Showing 9 of 40 Publications in CFPB

The CFPB’s Misleading Slant on Competition in Credit-Card Markets

TOTM In yet another example of interagency cheerleading from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Chair Lina Khan recently touted the work of the Consumer Financial Protection . . .

In yet another example of interagency cheerleading from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Chair Lina Khan recently touted the work of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) on payments networks:

https://twitter.com/linakhanFTC/status/1759962157133726060?s=20

Read the full piece here.

Continue reading
Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance

Looking Forward by Looking Backward: The Future of Consumer Finance and Financial Protection

Scholarship Abstract This essay was prepared for “The Future of Financial Regulation Symposium” October 6, 2023, sponsored by the C. Boyden Gray Center. I assess the . . .

Abstract

This essay was prepared for “The Future of Financial Regulation Symposium” October 6, 2023, sponsored by the C. Boyden Gray Center. I assess the future of consumer finance and financial protection by looking to the lessons of history. Consumer finance and financial protection in the United States exhibits a spontaneous evolution driven by changes in technology and consumer preferences in a repeated cycle. In general, consumers use consumer finance in a manner consistent with the predictions of rational behavior in order to improve their lives. Consistently, this goal of consumer betterment runs up against paternalistic and repressive laws, which attempt to prevent the beneficial evolution of technology and competition. Eventually economic forces overwhelm regulatory repression for the betterment of consumers.

I track three distinct eras in the evolution of consumer finance and financial regulation that provide a roadmap to the future evolution in the virtual era and emergent threats to consumers from private and public sources, including the growing use of the consumer finance system to infringe on the exercise of constitutionally-protected values.

Read at SSRN.

Continue reading
Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance

The Biden Executive Order on AI: A Recipe for Anticompetitive Overregulation

TOTM The Biden administration’s Oct. 30 “Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence” proposes to “govern… the development and . . .

The Biden administration’s Oct. 30 “Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence” proposes to “govern… the development and use of AI safely and responsibly” by “advancing a coordinated, Federal Government-wide approach to doing so.” (Emphasis added.)

This “all-of-government approach,” which echoes the all-of-government approach of the 2021 “Executive Order on Competition” (see here and here), establishes a blueprint for heightened regulation to deal with theorized problems stemming from the growing use of AI by economic actors. As was the case with the competition order, the AI order threatens to impose excessive regulatory costs that would harm the American economy and undermine competitive forces. As such, the order’s implementation warrants close scrutiny.

Read the full piece here.

Continue reading
Innovation & the New Economy

The Biden Administration’s Contradictory Disdain for ‘Junk Fees’

Popular Media The White House has declared war on so-called “junk fees,” i.e. add-on fees to transactions that increase complexity and decrease price transparency as opposed to rolling all . . .

The White House has declared war on so-called “junk fees,” i.e. add-on fees to transactions that increase complexity and decrease price transparency as opposed to rolling all relevant costs into one “all-in” price. Regulators such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and Federal Trade Commission have followed with their own rules implementing that command.

Read the full piece here.

Continue reading
Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance

Antitrust at the Agencies Roundup: The Cat’s Tuches of Summer Edition

TOTM I had thought we were in the dog days of summer, but the Farmer’s Almanac tells me that I was wrong about that. It turns out that . . .

I had thought we were in the dog days of summer, but the Farmer’s Almanac tells me that I was wrong about that. It turns out that the phrase refers to certain specific dates on the calendar, not just to the hot and steamy days that descend on the nation’s capital in . . . well, whenever they do (and not just before Labor Day, that’s for sure). The true dog days, it turns out, are July 3-Aug. 11, no matter the weather. So maybe this is just the cat’s tuches of summer, as if that makes it better.

Read the full piece here.

Continue reading
Data Security & Privacy

Student Loans and Financial Distress: A Qualitative Analysis of the Most Common Student Loan Complaints

Scholarship Abstract Student loan servicers are the face of the U.S. student loan system, and they are not well-liked. Using the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (the . . .

Abstract

Student loan servicers are the face of the U.S. student loan system, and they are not well-liked. Using the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (the CFPB) consumer complaint database, we study borrower perceptions of the student loan system. We qualitatively analyzed a sample of complaint narratives drawn from every student loan complaint ever filed with the CFPB. Our analysis of these complaint narratives reveals clear patterns of discontent in four primary areas: 1) a mismatch between ability to repay and repayment options, including problems with forbearance, deferments, the public service loan forgiveness program, income-driven repayment plans, and loan cancellation options; 2) customer service, including sudden and unexplained changes in payment obligations, 3) inappropriate payment processing, such as misapplying payments; and 4) unauthorized loans or outright scams. The first issue was, by far, the most common. Our results high-light areas where better regulation, whether through contract with the government, ex ante supervision by regulators, or ex post lawsuits in court, has the potential to improve the function of the student loan ecosystem.

Continue reading
Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance

Todd Zywicki on Rate Caps

Presentations & Interviews ICLE Academic Affiliate Todd Zywicki joined Southwest Public Policy Institute President Patrick M. Brenner on SPPI’s SPPI-TV podcast to discuss interest rate caps and the role . . .

