Showing 9 of 320 Publications in Telecommunications & Regulated Utilities

Class(less) Action: Undermining Consumers at the FCC

Popular Media Over the weekend, Sen. Al Franken and Federal Communications Commission Commissioner Mignon Clyburn issued an impassioned statement calling for the FCC to thwart the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in internet service providers’ consumer service agreements ...

Over the weekend, Sen. Al Franken and Federal Communications Commission Commissioner Mignon Clyburn issued an impassioned statement calling for the FCC to thwart the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in internet service providers’ consumer service agreements — starting with a ban on mandatory arbitration of privacy claims in the chairman’s proposed privacy rules. Unfortunately, their call to arms rests upon a number of inaccurate or weak claims. Before the commissioners vote on the proposed privacy rules later this week, they should carefully consider whether consumers would actually be served by such a ban.

Read the full piece here.

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Telecommunications & Regulated Utilities

FCC Chairman Wheeler’s claimed fealty to FTC privacy standards is belied by the rules he actually proposes

TOTM Next week the FCC is slated to vote on the second iteration of Chairman Wheeler’s proposed broadband privacy rules. Of course, as has become all . . .

Next week the FCC is slated to vote on the second iteration of Chairman Wheeler’s proposed broadband privacy rules. Of course, as has become all too common, none of us outside the Commission has actually seen the proposal. But earlier this month Chairman Wheeler released a Fact Sheet that suggests some of the ways it would update the rules he initially proposed.

According to the Fact Sheet, the new proposed rules are…

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Antitrust & Consumer Protection

MVPDs “Unlock” the Box (again), but the FCC Doesn’t Seem to Care

TOTM The FCC’s blind, headlong drive to “unlock” the set-top box market is disconnected from both legal and market realities. Legally speaking, and as we’ve noted . . .

The FCC’s blind, headlong drive to “unlock” the set-top box market is disconnected from both legal and market realities. Legally speaking, and as we’ve noted on this blog many times over the past few months (see here, here and here), the set-top box proposal is nothing short of an assault on contracts, property rights, and the basic freedom of consumers to shape their own video experience.

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Intellectual Property & Licensing

No, The FCC Should Not Have the Power to Cancel Contracts

TOTM Copyright law, ever a sore point in some quarters, has found a new field of battle in the FCC’s recent set-top box proposal. At the . . .

Copyright law, ever a sore point in some quarters, has found a new field of battle in the FCC’s recent set-top box proposal. At the request of members of Congress, the Copyright Office recently wrote a rather thorough letter outlining its view of the FCC’s proposal on rightsholders.

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Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance

Our amicus brief supporting en banc review of the court’s Open Internet Order decision

TOTM Last week the International Center for Law & Economics and I filed an amicus brief in the DC Circuit in support of en banc review of the court’s . . .

Last week the International Center for Law & Economics and I filed an amicus brief in the DC Circuit in support of en banc review of the court’s decision to uphold the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order.

In our previous amicus brief before the panel that initially reviewed the OIO, we argued, among other things, that…

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Telecommunications & Regulated Utilities

Comments, Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Telecom Services

Regulatory Comments The NPRM and many of the comments supporting it reflect an ill-considered approach to privacy regulation for ISPs.

Summary

The NPRM and many of the comments supporting it reflect an ill-considered approach to privacy regulation for ISPs. Getting regulation right is always difficult, but it is all the more so when confronting evolving technology, inconsistent and heterogeneous consumer demand, and intertwined economic effects that operate along multiple dimensions.

[S]ecuring a solution that increases social welfare[] isn’t straightforward as a practical matter. From the consumer’s side, the solution needs to account for the benefits that consumers receive from content and services and the benefits of targeting ads, as well as the costs they incur from giving up data they would prefer to keep private. Then from the ad platform’s side, the solution needs to account for the investments the platform is making in providing content and the risk that consumers will attempt to free ride on those investments without providing any compensation—in the form of attention or data—in return. Finally, the solution must account for the costs incurred by both consumers and the ad platform including the costs of acquiring information necessary for making efficient decisions.

The NPRM fails adequately to address these issues, to make out an adequate case for the proposed regulation, or to justify treating ISPs differently than other companies that collect and use data.

Perhaps most important, the NPRM also fails to acknowledge or adequately assess the actual market in which the use of consumer data arises: the advertising market. Whether  intentionally or not, this NPRM is not primarily about regulating consumer privacy; it is about keeping ISPs out of the advertising business. But in this market, ISPs are upstarts
challenging the dominant position of firms like Google and Facebook.

Placing onerous restrictions upon ISPs alone results in either under-regulation of edge providers or over-regulation of ISPs within the advertising market, without any clear justification as to why consumer privacy takes on different qualities for each type of advertising platform. But the proper method of regulating privacy is, in fact, the course that both the FTC and the FCC have historically taken, and which has yielded a stable, evenly administered regime: case-by-case examination of actual privacy harms and a minimalist approach to ex ante, proscriptive regulations.

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Telecommunications & Regulated Utilities

Kristian Stout Discusses the IANA Transition at IGF-USA

Presentations & Interviews We are now on the last step in transitioning oversight for Internet address and domain name functions from the US Government to global stakeholders, a . . .

