Comments Regarding Agriculture and Antitrust Enforcement Issues in Our 21st Century Economy
Introduction
Biotech seeds have become an enormously-?valuable part of the food supply in the US and abroad. A substantial portion of soybeans, corn, cotton and other agricultural products grown in the US are derived from genetically-?modified seeds. The genetic traits that give these seeds their value—traits that confer resistance to herbicide and high yields, for example—are often developed by large agribusiness companies, with enormous research and development investments. The process is technologically advanced, time- and money-intensive, a risky investment, and subject to various layers of regulation. The process of developing a new seed variety can take 15 years and require hundreds of millions of dollars of investment. Regulations from the USDA, the FDA and the EPA can slow or halt the process, and international trade regulations (particularly from countries that ban or severely restrict importation of GMOs) complicate the control and the commercialization of the final products.
In part for these reasons, the biotech seed industry—like all segments of the US agricultural industry—has seen a substantial increase in concentration. Large scale is of obvious benefit to companies engaged in massively expensive R&D programs that can achieve economies of scale and thus lower costs. Meanwhile, there are also likely other vertical efficiencies associated with contractual arrangements between various players in the transgenic supply chain:
Vertical efficiencies such as reduced transactions costs and coordination achieved by exploiting the complementarities between traits and traited seed assets can also reduce costs. Closer, more precise coordination between levels in the transgenic supply chain may result in more efficient creation of new transgenic varieties in increasingly differentiated product markets.[1]
Thus it is not surprising that the period of increasing innovation has been accompanied with an increase in concentration as innovating firms assembled the necessary, complementary assets to develop and commercialize their innovations, often through vertical and horizontal mergers and acquisitions.[2] The remarkable gains in biotech seed development since the industry’s infancy less than 20 years ago, along with the complexities of the industry and our limited understanding of the economic significance of organizational choices in the industry, should counsel strongly against hasty antitrust intervention in the industry. Consumers enjoy significant benefits from innovation that must be considered before responding too quickly or improperly to complaints about increased concentration, especially if the complaints come merely from competitors.
[1] Diana L. Moss, “Transgenic Seed Platforms: Competition Between a Rock and a Hard Place?,” American Antitrust Institute White Paper (October 23, 2009), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/Archives/seed.ashx.
[2] Id. at Figure 2. While Moss happens to conclude that this inverse correlation is a surprise and struggles to find explanations for the seeming contradiction, the proffered explanations are unpersuasive (or irrelevant). See Nicholas Kalaitzandonakes & Bruce Bjornson, Vertical and horizontal coordination in the Agro- biotechnology industry: Evidence and implications, 29 J. AG. AND APPL. ECON. 129 (1997) for a more relevant analysis of industry forces.