Should such a company obtain a patent covering the implementation of a standard, it would be able to exert significant leverage over the market for products that implemented the standard.  In particular, if a patent holder were to obtain, or even threaten to obtain, an injunction against manufacturers of competing standards-compliant products, either the standard would become far less useful, or the market would experience significant unanticipated costs.  This phenomenon is what commentators have come to call “patent hold-up”.  Due to the possibility of hold-up, most SDOs today require that participants in the standards-development process disclose their patents that are necessary to implement the standard and/or commit to license those patents on FRAND terms.

As Contreras notes, an important part of these FRAND commitments offered by Google, Motorola, and Apple related to the availability of injunctive relief (do go see the handy chart in Contreras’ post laying out the key differences in the commitments).  Contreras usefully summarizes the three statements’ positions on injunctive relief:

In their February FRAND statements, Apple and Microsoft each commit not to seek injunctions on the basis of their standards-essential patents.  Google makes a similar commitment, but qualifies it in typically lawyerly fashion (Google’s letter is more than 3 single-spaced pages in length, while Microsoft’s simple statement occupies about a quarter of a page).  In this case, Google’s careful qualifications (injunctive relief might be possible if the potential licensee does not itself agree to refrain from seeking an injunction, if licensing negotiations extended beyond a reasonable period, and the like) worked against it.  While the DOJ applauds Apple’s and Microsoft’s statements “that they will not seek to prevent or exclude rivals’ products form the market”, it views Google’s commitments as “less clear”.  The DOJ thus “continues to have concerns about the potential inappropriate use of [standards-essential patents] to disrupt competition”.

Its worth reading the DOJ’s press release on this point — specifically, that while the DOJ found that none of the three transactions itself raised competitive concerns or was substantially likely to lessen the competition, the DOJ expressed general concerns about the relationship between these firms’ market positions and ability to use the threat of injunctive relief to hold up rivals:

Apple’s and Google’s substantial share of mobile platforms makes it more likely that as the owners of additional SEPs they could hold up rivals, thus harming competition and innovation.  For example, Apple would likely benefit significantly through increased sales of its devices if it could exclude Android-based phones from the market or raise the costs of such phones through IP-licenses or patent litigation.  Google could similarly benefit by raising the costs of, or excluding, Apple devices because of the revenues it derives from Android-based devices.

The specific transactions at issue, however, are not likely to substantially lessen competition.  The evidence shows that Motorola Mobility has had a long and aggressive history of seeking to capitalize on its intellectual property and has been engaged in extended disputes with Apple, Microsoft and others.  As Google’s acquisition of Motorola Mobility is unlikely to materially alter that policy, the division concluded that transferring ownership of the patents would not substantially alter current market dynamics.  This conclusion is limited to the transfer of ownership rights and not the exercise of those transferred rights.

With respect to Apple/Novell, the division concluded that the acquisition of the patents from CPTN, formerly owned by Novell, is unlikely to harm competition.  While the patents Apple would acquire are important to the open source community and to Linux-based software in particular, the OIN, to which Novell belonged, requires its participating patent holders to offer a perpetual, royalty-free license for use in the “Linux-system.”  The division investigated whether the change in ownership would permit Apple to avoid OIN commitments and seek royalties from Linux users.  The division concluded it would not, a conclusion made easier by Apple’s commitment to honor Novell’s OIN licensing commitments.

In its analysis of the transactions, the division took into account the fact that during the pendency of these investigations, Apple, Google and Microsoft each made public statements explaining their respective SEP licensing practices.  Both Apple and Microsoft made clear that they will not seek to prevent or exclude rivals’ products from the market in exercising their SEP rights.

What’s problematic about a competition enforcement agency extracting promises not to enforce lawfully obtained property rights during merger review, outside the formal consent process, and in transactions that do not raise competitive concerns themselves?  For starters, the DOJ’s expression about competitive concerns about “hold up” obfuscate an important issue.  In Rambus the D.C. Circuit clearly held that not all forms of what the DOJ describes here as patent holdup violate the antitrust laws in the first instance.  Both appellate courts discussion patent holdup as an antitrust violation have held the patent holder must deceptively induce the SSO to adopt the patented technology.  Rambus makes clear — as I’ve discussed — that a firm with lawfully acquired monopoly power who merely raises prices does not violate the antitrust laws.  The proposition that all forms of patent holdup are antitrust violations is dubious.  For an agency to extract concessions that go beyond the scope of the antitrust laws at all, much less through merger review of transactions that do not raise competitive concerns themselves, raises serious concerns.

