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Presentations & Interviews Geoffrey Manne joins Olivier Blanchard on the Federalist Society teleforum to discuss the potential impact of the Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm Incorporated decision.
This teleforum will investigate the potential impact of the pending decision in the FTC’s controversial Section 5 lawsuit against Qualcomm, brought days before the change in administration two years ago, with the incoming acting chair writing an unusual and biting dissent. Among other things, the FTC is seeking to permanently enjoin Qualcomm from engaging in certain industry-wide patent licensing practices, which the FTC alleges impair competition in violation of the antitrust laws. However, it has been argued that the FTC’s novel theory fails to meet the burden of proof by showing actual evidence of harm, as clarified recently by the US Supreme Court in Ohio v. American Express Co. The consequences of FTC’s legal theory, if upheld by the court, could reach well-beyond patent licensing arrangements. Indeed, some experts fear that changes to Qualcomm’s business model will undermine U.S. national security interests and cede American leadership in the 5G race to a foreign adversary—the same concerns echoed last year by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) when it recommended that the President permanently prohibit Broadcom from acquiring Qualcomm.
Featuring:
Olivier Blanchard, Senior Analyst, Futurum Research
Geoffrey A. Manne, President and Founder, International Center for Law & Economics
TOTM In the opening seconds of what was surely one of the worst oral arguments in a high-profile case that I have ever heard, Pantelis Michalopoulos, . . .
In the opening seconds of what was surely one of the worst oral arguments in a high-profile case that I have ever heard, Pantelis Michalopoulos, arguing for petitioners against the FCC’s 2018 Restoring Internet Freedom Order (RIFO) expertly captured both why the side he was representing should lose and the overall absurdity of the entire net neutrality debate: “This order is a stab in the heart of the Communications Act. It would literally write ‘telecommunications’ out of the law. It would end the communications agency’s oversight over the main communications service of our time.”
Read the full piece here.
TOTM An important but unheralded announcement was made on October 10, 2018: The European Committee for Standardization (CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC) released a draft CEN CENELAC Workshop Agreement (CWA) on the licensing of Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) for 5G/Internet of Things (IoT) applications.
An important but unheralded announcement was made on October 10, 2018: The European Committee for Standardization (CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC) released a draft CEN CENELAC Workshop Agreement (CWA) on the licensing of Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) for 5G/Internet of Things (IoT) applications. The final agreement, due to be published in early 2019, is likely to have significant implications for the development and roll-out of both 5G and IoT applications.
TOTM It is a truth universally acknowledged that unwanted telephone calls are among the most reviled annoyances known to man. But this does not mean that laws intended to prohibit these calls are themselves necessarily good. Indeed, in one sense we know intuitively that they are not good.
It is a truth universally acknowledged that unwanted telephone calls are among the most reviled annoyances known to man. But this does not mean that laws intended to prohibit these calls are themselves necessarily good. Indeed, in one sense we know intuitively that they are not good. These laws have proven wholly ineffective at curtailing the robocall menace — it is hard to call any law as ineffective as these “good”. And these laws can be bad in another sense: because they fail to curtail undesirable speech but may burden desirable speech, they raise potentially serious First Amendment concerns.
Amicus Brief ICLE filed a brief in support of Petitioners in the D.C. Circuit case, Mozilla v. FCC, a case that challenged the FCC's authority to issue the Restoring Internet Freedom Order ("RIFO").
ICLE filed a brief in support of Petitioners in the D.C. Circuit case, Mozilla v. FCC, a case that challenged the FCC’s authority to issue the Restoring Internet Freedom Order (“RIFO”). In RIFO, the FCC repealed the Title II classification on ISPs, preempted conflicting state laws, and applied a transparency rule against ISPs, among other provisions. In our brief, we argue that:
Contrary to the claims of Petitioners, the Commission acted well within its authority in adopting the Order. The Commission developed a comprehensive regulatory scheme for ISPs that includes both obligations imposed under the Communications Act, as well as complementary regulation and potential enforcement under antitrust law by the Commission’s sister agencies. As we show below, this competition-oriented, light touch regulatory regime comports with the relevant provisions and stated goals of the Communications Act far better than the ex ante rules adopted in the Title II Order. In adopting this competition-oriented regulatory regime, the Commission also acted within its authority to preempt contradictory state laws under well- established precedent. The Commission did so while properly allowing for states to continue to regulate under other laws of general applicability that do not conflict with or frustrate the federal policies underlying the Order. Accordingly, the Order should be upheld and the petitions for review should be denied.
Contrary to the claims of Petitioners, the Commission acted well within its authority in adopting the Order. The Commission developed a comprehensive regulatory scheme for ISPs that includes both obligations imposed under the Communications Act, as well as complementary regulation and potential enforcement under antitrust law by the Commission’s sister agencies. As we show below, this competition-oriented, light touch regulatory regime comports with the relevant provisions and stated goals of the Communications Act far better than the ex ante rules adopted in the Title II Order.