ICLE Academic Affiliate Todd Zywicki joined Southwest Public Policy Institute President Patrick M. Brenner on SPPI’s SPPI-TV podcast to discuss interest rate caps and the role of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). Video of the full episode is embedded below.

Continue reading
Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance

The Magic of Fintech? Insights for a Regulatory Agenda from Analyzing Student Loan Complaints Filed with the CFPB

Scholarship Abstract This paper looks at consumer complaints about student loan lenders and servicers from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB’s) consumer complaint database. Using a . . .

Abstract

This paper looks at consumer complaints about student loan lenders and servicers from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB’s) consumer complaint database. Using a novel dataset drawn from 30,678 complaints filed against 212 student loan companies, we analyze consumers’ subjective views about whether traditional or fintech student loan lenders and servicers provide a better customer experience. Overall, we find that consumers initiate far fewer complaints against fintech lenders than traditional lenders. But we find that fintech lenders are twenty-eight times more likely than traditional lenders to receive complaints for making confusing or misleading advertisements. Our data also show that complaints against fintech lenders or servicers have not risen in parallel with greater loan volume by those firms, despite the rising number of complaints being filed against traditional lenders and servicers, as those firms continue to dominate the market share of student loan lending and servicing. We consider various reasons for this difference, including whether this means fintech student loan companies are providing a better consumer experience.

Continue reading
Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance

The Fundamental Flaws in Behavioral L&E Arguments Against No-Surcharge Laws

ICLE White Paper During the past decade, academics—predominantly scholars of behavioral law and economics—have increasingly turned to the claimed insights of behavioral economics in order to craft novel policy proposals in many fields, most significantly consumer credit regulation.

Summary

During the past decade, academics—predominantly scholars of behavioral law and economics—have increasingly turned to the claimed insights of behavioral economics in order to craft novel policy proposals in many fields, most significantly consumer credit regulation. Over the same period, these ideas have also gained traction with policymakers, resulting in a variety of legislative efforts, such as the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.

In 2016 the issue reached the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari in Expressions Hair Design v. New York for the October 2016 term. The case, which centers on a decades-old New York state law that prohibits merchants from imposing surcharge fees for credit card purchases, represents the first major effort to ground constitutional law (here, First Amendment law) in the claims of behavioral economics.

In this article we examine the merits of that effort. Claims about the real-world application of behavioral economic theories should not be uncritically accepted— especially when advanced to challenge a state’s commercial regulation on constitutional grounds. And courts should be especially careful before relying on such claims where the available evidence fails to support them, where the underlying theories are so poorly developed that they have actually been employed elsewhere to support precisely opposite arguments, and where alternative theories grounded in more traditional economic reasoning are consistent with both the history of the challenged laws and the evidence of actual consumer behavior. The Petitioners in the case (five New York businesses) and their amici (scholars of both behavioral law and economics and First Amendment law) argue that New York’s ban on surcharge fees but not discounts for cash payments violates the free speech clause of the First Amendment. The argument relies on a claim derived from behavioral economics: namely, that a surcharge and a discount are mathematically equivalent, but that, because of behavioral biases, a price adjustment framed as a surcharge is more effective than one framed as a discount in inducing customers to pay with cash in lieu of credit. Because, Petitioners and amici claim, the only difference between the two is how they are labeled, the prohibition on surcharging is an impermissible restriction on commercial speech (and not a permissible regulation of conduct). Assessing the merits of the underlying economic arguments (but not the ultimate First Amendment claim), we conclude that, in this case, neither the behavioral economic

The Petitioners in the case (five New York businesses) and their amici (scholars of both behavioral law and economics and First Amendment law) argue that New York’s ban on surcharge fees but not discounts for cash payments violates the free speech clause of the First Amendment. The argument relies on a claim derived from behavioral economics: namely, that a surcharge and a discount are mathematically equivalent, but that, because of behavioral biases, a price adjustment framed as a surcharge is more effective than one framed as a discount in inducing customers to pay with cash in lieu of credit. Because, Petitioners and amici claim, the only difference between the two is how they are labeled, the prohibition on surcharging is an impermissible restriction on commercial speech (and not a permissible regulation of conduct). Assessing the merits of the underlying economic arguments (but not the ultimate First Amendment claim), we conclude that, in this case, neither the behavioral economic

Assessing the merits of the underlying economic arguments (but not the ultimate First Amendment claim), we conclude that, in this case, neither the behavioral economic theory, nor the evidence adduced to support it, justifies the Petitioners’ claims. The indeterminacy of the behavioral economics underlying the claims makes for a behavioral law and economics “just-so story”—an unsupported hypothesis about the relative effect of surcharges and discounts on consumer behavior adduced to achieve a desired legal result, but that happens to lack any empirical support. And not only does the evidence not support the contention that consumer welfare is increased by permitting card surcharge fees, it strongly suggests that, in fact, consumer welfare would be harmed by such fees, as they expose consumers to potential opportunistic holdup and rent extraction.

As far as we know, this is the first time the Supreme Court has been expressly asked to consider arguments rooted in behavioral law and economics in reaching its decision. It should decline the offer.

Continue reading
Financial Regulation & Corporate Governance