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In the past weeks, the chatter surrounding a possible FTC antitrust case against Google has risen in volume, thanks largely to the FTC’s hiring of litigator Beth Wilkinson.  The question remains, however, what this aggressive move portends and, more importantly, why the FTC is taking it.

Read the full piece here. 

The pending wireless spectrum deal between Verizon Wireless and a group of cable companies (the SpectrumCo deal, for short) continues to attract opprobrium from self-proclaimed consumer advocates and policy scolds.  In the latest salvo, Public Knowledge’s Harold Feld (and other critics of the deal) aren’t happy that Verizon seems to be working to appease the regulators by selling off some of its spectrum in an effort to secure approval for its deal.  Critics are surely correct that appeasement is what’s going on here—but why this merits their derision is unclear.

Read the full piece here. 

Judge Edward Chen in the Northern District of California granted Church & Dwight’s motion for summary judgment as to Mayer Laboratories antitrust claims involving Church & Dwight’s shelf space agreements with retailers in the condom market.  Church & Dwight is the manufacturer of Trojan brand condoms.  Specifically, Mayer argued that Church & Dwight’s shelf space share discounts with retailers — all units discounts triggered upon the retailer committing a specified percentage of its condom shelf space to Trojan products — prevented Mayer from competing by denying it access to retailer shelf space and thus allowed Church & Dwight to unlawfully monopolize the condom market.

Judge Chen’s opinion is available here (and at 2012 WL 1231801).  Judge Chen’s opinion is lengthy and correspondingly thorough; summary judgment was granted on a number of independent grounds, including lack of antitrust injury, failure to demonstrate substantial foreclosure, and insufficient evidence of monopoly power.  I was the economic expert witness for Church & Dwight in the case (along with my colleague at Charles River Associates, Serge Moresi, who filed a rebuttal report) and am obviously quite pleased with the outcome and that Judge Chen relied upon my analysis in reaching these conclusions.

Notwithstanding my private interest in the case, I suspect our readers will find the opinion interesting both respect to the handling of economic evidence, but also with respect to the analysis of shelf space share discounts, which have been the focus of some recent speeches by agency economists.  Judge Chen’s opinion also directly addresses both traditional foreclosure based analysis of allegedly exclusionary agreements as well as the more novel “tax effect” theories.  While I cannot comment on the case directly, I thought some of our readers might be interested in seeing the opinion.

Professor Wright, a recognized authority on vertical contractual arrangements at the George Mason University School of Law, filed expert and rebuttal reports in anticipation of trial. Serge Moresi, CRA’s Director of Competition Modeling, filed a rebuttal report in response to the claims of Mayer Laboratories’ economic experts. Professor Wright and Dr. Moresi explained why, both factually and conceptually, the opposing experts’ claims were substantially flawed. Relying extensively on the evidence and analysis presented by CRA’s economic experts, the Court granted summary judgment in Church & Dwight’s favor with regard to each of the antitrust claims raised in this case.

Filed under: antitrust, economics, exclusionary conduct, exclusive dealing, monopolization

From the WSJ:

Publishers argue that the agency model promotes competition by allowing more booksellers to thrive. They say Amazon had sold e-books below cost and that agency pricing saved book publishers from the fate suffered by record companies.

But the Justice Department believes it has a strong case that Apple and the five publishers colluded to raise the price of e-books, people familiar with the matter say.

Apple and the publishers deny that.

The Justice Department isn’t taking aim at agency pricing itself. The department objects to, people familiar with the case say, coordination among companies that simultaneously decided to change their pricing policies.

“We don’t pick business models—that’s not our job,” Ms. Pozen says, without mentioning the case explicitly. “But when you see collusive behavior at the highest levels of companies, you know something’s wrong. And you’ve got to do something about it.”

For related posts, see here.  The case increasingly appears to focus on whether the DOJ can prove coordination among rivals with respect to the shift to the agency model and e-book prices.

Filed under: antitrust, cartels, contracts, doj, e-books, economics, error costs, law and economics, litigation, MFNs, monopolization, resale price maintenance, technology, vertical restraints Tagged: agency model, Amazon, antitrust, Apple, doj, e-books, iBookstore, major publishers, MFN, most favored nations clause, per se, price-fixing, publishing industry, Rule of reason, vertical restraints

From a pure antitrust perspective, the real story behind the DOJ’s Apple e-book investigation is the Division’s deep commitment to the view that Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) clauses are anticompetitive (see also here), no doubt spurred on at least in part by Chief Economist Fiona Scott-Morton’s interesting work on the topic.

Of course, there are other important stories here (see Matt Yglesias’ excellent post), like “how much should a digital book cost?” And as Yglesias writes, whether “the Justice Department’s notion that we should fear a book publishers’ cartel is borderline absurd, on par with worrying about price-fixing in the horse-and-buggy market.”