Here is what the DOJ says about Google’s commitment:

If adhered to in practice, these positions could significantly reduce the possibility of a hold up or use of an injunction as a threat to inhibit or preclude innovation and competition.

Google’s commitments have been less clear.  In particular, Google has stated to the IEEE and others on Feb. 8, 2012, that its policy is to refrain from seeking injunctive relief for the infringement of SEPs against a counter-party, but apparently only for disputes involving future license revenues, and only if the counterparty:  forgoes certain defenses such as challenging the validity of the patent; pays the full disputed amount into escrow; and agrees to a reciprocal process regarding injunctions.  Google’s statement therefore does not directly provide the same assurance as the other companies’ statements concerning the exercise of its newly acquired patent rights.  Nonetheless, the division determined that the acquisition of the patents by Google did not substantially lessen competition, but how Google may exercise its patents in the future remains a significant concern.

No doubt the DOJ statement is accurate and the DOJ’s concerns about patent holdup are genuine.  But that’s not the point.

The question of the appropriate role for injunctions and damages in patent infringement litigation is a complex one.  While many scholars certainly argue that the use of injunctions facilitates patent hold up and threatens innovation.  There are serious debates to be had about whether more vigorous antitrust enforcement of the contractual relationships between patent holders and standard setting organization (SSOs) would spur greater innovation.   The empirical evidence suggesting patent holdup is a pervasive problem is however, at best, quite mixed.  Further, others argue that the availability of injunctions is not only a fundamental aspect of our system of property rights, but also from an economic perspective, that the power of the injunctions facilitates efficient transacting by the parties.  For example, some contend that the power to obtain injunctive relief for infringement within the patent thicket results in a “cold war” of sorts in which the threat is sufficient to induce cross-licensing by all parties.  Surely, this is not first best.  But that isn’t the relevant question.

There are other more fundamental problems with the notion of patent holdup as an antitrust concern.  Kobayashi & Wright also raise concerns with the theoretical case for antitrust enforcement of patent holdup on several grounds.  One is that high probability of detection of patent holdup coupled with antitrust’s treble damages makes overdeterrence highly likely.  Another is that alternative remedies such as contract and the patent doctrine of equitable estoppel render the marginal benefits of antitrust enforcement trivial or negative in this context.  Froeb, Ganglmair & Werden raise similar points.   Suffice it to say that the debate on the appropriate scope of antitrust enforcement in patent holdup is ongoing as a general matter; there is certainly no consensus with regard to economic theory or empirical evidence that stripping the availability of injunctive relief from patent holders entering into contractual relationships with SSOs will enhance competition or improve consumer welfare.  It is quite possible that such an intervention would chill competition, participation in SSOs, and the efficient contracting process potentially facilitated by the availability of injunctive relief.

The policy debate I describe above is an important one.  Many of the questions at the center of that complex debate are not settled as a matter of economic theory, empirics, or law.  This post certainly has no ambitions to resolve them here; my goal is a much more modest one.  The DOJs policymaking efforts through the merger review process raise serious issues.  I would hope that all would agree — regardless of where they stand on the patent holdup debate — that the idea that these complex debates be hammered out in merger review at the DOJ because the DOJ happens to have a number of cases involving patent portfolios is a foolish one for several reasons.

First, it is unclear the DOJ could have extracted these FRAND concessions through proper merger review.  The DOJ apparently agreed that the transactions did not raise serious competitive concerns.   The pressure imposed by the DOJ upon the parties to make the commitments to the SSOs not to pursue injunctive relief as part of a FRAND commitment outside of the normal consent process raises serious concerns.  The imposition of settlement conditions far afield from the competitive consequences of the merger itself is something we do see from antitrust enforcement agencies in other countries quite frequently, but this sort of behavior burns significant reputational capital with the rest of the world when our agencies go abroad to lecture on the importance of keeping antitrust analysis consistent, predictable, and based upon the economic fundamentals of the transaction at hand.

Second, the DOJ Antitrust Division does not alone have comparative advantage in determining the optimal use of injunctions versus damages in the patent system.

Third, appearances here are quite problematic.  Given that the DOJ did not appear to have significant competitive concerns with the transactions, one can create the following narrative of events without too much creative effort: (1) the DOJ team has theoretical priors that injunctive relief is a significant competitive problem, (2) the DOJ happens to have these mergers in front of it pending review from a couple of firms likely to be repeat players in the antitrust enforcement game, (3) the DOJ asks the firms to make these concessions despite the fact that they have little to do with the conventional antitrust analysis of the transactions, under which they would have been approved without condition.

