There is a danger that the UK is heading for a significant and potentially damaging overhaul of its competition policy on the basis of thin evidence, rushed analysis, and no attempt to measure the costs, benefits and risks of the approach being undertaken.

Vertical integration allows businesses to innovate more. It may be bad for certain competitors, but it is rarely bad for competition.

Competition is strong in digital markets, but traditional antitrust tools may miss competitive nuances in these markets.

“Self-preferencing” is a normal part of how platforms operate, both to improve the value of their core product and to make money from it so that they have a reason to keep investing in it.

Being acquired is how many startup founders and investors expect to make money. If you make that harder you’ll get fewer startups.

Concentration is a poor measure of competition, because large businesses can be better for consumers than small ones. And concentration isn’t even rising in the ways that would matter.

Data doesn’t create a barrier to entry, but privacy regulations might.

Geoffrey A. Manne, Kristian Stout, Eric Fruits, "The Fatal Economic Flaws of the Contemporary Campaign Against Vertical Integration", Kansas Law Review, Kansas Law Review Inc. 2019 vol. 68(5)

"Platform competition is more complicated than simple theories of vertical discrimination would have it, and there is certainly no basis for a presumption of harm."