We are now on the last step in transitioning oversight for Internet address and domain name functions from the US Government to global stakeholders, a transition that was anticipated 18 years ago when the US established ICANN. It’s said that “if you love something you have to let it go”, but some in Washington aren’t ready to let go of the unique role for US government in the domain name system.

Kristian Stout joined a panel at IGF-USA to discuss the impending the transition plan and new accountability mechanisms for ICANN, offering views on what Congress and the Administration should do next. Video of the panel is embedded below.

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Telecommunications & Regulated Utilities

ICLE & TechFreedom Policy Comments

Regulatory Comments The Commission’s NPRM would shoehorn the business models of a subset of new economy firms into a regime modelled on thirty-year-old CPNI rules designed to address fundamentally different concerns about a fundamentally different market.

Summary

The Commission’s NPRM would shoehorn the business models of a subset of new economy firms into a regime modelled on thirty-year-old CPNI rules designed to address fundamentally different concerns about a fundamentally different market. The Commission’s hurried and poorly supported NPRM demonstrates little understanding of the data markets it proposes to regulate and the position of ISPs within that market. And, what’s more, the resulting proposed rules diverge from analogous rules the Commission purports to emulate. Without mounting a convincing case for treating ISPs differently than the other data firms with which they do or could compete, the rules contemplate disparate regulatory treatment that would likely harm competition and innovation without evident corresponding benefit to consumers.

Concerns relating to online privacy have been extensively studied by regulators and others over the past two decades. By and large, regulators responded to these concerns with a combination of a general case-by-case approach alongside tailored rules derived from the relevant information involved in particular areas of privacy concern. Few, if any, regulators have adopted an “opt-in” privacy regime for non-sensitive data such as the FCC proposes. The FCC’s proposed regime may have been cutting-edge in the 1980s and 1990s — but it makes no sense in today’s information economy in which firms from different segments of the economy fluidly enter each other’s markets and effectively compete in a separate, cross- sector, informatics and advertising market. The proposed rules instead dig in the heels of the Commission against the irresistible tide of progress, attempting to maintain arbitrary industry firewalls between firms.

The “problem” the Commission attempts to fix with this proposed rulemaking is not one of preventing ISPs from using personal information to prevent new entrants from effectively competing with their incumbent businesses — which was, in fact, the genesis of the CPNI rules.1 Rather, these rules are designed to keep ISPs from competing with edge providers like Google, Facebook, and Netflix. But, in truth, both edge providers and ISPs actually need general rules of broad applicability. This is what the FTC and other regulators have largely done to date. Such broadly applicable rules are designed to be competitively neutral, and to offer the flexibility needed to address the various concerns that may come up in these markets while balancing legitimate economic and privacy interests and providing an adequate level of notice to those subject to regulation about their expected norms of conduct.

In short, the Commission has not made a convincing case that discrimination between ISPs and edge providers makes sense for the industry or for consumer welfare. The overwhelming body of evidence upon which other regulators have relied in addressing privacy concerns urges against a hard opt-in approach. That same evidence and analysis supports a consistent regulatory approach for all competitors, and nowhere advocates for a differential approach for ISPs when they are participating in the broader informatics and advertising markets. Absent the collection and analysis of substantial evidence — which at this point has not been articulated by the Commission or those advocating the Commission’s proposed approach, and which is far beyond the scope of the present NPRM — the proposed approach is not supportable.

And all of the foregoing is particularly perplexing in light of the fact that the Commission will inadvertently create more consumer harm than benefit. At the same time, the Commission has not shown that regulatory efficacy, administrative efficiency or anything else demands such rules. Particularly given TerraCom and the demonstrated ability of the Commission to handle harms as they arise even absent prescriptive rules, the need for these aggressive new rules simply cannot be justified.

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Telecommunications & Regulated Utilities

Reply Comments, Expanding Consumers’ Video Navigation Choices, FCC

Regulatory Comments "The Commission undertakes this rulemaking with the commendable goal of enhancing competition. But even the noblest of goals cannot be pursued by plainly illegal means. Unfortunately, that’s exactly what these proposed rules would do..."

Summary

“The Commission undertakes this rulemaking with the commendable goal of enhancing competition. But even the noblest of goals cannot be pursued by plainly illegal means. Unfortunately, that’s exactly what these proposed rules would do.

In our Comments we took issue with the disconnect between the stated goal of competition and the mechanism used to implement it, the unintended results, the vast underestimation of the existing vibrant video marketplace, and the fatal inconsistencies in the logic used to justify the Chairman’s NPRM. In this Reply Comment we highlight another overlooked, but crucial, problem with the proposed rules: they directly violate United States treaty obligations.

As we discussed in our Comments, the proposed rules would violate a number of exclusive rights guaranteed to copyright holders — including the right to license their content to MVPDs on narrow, specific grounds —and will create a high likelihood of exposing MVPDs to secondary liability. But the rules also threaten to violate a host of free trade agreements, to substantially interfere with rights holders’ exclusive right of public performance, and to upend the system of retransmission consent agreements authorized by the Cable Act…”

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Telecommunications & Regulated Utilities