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TOTM President Donald Trump has repeatedly called for repeal of Section 230. But while Trump and fellow conservatives decry Big Tech companies for their alleged anti-conservative bias, . . .
President Donald Trump has repeatedly called for repeal of Section 230. But while Trump and fellow conservatives decry Big Tech companies for their alleged anti-conservative bias, including at yet more recent hearings, their issue is not actually with Section 230. It’s with the First Amendment.
Read the full piece here.
TL;DR The First Amendment and Section 230 immunity work together to protect free speech on the Internet. Attempts at Section 230 reform based on how online platforms use their editorial discretion will run into Constitutional limitations.
The First Amendment and Section 230 immunity work together to protect free speech on the Internet. Attempts at Section 230 reform based on how online platforms use their editorial discretion will run into Constitutional limitations.
Complaints of anti-conservative bias by major online platforms have led to proposals to modify Section 230 immunity in ways that target the manner in which platforms moderate user-generated content. Proponents contend that absent some sort of liability these dominant digital “gatekeepers” of news and social opinion will skew their content-moderation practices to reflect their own political preferences, dishonestly labeling conservative views as offensive or otherwise in violation of the platform’s terms of use.
Online platforms have a First Amendment right to adopt whatever content standards they choose. With very few exceptions the government may not mandate speech. But a law requiring online platforms to adopt a particular set of content moderation practices — say, to maintain a “balance” of political views — would do just that. Conditioning Section 230 immunity on online platforms giving up their right to editorial discretion would be unlikely to survive the strict standard of review to which such government regulation of speech would be subjected by the courts.
Download the tl;dr explainer PDF here
Amicus Brief ICLE supports the petition for certiorari filed by the National Association of Broadcasters (“NAB”), et al. seeking this Court’s review of the order issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC.
This proceeding is fast becoming the Jarndyce v. Jarndyce of administrative law. For nearly two decades, a three-judge panel in the Third Circuit has blocked the FCC’s efforts to comply with its statutory obligation under the 1996 Act to review its media ownership rules periodically and repeal or modify any rules that are no longer necessary because of increased competition in local media markets.
The order in Prometheus IV is the most recent and extreme example of the Third Circuit panel’s improper interference with the FCC’s efforts to comply with this statutory obligation. In it, the panel vacated an FCC order that would have repealed or modified media ownership regulations that even the panel did not dispute are no longer needed to achieve their original purpose of promoting competition, localism, and diversity of viewpoints. See Prometheus IV, 939 F.3d at 584-588 (disputing the FCC’s analysis and conclusions as to female and minority ownership diversity, but not as to promotion of competition, localism or diversity of viewpoints).
The Third Circuit panel instead vacated the FCC’s order because two judges on the panel believed those regulations might serve another, altogether different objective—promoting minority and female ownership—that is nowhere mentioned in either the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., or the 1996 Act. See Prometheus IV, 939 F.3d at 584- 588. In so doing, the panel exceeded the limits of judicial review authorized by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., by substituting its judgment for that of the agency to which Congress had expressly delegated authority to determine whether these media ownership regulations were still both necessary and in the public interest, and by placing burdens on the agency beyond those established by Congress.
In overstepping these limits, the Third Circuit panel will further delay the elimination of regulations that are not only no longer necessary, but that are also limiting the ability of local newspapers and broadcasters to compete with increasingly important digital media platforms. These outdated regulations have already contributed to an “extinction-level crisis” in the newspaper industry, and the spread of that crisis to local broadcasters in smaller markets is imminent. Consequently, the panel’s order will cause serious and immediate injury to the public’s First Amendment interest in preserving a strong local free press. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 28 (1945) (a “free press is indispensable to the workings of our democratic society”) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
TOTM Monday July 22, ICLE filed a regulatory comment arguing the leased access requirements enforced by the FCC are unconstitutional compelled speech that violate the First Amendment.
Monday July 22, ICLE filed a regulatory comment arguing the leased access requirements enforced by the FCC are unconstitutional compelled speech that violate the First Amendment.
Regulatory Comments ICLE submitted comments to the FCC on the First Amendment implications of the leased access rules. Associate Director, Legal Research Ben Sperry argued the changes in the video marketplace towards competition undercut the justification for subjecting regulation of cable operators' speech to only intermediate scrutiny.
ICLE submitted comments to the FCC on the First Amendment implications of the leased access rules. Associate Director, Legal Research Ben Sperry argued the changes in the video marketplace towards competition undercut the justification for subjecting regulation of cable operators’ speech to only intermediate scrutiny. As a result, the leased access rules should be reviewed as compelled speech under strict scrutiny. The leased access rules are not narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest and therefore would fail under the strict scrutiny standard.
Click here to read the full comments.
TOTM Despite the simplistic narrative tying President Trump’s vision of the world to conservatism, there is nothing conservative about his views on the First Amendment and how it applies to social media companies.