I can’t help but notice another angle here.  For those not familiar, the current dispute over e-books emerges over a shift in business models from a traditional one in which publishers sold at wholesale prices to bookstores who would, in turn, set the prices they desired — sometimes below the book’s cover price — and sell to consumers at retail.  Much of the dispute arises out of the incentive conflict between publishers and retailers with respect to the profit-maximizing price.  The WSJ describes the recent iteration of the conflict:

To build its early lead in e-books, Amazon Inc. AMZN +0.19% sold many new best sellers at $9.99 to encourage consumers to buy its Kindle electronic readers. But publishers deeply disliked the strategy, fearing consumers would grow accustomed to inexpensive e-books and limit publishers’ ability to sell pricier titles.

Apple’s proposed solution was a move to what is described as an “agency model,” in which Apple takes a 30% share of the revenues and the publisher sets the price — readers may recognize that this essentially amounts to resale price maintenance — an oft-discussed topic at TOTM.  The move to the agency-RPM model also entailed the introduction of an MFN clause stipulating that publishers could not sell to rivals at a lower price.

Whether Apple facilitated a collusive agreement among publishers or whether this industry-wide move to the agency-model is an efficient and consumer-welfare enhancing method of solving the incentive conflict between publishers and retailers remains to be seen.  What is somewhat new in this dispute about book distribution is the technology involved; but the underlying economics of vertical incentive conflict between publishers and retailers is not!

Many economists are aware Alfred Marshall’s Principles of Economics textbook was apparently the first commodity sold in the United States under an RPM agreement!  (HT: William Breit)  The practice apparently has deeper roots in Germany.  The RPM experiment was thought up by (later to become Sir) Frederick Macmillan.  Perhaps this will sound familiar:

In 1890 Frederick Macmillan of the Macmillan Company was casting about for a book with which to conduct an experiment in resale price maintenance.  For years it had been the practice in Great Britain for the bookselllers to give their customers discounts off the list prices; i.e. price cutting had become the general practice.  In March, 1890, Mr. Macmilan had written to The Bookseller suggesting a change from the current discount system and had inserted a form to be filled out by the dealers.

Experimentation with business models to align the incentives of publishers and sellers is nothing new; it is only wonderful coincidence that the examples involve a seminal economics text published as the Sherman Act was enacted.  Nonetheless, an interesting historical parallel and one that suggests caution in interpreting the relevant facts without understanding the pervasive nature of incentive conflicts within this particular product line between publishers and sellers.  One does not want to discourage experimentation with business models aimed at solving those incentive conflicts.  What remains to be seen is whether and why the move to the new arrangement was executed through express coordination rather than unilateral action.

Filed under: antitrust, cartels, contracts, doj, e-books, economics, error costs, law and economics, litigation, MFNs, monopolization, resale price maintenance, technology, vertical restraints Tagged: agency model, Amazon, antitrust, Apple, doj, e-books, iBookstore, major publishers, MFN, most favored nations clause, per se, price-fixing, publishing industry, Rule of reason, vertical restraints

Charles (“Rick”) Rule, who represents Microsoft and is the head of the antitrust practice at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, and I had an opportunity to debate the various antitrust issues involving Google and its search engine on last week.  I didn’t have much of a chance to report here on the blog over the past week, but the Columbia Law School has done the work for me.  Here’s a recent report:

Joshua Wright, professor of law at George Mason University School of Law, took the position that there is no significant evidence that Google is guilty of antitrust violations. Even if Google, like other search engines, favors its own content when producing the results of a search request, he argued, dissatisfied customers can easily switch search engines. In other words, the competition is just a click away.

On the other side of the debate was Charles F. Rule, head of the antitrust practice at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP. Rule, who has defended Microsoft in antitrust litigation, argued that ample anecdotal evidence exists that implicates Google in a mix of practices that have had the cumulative effect of excluding competitors’ content from appearing in a Google search, as well as monopolizing advertisers. He stressed that his opinions were his own.

…

Wright discussed the evolution of search engines in the last ten years. He conceded that the allegation of search bias, in which a search engine favors its own content at the expense of rivals, is a possible violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. But Wright noted that leading case law indicates that the behavior in question must harm the competitive process and thereby harm consumers, to be dubbed “exclusionary.”

“We demand evidence of real harm to competition before we break out the antitrust hammer,” he said, “and I don’t think there’s significant evidence of that here. It’s not hard to switch to get what you are looking for.”

Rule dismissed the “just-a-click-away” argument at the beginning of his talk.

“It’s not quite that simple,” he said. “The fact is that because of some of Google’s practices, the company has made it difficult for other search engines like Bing to achieve the same level of performance.”