The more I think about the use of the merger review process to extract concessions from patent holders in the form of promises not to enforce property rights which they would otherwise be legally entitled to, the more the DOJ’s actions appear inappropriate.  The stakes are high here both in terms of identifying patent and competition rules that will foster rather than hamper innovation, but also with respect to compromising the integrity of merger review through the imposition of non-merger related conditions we are more akin to seeing from the FCC, states, or less well-developed antitrust regimes.

Filed under: antitrust, contracts, economics, google, intellectual property, licensing, litigation, markets, merger guidelines, mergers & acquisitions, patent, technology, telecommunications, wireless

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Competition for Distribution, Search Engine Edition

Popular Media A recent report notes that while Apple may be shifting away from Google Maps, Google remains the default search engine in Safari, and thus, remains . . .

A recent report notes that while Apple may be shifting away from Google Maps, Google remains the default search engine in Safari, and thus, remains the default search on a variety of Apple devices.  Google competes vigorously for this right; indeed, competition among search engines drives the price paid to Apple for its ability to shift its users from one engine to another.

The chart below illustrates some analysis estimating Google generates $1.3 billion in revenue from toolbar searches on Apple devices of which over 75% goes to Apple.

This form of competition is a normal part of the competitive process, though as Geoff notes in his recent post (and in our joint work on the flaws in the antitrust case against Google), often misdiagnosed in competition settings.

Filed under: antitrust, economics, google, technology

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Greg Werden in Defense of Defining Markets

Popular Media One of the more significant papers in antitrust of late has been Professor Kaplow’s Why (Ever) Define Markets?  Kaplow provocatively argues that the entire “market . . .

One of the more significant papers in antitrust of late has been Professor Kaplow’s Why (Ever) Define Markets?  Kaplow provocatively argues that the entire “market definition/ market share” paradigm of antitrust is misguided and beyond repair.  Kaplow describes the exclusive role of market definition in that paradigm as generating inferences about market power, argues that market definition is incapable of generating reasonable inferences for that purpose as a matter of basic economic principles primarily because one must have a “best estimate” of market power previous to market definition, and concludes that antitrust ought to do away with market definition entirely.  As my description of the paper suggests, and Kaplow recognizes, it is certainly an “immodest” claim.  But it is a paper that has evoked much discussion in antitrust circles, especially in light of the recent shift in the 2010 HMGs toward analysis of competitive effects and away from market definition.

Many economists were inclined to agree with the basic conceptual shift toward direct analysis of competitive effects.  Much of that agreement was had on the basis that the market definition exercise aimed to do a number of things directed toward identifying the potential competitive effects of a merger (identifying market power is certainly one of those things), and that if we had tools allowing for direct inferences we ought to use those instead.  Kaplow’s attack on market definition, however, was by far the most aggressive critique.

Greg Werden has now posted an excellent paper in response, “Why (Ever) Define Markets?  An Answer to Professor Kaplow.”  Here is the abstract:

Professor Louis Kaplow has argued that market delineation in antitrust should be abandoned because it is not useful in assessing market power or evaluating competitive effects. This article takes issue with that view, explaining that market delineation serves purposes overlooked by Professor Kaplow. Most importantly, market delineation separates active forces of competition from those in the background. This separation is significant in the application of economic models and in the narrative of presenting an antitrust case. This article also explains why Professor Kaplow’s proposed analyses dispensing with market delineation would break down in important circumstances.

The entire paper is worth reading.  It provides an important perspective on the debate over the value of market definition not only from an economic perspective, but also with respect to the role of market definition in the law.  I summarize a few of the key points and basic arguments of the paper for readers.

Werden first begins by attacking the presumption in Kaplow’s argument that the exclusive purpose of market definition in the modern antitrust paradigm is to infer market power from market share.  For example, Kaplow claims that “the entire rationale for the market definition process is to enable an inference about market power.”  Werden claims, I think correctly, that Kaplow’s premise is incorrect.  While Werden makes the point that courts use market definition to infer market power even in the absence of market shares, the more important argument is that courts have long recognized the high shares themselves do not establish market power — indeed, the law requires the market power be “durable.”  The durability requirement, in turn, requires some analysis of entry conditions before a court can infer market power and, as Werden points out, market delineation is a useful tool for understanding which products — upon entry — would be sufficiently close substitutes as to preclude a firm from charging supra-competitive prices.  Similarly, of course, courts use market definition to cabin where the relevant antitrust injury might occur.

