What are you looking for?

Showing 9 of 117 Results in Market Definition

Do the Merger Guidelines Need Revision?

TOTM The merger guidelines should be revised, not only to provide clearer guidance, but because the current version makes it harder for the agencies to win . . .

The merger guidelines should be revised, not only to provide clearer guidance, but because the current version makes it harder for the agencies to win cases when they do challenge a merger.  The reason is that the guidelines often don’t fit actual agency practice or modern economic theory.  For example, part of the reason the DOJ lost the Oracle/Peoplesoft merger case was that its guidelines on unilateral effects do not match modern practice or theory.  Such a mismatch makes it harder to convince judges that merger enforcement satisfies traditional rule of law concerns about providing advance notice of legal standards that are clear enough to guide private conduct and meaningfully constrain legal discretion.  Here are the areas on which I would focus.

Read the full piece here.

Continue reading
Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Dennis Carlton on Revising the Merger Guidelines

TOTM 1. Do the Guidelines need revision? The Horizontal Merger Guidelines have served a very valuable purpose by making horizontal merger analysis much more sensible than . . .

1. Do the Guidelines need revision?

The Horizontal Merger Guidelines have served a very valuable purpose by making horizontal merger analysis much more sensible than it was prior to the 1980s.There is much less disagreement about horizontal merger policy than there is about vertical antitrust policy so some vertical guidelines would be especially welcome. Nevertheless, despite the lack of widespread disagreement about horizontal merger policy, it is desirable, though not critical, to improve the horizontal guidelines, making sure that they are up to date and relevant. I would be reluctant to change them significantly because they have served a valuable purpose by providing a consistent and durable framework for merger analysis primarily by focusing attention on the right questions to ask in merger analysis, namely how will price and competition be affected post merger.

Read the full piece here.

Continue reading
Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Merger Enforcement Without Market Definition?

TOTM The Horizontal Merger Guidelines have brought discipline to the unruly world of merger analysis; but have also accommodated advances in our understanding of the myriad . . .

The Horizontal Merger Guidelines have brought discipline to the unruly world of merger analysis; but have also accommodated advances in our understanding of the myriad ways in which firms compete and how mergers affect such competition.  However, in cases where there is better information about the effects of the merger than there is about the relevant market, I would change the Guidelines to allow analysis that bypasses market delineation.

Read the full piece here.

Continue reading
Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Coming Soon: New Merger Guidelines

TOTM The possibility of new Merger Guidelines has been much discussed in the antitrust community, particularly in light of appointment of the two new chief agency . . .

The possibility of new Merger Guidelines has been much discussed in the antitrust community, particularly in light of appointment of the two new chief agency economists, Carl Shapiro and Joe Farrell, who have done substantial work on the economics of horizontal mergers and market definition.  Today, the FTC and DOJ announced a series of workshops and period for public comment to explore potential revision of the Guidelines…

Read the full piece here.

Continue reading
Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Let’s Have New Section 2 Hearings!

TOTM Commissioner Rosch has offered a defense of the withdraw of the Section 2 Report.  This is an important step and the Commissioner, who readers know . . .

Commissioner Rosch has offered a defense of the withdraw of the Section 2 Report.  This is an important step and the Commissioner, who readers know I’ve criticized from time to time here, should be credited for laying out his specific objections to the Report.  The objections are, in short, that the Report…

Read the full piece here.

Continue reading
Antitrust & Consumer Protection

Section 2 Symposium: Tim Brennan on Predation, Exclusion, and Complement Market Monopolization

TOTM As evidenced by this on-line symposium, the handling of cases under the rubrics “monopolization,” “single firm conduct”, or “abuse of dominance” continues to be debated . . .

As evidenced by this on-line symposium, the handling of cases under the rubrics “monopolization,” “single firm conduct”, or “abuse of dominance” continues to be debated by the competition policy community. This debate, as evidenced by the Antitrust Division’s Sept. 2008 single firm conduct report and the FTC responses, is not restricted within the U.S. The European Union has published “Guidance Papers” on standards for exclusionary conduct under Article 82, and the Canadian Competition Bureau recently issued draft guidelines for prosecuting conduct under the abuse of dominance provisions of Sec. 79 of its Competition Act.

Read the full piece here.

Continue reading
Antitrust & Consumer Protection

No Ovation for FTC’s Latest Enforcement Theory

TOTM The Federal Trade Commission announced a puzzling complaint filed in a new consummated merger & monopolization case in the U.S. District Court for the District . . .

The Federal Trade Commission announced a puzzling complaint filed in a new consummated merger & monopolization case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. Here’s the explanation of the case from the press release…

Read the full piece here.

Continue reading
Antitrust & Consumer Protection

The D.C. Circuit Re-Disappoints in Whole Foods: An Analysis of the Amended Opinions

TOTM Being a “glass is half-full” type of guy, I figured there was no way the D.C. Circuit’s decision on Whole Foods’ petition for rehearing en . . .

Being a “glass is half-full” type of guy, I figured there was no way the D.C. Circuit’s decision on Whole Foods’ petition for rehearing en banc could turn out poorly: Either the court would grant the motion and correct the panel’s mistakes, or the court would deny the motion, setting up an attractive opportunity for the Supreme Court, which hasn’t decided a significant merger case since 1974 and badly needs to update its doctrine (see, e.g., Brown Shoe, upon which the D.C. Circuit heavily relied in Whole Foods).

Read the full piece here.

Continue reading
Antitrust & Consumer Protection

A High Profile Test Case for the Chinese Antimonopoly Law

TOTM Coca-Cola and China’s Huiyuan Juice Group Ltd $2.4 billion deal looks like it is set to be the first major merger test for the China’s . . .

Coca-Cola and China’s Huiyuan Juice Group Ltd $2.4 billion deal looks like it is set to be the first major merger test for the China’s new AML. This WSJ story gives some sense of market shares and potential market definition issues…

Read the full piece here.

Continue reading
Antitrust & Consumer Protection