Rule explained that search engines make their money by selling eyeballs to advertisers, and cited statistics that establish Google’s long-time share of the search-engine advertising market at 90 percent and up. He offered detailed descriptions of specific Google practices that have had the alleged effect of excluding competitive search engines—not just by blocking their content, but also by denying them opportunities to reach advertisers.

“With respect to bias, you can see specific anecdotes where it appears that Google has allegedly blacklisted certain companies intentionally and, in a very focused way, degraded their results so they appear lower on the page,” he said. “But also on the advertising side, there are anecdotes that when Google perceived a potential competitive threat, it automatically dramatically increases the price competitors have to pay, sometimes five to ten thousand percent overnight.”

Filed under: antitrust, economics, federal trade commission, google, monopolization, technology

Keith Woolcock (Time Business) offers an interesting perspective on what economists would describe as “competition for the field” between Apple, Facebook, Google, and Facebook.  It gives a good sense of the many dimensions of competition upon which these firms compete.

The upcoming IPO of Facebook, the flak surrounding Twitter’s decision to censor some tweets, and Google’s weaker-than-expected 4th-quarter earnings all point to one of the big events of our times: The crazy, chaotic, idealistic days of the Internet are ending. Once, the Prairies were open and shared by everyone. Then the farmers arrived and fenced them in. The same is happening to the Internet: Apple, Amazon and Facebook are putting up fences — and Google is increasingly being left outside.

The old Internet on which Google has thrived is still there, of course, but like the wilderness it is shrinking. Often these days, we sign up for Facebook or Amazon’s private version of the Internet. At other times, we use a smartphone and download an App instead of using Google search.

…

The danger to Google, in other words, is that as social networking, smartphones and tablets increasingly come to dominate the Internet, Google’s chance to earn advertising revenues from searching will shrink along with its influence.

Yes, Google has the Android and Google+, but these may not be enough to fight the shift to the closed Internet. Google+, of course, has just a tiny fraction of Facebook’s scale and there’s currently little reason to think it can catch up. The Android operating system, also an attempt by Google to build its own internet eco-system, is a more conspicuous success. Most commentators focus on the rapid growth of Android and the fact that it has greater market share than the iPhone.

But this analysis misses the point: The Android may have market share, but more than half of mobile searches come from iPhone users. Google may have developed Android but, unlike Apple’s iPhone, it does not really control it. Licensees like Samsung and HTC are able to adapt Android software to their own ends. And smart companies like Amazon are getting a free ride on Android while sharing little of the spoils with Google.

Don’t get me wrong: Google is still a force, just as Microsoft, Intel and IBM are. But they are no longer at the epicentre of the zeitgeist. Like Microsoft before it, Google can fight the good fight on many different fronts. Whether it can ever find an engine of growth capable of supplanting its core business is another question.

Check out the whole thing.

Filed under: antitrust, business, economics, google, monopolization, technology

As has become customary with just about every new product announcement by Google these days, the company’s introduction on Tuesday of its new “Search, plus Your World” (SPYW) program, which aims to incorporate a user’s Google+ content into her organic search results, has met with cries of antitrust foul play. All the usual blustering and speculation in the latest Google antitrust debate has obscured what should, however, be the two key prior questions: (1) Did Google violate the antitrust laws by not including data from Facebook, Twitter and other social networks in its new SPYW program alongside Google+ content; and (2) How might antitrust restrain Google in conditioning participation in this program in the future?

Read the full piece here.

Summary

In recent months a veritable legal and policy frenzy has erupted around Google generally, and more specifically concerning how its search activities should be regulated by government authorities throughout the world in the name of ensuring “search neutrality.”  Concerns with search engine bias have led to a menu of proposed regulatory reactions.  Although the debate has focused upon possible remedies to the “problem” presented by a range of Google’s business decisions, it has largely missed the predicate question of whether search engine bias is the product of market failure or otherwise generates significant economic or social harms meriting regulatory intervention in the first place.  “Search neutrality” by its very name presupposes that mandatory neutrality or some imposition of restrictions on search engine bias is desirable, but it is an open question whether advocates of search neutrality have demonstrated that there is a problem necessitating any of the various prescribed remedies. This paper attempts to answer that question, and we evaluate both the economic and non-economic costs and benefits of search bias, as well as the solutions proposed to remedy perceived costs. We demonstrate that search bias is the product of the competitive process and link the search bias debate to the economic and empirical literature on vertical integration and the generally-efficient and pro-competitive incentives for a vertically integrated firm to favor its own content. We conclude that neither an ex ante regulatory restriction on search engine bias nor the imposition of an antitrust duty to deal upon Google would benefit consumers. Moreover, in considering the proposed remedies, we find that by they substitute away from the traditional antitrust consumer welfare standard, and would impose costs exceeding any potential benefits.