Keith Hylton makes a related, but distinct, argument about the value of market definition in his paper on the 2010 HMGs published in a symposium in the Review of Industrial Organization (note: Professor Kaplow has a shorter article in the Review of IO symposium previewing his arguments in the longer Harvard Law Review piece; I also have an article (with Judd Stone) on the new Guidelines’ treatment of efficiencies in the same issue).  Hylton objects to the change in focus in the new HMGs on the grounds that courts have used the market definition exercise for a number of valuable functions involving the trading off of error concerns in merger analysis:

In implementing the discretionary test of Brown Shoe, courts have traditionally required a definition of the relevant market. In order to determine whether competition appears to be structurally or operationally intense, or whether entry is easy, courts first have to define a relevant market. The definition of a relevant market has involved a fact intensive inquiry that trades off many concerns, in addition to the strict concern of finding a market which could be monopolized by the defendant (through an acquisition or through some anticompetitive conduct). When courts determine a relevant market, they are taking into account the consequences of that decision for the competitive process itself. If defining a market too narrowly will lead to the replacement of the market process of industrial rationalization with an administrative process, or discourage innovation incentives, courts are likely to take those costs into account. They are aware of the possibility that they could err in the decision, and will therefore tend toward a market definition that minimizes the costs of errors.36 The FTC’s standard would relegate the market definition component of a merger dispute to a lesser status. In so doing, it would constrain the ability of courts to make the tradeoffs that currently go into a market definition finding.37

Werden acknowledges that market definition can be avoided in some cases, such as consummated mergers with evidence of actual anticompetitive effects after the acquisition, or in some cases involving unilateral price effects.  Note that while Werden would likely dispense with market definition in some of these cases, the role Hylton ascribes to market definition as applied by the courts would still provide value in both of these types of cases.  Werden also makes the key point that Kaplow’s “direct” analysis of market power assumes that “all of the competitive action is confined to a single homogenous good, and his analysis goes awry when the sellers of the good have a significant strategic interaction with the sellers of close substitutes.”

A related point is that Kaplow’s analysis implicitly uses perfect competition as a competitive benchmark for inferring market power.  Indeed, the analysis presumes that all sellers other than the producer at issue “behave as price-takers.”   As Werden points out, the direct analysis of market power Kaplow prefers establishes market power as a matter of degree measured by the Lerner Index (i.e. the price – cost margin).  For a number of reasons, setting perfect competition as a competitive benchmark can be problematic; but for present purposes, note that to the extent that courts use the market definition inquiry to incorporate considerations wherein a firm might have high margins but yet face intense competition rendering it incapable of harming the competitive process, this would be yet another valuable function of that market definition inquiry.

Werden ends the paper by offering up some examples of the differences between the “conventional” approach and Kaplow’s analysis that are helpful.  You can go to the paper to read them — but Werden’s key point, as I read the paper, is that market definition is useful not only for allowing the assignment of market shares, but also for separating the important elements of the competitive story of a proposed merger (for example) from unimportant elements.   The distinction between those important and unimportant elements can inform modeling choices in unilateral effects cases, or the likelihood of post-merger coordination, and focuses courts on the competitive process to be investigated for potential harm.  His conclusion in response to Kaplow is direct:

Placing less emphasis on market delineation and market shares would be for the best in many antitrust cases, but market delineation serves analytical and narrative purposes not served by other tools.  Professor Kaplow’s proposal to abandon market definition would bring chaos to antitrust litigation.

Please go do read the whole thing.  There is some narrow sense in which I find the debate trivial.  Courts are highly unlikely to adopt Professor Kaplow’s proposal.  There are a number of barriers to eliminating market definition and there is no demand to do so from courts or agencies.  But that would be far too narrow a viewpoint on the issues raised by the paper.  The debate over market definition in the 2010 HMGs, and now spurred by Kaplow’s provocative and well argued paper, is very useful in helping us understand exactly what we aim to achieve through market definition.  The role of market definition in antitrust analysis is much more flexible under the new Guidelines — even if all agree that the agencies must define markets.  How flexible courts and agencies are and should be with respect to market definition does depend precisely upon the answer to the questions Werden tangles with in his paper, i.e. what does market definition accomplish, how well does it accomplish it, and when might we rely upon other tools to accomplish those ends?