Yesterday was President Trump’s big “Social Media Summit” where he got together with a number of right-wing firebrands to decry the power of Big Tech to censor conservatives online. According to the Wall Street Journal…
Presentations & Interviews In the “News Roundup” of episode 269. A McLaughlin Group for Cybersecurity, Gus Hurwitz covers the Supreme Court’s ruling on when a forum is subject . . .
In the “News Roundup” of episode 269. A McLaughlin Group for Cybersecurity, Gus Hurwitz covers the Supreme Court’s ruling on when a forum is subject to First Amendment limits. The full episode is embedded below.
https://www.steptoe.com/podcasts/TheCyberlawPodcast-269.mp3
TOTM It is a truth universally acknowledged that unwanted telephone calls are among the most reviled annoyances known to man. But this does not mean that laws intended to prohibit these calls are themselves necessarily good. Indeed, in one sense we know intuitively that they are not good.
It is a truth universally acknowledged that unwanted telephone calls are among the most reviled annoyances known to man. But this does not mean that laws intended to prohibit these calls are themselves necessarily good. Indeed, in one sense we know intuitively that they are not good. These laws have proven wholly ineffective at curtailing the robocall menace — it is hard to call any law as ineffective as these “good”. And these laws can be bad in another sense: because they fail to curtail undesirable speech but may burden desirable speech, they raise potentially serious First Amendment concerns.
ICLE White Paper During the past decade, academics—predominantly scholars of behavioral law and economics—have increasingly turned to the claimed insights of behavioral economics in order to craft novel policy proposals in many fields, most significantly consumer credit regulation.
During the past decade, academics—predominantly scholars of behavioral law and economics—have increasingly turned to the claimed insights of behavioral economics in order to craft novel policy proposals in many fields, most significantly consumer credit regulation. Over the same period, these ideas have also gained traction with policymakers, resulting in a variety of legislative efforts, such as the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
In 2016 the issue reached the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari in Expressions Hair Design v. New York for the October 2016 term. The case, which centers on a decades-old New York state law that prohibits merchants from imposing surcharge fees for credit card purchases, represents the first major effort to ground constitutional law (here, First Amendment law) in the claims of behavioral economics.
In this article we examine the merits of that effort. Claims about the real-world application of behavioral economic theories should not be uncritically accepted— especially when advanced to challenge a state’s commercial regulation on constitutional grounds. And courts should be especially careful before relying on such claims where the available evidence fails to support them, where the underlying theories are so poorly developed that they have actually been employed elsewhere to support precisely opposite arguments, and where alternative theories grounded in more traditional economic reasoning are consistent with both the history of the challenged laws and the evidence of actual consumer behavior. The Petitioners in the case (five New York businesses) and their amici (scholars of both behavioral law and economics and First Amendment law) argue that New York’s ban on surcharge fees but not discounts for cash payments violates the free speech clause of the First Amendment. The argument relies on a claim derived from behavioral economics: namely, that a surcharge and a discount are mathematically equivalent, but that, because of behavioral biases, a price adjustment framed as a surcharge is more effective than one framed as a discount in inducing customers to pay with cash in lieu of credit. Because, Petitioners and amici claim, the only difference between the two is how they are labeled, the prohibition on surcharging is an impermissible restriction on commercial speech (and not a permissible regulation of conduct). Assessing the merits of the underlying economic arguments (but not the ultimate First Amendment claim), we conclude that, in this case, neither the behavioral economic
The Petitioners in the case (five New York businesses) and their amici (scholars of both behavioral law and economics and First Amendment law) argue that New York’s ban on surcharge fees but not discounts for cash payments violates the free speech clause of the First Amendment. The argument relies on a claim derived from behavioral economics: namely, that a surcharge and a discount are mathematically equivalent, but that, because of behavioral biases, a price adjustment framed as a surcharge is more effective than one framed as a discount in inducing customers to pay with cash in lieu of credit. Because, Petitioners and amici claim, the only difference between the two is how they are labeled, the prohibition on surcharging is an impermissible restriction on commercial speech (and not a permissible regulation of conduct). Assessing the merits of the underlying economic arguments (but not the ultimate First Amendment claim), we conclude that, in this case, neither the behavioral economic
Assessing the merits of the underlying economic arguments (but not the ultimate First Amendment claim), we conclude that, in this case, neither the behavioral economic theory, nor the evidence adduced to support it, justifies the Petitioners’ claims. The indeterminacy of the behavioral economics underlying the claims makes for a behavioral law and economics “just-so story”—an unsupported hypothesis about the relative effect of surcharges and discounts on consumer behavior adduced to achieve a desired legal result, but that happens to lack any empirical support. And not only does the evidence not support the contention that consumer welfare is increased by permitting card surcharge fees, it strongly suggests that, in fact, consumer welfare would be harmed by such fees, as they expose consumers to potential opportunistic holdup and rent extraction.
As far as we know, this is the first time the Supreme Court has been expressly asked to consider arguments rooted in behavioral law and economics in reaching its decision. It should decline the offer.