In adopting this competition-oriented regulatory regime, the Commission also acted within its authority to preempt contradictory state laws under well- established precedent. The Commission did so while properly allowing for states to continue to regulate under other laws of general applicability that do not conflict with or frustrate the federal policies underlying the Order.
Accordingly, the Order should be upheld and the petitions for review should be denied.
TOTM FCC Commissioner Rosenworcel penned an article this week on the doublespeak coming out of the current administration with respect to trade and telecom policy. On one hand, she argues, the administration has proclaimed 5G to be an essential part of our future commercial and defense interests.
FCC Commissioner Rosenworcel penned an article this week on the doublespeak coming out of the current administration with respect to trade and telecom policy. On one hand, she argues, the administration has proclaimed 5G to be an essential part of our future commercial and defense interests. But, she tells us, the administration has, on the other hand, imposed tariffs on Chinese products that are important for the development of 5G infrastructure, thereby raising the costs of roll-out. This is a sound critique: regardless where one stands on the reasonableness of tariffs, they unquestionably raise the prices of goods on which they are placed, and raising the price of inputs to the 5G ecosystem can only slow down the pace at which 5G technology is deployed.
Written Testimonies & Filings We are a group of eight scholars of antitrust law and economics affiliated with the International Center for Law & Economics, a nonprofit, nonpartisan policy research center based in Portland, OR. Without taking a position on the merits of the proposed T-Mobile/Sprint merger, this letter provides a brief explication of our views on some of the important economic issues involved in the transaction’s antitrust review.
Dear Senators Grassley, Feinstein, Lee, and Klobuchar,
We are a group of eight scholars of antitrust law and economics affiliated with the International Center for Law & Economics, a nonprofit, nonpartisan policy research center based in Portland, OR. Without taking a position on the merits of the proposed T-Mobile/Sprint merger, this letter provides a brief explication of our views on some of the important economic issues involved in the transaction’s antitrust review.
At the highest level, and as discussed in more detail below, we believe that an appropriate concern for consumer welfare in the regulatory review of the transaction demands that the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) account for the dynamic, fast-moving nature of competition in the markets affected by the merger. Above all, this means that the agencies should shun the mechanical application of obsolete market-share and concentration presumptions that could wrongly condemn the merger.
Modern antitrust principles, sound economics, and the public interest dictate that an analysis of the proposed merger incorporate these foundational precepts:
These principles are particularly appropriate here given the clear importance to the parties’ decision to merge of their interest in launching a competitive, national 5G network. If successful, the deal could create a combined T-Mobile and Sprint that is a stronger competitor to AT&T and Verizon, which, in turn, could spur increased investment competition in the market. Realizing those objectives — which could result in enormous benefit to consumers and enhance competition in the wireless communications and broadband markets — will take time, and the process will entail business model disruption, corporate reorganization, experimentation, and significant investment.
It is crucial to ensuring that the claimed consumer benefits of this process can be realized that the proposed merger not be thwarted by regulators inappropriately focused on short-term, static effects.
TOTM AT&T’s merger with Time Warner has lead to one of the most important, but least interesting, antitrust trials in recent history. It’s about a close to a “pure” vertical merger as we can get in today’s world and would not lead to a measurable increase in prices paid by consumers.
AT&T’s merger with Time Warner has lead to one of the most important, but least interesting, antitrust trials in recent history.
ICLE Issue Brief As has been rumored in the press for a few weeks, Comcast announced today that it is considering a renewed bid for a large chunk of Twenty-First Century Fox’s (Fox) assets. In December 2017, Fox’s board rejected a bid from Comcast that was some 16% higher than the one it ultimately accepted from Disney.
As has been rumored in the press for a few weeks, Comcast announced today that it is considering a renewed bid for a large chunk of Twenty-First Century Fox’s (Fox) assets. In December 2017, Fox’s board rejected a bid from Comcast that was some 16% higher than the one it ultimately accepted from Disney.
The board’s decision was based largely on its assessment that a merger with Comcast created unacceptable antitrust risk, where a merger with Disney did not.
In a brief analysis of the proposed deal, ICLE executive director and antitrust expert, Geoffrey Manne, posits that there is no basis for ascribing a greater antitrust risk to Comcast’s purchase of Fox’s assets than to Disney’s.
Among other things, Manne discusses why the DOJ’s AT&T/Time Warner merger challenge doesn’t increase the risk that the DOJ would challenge a Comcast/Fox deal. His analysis also touches on:
In sum, Manne finds that while a Comcast/Fox deal may pose some antitrust enforcement risk, it certainly doesn’t entail sufficient risk to deem the deal dead on arrival — and it seems to represent less regulatory risk than a Disney/Fox tie-up.
Continue reading the full paper