Filed under: antitrust, economics, merger guidelines, mergers & acquisitions

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Local Barriers to Entry: Arlington Beer Garden Edition

Popular Media Last week I posted about the regulatory barriers facing an ice cream shop in San Francisco.  A student passes along a story that hits a . . .

Last week I posted about the regulatory barriers facing an ice cream shop in San Francisco.  A student passes along a story that hits a bit closer to home: the sale of beer right here in Arlington County.  Apparently, the owner of the Westover Beer Garden has had enough:

It’s been a contentious couple of weeks for the Westover Market and Beer Garden. Upon receiving a warning from Arlington County, it suddenly declared the beer garden would shut down until April 1. Today, the saga continues as management has decided to re-open the beer gardenagainst the County’s wishes.

Owner Devin Hicks said he’s tried working with the county on the matter but his efforts have not been successful. Now he’s going to do what he believes Westover Market is entitled to do by law — operate a year-round patio area.

Arlington County has a website devoted the Westover Beer Garden and its regulation thereof.  The heart of the dispute appears to be whether a parking requirement imposed by the county is optional or mandatory.

On the page, it states that establishments with outdoor patios must have ample parking for the number of people being served, but that parking requirement is reduced if the establishment is near a Metro stop. The County allows establishments to get around the parking rule by becoming “seasonal” and closing for three or more months each year.

Because the Westover beer garden isn’t deemed as having enough parking, it’s supposed to be seasonal. However, Hicks points out the rule is technically a “guideline” and not an actual “ordinance.” He believes the county has been enforcing a measure that was never officially put in the books.

The County’s web page for Westover Market links to another County page, titled “Guidelines for Outdoor Cafes.” On that document it states: “Unless otherwise required by the County Board, outdoor cafes shall be exempt from any parking requirement.” It goes on to say: “There is no explicit requirement in the Zoning Ordinance that requires them to be temporary or seasonal.”

Of his long-running trouble with the county, Hicks said relations have improved over the past year or so, but he believes he’s currently being unfairly targeted with the enforcement of the seasonal rule.

“We’re just going to go ahead and do what’s legally right,” Hicks said. “There’s nothing in the rules that says it has to be seasonal.”

As I mentioned in the post on the bay area ice cream shop, I suspect the pernicious economic effects of local barriers to entry, rather than those at the state or federal level, are much larger than generally presumed.

Filed under: antitrust, barriers to entry, business, cartels, economics

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Amit Singhal on the Past, Present, and Future of Search

Popular Media Pretty interesting interview with Google’s Senior VP Amit Singhal on where search technology is headed.  In the article, Singhal describes the shift from a content-based, . . .

Pretty interesting interview with Google’s Senior VP Amit Singhal on where search technology is headed.  In the article, Singhal describes the shift from a content-based, keyword index  to incorporating links and other signals to improve query results.  The most interesting part of the interview is about what is next.

Google now wants to transform words that appear on a page into entities that mean something and have related attributes. It’s what the human brain does naturally, but for computers, it’s known as Artificial Intelligence.

It’s a challenging task, but the work has already begun. Google is “building a huge, in-house understanding of what an entity is and a repository of what entities are in the world and what should you know about those entities,” said Singhal.

In 2010, Google purchased Freebase, a community-built knowledge base packed with some 12 million canonical entities. Twelve million is a good start, but Google has, according to Singhal, invested dramatically to “build a huge knowledge graph of interconnected entities and their attributes.”

The transition from a word-based index to this knowledge graph is a fundamental shift that will radically increase power and complexity. Singhal explained that the word index is essentially like the index you find at the back of a book: “A knowledge base is huge compared to the word index and far more refined or advanced.”

Right now Google is, Singhal told me, building the infrastructure for the more algorithmically complex search of tomorrow, and that task, of course, does include more computers. All those computers are helping the search giant build out the knowledge graph, which now has “north of 200 million entities.” What can you do with that kind of knowledge graph (or base)?

Initially, you just take baby steps. Although evidence of this AI-like intelligence is beginning to show up in Google Search results, most people probably haven’t even noticed it.

For example:

Type “Monet” into Google Search, for instance, and, along with the standard results, you’ll find a small area at the bottom: “Artwork Searches for Claude Monet.” In it are thumbnail results of the top five or six works by the master. Singhal says this is an indication that Google search is beginning to understand that Monet is a painter and that the most important thing about an artist is his greatest works.

When I note that this does not seem wildly different or more exceptional that the traditional results above, Singhal cautioned me that judging the knowledge graph’s power on this would be like judging an artist on work he did as a 12- or 24-month-old.

Check out the whole article.  Counterfactuals are always difficult — but its difficult to imagine a basis for arguments that the evolution of search technology would have been — or will be — better for consumers with government regulation.

Filed under: google, Internet search, technology

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Lessons in Regulatory Barriers to Entry: San Francisco Ice Cream Shop Edition

Popular Media A great video recounting the trials and tribulations of an entrepreneur and her attempts to open an ice cream shop in San Francisco (HT: Scott . . .

A great video recounting the trials and tribulations of an entrepreneur and her attempts to open an ice cream shop in San Francisco (HT: Scott James at the NY Times and Craig Newmark).  From the NY Times story:

Ms. Pries said it took two years to open the restaurant, due largely to the city’s morass of permits, procedures and approvals required to start a small business. While waiting for permission to operate, she still had to pay rent and other costs, going deeper into debt each passing month without knowing for sure if she would ever be allowed to open.

“It’s just a huge risk,” she said, noting that the financing came from family and friends, not a bank. “At several points you wonder if you should just walk away and take the loss.”

Ms. Pries said she had to endure months of runaround and pay a lawyer to determine whether her location (a former grocery, vacant for years) was eligible to become a restaurant. There were permit fees of $20,000; a demand that she create a detailed map of all existing area businesses (the city didn’t have one); and an $11,000 charge just to turn on the water.

The ice cream shop’s travails are at odds with the frequent promises made by the mayor and many supervisors that small businesses and job creation are top priorities. ….

Even after she acceded to all the city’s demands, her paperwork sat unprocessed for months. Ms. Pries would not say exactly how much it all cost, including construction, but smiled and nodded when asked if it was in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.

I suspect the pernicious economic effects of local barriers to entry, rather than those at the state or federal level, are significantly greater than commonly thought.  They are certainly understudied.

 

Filed under: business, economics, regulation

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Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance

Free to Err? An Exchange on Behavioral Law and Economics at the Liberty Forum

Popular Media Douglas Ginsburg and I have posted “Free to Err: Behavioral Law and Economics and its Implications for Liberty” on the new and very good Liberty . . .

Douglas Ginsburg and I have posted “Free to Err: Behavioral Law and Economics and its Implications for Liberty” on the new and very good Liberty Forum.  Our contribution is based upon a more comprehensive analysis of the implications of behavioral law and economics for both economic welfare and liberty forthcoming in the Northwestern Law Review.   We were fortunate to draw several thoughtful responses to our piece as part of the Forum, and I’ve provided links to those here:

We have have some thoughts to the various responses later, but please do go and read them.

And a reminder to readers interested in the topic more generally that our “Free to Choose” symposium on behavioral law and economics is available here.

Filed under: behavioral economics, free to choose symposium

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Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance

Concurrences Antitrust Writing Awards 2012

Popular Media The Institute for Competition Law and GW Law have put together the Antitrust Writing Awards.  You can vote on academic or business articles here.  I’m . . .

The Institute for Competition Law and GW Law have put together the Antitrust Writing Awards.  You can vote on academic or business articles here.  I’m very pleased to report that one of my articles — Does Antitrust Enforcement in High-Tech Markets Benefit Consumers?  Stock Price Evidence from FTC v. Intel (Review of Industrial Organization) — was nominated in the “economics” category.

Here is a description:

The Antitrust Writing Awards’ goal is to promote antitrust scholarship and competition advocacy by recognizing and awarding the best articles published in the antitrust law and law & economics fields in the last 12 months. The Awards feature two different categories of articles: Academic and Business. The Academic Articles category comprises articles published in academic journals, whereas the Business Articles category features articles published in professional magazines or newsletters. The articles are selected by a jury and by readers. The jury consist of a Board, an Academic and a Business Steering Committees composed of the leading academics and counsels. Readers contribute to the selection process by voting for articles. The Institute of Competition Law – the publisher of the Journal Concurrences and the e-Competitions Bulletin – and George Washington University Law School, are organizing these first of their kind Antitrust Writing Awards with the support of partners. The Awards ceremony will take place in Washington DC on 27 March 2012.

The Board ultimately selects the winners with input from reader votes and steering committees (I am a member of the academic steering committee).

Lots of interesting articles nominated; go check them out and vote.

Filed under: antitrust, economics

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection